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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2205

Fake 'Beloved PBN Entegrasyonu' WordPress Plugin Drops Dual Webshells via Database Injection

criticalACTIVE

A fake WordPress plugin, 'Beloved PBN Entegrasyonu', beacons the compromised site's URL to an external C2 API on every page load and injects attacker-supplied HTML/JavaScript into the page footer, while separately planting two PHP webshells directly inside wp_posts database records rather than on the filesystem.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2205
Also known asBeloved PBN Entegrasyonu
SeverityCRITICAL
First disclosed
Affected productsN/A (malicious third-party plugin, not an official WordPress.org listing or a vulnerability in legitimate software) Self-hosted WordPress sites on which the fake 'Beloved PBN Entegrasyonu' plugin was installed
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-94, CWE-306, CWE-829, CWE-912
MalwareBeloved PBN Entegrasyonu
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1036 Masquerading, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1505.003 Web Shell, T1564 Hide Artifacts, T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories, T1583.001 Domains, T1584.004 Server
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorswebsites, digital media
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources5 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2205 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 5 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Fake 'Beloved PBN Entegrasyonu' Plugin File Drop / Activation

Detects the file-integrity-monitoring artifact of the fake 'Beloved PBN Entegrasyonu' WordPress plugin being written to disk or activated at wp-content/plugins/beloved-pbn/beloved-pbn.php. This plugin has no legitimate PBN function — its presence at all indicates the exploitation/initial-foothold stage of this campaign, since the actor must have already obtained upload/admin access to plant it.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1505.003, T1036, T1583.001, T1584.004
  • Data sources: osquery file_events (FIM), Microsoft Defender DeviceFileEvents, WordPress plugin activation log
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=fim sourcetype="osquery:file_events" action=CREATED
(target_path="*/wp-content/plugins/beloved-pbn/beloved-pbn.php" OR target_path="*beloved-pbn*")
| eval threat="Beloved-PBN-fake-plugin"
| table _time, host, target_path, md5, uid, threat
| sort -_time

Microsoft KQL

DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FolderPath has @"wp-content\plugins\beloved-pbn" or FileName =~ "beloved-pbn.php"
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileRenamed")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, SHA256

Sigma

title: Fake Beloved PBN Entegrasyonu WordPress Plugin File Dropped
id: 7a1c2e6a-1f3d-4c5b-9e2a-2f6b1c9d0a11
status: experimental
description: Detects the malicious file wp-content/plugins/beloved-pbn/beloved-pbn.php being created on a WordPress host, the disguise plugin used to beacon to a C2 and inject content into the page footer.
references:
    - https://blog.sucuri.net/2026/06/wordpress-pbn-plugin-drops-dual-webshells-via-database-injection.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-06-16
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '/wp-content/plugins/beloved-pbn/'
            - 'beloved-pbn.php'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - A legitimate plugin coincidentally sharing the 'beloved-pbn' naming (highly unlikely; this string is unique to the malicious campaign)
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • A file-integrity monitor misconfigured to also alert on benign plugin backup/staging copies with a similar path

Tuning notes: If the host runs a staging/backup workflow that mirrors the wp-content/plugins tree to another path, add an exclusion for that mirror path; otherwise any hit on this exact plugin slug should be treated as a true positive given it has no legitimate distribution.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Fake 'Beloved PBN Entegrasyonu' Plugin File Drop / Activation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Database-Resident PHP Webshell Written into wp_posts · unlock with TL Creds
  • Beloved PBN C2 Beacon / Footer-Injection Callback · unlock with TL Creds
  • Fake 'Beloved PBN Entegrasyonu' Plugin File Drop / Activation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Database-Resident PHP Webshell Written into wp_posts · unlock with TL Creds
  • Beloved PBN C2 Beacon / Footer-Injection Callback · unlock with TL Creds
  • Database-Resident PHP Webshell Written into wp_posts · unlock with TL Creds
  • Beloved PBN C2 Beacon / Footer-Injection Callback · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 5 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2205.

Sample indicators (2 of 5)

  • Domain: wp-tracker[.]com
  • Domain: destangelirvip[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 5 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

5 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

The database-resident webshells grant unauthenticated, unrestricted read/write access to the entire server filesystem and are purpose-built to evade file-based malware scanners.

