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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0854

CryptoBandits Windows Crypto-Clipper Campaign: USB LNK Worm + Tor Hidden-Service C2 (Trojan:Win32/CryptoBandits)

highACTIVE

Microsoft Defender Experts have tracked a Windows cryptocurrency clipper campaign since February 2026 that propagates via USB-distributed LNK worm files and communicates over a bundled Tor client to a hidden-service C2. The malware (detected as Trojan:Win32/CryptoBandits) performs ~500ms clipboard monitoring to steal seed phrases and private keys, substitutes copied wallet addresses with attacker-controlled ones, exfiltrates screenshots over Tor, and supports runtime code execution via an EVAL command, turning a financially motivated stealer into a lightweight backdoor.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0854
Also known asCryptoBandits, Crypto Clipper (Microsoft)
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows
MalwareCryptoBandits
ToolsTor hidden-service C2
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy, T1091 Replication Through Removable Media, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer and 8 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorscryptocurrency, financial, consumer, technology
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0854 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 40 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: CryptoBandits Exploitation — WSH/JScript Stager Spawned From User-Writable Public Documents

Detects the CryptoBandits initial-access chain where a document-impersonating LNK lure launches wscript.exe/cscript.exe (or mshta.exe) against a randomly-named 5-character JScript stager dropped under C:\Users\Public\Documents. Legitimate logon scripts almost never run script interpreters from this user-writable directory, so the path + interpreter combination is a high-fidelity exploitation signal. Optionally correlates with the explorer.exe -> wscript.exe parent-child chain typical of LNK execution from removable media.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1059.007, T1204.002, T1091
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| where (match(Image, "(?i)\\\\(wscript|cscript|mshta)\.exe$"))
| where (match(CommandLine, "(?i)\\\\Users\\\\Public\\\\Documents\\\\") AND match(CommandLine, "(?i)\.js(\"|\s|$)"))
| eval lnk_chain=if(match(ParentImage,"(?i)\\\\(explorer|wscript|cscript)\.exe$"),"yes","no")
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(CommandLine) as cmdlines values(ParentImage) as parents by host, User, Image
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| where count >= 1

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has @"\Users\Public\Documents\" and ProcessCommandLine has ".js"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: CryptoBandits WSH JScript Stager From Public Documents
id: 2f3c8b41-0a7e-4d2c-9b6f-1c0a854ab001
status: experimental
description: Detects wscript/cscript/mshta executing a JScript stager from the user-writable C:\Users\Public\Documents path, matching the CryptoBandits (Trojan:Win32/CryptoBandits) USB LNK worm initial-access chain.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/06/17/crypto-clipper-uses-tor-worm-like-propagation-for-persistence-control/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1091
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '\Users\Public\Documents\'
        CommandLine|contains: '.js'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare administrative or vendor logon scripts intentionally staged under Public Documents
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Rare administrative or vendor logon scripts intentionally staged under C:\Users\Public\Documents
  • Software installers that drop and execute JScript helpers from a public path

Tuning notes: Allowlist any known-good script paths/hashes under Public Documents in your environment. Tighten the 5-character random folder/script name with a regex like \\Users\\Public\\Documents\\[a-z]{5}\\[a-z]{5}\.js to cut false positives further. Pair with EventCode 11 (FileCreate) of the same .js to confirm the drop.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • CryptoBandits Exploitation — USB/Removable-Media LNK Lure Driving Script Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • CryptoBandits Post-Exploitation — PowerShell/GDI+ Screen Capture for Wallet-Context Collection · unlock with TL Creds
  • CryptoBandits C2 — Screenshot/File Exfiltration to Tor SOCKS5 Proxy on 127.0.0.1:9050 · unlock with TL Creds
  • CryptoBandits Impact — High-Frequency Clipboard Monitoring With Wallet-Address Substitution · unlock with TL Creds
  • CryptoBandits Defense Evasion — Defender Exclusion Tampering and Task Manager Anti-Analysis · unlock with TL Creds
  • CryptoBandits C2 — Tor Ingress Tool Transfer and EVAL Backdoor Payload Drop ([indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
  • CryptoBandits Post-Exploitation — 30-Minute Scheduled-Task Persistence Launching WSH Payload · unlock with TL Creds
  • CryptoBandits C2 — Renamed Tor Client ([indicator]) and [indicator] SOCKS5 Proxy Usage · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 40 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0854.

Sample indicators (3 of 40)

  • Domain: cgky6bn6ux5wvlybtmm3z255igt52ljml2ngnc5qp3cnw5jlglamisad[.]onion
  • File hash: 7630debd35cac6b7d58c4427695579b3e3a8b1cc462f523234cd6c698882a68c
  • Domain: gfoqsewps57xcyxoedle2gd53o6jne6y5nq5eh25muksqwzutzq7b3ad[.]onion

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 40 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

40 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

2 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

Since February 2026, Microsoft Defender Experts have tracked an active cryptocurrency clipper campaign affecting Windows users, with roughly 9,000 infections traced to the operation. Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects the threat family as Trojan:Win32/CryptoBandits (with .A/.B and JS variants) alongside several behavioral detections.

