Skip to navigation

Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2040

Operation QUICSILVER: China-Nexus Actor Targets Myanmar Diplomats via VHD-Delivered Go Backdoor (QUICAgent)

highACTIVE

Seqrite Labs reports 'Operation QUICSILVER,' a China-nexus (moderate confidence) espionage campaign against Myanmar government and diplomatic personnel that lures victims with a Burmese-language graduation-ceremony invitation into mounting a VHD file disguised as a JPEG. The VHD contains a PDF-icon LNK that abuses ftp.exe to reconstruct and launch QUICAgent, a custom Go 1.20 backdoor that beacons over QUIC/HTTP3 with RC4-encrypted traffic and resolves fallback C2 via Cloudflare Workers dead-drop endpoints.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2040
Also known asOperation QUICSILVER
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (endpoint OS)
Nation-state nexusChina
MalwareQUICAgent
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027.009 Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads, T1036.008 Masquerading: Masquerade File Type, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File, T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution, T1497.003 Time Based Checks, T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder and 2 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration, diplomatic, non-governmental organizations
Target regionsmyanmar, Southeast Asia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2040 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 19 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: VHD-Disguised JPEG Lure Mount and PDF-Masquerading LNK Execution

Detects the Operation QUICSILVER initial-access chain: a VHD file disguised with a .jpg/.jpeg extension being mounted, followed by execution of a .lnk shortcut masquerading as a PDF (e.g. TrainingAnnouncement.jpg -> TrainingAnnouncement.pdf.lnk, ACMECS_Pillar_1.vhd) launched from explorer.exe.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1566.001, T1204.002, T1036.008
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_vhdmp_operational, windows_security
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-VHDMP-Operational" (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=2)
| rename ImagePath as vhd_path
| where match(vhd_path, "(?i)\.jpe?g$")
| join type=left host [
    search index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" Image="*.lnk"
    | rename Image as lnk_path CommandLine as lnk_cmdline Hashes as lnk_hashes
    | fields host User lnk_path lnk_cmdline lnk_hashes _time
  ]
| eval known_hash=if(match(lnk_hashes,"(?i)daeac66441b88ba22806f6617058a2dbf1ea0ddcc6c94f291542ea853ac6f9d3|26f735cbbb1257be94e6d01656a35bf66a8ae9c34868548d69ec5cb588f9f916"),1,0)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen by host, User, vhd_path, lnk_path, lnk_cmdline, known_hash
| where count > 0

Microsoft KQL

DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName endswith ".jpg" or FileName endswith ".jpeg"
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileRenamed")
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
    | where FileName endswith ".lnk"
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (".pdf.lnk", "TrainingAnnouncement", "ACMECS")
) on DeviceId
| where SHA256 in ("daeac66441b88ba22806f6617058a2dbf1ea0ddcc6c94f291542ea853ac6f9d3","26f735cbbb1257be94e6d01656a35bf66a8ae9c34868548d69ec5cb588f9f916") or FileName has "TrainingAnnouncement" or FileName has "ACMECS"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, SHA256, ProcessCommandLine

Sigma

title: VHD-Disguised Lure Mount with PDF-Masquerading LNK Execution
id: c3a1e6d2-4f8b-4a2c-9e17-8b6a2f0c1d01
status: experimental
description: Detects a Virtual Hard Disk file disguised with an image extension being mounted, followed by execution of a .lnk shortcut masquerading as a PDF file -- the Operation QUICSILVER initial-access chain (TrainingAnnouncement.jpg -> TrainingAnnouncement.pdf.lnk).
references:
    - https://www.seqrite.com/blog/operation-quicsilver-china-nexus-actor-targets-myanmar-diplomats-via-vhd-delivered-go-backdoor/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/08/17
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036.008
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
    selection_lnk:
        Image|endswith: '.lnk'
    selection_lure:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'TrainingAnnouncement'
            - 'ACMECS_Pillar_1'
            - '.pdf.lnk'
    condition: selection_parent and selection_lnk and selection_lure
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate shortcut files distributed via email with unusual naming
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate IT-distributed shortcut files with unconventional naming conventions mimicking documents

