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Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-1352

Malicious NuGet Packages Disguised as Game Cheats Deploy Remote Access Malware (pepesoft.exe)

criticalACTIVE

Socket's Threat Research Team identified 11 malicious NuGet DotnetTool packages, all published by the account pepegit666, posing as cheats/bots/management panels for role-play games (Albion Online, GTA5RP, GrandRP, Majestic RP, Throne and Liberty, Lineage 2, RMRP, Russian Fishing 4).

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1352
Also known aspepesoft campaign, Fake Game Cheats NuGet Campaign, 11 Malicious NuGet Tools Pose as Game Cheats
SeverityCRITICAL
Affected productsNuGet Gallery NuGet DotnetTool packages published by pepegit666 (albion-x-x, amazing-x-x, calc-x-x, grandrp-x-x, gta5rp-x-x, l2-x-x, majestic-x-x, rmrp-x-x, rusfish4-x-x, throne-x-x, trigger-x-x); pepesoft pepesoft.exe (PyInstaller/PyArmor-packed second-stage payload)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-506, CWE-494, CWE-522, CWE-798
Nation-state nexusRussia
Malwarepepesoft RAT, pepesoft.exe
ToolsGoogle Sheets (abused as telemetry/licensing/C2 channel), PyArmor, PyInstaller, Telegram Bot API (aiogram) — t.me/pepesoft777, aiogram
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1070 Indicator Removal, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1090 Proxy, T1102 Web Service, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1112 Modify Registry and 14 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsgaming, individual consumers, software supply chain
Target regionsGlobal, russia, CIS / Russian-speaking gaming communities
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources5 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-07-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1352 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 39 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Hidden PowerShell UAC-Elevation Pretext via w32tm runas (pepesoft NuGet Downloader)

Detects a hidden-window PowerShell child process spawned by a dotnet-tool executable that references the 'runas' verb and forces a Windows Time service resync — the UAC-elevation pretext used by 10 of 11 pepesoft first-stage NuGet downloaders (albion.dll, gta5rp.dll, etc.) immediately after `dotnet tool install`.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1548.002, T1204.002
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| search Image="*\\powershell.exe" ParentImage="*\\dotnet.exe"
| search CommandLine="*-WindowStyle Hidden*" CommandLine="*runas*" CommandLine="*w32tm*"
| eval mitre="T1548.002"
| table _time, ComputerName, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine, mitre
| sort -_time

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "dotnet.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "-WindowStyle Hidden" and ProcessCommandLine has "runas" and ProcessCommandLine has "w32tm"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Hidden PowerShell UAC-Elevation Pretext via w32tm runas
id: a1c2e4f6-1001-4b1a-9c11-1352spl001aa
status: experimental
description: Detects a hidden PowerShell child of a dotnet-tool process invoking the runas verb against w32tm, matching the pepesoft NuGet downloader UAC-elevation pretext
references:
    - https://socket.dev/blog/11-malicious-nuget-tools-pose-as-game-cheats
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-15
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
    - attack.tool.pepesoft
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\\powershell.exe'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\\dotnet.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-WindowStyle Hidden'
            - 'runas'
            - 'w32tm'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative scripts that resync time via w32tm through PowerShell (rare with hidden window + dotnet parent)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate IT automation that resyncs system time via w32tm through a hidden PowerShell window spawned from a dotnet tool (uncommon)

