Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0838
Dropping Elephant (Patchwork / APT-C-09) China-Themed Energy-Sector Loader Chain Delivering Memory-Resident Salsa20 RAT
Rapid7 tracked an active Dropping Elephant (Patchwork) campaign using a China-themed energy-contract lure (GRES-3 industrial seawater pump project) delivered via a malicious LNK that chains obfuscated PowerShell, DLL side-loading through APPWIZ.cpl, an AES-256-CBC-decrypted Donut loader, and a fully memory-resident 32-bit C++ RAT.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0838 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | GRES-3 Energy Lure Campaign, China-Themed Loader Chain |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows |
| Attribution | Patchwork (high confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | India |
| Malware | Dropping Elephant RAT |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1083 File and Directory Discovery and 11 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | energy, defense, government, diplomatic |
| Target regions | South Asia, East Asia |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 7 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-06-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0838 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 30 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Dropping Elephant Memory-Resident RAT HTTPS C2 Beacon to gcl-power[.]org — C2/Exfiltration
Detects beaconing and exfiltration to the Dropping Elephant operational C2 and staging infrastructure (gcl-power[.]org, chinagreenenergy[.]org) and geolocation-recon abuse of api.ipify[.]org / ip2c[.]org. Flags the distinctive hardcoded User-Agent (missing the space after 'x64') and the ~10s/2s beacon cadence to the /prjozifvkpkfhkr/ registration and /gedhagammgjvvva/ polling endpoints.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1071.001, T1573.001, T1041, T1016, T1614
- Data sources: proxy, zeek, dns, windows_defender_network
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=proxy OR index=network sourcetype IN ("stream:http","pan:traffic","zeek:http","squid:access")
| eval dom=lower(coalesce(dest_host,site,url_domain,query))
| where match(dom,"gcl-power\.org") OR match(dom,"chinagreenenergy\.org") OR match(lower(uri_path),"/prjozifvkpkfhkr/") OR like(http_user_agent,"%Win64; x64)AppleWebKit%")
| eval geo_recon=if(match(dom,"api\.ipify\.org") OR match(dom,"ip2c\.org"),1,0)
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(uri_path) as paths values(http_user_agent) as user_agents dc(dom) as domains by src_ip dest host
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| where count > 0Microsoft KQL
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("gcl-power.org", "chinagreenenergy.org") or RemoteUrl has "/prjozifvkpkfhkr/"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Dropping Elephant HTTPS C2 Beacon and Staging Domain Contact
id: 8f2a1c44-0838-4a03-9b7e-1e3c5f9ad103
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS/HTTP contact with Dropping Elephant C2 (gcl-power.org) and staging (chinagreenenergy.org) infrastructure, including the distinctive malformed User-Agent and /prjozifvkpkfhkr/ beacon path
references:
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-malware-tracking-dropping-elephant-tradecraft-china-themed-loader-chain
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/17
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1573.001
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1041
logsource:
category: dns_query
product: windows
detection:
selection:
QueryName:
- 'gcl-power.org'
- 'chinagreenenergy.org'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None expected; these domains are dedicated malicious infrastructure
level: criticalKnown false positives:
- Security researchers or sandboxes intentionally resolving the IOC domains
- Threat-intel feed validation traffic
Tuning notes: Add the malformed User-Agent 'Win64; x64)AppleWebKit' (missing space after x64) as a high-fidelity standalone signature. For ipify/ip2c, only alert when the initiating process is non-browser. Tune beacon cadence detection to ~10s intervals with low jitter for C2 confirmation.