Tuning notes: Extend the known_hash lookup with the TL_OSINT_Scan-corroborated LNK hash daeac66441b88ba22806f6617058a2dbf1ea0ddcc6c94f291542ea853ac6f9d3 (1 community sighting, reporter nextronresearch) plus the related community-observed sibling sha256 hashes (836fa2c799b0b7c2ab683055d880674a2cfe95dc6e47b0650f9f8e0dcb43f858, a8b41646405c819e8e023355ef31b5cf76a09173ff553880d1e984db2e88f01b, 9e5005fd9dadd8486bbe89318fc840380840314dedfa2bb8ad5db19b9ea300b0, 767d95559f7dd0808e6deb69cb107ea4a218a5fef2ff295774d32d876acf9c03, 9f119d05403b1e079893fb77f6b8b2a9682d1df7ced31a189e7490924ccfb170) as a lower-confidence hash watchlist tier.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • ftp.exe LOLBAS Script Abuse and Split-Payload Reconstruction (header.doc + body.doc) · unlock with TL Creds
  • QUICAgent Forensic Artifact Deletion Following Backdoor Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cloudflare Workers Dead-Drop C2 Resolver Requests (appupdate/regupdate workers.dev) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Virtual Hard Disk Mount from File Carrying a Non-Disk-Image Extension · unlock with TL Creds
  • Windowsupdate.exe (QUICAgent) Spawning System/File Discovery Commands · unlock with TL Creds
  • TLS/QUIC Handshake Presenting Self-Signed 'RAT CA' Certificate · unlock with TL Creds
  • QUICAgent Startup Persistence via SystemIn.lnk and create_lnk PowerShell Script · unlock with TL Creds
  • QUICAgent QUIC/HTTP3 Beaconing to Known C2 Infrastructure over UDP/443 · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 19 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2040.

Sample indicators (3 of 19)

  • IP address: 104.64.211[.]22
  • Domain: register[.]mediumser[.]com
  • URL: hxxps://appupdate[.]0cmds20cj2cdf8[.]workers[.]dev/A3cmf0q9ASCion

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 19 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

19 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

Seqrite Labs disclosed Operation QUICSILVER, a China-nexus (moderate confidence) cyber-espionage campaign targeting Myanmar government and diplomatic personnel, including staff of the Information Technology and Cyber Security Department (ITCSD) under the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC), as well as embassy and NGO personnel. Recovered deleted documents from victim machines cover BIMSTEC affairs, Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies (MISIS) collaboration, Malaysian foreign-policy assessments, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs material marked 'Confidential - For Official Use Only,' indicating a clear diplomatic/foreign-policy collection objective.

Initial access relies on a Burmese-language graduation-ceremony lure impersonating the ITCSD/MOTC (event date 3 July 2026, Assembly Hall, Office Building No. 2, MOTC, Naypyidaw; training topics: Computer Repair & Maintenance and Project Planning & Management for Software Development), alongside ACMECS (Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy)-themed decoys. The lure delivers TrainingAnnouncement.jpg, which is in fact a Virtual Hard Disk (VHD) file. Mounting the VHD exposes TrainingAnnouncement.pdf.lnk, a Windows shortcut masquerading as a PDF (T1036.008) that, once opened, silently invokes the Microsoft-signed ftp.exe utility with the `-s:` flag against a locally dropped script named '_' (T1218, LOLBAS abuse). That script runs `copy /b` to concatenate two payload fragments, header.doc and body.doc, into Windowsupdate.exe in %LOCALAPPDATA% — a split-payload reconstruction technique (T1027.009) designed to defeat static and network-transit detection, since neither fragment alone resembles an executable. A decoy PDF (TrainingAnnouncement.pdf) is opened simultaneously to distract the victim.

Windowsupdate.exe is QUICAgent, a custom Go 1.20 backdoor (embedded build ID `VQ20YVf_9K_8cgCF_NX7/TKHb39wS9Mu5bek0tOPM/xNfDrnhseTXcWQEFyFKX/HlpR3WMRKM_BIA32YLDE`). It communicates with its C2 over QUIC transported on UDP/443 using HTTP/3, encrypting traffic with RC4 under a hardcoded key (`MySecretEncryptionKey2025!@#$%`) and validating the server via a custom VerifyPeerCertificate routine that checks for an embedded self-signed CA (subject 'RAT CA', organization 'RAT System'). Default beacon interval is 5 seconds and is remotely adjustable via a `set_heartbeat` command. Supported operator commands are `shell` (arbitrary command execution), `set_heartbeat`, `upload` (exfiltration), `download` (retrieval/staging of additional tooling), and `list_dir` (filesystem enumeration). Primary C2 resolves to register.mediumser.com (domain registered 20 March 2026 via NameSilo, delegated to Cloudflare DNS at kelly.ns.cloudflare.com), which pointed to 38.60.244.141 from 1-6 July 2026 before infrastructure moved to 104.64.211.22 from 7 July 2026 onward; maui-cocktailbar.com serves as a secondary/backup C2 domain. QUICAgent also resolves two Cloudflare Workers URLs (appupdate.0cmds20cj2cdf8.workers.dev and regupdate.eamakfu49dc28wa.workers.dev) as dead-drop resolvers (T1102.001), using a trusted, hard-to-block CDN-hosted service to locate or fall back to live C2 infrastructure.

