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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2213

APT28-Linked HOOKEDGE Backdoor Targets Diplomatic and Government Organizations in Romania, Spain, and Türkiye

highACTIVE

APT28 (Fancy Bear / Forest Blizzard), tracked by Recorded Future's Insikt Group as BlueDelta, ran a series of initial-access campaigns between late September 2025 and early April 2026 against government and diplomatic organizations in Romania, Spain, and Türkiye, delivering a lightweight Windows batch-script backdoor dubbed HOOKEDGE via macro-enabled Word documents.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2213
Also known asHOOKEDGE Campaign, BlueDelta Diplomatic Espionage Campaign
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Word (Microsoft 365 / Office); Microsoft Windows (Task Scheduler, Edge)
AttributionAPT28 (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusRussia
MalwareHOOKEDGE, Headlace
ToolsSOURFACE
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1059.005 Visual Basic, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1497.003 Time Based Checks, T1564.003 Hidden Window, T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment, T1567.004 Exfiltration Over Webhook and 1 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration, diplomatic, defense
Target regionsromania, spain, Türkiye, Europe
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-29, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2213 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 20 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Scheduled Task With 5/30/61-Minute Interval Invoking cmd.exe/wscript.exe (HOOKEDGE Persistence)

Detects schtasks.exe process creation or Security 4698 scheduled-task-creation events using a 5, 30, or 61-minute repeat interval whose action invokes cmd.exe or wscript.exe. HOOKEDGE's installer creates such a task to re-execute its .vbs launcher (30 min for standard targets, 61 min to outlast a ~1-hour sandbox window, 5 min for high-value second-stage instances) and then self-deletes.

Splunk SPL

(index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*\\schtasks.exe")
OR
(index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4698)
| eval action_target=coalesce(CommandLine, TaskContent)
| where match(action_target, "(?i)\/sc\s+minute.*\/mo\s+(5|30|61)\b") OR match(action_target, "(?i)PT(5|30|61)M")
| where match(action_target, "(?i)(cmd\.exe|wscript\.exe)")
| table _time, ComputerName, User, SubjectUserName, TaskName, action_target

Microsoft KQL

let taskProc = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)/create"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)/sc\s+minute.*\/mo\s+(5|30|61)\b"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("cmd.exe", "wscript.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, Source = "DeviceProcessEvents";
taskProc

Sigma

title: Scheduled Task Created With 5/30/61-Minute Interval Invoking cmd.exe or wscript.exe (HOOKEDGE Persistence)
id: 3d6b7e44-1a2f-4c9d-9b0e-5a7c8f1d3e02
status: experimental
description: Detects schtasks.exe or Security 4698 scheduled-task creation events using a 5, 30, or 61-minute repeat interval whose action invokes cmd.exe or wscript.exe, consistent with HOOKEDGE's installer persisting its launcher and re-executing outside the ~1-hour sandbox observation window.
references:
    - https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/bluedelta-targets-with-hookedge
    - https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/apt28-linked-hookedge-backdoor-targets.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-29
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1070.004
    - attack.t1564.003
    - attack.t1497.003
    - attack.g0007
    - detection.hookedge
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
    selection_create:
        CommandLine|contains: '/create'
    selection_interval:
        CommandLine|re: '(?i)/sc\s+minute.*\/mo\s+(5|30|61)\b'
    selection_target:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cmd.exe'
            - 'wscript.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate RMM, patch-management, or monitoring agents that create short-interval scheduled tasks invoking cmd.exe or wscript.exe
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate RMM, patch-management, or endpoint-monitoring agents that create short-interval scheduled tasks invoking cmd.exe or wscript.exe as part of normal operation

Tuning notes: Allowlist known RMM/monitoring task names, publishers, and install paths; raise confidence by requiring the task action reference a script path under %userprofile% (outside Program Files) to filter legitimate enterprise software.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • HOOKEDGE Maldoc Drops GUID-Named Payload Set to User Profile (Sentinel/KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Scheduled Task With 5/30/61-Minute Interval Invoking cmd.exe/wscript.exe (HOOKEDGE Persistence, Sentinel/KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Headless Microsoft Edge Requesting [indicator] for Tasking/Exfiltration (HOOKEDGE C2, Sentinel/KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • HOOKEDGE Maldoc Drops GUID-Named Payload Set to User Profile (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Scheduled Task With 5/30/61-Minute Interval Invoking cmd.exe/wscript.exe (HOOKEDGE Persistence, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Headless Microsoft Edge Requesting [indicator] for Tasking/Exfiltration (HOOKEDGE C2, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • HOOKEDGE Maldoc Drops GUID-Named Payload Set to User Profile (Splunk) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Headless Microsoft Edge Requesting [indicator] for Tasking/Exfiltration (HOOKEDGE C2) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-29, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 20 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2213.

Sample indicators (3 of 20)

  • Domain: webhook[.]site
  • File hash: 001b57368c10bee9e62374e3b3f232b113eb75a1f198243d43a5bb90e1d0f500
  • File hash: 206bd177f3f3b637b0a444ce2dd6d5aaaefc9d66c866ac6ec0c9e946ce140991

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 20 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

20 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Insikt Group assesses with moderate confidence that BlueDelta, which overlaps with APT28/Fancy Bear/Forest Blizzard and is attributed to Russia's GRU Main Directorate of the General Staff, ran an espionage campaign against European government and diplomatic targets from late September 2025 through early April 2026. The campaign opened with a macro-enabled Word document impersonating material from Spain's Ministry of the Presidency, Justice and Relations with the Cortes, created shortly after a September 8, 2025 meeting between Spanish and Moldovan officials, and later pivoted to generic 'Enable Content' lures with fake error dialogs targeting Romania, and eventually Türkiye by April 2026.