- Dropping Elephant LNK-Spawned PowerShell Loader Chain — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Dropping Elephant Fondue.exe DLL Side-Loading of APPWIZ.cpl from C:\Users\Public — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Dropping Elephant In-Memory AMSI/WLDP/ETW Tamper and Token-Gated C2 Registration — C2/Lateral · unlock with TL Creds
- Dropping Elephant LNK-to-PowerShell Initial Execution via conhost — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Dropping Elephant editor.dat Encrypted Blob Staging in C:\Windows\Tasks — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Dropping Elephant Malformed User-Agent HTTPS Beacon — C2/Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
- Dropping Elephant Obfuscated PowerShell String-Splitting Stager via conhost — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Dropping Elephant GoogleErrorReport Scheduled-Task Persistence Pointing at C:\Users\Public — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-06-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 30 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0838.
Sample indicators (3 of 30)
- Domain:
chinagreenenergy[.]org - File hash:
a8ecbd9c049044ca4990a0e5960d19ce782a3b42d7763e9693d7c91ead24a0b7 - Domain:
gcl-power[.]org
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 30 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
The reworked implant adds control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and Salsa20-encrypted HTTPS C2 while retaining recognizable Dropping Elephant beaconing, screenshot, and command-handler patterns confirmed via Diaphora function overlap with a July 2025 Arctic Wolf sample.
In June 2026 Rapid7 Labs documented a Dropping Elephant (a.k.a. Patchwork, APT-C-09, Quilted Tiger, Monsoon, Operation Hangover; MITRE G0040) intrusion set delivering a reworked memory-resident remote access trojan to energy-sector targets using a China-themed decoy. The attack opens with a malicious Windows shortcut, GRES3001.lnk, masquerading as a PDF and themed around the GRES-3 industrial seawater circulation pump procurement project. When opened, the LNK spawns obfuscated PowerShell through conhost.exe using basic string-splitting evasion (e.g. iw''r, g''c''i, r''e''n, c''p''i) that retrieves a staged payload set from chinagreenenergy[.]org.
The downloaded files arrive with junk extensions (.ezxzez, .cypyly, .dzlzlz) and are renamed into C:\Users\Public\: a legitimate Microsoft binary Fondue.exe, a malicious loader APPWIZ.cpl (internal metadata bluetooth_callback.dll, export RunFODW), the VC++ runtimes msvcp140.dll and vcruntime140.dll, and an AES-256-CBC-encrypted blob editor.dat staged in C:\Windows\Tasks\. Persistence is established with a scheduled task named GoogleErrorReport that runs Fondue.exe every minute. Fondue.exe side-loads the malicious APPWIZ.cpl from the non-standard C:\Users\Public\ directory (DLL side-loading), and APPWIZ.cpl decrypts editor.dat via Windows CNG (bcrypt.dll) AES-256-CBC using a hardcoded 32-byte key and 16-byte IV, transferring control to a Donut shellcode blob through an EnumUILanguagesW callback.
The Donut loader protects its embedded PE with Chaskey-CTR and patches AMSI, WLDP, and ETW before reflectively loading the final 32-bit native C++ implant entirely in memory. The RAT registers to operational C2 gcl-power[.]org over HTTPS/443, gating traffic with token RRn926EmIRfm9IlJyP1yVO2 and submitting a Salsa20-encrypted, base64url-wrapped registration beacon carrying username, computer name, runtime-derived bot ID, OS version, public IP, and country (resolved via api.ipify[.]org and ip2c[.]org) plus the full process list. Salsa20 uses key tn9905083tfbsxqrxs7qe4ryw1nif8h1 with nonce lPvymwIk; check-in cadence is every 10 seconds with 2-second retry, and an idle sentinel MMMMM==YYYYY indicates no tasking. Command handlers support directory listing (fl), download-and-execute (dw), screenshot via BitBlt/WIC (sc), shell execution (cmx), and file upload/exfiltration (uf). Anti-analysis tradecraft includes control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, dynamic API resolution, stack-built strings, static CRT linking, process blacklist checks, CPUID hypervisor checks, and VM artifact checks. Rapid7 attributed the campaign to Dropping Elephant through Diaphora function-level overlap (four shared functions) with reference sample 8b6acc087e403b913254dd7d99f09136dc54fa45cf3029a8566151120d34d1c2 documented by Arctic Wolf in July 2025 against the Turkish defense industry; BinDiff scored only 8.6% similarity, discounted due to control-flow flattening. No CVE is involved.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1113 Screen Capture