Tuning notes: Scope to endpoints where dotnet global tools are routinely installed by non-admin users; whitelist known internal deployment scripts by ParentImage hash if false positives appear.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • DNS-over-HTTPS Resolution via Custom SocketsHttpHandler from .NET Tool Process · unlock with TL Creds
  • PyInstaller/PyArmor-Packed Process Authenticating to Google Sheets API for Telemetry/Licensing · unlock with TL Creds
  • Fallback Traffic via Hardcoded Authenticated Proxy ([indicator]:9528) to Bypass API Blocking · unlock with TL Creds
  • Outbound Connection to pepesoft C2 Infrastructure (Cloudflare Worker / S3 Fallback / Storefront) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Interactive Telegram/Discord C2 Traffic from Non-Chat Process (/screen, /pscreen Remote Screenshot Commands) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Shared pepesoft Campaign Mutex GUID Detected (Global\{5BD61028-3D9C-4B4E-AD45-CA4F1B35D0F4}) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Windows Installer Logging/Policy Keys Deleted (DisableLogging/DisableMSI) — pepesoft Anti-Forensics · unlock with TL Creds
  • Mass Non-Executable File Deletion + Subdirectory Removal in Process Working Directory (exitadaptive Wipe) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-07-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 39 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1352.

Sample indicators (3 of 39)

  • IP address: 196.16.3[.]71
  • Domain: bots[.]pepesoft[.]ru
  • File hash: d5385526f2f3e52c7d96087611c6cd4e479bf61828400efdb3ca09406d981609

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 39 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

39 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

A two-stage chain — a shared .NET downloader abusing DNS-over-HTTPS and UAC elevation, then a PyInstaller/PyArmor-packed Python payload (pepesoft.exe) — provides remote screenshot access, hardware-bound licensing/HWID ban-listing, Google Sheets telemetry, Telegram-bot C2, Discord webhooks, and destructive file-wipe routines, attributed to the Russian-speaking commercial paid-cheat operator 'pepesoft' (storefront bots.pepesoft.ru).

On July 14, 2026, Socket's Threat Research Team (analyst Kush Pandya) published research on 11 malicious NuGet packages, all of the `DotnetTool` package type and all published under the single account `pepegit666`: albion-x-x, amazing-x-x, calc-x-x, grandrp-x-x, gta5rp-x-x, l2-x-x, majestic-x-x, rmrp-x-x, rusfish4-x-x, throne-x-x, and trigger-x-x. Each masquerades as a cheat, bot, or server-management panel for a specific Russian-speaking role-play (RP) gaming community — Albion Online, an unrelated 'Amazing RP', GTA5RP, GrandRP, Lineage 2, Majestic RP, RMRP, Russian Fishing 4, and Throne and Liberty — installed by victims via `dotnet tool install`.

All 11 packages share an identical first-stage .NET downloader assembly (albion.dll, amazingrp.dll, calculator.dll, grandrp.dll, gta5rp.dll, lineage2.dll, majestic.dll, rmrp.dll, rusfish4.dll, setup.dll, trigger.dll — each with a unique but structurally identical SHA-256). Ten of the eleven downloaders spawn a hidden PowerShell process using the `runas` verb to start the Windows Time service and force a clock resync, which functions as a pretext for UAC elevation. All downloaders use a custom `SocketsHttpHandler` with a `ConnectCallback` that resolves GitHub hosts through `dns.google/resolve` (DNS-over-HTTPS), bypassing local hosts-file and DNS-sinkhole blocking. All 11 share an identical hardcoded AWS-style access key/secret key pair and an identical process-mutex GUID (`Global\{5BD61028-3D9C-4B4E-AD45-CA4F1B35D0F4}`, derived from the same key material) that prints the Russian message 'Программа уже запущена' ('The program is already running') on re-invocation — conclusive evidence of a single shared build pipeline and operator.

Second-stage payload retrieval is multi-tiered: primary distribution via a Hugging Face bucket mirror (`huggingface.co/buckets/pepegit666/<tag>/resolve/pepesoft.exe`), fallback to GitHub Releases on the staging repo `github.com/pepegit666/123f53y45ysdf34` (tags per game: albion.onlinepanel, amazing.rp, calculator, grandrp.su, gta5rp.com, lineage2panel, majesticpanel, rmrp, russianfish4, throne, trigpanel), and a dormant BitTorrent magnet-link branch (MonoTorrent/Mono.Nat libraries bundled but inert in analyzed samples). Runtime configuration is retrieved from a Cloudflare Worker (`calm-voice-9797.888c888x888.workers.dev`), with an S3-compatible fallback store (`s3.ru-3.storage.selcloud.ru`, bucket `zfile`).