Sucuri incident responders identified a fake WordPress plugin named 'Beloved PBN Entegrasyonu' (Turkish: "Beloved PBN Integration") planted on a compromised WordPress site at wp-content/plugins/beloved-pbn/beloved-pbn.php. Rather than providing any legitimate PBN (Private Blog Network) functionality, the plugin's actual purpose was to silently beacon the compromised site's URL to an external API — hxxps://wp-tracker[.]com/api.php — on every page load, and to echo whatever HTML or JavaScript the C2 server returned directly into the page footer. To avoid printing garbage or tipping off defenders when the C2 was offline or returned unexpected data, the injection logic only executes/prints C2 responses containing a specific marker string. The plugin's metadata (Plugin URI) points to a second attacker-controlled domain, hxxps://destangelirvip[.]com.

Separately from the plugin, the attackers staged two PHP webshells as raw executable code stored directly inside wp_posts database records rather than as files on disk — a deliberate choice to evade file-based malware scanners that only inspect the filesystem. Both webshells are reachable over HTTP with no authentication or IP restriction and expose an action-handler model driven by attacker-submitted parameters, providing unrestricted file read, write, delete, rename, and permission-modification across the entire server filesystem, unrestricted file upload with no extension filtering, and unrestricted directory traversal. One of the two webshells additionally hides itself from directory listings so it will not appear if an administrator browses the plugin directory. Outbound requests from the malware spoof a Chrome 120 User-Agent string, and source-code comments explicitly reference bypassing FortiGuard web filtering.

Sucuri assesses the campaign as run by a Turkish-speaking threat actor operating a classic black-hat SEO monetization scheme: the database-resident access and footer injection are used to plant hidden backlinks as part of a Private Blog Network, most likely tied to gambling and adult-affiliate niches. The injected outbound links risk damaging the compromised site's own search rankings and can trigger manual actions in Google Search Console. No CVE applies — this is a malicious, self-installed fake plugin rather than a vulnerability in a legitimate one; the underlying access vector used to plant the plugin on the victim site in the first place is not documented in available sourcing. Sucuri published a SQL hunting query against wp_posts and remediation guidance (plugin/database cleanup, credential rotation, wp_users audit) alongside the disclosure.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Defense Evasion

T1036 Masquerading; T1564 Hide Artifacts; T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols

Persistence

T1505.003 Web Shell

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains; T1584.004 Server

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Remove the wp-content/plugins/beloved-pbn/ directory and deactivate/delete the 'Beloved PBN Entegrasyonu' plugin
  • Query wp_posts for records matching post_content LIKE '%<?php%' OR post_content LIKE '%file_put_contents%' OR post_content LIKE '%file_get_contents%' OR post_content LIKE '%eval(%' and remove the malicious rows
  • Block outbound and inbound traffic to wp-tracker[.]com and destangelirvip[.]com at the perimeter/WAF

Longer-term hardening

  • Audit wp_users for unauthorized administrator accounts created via the webshells
  • Rotate all WordPress admin, database, and hosting credentials
  • Deploy database-content integrity monitoring (not just filesystem file-integrity monitoring) that inspects wp_posts for embedded PHP/eval payloads

Affected and fixed versions

  • N/A (malicious third-party plugin, not an official WordPress.org listing or a vulnerability in legitimate software) — Self-hosted WordPress sites on which the fake 'Beloved PBN Entegrasyonu' plugin was installed
    Vulnerable versions: Any WordPress installation where the fake plugin was manually installed/activated after the attacker obtained prior access
    Fixed in: N/A — remediation is removal of the malicious plugin and database-resident webshells, not a software patch

Timeline

  • Sucuri publishes a public technical write-up including a wp_posts hunting SQL query and remediation guidance (plugin removal, database cleanup, credential rotation, wp_users audit).
  • Sucuri assesses the campaign as run by a Turkish-speaking threat actor operating a gambling/adult-affiliate Private Blog Network hidden-backlink monetization scheme.
  • Self-hiding directory-listing evasion in one webshell, Chrome 120 User-Agent spoofing, and explicit FortiGuard-bypass comments are identified in the malware.
  • Two PHP webshells are found stored as raw executable code inside wp_posts database records rather than on the filesystem, exposing unauthenticated full-filesystem read/write/upload/traversal via an attacker-driven action handler.
  • Beacon and footer-injection logic is identified in the plugin, calling locked-ioc-2 on every page load and injecting the marker-gated response into the page footer.
  • Sucuri incident responders identify a fake plugin, 'Beloved PBN Entegrasyonu', at locked-ioc-1 on a compromised WordPress site during cleanup.

Sources cited

Previous and next in malware

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 5 sources; published ; last updated —.

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