Initial access occurs through malicious Windows Shortcut (.lnk) files distributed on USB storage devices. When a victim plugs in an infected USB device, a worm component scans for common document types (DOC, XLSX, PDF), hides the legitimate files, and creates LNK files bearing the same names to trick the user into executing the payload. The LNK chain drops a JavaScript stager under C:\Users\Public\Documents in randomly named 5-character folders/scripts, executed via Windows Script Host and ActiveX-driven logic. The worm first checks whether the machine is already infected and only fetches the remote payload if not present.

For command-and-control, the malware deploys a portable Tor client renamed ugate.exe, launches it in a hidden window, waits roughly 60 seconds for the Tor circuit to bootstrap, and routes all traffic through a local SOCKS5 proxy at localhost:9050 to reach .onion hidden-service C2 servers. The device registers via a GUID heartbeat and polls C2 endpoints (/route.php for beacon/commands, /recvf.php for screenshot upload, /stub.php for payload download, output written to 'cfile'). Victim-to-C2 actions include GUID (heartbeat), SEED (seed phrase), PKEY (private key), REPL (address-replacement notice) and GOOD (legacy/fallback). If the C2 returns an EVAL response, the malware executes attacker-supplied JScript at runtime, providing arbitrary remote code execution.

The clipper monitors the clipboard roughly every 500 milliseconds, parsing it for BIP39 seed phrases (12/24-word), Ethereum private keys, Bitcoin WIF private keys, and a wide range of wallet-address formats (Bitcoin legacy/P2SH/Taproot/Bech32, Tron, Monero). When a destination wallet address is detected, it is silently replaced with an attacker-controlled address so funds are diverted on the next transaction (financial theft). The malware also captures five screenshots ten seconds apart for wallet context and uploads them over Tor.

Persistence is achieved through scheduled tasks for both the worm and stealer components; a scheduled task fires every 30 minutes to maintain persistence from the first step. Defense-evasion behavior includes masquerading (renamed Tor binary, document-impersonating LNKs), hidden files/window, obfuscated scripts, Defender process/path exclusion behaviors, and an anti-analysis check that queries running processes and exits if Task Manager is detected. No CVE is associated; this is a malware/TTP disclosure. The strongest defensive signals are behavioral: script interpreters spawning suspicious children, localhost:9050 SOCKS proxy usage, PowerShell screen-capture commands, and clipboard inspection / crypto-address replacement.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories

Exfiltration

T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task

Discovery

T1057 Process Discovery

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.007 JavaScript; T1204.002 Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Initial Access

T1091 Replication Through Removable Media

Collection

T1113 Screen Capture; T1115 Clipboard Data

Impact

T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation; T1657 Financial Theft

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block USB autorun and restrict removable-media execution via Group Policy / device control
  • Hunt for and terminate the renamed Tor client ugate.exe and any process opening localhost:9050
  • Inspect and remove scheduled tasks that launch JScript/WSH payloads from C:\Users\Public\Documents
  • Block outbound Tor traffic at the network egress (Tor entry-node lists, SOCKS5 on 9050)
  • Treat any wallet copied/pasted on a potentially infected host as compromised; rotate keys and move funds from exposed wallets

Workarounds

  • Configure Microsoft Defender ASR rules to block executable content from email/USB and obfuscated script execution
  • Show file extensions and disable hidden-item concealment so swapped LNK lures are visible
  • Use hardware wallets with on-device address verification to defeat clipboard substitution

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for clipboard inspection and crypto-address replacement
  • Enforce application control (WDAC/AppLocker) to block wscript/cscript/mshta execution of user-writable scripts
  • Disable Windows Script Host where not required
  • Enable tamper protection so malware cannot add Defender process/path exclusions
  • User awareness training on USB-borne LNK lures and verifying wallet addresses out-of-band before transacting

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: Windows (all supported desktop versions running Windows Script Host)

Timeline

  • Clipper begins ~500ms clipboard monitoring, substituting copied wallet addresses and exfiltrating seed phrases, private keys, and screenshots over Tor.
  • Infected hosts deploy the renamed portable Tor client (ugate.exe) and register with .onion hidden-service C2 servers over a localhost:9050 SOCKS5 proxy.
  • USB worm component begins hiding DOC/XLSX/PDF files and creating same-named LNK lures to drive execution and self-propagate across removable media.
  • Earliest activity of the CryptoBandits cryptocurrency clipper campaign tracked by Microsoft Defender Experts; malicious .lnk payloads begin spreading via USB storage devices.
  • Microsoft Defender Antivirus signatures published: Trojan:Win32/CryptoBandits.A/.B, Trojan:JS/CryptoBandits.A/.B and related behavioral detections.
  • Microsoft Security Blog publishes 'Crypto Clipper uses Tor and worm-like propagation for persistence and control,' detailing TTPs, detections, and IOCs (~9,000 infections).
  • Threat ingested into the Threadlinqs Intelligence Platform as TL-2026-0854 for detection-coverage development.
  • The Hacker News and other outlets report on Microsoft's disclosure of the Windows clipper USB LNK worm and Tor-based C2 campaign.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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