The resulting second-stage payload, pepesoft.exe, is PyInstaller-packed; 8 of 11 variants (Amazing RP, GrandRP, GTA5RP, Lineage 2, Majestic, RMRP, Russian Fishing 4, Trigger) are additionally protected with PyArmor and, embedded Python source is base64+zlib compressed and Fernet-encrypted, decoded and `exec()`'d at runtime. The remaining 3 variants (Albion, Calculator/'gtaobus.pyc', Throne) ship as unprotected direct Python bytecode modules. On execution, pepesoft.exe authenticates to a set of Google Sheets used as a telemetry and licensing backend: shared sheets `info`, `GTA5RP` (ban-list), and `STAT` (direct-bytecode telemetry), plus per-game product sheets (RMRP, AMAZING, GRANDRP, GTA5RP, L2, MajesticMAIN, RusFish4, TriggerRP, ALBIONBOTMAIN, GTA5RPCALC, THRONE). It records hardware fingerprints (CPU, motherboard, GPU model), hostname, IP-based geolocation, and OS activation status, then re-reads the stored spreadsheet row on subsequent launches and compares it to the live machine to enforce hardware-bound licensing. It also checks the host's HWID/UUID against a 'banned' worksheet; a match halts execution with the message 'Ваш ПК в системе приостановлен' ('Your PC is suspended in the system'), giving the operator a remote kill-switch. The 8 PyArmor-protected variants probe direct Google Sheets/googleapis.com access first and, on failure, retry the same traffic through a hardcoded authenticated HTTP proxy (`196.16.3.71:9528`, credentials `X1U0z7:ZHcUHN`) to bypass IP-level blocking.

For interactive access, the 3 direct-bytecode variants run an `aiogram`-based Telegram bot (channel `t.me/pepesoft777`, chat IDs cached locally in `./libgg/chat_ids.txt`) exposing commands `/screen`, `/pscreen`, `/connect`, and `/disconnect` that capture the active game window or full desktop via `pyautogui.screenshot()` and return images with `reply_photo` — enabling opportunistic capture of on-screen credentials, password managers, browser sessions, and cryptocurrency wallet interfaces. Two Discord webhook URLs are also embedded, providing a secondary exfiltration/notification channel. On exit, the direct-bytecode variants delete `DisableLogging` and `DisableMSI` values from `HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer` (weakening Windows Installer logging/policy controls) and, when a conditional flag (`exitadaptive`) is set, run a destructive cleanup batch that deletes every non-EXE file in the current directory, deletes `UnRaR.exe`, and recursively removes subdirectories — a routine that can destroy unrelated user files if the malware runs from a shared directory, and appears intended to erase forensic evidence.

Attribution indicators — the single publisher account `pepegit666`, Russian-language console/error strings, and consistent targeting of Russian-speaking RP gaming communities — point to a Russian-speaking commercial paid-cheat operator branding itself 'pepesoft', operating a public storefront at bots.pepesoft.ru. The campaign is financially motivated supply-chain-borne malvertising: gamers seeking paid cheats for competitive RP servers install what they believe is licensed cheat software and instead receive a fully featured remote access trojan with credential, financial-account, and privacy exposure risk. Socket reported the packages to the NuGet security team for takedown.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1113 Screen Capture

Discovery

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1518 Software Discovery

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1070 Indicator Removal; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1102 Web Service; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

command-and-control

T1090 Proxy

Persistence

T1112 Modify Registry; T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

defense-impairment

T1112 Modify Registry

Initial Access

T1195 Supply Chain Compromise; T1199 Trusted Relationship

Impact

T1485 Data Destruction

Privilege Escalation

T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1584 Compromise Infrastructure; T1587 Develop Capabilities

