Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0861
Versatile Werewolf (HeartlessSoul): Fondue.exe LOLBin Abuse via APPWIZ.cpl Side-Loading Delivers Sliver Implant and SoullessRAT
An espionage cluster tracked by BI.ZONE as Versatile Werewolf (HeartlessSoul) abuses the legitimate Windows Features-on-Demand UX binary Fondue.exe as a LOLBin: a malicious APPWIZ.cpl placed in Fondue.exe's working directory is side-loaded ahead of system paths, executing a UPX-packed, Oreans Code Virtualizer-obfuscated applet that deploys a Sliver post-exploitation implant in memory.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0861 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Unholy Trinity (campaign), Fondue.exe side-loading campaign |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows (Fondue.exe / Features on Demand UX) |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-427, CWE-426 |
| Attribution | Versatile Werewolf (medium confidence) |
| Malware | SoullessRAT |
| Tools | Oreans Code Virtualizer, Sliver - S0633, UPX |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053 Scheduled Task/Job, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1070 Indicator Removal, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer and 17 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | government, military, defense, aerospace, drone-manufacturing, law-enforcement |
| Target regions | Russia, Eastern Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 7 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-06-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0861 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 32 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Sliver Implant Beaconing to C2 from fondue.exe / MediumTurquoiseBeige Mutex — C2
Detects the Sliver post-exploitation implant's command-and-control: outbound HTTPS network connections initiated by a non-System32 fondue.exe (or appwiz.cpl host) to the known Versatile Werewolf C2 domain curtainbeatdisturbance[.]com, and creation of the single-instance mutex MediumTurquoiseBeige. Also flags the SoullessRAT delivery domain newfolder[.]click and StarDebug/AlphaFly distribution domains.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1071.001, T1573, T1105
- Data sources: sysmon, dns_logs, proxy, windows_defender_for_endpoint, network
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=3 OR EventCode=22 OR EventCode=17 OR EventCode=18)
| eval dom=coalesce(QueryName,DestinationHostname), pipe_or_mutex=coalesce(PipeName,EventType)
| where like(lower(dom),"%curtainbeatdisturbance.com%") OR like(lower(dom),"%newfolder.click%") OR like(lower(dom),"%stardebug.app%") OR like(lower(dom),"%alphafly-drones.com%") OR like(Image,"%\\fondue.exe") OR like(lower(pipe_or_mutex),"%mediumturquoisebeige%")
| eval c2=case(like(lower(dom),"%curtainbeatdisturbance.com%"),"Sliver C2",like(lower(dom),"%newfolder.click%"),"SoullessRAT C2",like(lower(dom),"%stardebug.app%") OR like(lower(dom),"%alphafly-drones.com%"),"Distribution lure",like(lower(pipe_or_mutex),"%mediumturquoisebeige%"),"Sliver mutex",1=1,"fondue.exe egress")
| stats values(c2) as classification values(dom) as domains values(Image) as proc values(DestinationIp) as dst_ip min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen count by Computer
| table Computer classification domains proc dst_ip first_seen last_seen countMicrosoft KQL
union
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("curtainbeatdisturbance.com", "newfolder.click", "stardebug.app", "alphafly-drones.com")
or (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "fondue.exe" and InitiatingProcessFolderPath !startswith "C:\\Windows\\System32")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Kind="network", Indicator=RemoteUrl, Proc=InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP),
(DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("CreateRemoteThreadApiCall", "NamedPipeEvent") or AdditionalFields has "MediumTurquoiseBeige"
| where AdditionalFields has "MediumTurquoiseBeige"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Kind="mutex", Indicator="MediumTurquoiseBeige", Proc=InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP="")
| summarize Indicators=make_set(Indicator), Kinds=make_set(Kind), Procs=make_set(Proc), FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp), Count=count() by DeviceName
| extend Risk="Sliver/SoullessRAT C2 (T1071.001 / T1573 / T1105)"Sigma
title: Sliver C2 Beacon to curtainbeatdisturbance.com or MediumTurquoiseBeige Mutex
id: 8b3c4d6a-0d3f-4b9c-9e4a-2c3d4e5f6071
status: experimental
description: Detects network connections to Versatile Werewolf C2/distribution domains or the Sliver single-instance mutex MediumTurquoiseBeige, indicating an active in-memory Sliver implant or SoullessRAT check-in.