Discovery
T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery; T1614 System Location Discovery
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1497.001 System Checks; T1620 Reflective Code Loading
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Persistence
Execution
T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1204.002 Malicious File
Command and Control
T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1132.001 Standard Encoding; T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography
Initial Access
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
stealth
defense-impairment
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block C2 and staging domains gcl-power.org and chinagreenenergy.org at DNS/perimeter
- Hunt for scheduled task named GoogleErrorReport executing Fondue.exe every minute
- Hunt for Fondue.exe loading APPWIZ.cpl from C:\Users\Public\ rather than a Windows system directory
- Quarantine files staged in C:\Users\Public\ (Fondue.exe, APPWIZ.cpl) and C:\Windows\Tasks\editor.dat matching listed hashes
Workarounds
- Disable execution of .cpl files from non-system paths via application control
- Apply LNK and Office attachment filtering at the email gateway
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR with in-memory/behavioral detection for AMSI/WLDP/ETW tampering
- Restrict and monitor execution of files from C:\Users\Public\
- Block or alert on Windows shortcuts (.lnk) that spawn PowerShell via conhost.exe
- Enforce PowerShell script-block and module logging to catch string-splitting obfuscation
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows
Vulnerable versions: Windows 10; Windows 11; Windows Server
Timeline
- Dropping Elephant / Patchwork (APT-C-09, G0040) active as a suspected India-linked espionage group targeting foreign-policy, defense, diplomatic and academic entities across South and East Asia.
- Kaspersky GReAT publicly documented the espionage group as 'Dropping Elephant' (a.k.a. Chinastrats); Symantec independently named the same intrusion set 'Patchwork' the same year, noting heavy reliance on copy-pasted/repurposed code and decoy-document lures.
- Forcepoint detailed the MONSOON cyber-espionage campaign, later linked to Patchwork, using malicious documents and a long-running infrastructure set against government and military targets.
- MITRE ATT&CK catalogued the group as Patchwork (G0040), formalizing its documented techniques including spearphishing, scheduled-task persistence, and DLL side-loading.
- Arctic Wolf observed Dropping Elephant infrastructure preparation beginning, ahead of operations against the Turkish defense industry.
- Arctic Wolf documented the reference RAT sample (SHA-256 locked-ioc-13) against Turkish defense contractors; later used as the lineage anchor for the 2026 variant.
- Rapid7 Labs published 'Tracking Dropping Elephant Tradecraft: China-Themed Loader Chain Delivering Memory-Resident RAT' with full IOCs and ATT&CK mapping.
- Rapid7 confirmed Dropping Elephant lineage via Diaphora function-level overlap (four shared functions); BinDiff scored 8.6% similarity, discounted due to control-flow flattening.
- Staging domain locked-ioc-20 and operational C2 locked-ioc-21 observed active during Rapid7 analysis of the China-themed energy loader chain.
Sources cited
- Tracking Dropping Elephant Tradecraft: China-Themed Loader Chain Delivering Memory-Resident RAT Rapid7 · Research · 2026-06-17
- Dropping Elephant APT Group Targets Turkish Defense Industry: LOLBAS, VLC Player, and Encrypted Shellcode arcticwolf.com · Vendor report · 2025-07-01
- Patchwork, Hangover Group, Dropping Elephant, MONSOON, Operation Hangover (G0040) MITRE · Research · 2026-06-17
- QUILTED TIGER (Threat Actor) - Malpedia malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de · Research · 2026-06-17
- Dark Web Profile: Patchwork APT socradar.io · Blog · 2026-06-17
- A Deep Dive Into Patchwork APT Group cyble.com · Blog · 2026-06-17
- MONSOON Cyber-Espionage Campaign Linked to Patchwork APT SecurityWeek · News · 2026-06-17
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.