For persistence, QUICAgent generates a PowerShell script (pattern `create_lnk_*.ps1`, T1059.001) that drops SystemIn.lnk into the current user's Startup folder, pointing back at Windowsupdate.exe so the backdoor auto-launches at every logon (T1547.001). Anti-analysis measures include a randomized 100-600ms execution delay and 1,000 iterations of SHA-256 hashing purely to burn sandbox time budgets (T1497.003), plus deletion of dropped intermediate artifacts to remove forensic traces (T1070.004). Two earlier delivery variants were identified: HolidayNotice.pdf.exe (April 2026, using a Belgian-Myanmar holiday-calendar lure) and ACMECS_Pillar_1.vhd (July 2026, reusing the same VHD/LNK chain with an ACMECS theme), showing the operators iterating lure content while keeping the loader mechanics constant.

Seqrite assesses China-nexus attribution with moderate confidence, driven by infrastructure and tooling overlap with 'Operation GriefLure' (Seqrite, published May 2026), a related China-nexus (moderate-to-high confidence) campaign against Vietnam's military-linked telecom sector and Philippine healthcare that used an identical LNK-abuses-ftp.exe infection chain reconstructing a payload from header.doc/body.doc fragments. Both campaigns share a builder hostname artifact, 'desktop-stv6gg', embedded in the malicious LNK files, while Operation QUICSILVER introduces a distinct Go-based backdoor (QUICAgent, versus GriefLure's sfsvc.exe payload) and wholly separate C2 infrastructure — consistent with a shared toolkit/builder used across multiple regional targets by the same or an affiliated China-nexus cluster. No CVE is associated with this campaign; compromise depends entirely on social engineering and LOLBAS abuse rather than a software vulnerability.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Defense Evasion

T1027.009 Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads; T1036.008 Masquerading: Masquerade File Type; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion; T1497.003 Time Based Checks

Execution

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver; T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

stealth

T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution

Persistence

T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Initial Access

T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block network indicators: register.mediumser.com, maui-cocktailbar.com, 104.64.211.22, 38.60.244.141, and the two Cloudflare Workers URLs (appupdate.0cmds20cj2cdf8.workers.dev, regupdate.eamakfu49dc28wa.workers.dev) at DNS/proxy/firewall.
  • Hunt for and quarantine the published SHA-256 hashes (TrainingAnnouncement.jpg, TrainingAnnouncement.pdf.lnk, Windowsupdate.exe, header.doc, body.doc, ACMECS_Pillar_1.vhd, HolidayNotice.pdf.exe) across endpoints and mail gateways.
  • Hunt for SystemIn.lnk in user Startup folders and create_lnk_*.ps1 script artifacts as post-compromise indicators.
  • Alert on ftp.exe spawned with a '-s:' argument pointing at a non-standard local script — this is not normal ftp.exe usage in most environments.

Workarounds

  • Disable or restrict user-mode disk-image (VHD/VHDX) auto-mount handling via Group Policy for at-risk user populations.
  • Block outbound QUIC/UDP-443 at the network perimeter for hosts that do not require it, forcing C2 fallback to more easily detected protocols.

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR/behavioral detection for QUIC/HTTP3 traffic over UDP/443 to unfamiliar destinations, especially from endpoints not expected to use QUIC-based applications.
  • Restrict or monitor VHD/VHDX mounting on user endpoints via Explorer, especially from email- or download-sourced files with non-VHD extensions.
  • Enforce Attack Surface Reduction / application control rules blocking ftp.exe from being used as a script interpreter (LOLBAS abuse) outside of authorized administrative contexts.
  • Deliver targeted phishing-awareness training to Myanmar government, MOTC, and diplomatic-mission staff on VHD/LNK-based lures given the ongoing campaign.

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (endpoint OS)
    Vulnerable versions: Any Windows version supporting VHD mount, .lnk shortcut execution, and ftp.exe (no specific version dependency; social-engineering/LOLBAS-driven, not a software vulnerability)

Timeline

  • Primary C2 domain locked-ioc-11 registered via NameSilo, delegated to Cloudflare DNS (kelly.ns.cloudflare.com).
  • Earlier delivery variant HolidayNotice.pdf.exe observed, using a Belgian-Myanmar holiday-calendar lure (exact day within April 2026 not disclosed by source).
  • TrainingAnnouncement.jpg VHD-based delivery sample first observed (exact day within June 2026 not disclosed by source).
  • Historical C2 IP locked-ioc-15 becomes active for locked-ioc-11.
  • Date referenced in the graduation-ceremony lure document: Assembly Hall, Office Building No. 2, MOTC, Naypyidaw, 3:00 PM.
  • Historical C2 IP locked-ioc-15 activity period ends.
  • C2 infrastructure for locked-ioc-11 pivots to current IP locked-ioc-14, active onward.
  • ACMECS_Pillar_1.vhd delivery variant observed reusing the VHD/LNK infection chain with an ACMECS theme (exact day within July 2026 not disclosed by source).
  • Seqrite Labs publishes Operation QUICSILVER research disclosing the campaign, IOCs, and full ATT&CK mapping.

Sources cited

Previous and next in malware

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

// threat_feed
$ sort --newest
Showing all threats

Live intelligence console

Threat level

Latest Threats