references:
- https://bi-zone.medium.com/unholy-trinity-werewolves-target-law-enforcers-f28357945280
- https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/wiki/DNS-C2
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-06-18
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1573
- attack.t1105
- attack.tool.sliver
logsource:
product: windows
category: dns_query
detection:
selection_dns:
QueryName|contains:
- 'curtainbeatdisturbance.com'
- 'newfolder.click'
- 'stardebug.app'
- 'alphafly-drones.com'
condition: selection_dns
falsepositives:
- None expected; these are confirmed-malicious domains
level: highKnown false positives:
- Security researchers or sandboxes intentionally resolving the IOC domains — scope to production endpoints
- Mutex name collisions are highly improbable given the distinctive string
Tuning notes: Feed the IOC domains into a TI lookup table so the search auto-updates as infrastructure rotates. Raise to critical and auto-isolate when curtainbeatdisturbance.com egress originates from a non-System32 fondue.exe. Add Sliver beacon heuristics (fixed interval + jitter to a single low-reputation domain) for config-less variants.
- Hidden ProgramData GUID Directory Staging [indicator] + [indicator] Pair — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- MSI/PowerShell/.NET Loader Chain Decoding Base64 Payloads to TEMP — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- SoullessRAT JS Discovery + Outlook/Screenshot Collection via wscript/cscript — C2/Collection · unlock with TL Creds
- CPL Module Load Outside System32 into a Signed LOLBin — Exploitation (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Hidden ProgramData GUID Directory Creation + Hidden-Attribute Set — Post-Exploitation (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Sliver/SoullessRAT C2 Egress to Werewolf Infrastructure + Exfil — C2 (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] Side-Loading [indicator] from Non-System32 Path — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Edge-Update Masquerading Scheduled Task Launching [indicator] -Embedding — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-06-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 32 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0861.
Sample indicators (3 of 32)
- Domain:
curtainbeatdisturbance[.]com - File hash:
df1d20e392f7b7c5c408bdda317e0733e5ec27a973e3bf75034c6566343aa67f - Domain:
stardebug[.]app
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 32 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Delivery uses malicious MSI installers with Starlink (StarDebug) and drone-pilot-training (AlphaFly) lures against government, military, and drone-engineering personnel, with Scheduled Task persistence masquerading as Microsoft Edge updates.
Versatile Werewolf (also tracked as HeartlessSoul) is one of three 'Werewolf' espionage clusters documented by BI.ZONE in its April 2026 'Unholy trinity' analysis, alongside Paper Werewolf (GOFFEE) and Eagle Werewolf. The cluster is notable for leveraging generative AI to accelerate tool development, producing the JavaScript-based SoullessRAT and weaponizing the open-source Sliver framework as its primary post-exploitation implant.
The infection chain begins with a social-engineering lure: spoofed product sites distribute malicious MSI installers impersonating a Starlink terminal management utility (StarDebug, stardebug[.]app, with Telegram support @StarDebugAdmin1) and a drone pilot training simulator (AlphaFly, alphafly-drones[.]com, whose site mimics betaflight.com and reuses media from obriy[.]airforce). The MSI extracts a PowerShell script (run-script.ps1), a VBS helper, and a .NET loader (installer.exe). The PowerShell stage pulls remote code from a private IP; the .NET loader executes an embedded PowerShell script that decodes two Base64 executables into %TEMP%. An NSIS installer deploys the genuine decoy application while an Inno Setup installer (testexe.exe) unpacks the legitimate Fondue.exe and a malicious appwiz.cpl into the hidden directory %PROGRAMDATA%\29167fc2-cdc7-490d-9c70-96bfb9b58225.
The core technique is hijack-execution-flow abuse of Fondue.exe (Windows Features on Demand UX, v10.0.19041.1), which resolves appwiz.cpl from its own working directory before standard system paths. The planted appwiz.cpl — packed with UPX and obfuscated with Oreans Code Virtualizer — is loaded into Fondue.exe's address space via DLL side-loading and stages the Sliver implant directly in memory. Sliver beacons to the C2 domain curtainbeatdisturbance[.]com and guards single-instance execution with the mutex MediumTurquoiseBeige.