Opening the document's AutoOpen() macro drops six files into %userprofile%, including a GUID-named .bat/.vbs/.cmd chain (the HOOKEDGE payload, its launcher, and an installer) plus .htm/.xhtml staging files used to format exfiltrated output. The installer creates a scheduled task that re-executes the HOOKEDGE launcher every 30 minutes (later widened to 61 minutes, timed to outlast the roughly one-hour observation window of common sandboxes) and then self-deletes. HOOKEDGE itself is a polling-loop batch backdoor: it launches Microsoft Edge in headless or hidden-window mode to retrieve a `.cmd` payload from a dedicated webhook.site tasking endpoint, executes it locally via cmd.exe, and posts the results to a second, separate webhook.site endpoint for exfiltration, then cleans up temporary files. High-value targets receive a dedicated second-stage HOOKEDGE instance with its own webhook pair and a much tighter 5-minute beacon interval, enabling near-interactive tasking. Because webhook.site's free tier caps each endpoint at 100 requests, BlueDelta rotated endpoints frequently and lengthened beacon intervals to stretch the quota; operators accessed the webhook.site administration panel through NordVPN egress IPs to obscure themselves. Lure engineering included phishing-funnel tracking pixels (`docopened.jpg`, later `mailopened.jpg`) that beacon to webhook.site the moment a target opens the email or the document, giving operators delivery-success telemetry before any payload runs.

HOOKEDGE shares extensive code and tradecraft overlap with APT28's earlier HEADLACE backdoor (in use against diplomats since at least April 2023, including a March 2024 car-for-sale-themed campaign using an Audi Q7 decoy and DLL-sideloading via a trojanized calculator binary), including identical second-stage JavaScript variable names, structure, and base64 encoding schemes, near-identical GUID file-naming conventions, and the same reliance on abusing free web services (webhook.site, and previously Mocky) instead of adversary-owned infrastructure. Insikt Group assesses HOOKEDGE is a direct evolutionary successor to HEADLACE maintained by the same operators, reflecting BlueDelta's preference for lightweight, rapidly modifiable tooling over more complex implants.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File; T1070.004 File Deletion; T1497.003 Time Based Checks; T1564.003 Hidden Window

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task

Execution

T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1059.005 Visual Basic; T1204.002 Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication

Initial Access

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

Exfiltration

T1567.004 Exfiltration Over Webhook

Resource Development

T1583.006 Web Services

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block or alert on outbound connections to webhook.site and similar generic webhook/request-bin services unless explicitly business-justified
  • Disable Office macros for documents originating from the internet, or restrict execution to signed VBA only
  • Hunt for scheduled tasks created in user-writable contexts that re-execute cmd.exe, wscript.exe, or a .bat/.vbs pair at 5-, 30-, or 61-minute intervals

Workarounds

  • Restrict or closely monitor outbound HTTP/HTTPS traffic to *.webhook.site at the network egress boundary

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR detections for msedge.exe launched with headless or hidden-window flags and no corresponding user activity
  • Enforce FIDO2/hardware-key MFA for externally facing services used by diplomatic and government staff to blunt post-compromise credential reuse
  • Build phishing-lure detection content for diplomatic-themed documents impersonating ministries or referencing recent bilateral meetings

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Word (Microsoft 365 / Office)
    Vulnerable versions: any version with macros enabled for internet-sourced documents
    Fixed in: N/A - social-engineering delivery vector, not a software vulnerability
  • Microsoft — Windows (Task Scheduler, Edge)
    Vulnerable versions: all supported Windows versions with msedge.exe and Task Scheduler available
    Fixed in: N/A

Timeline

  • HEADLACE, HOOKEDGE's direct predecessor, is in use by APT28/BlueDelta against diplomatic targets as early as April 2023.
  • APT28 runs a HEADLACE campaign using a car-for-sale (Audi Q7) phishing decoy and DLL sideloading via a trojanized calculator binary to target diplomats.
  • Earlier May 2024 HEADLACE campaigns target European networks with credential-harvesting components using the same malware family.
  • The Hacker News publishes reporting on the HEADLACE car-sale-lure campaign, documenting APT28's locked-ioc-16/Mocky-based C2 tradecraft.
  • Spanish and Moldovan officials hold a bilateral meeting that is subsequently referenced in the earliest HOOKEDGE lure document.
  • Earliest observed HOOKEDGE lure deployed, a macro-enabled Word document impersonating material from Spain's Ministry of the Presidency, Justice and Relations with the Cortes.
  • BlueDelta shifts to generic 'Enable Content' lures with fake error dialogs, expanding targeting to Romanian government organizations through December 2025.
  • Operators introduce a 'mailopened.jpg' locked-ioc-16 tracking canary alongside the existing 'docopened.jpg' canary to monitor the full phishing funnel.
  • HOOKEDGE variants targeting Türkiye are identified, marking the campaign's geographic expansion and the end of the documented late-September-2025-to-early-April-2026 activity window.
  • BlueDelta introduces minor VBA obfuscation changes to HOOKEDGE lure documents and removes the document-open tracking canary from later builds.
  • Recorded Future's Insikt Group publishes its BlueDelta/HOOKEDGE research; The Hacker News and other outlets report on the campaign the same day.

Sources cited

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