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Remove all 11 identified malicious NuGet DotnetTool packages (albion-x-x, amazing-x-x, calc-x-x, grandrp-x-x, gta5rp-x-x, l2-x-x, majestic-x-x, rmrp-x-x, rusfish4-x-x, throne-x-x, trigger-x-x) from developer and gamer machines
  • Kill and quarantine any running pepesoft.exe process; treat the host as compromised and image for forensics before any cleanup routine can trigger destructive file deletion
  • Block egress to bots.pepesoft.ru, calm-voice-9797.888c888x888.workers.dev, s3.ru-3.storage.selcloud.ru, 196.16.3.71:9528, and t.me/pepesoft777 at the perimeter and via DNS/web filtering
  • Rotate any credentials (password manager, browser session, crypto wallet) that were visible on-screen while the host was infected
  • Block outbound Telegram Bot API and Discord webhook traffic (api.telegram.org, discord.com/api/webhooks) from developer workstations where not business-justified
  • Audit HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer for tampered DisableLogging/DisableMSI values on any host that ran the direct-bytecode variants
  • Restrict or monitor DNS-over-HTTPS usage (dns.google/resolve and similar) from endpoints to detect DoH-based sinkhole evasion

Workarounds

  • Disable `dotnet tool install` from untrusted/public NuGet sources on managed endpoints
  • Block DNS-over-HTTPS resolvers at the network layer to force DNS resolution through monitored/sinkholed resolvers

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy software composition analysis / package-registry scanning (e.g., Socket) in CI and on developer workstations to flag malicious npm/NuGet/PyPI installs before execution
  • Enforce a policy prohibiting installation of unofficial 'cheat', 'bot', or 'management panel' tools for third-party games on corporate or personal-with-VPN-access endpoints
  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for PyInstaller-packed/PyArmor-obfuscated child processes spawned from dotnet tool executables
  • Monitor for anomalous Google Sheets API traffic (accounts.google.com/googleapis.com from unexpected processes) and Hugging Face bucket downloads of executables

Affected and fixed versions

  • NuGet Gallery — NuGet DotnetTool packages published by pepegit666 (albion-x-x, amazing-x-x, calc-x-x, grandrp-x-x, gta5rp-x-x, l2-x-x, majestic-x-x, rmrp-x-x, rusfish4-x-x, throne-x-x, trigger-x-x)
    Vulnerable versions: all published versions of the 11 identified packages
    Fixed in: N/A — packages reported to NuGet security team for takedown
  • pepesoft — pepesoft.exe (PyInstaller/PyArmor-packed second-stage payload)
    Vulnerable versions: all observed builds across 11 game-specific variants

Timeline

  • Estimated active window for the 11 malicious NuGet DotnetTool packages published by pepegit666 prior to public disclosure; exact publication dates of individual packages not specified by the source.
  • Socket publishes '11 Malicious NuGet Tools Pose as Game Cheats' at socket.dev/blog with full technical IOC breakdown.
  • Socket reports the identified malicious packages to the NuGet security team for remediation/takedown.
  • Socket's Threat Research Team (Kush Pandya) identifies and analyzes the 11 malicious NuGet packages disguised as game cheats/bots/management panels for RP gaming communities, extracting hashes, hardcoded credentials, and full C2 infrastructure.
  • Threat first observed/ingested by the Threadlinqs Intelligence Platform hunt pipeline via RSS source feed.
  • Socket's disclosure and derivative reporting circulate remediation guidance for defenders — perimeter blocking of identified C2/hosting infrastructure, credential rotation, and Windows Installer policy audits — following the public disclosure.
  • Cyber Security News publishes companion coverage 'Windows User Account Control Bypassed', detailing the same campaign's hidden-PowerShell/runas UAC elevation technique used by 10 of the 11 first-stage downloaders.
  • Cyber Security News publishes companion coverage 'Malicious NuGet Packages Target Browser Credentials', contextualizing the pepesoft campaign within a broader wave of credential-focused malicious NuGet packages.
  • Cyber Security News publishes 'Fake Game Cheats NuGet Packages Deliver Remote Access Malware', summarizing Socket's findings for a broader audience.

Sources cited

Previous and next in supply chain

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 5 sources; published ; last updated —.

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