Persistence is established through a Windows Scheduled Task named in the format MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineUA{GUID} (observed: MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineUA{dccb869b-0d8f-1b4e-f48c-85c613ae8b4b}) that re-launches %PROGRAMDATA%\29167fc2-cdc7-490d-9c70-96bfb9b58225\fondue.exe -Embedding every minute, masquerading as legitimate Microsoft Edge update activity. In a parallel delivery branch (newfolder[.]click) the cluster drops SoullessRAT, an AI-authored JavaScript RAT supporting C2 file upload, modular downloads (self-destruction, SSH, Outlook harvesting), system-information collection, PowerShell remote command execution, screenshot capture, logical-volume enumeration, directory listing, and process termination. No CVE is involved; this is a trusted-binary/technique-abuse threat warranting behavioral SOC detection. BeaconBeagle returned no existing config/beacon records for curtainbeatdisturbance[.]com at time of analysis.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1113 Screen Capture; T1114 Email Collection
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1070 Indicator Removal; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution; T1564 Hide Artifacts; T1620 Reflective Code Loading
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Persistence
T1053 Scheduled Task/Job; T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Discovery
T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1106 Native API; T1204 User Execution
Command and Control
T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1573 Encrypted Channel
Credential Access
Initial Access
stealth
Resource Development
T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1587 Develop Capabilities; T1588 Obtain Capabilities; T1608 Stage Capabilities
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block C2 domain curtainbeatdisturbance[.]com and distribution domains stardebug[.]app, alphafly-drones[.]com, newfolder[.]click at perimeter/DNS
- Hunt for Fondue.exe executing from any path other than %WINDIR%\System32 (e.g. %PROGRAMDATA% subfolders)
- Hunt for an appwiz.cpl present in any directory alongside Fondue.exe outside System32
- Quarantine hosts with a Scheduled Task matching MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineUA{GUID} that launches fondue.exe -Embedding
Workarounds
- Restrict or monitor execution of Fondue.exe (Features on Demand) which is rarely needed interactively
- Alert on Scheduled Tasks created with Microsoft-Edge-update-like names that point to non-standard binaries
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for trusted-binary side-loading (Fondue.exe loading non-System32 CPL/DLL)
- Enable command-line and module-load (Sysmon Event ID 7) logging across the fleet
- Application control (WDAC/AppLocker) to restrict execution of binaries from %PROGRAMDATA% and %TEMP%
- User awareness training on MSI lures impersonating Starlink/drone tooling
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows (Fondue.exe / Features on Demand UX)
Vulnerable versions: 10.0.19041.1 (binary abused as LOLBin)
Timeline
- Espionage activity employing Sliver-via-locked-ioc-23 side-loading and SoullessRAT via fake AlphaFly installer observed in the wild (related Werewolf-cluster campaign).
- Distribution and C2 infrastructure (locked-ioc-20, locked-ioc-17, locked-ioc-16, locked-ioc-18) attributed to the Werewolf clusters.
- Sliver implant C2 (locked-ioc-16) and single-instance mutex MediumTurquoiseBeige documented; staging/persistence directory locked-ioc-14 identified.
- Parallel delivery branch via locked-ioc-18 documented dropping SoullessRAT, an AI-authored JavaScript RAT with modular SSH, Outlook-harvesting, self-destruction, screenshot, and remote-PowerShell capabilities.
- StarDebug lure (locked-ioc-20, Telegram support @StarDebugAdmin1) impersonating a Starlink terminal management utility and AlphaFly lure (locked-ioc-17, mimicking betaflight.com and reusing obriy[.]airforce media) documented as the social-engineering delivery vectors.
- Versatile Werewolf assessed to leverage generative AI to develop tooling, including the JavaScript SoullessRAT and a comment-rich, unobfuscated VBS helper.
- locked-ioc-23 LOLBin abuse via malicious locked-ioc-24 side-loading, UPX + Oreans Code Virtualizer packing, and MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineUA{GUID} scheduled-task persistence documented.
- BI.ZONE publishes 'Unholy trinity: werewolves target law enforcers,' documenting Versatile Werewolf (HeartlessSoul) alongside Paper Werewolf (GOFFEE) and Eagle Werewolf, with full IOC set.
- BeaconBeagle queried for the Sliver C2 domain locked-ioc-16 during analysis; no existing config or beacon records were returned at that time.
- Cyber Security News publishes coverage of the locked-ioc-23 locked-ioc-24 side-loading technique delivering the Sliver implant.
Sources cited
- Unholy trinity: werewolves target law enforcers bi-zone.medium.com · Research · 2026-04-01
- Unholy trinity: werewolves target law enforcers (BI.ZONE blog) bi.zone · Vendor report · 2026-04-01
- Fondue.exe | Windows Features on Demand UX | STRONTIC xcyclopedia strontic.github.io · Research · 2026-01-01
- DNS C2 - BishopFox/sliver Wiki GitHub · Code repository · 2026-01-01
- Sliver Implant Targets German Entities With DLL Sideloading and Proxying Techniques (Cyble) cyble.com · Blog · 2026-01-01
- Learning Sliver C2 (10) - Sideload dominicbreuker.com · Blog · 2026-01-01
- Hackers Abuse Microsoft Fondue.exe to Side-Load APPWIZ.cpl and Execute Malware cybersecuritynews.com · News · 2026-06-18
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.