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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2219

Dark Caracal Deploys New GoCaracal Malware with Ethereum-Based C2 Resilience in Venezuela Breach

highACTIVE

Lebanon-linked cyberespionage group Dark Caracal (G0070) deployed a previously undocumented Go-based malware framework, GoCaracal, alongside its legacy Bandook backdoor in a confirmed June 2026 breach of a Venezuelan communications organization. The extended GoCaracal build queries a custom Ethereum smart contract ("BulletproofC2") as a dead-drop fallback to fetch replacement C2 server addresses when its primary infrastructure is seized or unreachable.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2219
Also known asDark Caracal Reloaded
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows; Google Chrome; Brave Software Brave Browser; Mozilla Firefox
AttributionDark Caracal (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusLebanon
MalwareBandook, GoCaracal
Tools0x03D605f13A74Bfb6149078122FcF62BD6d8799d8, 0x04aB453494381E60171BE04Ea6BE6E7C44EafAfd, 0x7D321FE277f8c25aaC14aF1BA3Fc34953242052F, 0xD7635f31620772882a6712472a6278c53247Bc44, 0xf165F26300BF65DFaC78BC9557326bDbB3C6d33C
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1021.005 VNC, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1055 Process Injection, T1056.001 Keylogging, T1057 Process Discovery, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1090 Proxy, T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver, T1112 Modify Registry, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1518.001 Security Software Discovery, T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder and 4 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorstelecoms
Target regionsLatin America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-29, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2219 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 30 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: GoCaracal/Bandook Post-Exploitation — Registry Run Key Persistence, NTUSER.MAN Concealment, Browser Process Injection (SPL)

Detects the extended GoCaracal/Bandook post-exploitation footprint: a Registry Run-key entry pointing to a randomized executable under %AppData%\Roaming\<random>\ (the observed persistence path pattern), creation of a concealed NTUSER.MAN artifact, and process injection into a browser process (Chrome/Brave/Firefox) associated with browser-credential harvesting and keylogging by the extended GoCaracal build.

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
( (EventCode=13 TargetObject="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*" Details="*\\AppData\\Roaming\\*" Details="*.exe" NOT (Details="*\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\*" OR Details="*\\Roaming\\Google\\*"))
  OR (EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*\\NTUSER.MAN")
  OR (EventCode=8 SourceImage IN ("*\\chrome.exe","*\\firefox.exe","*\\brave.exe"))
)
| eval technique=case(EventCode=13,"T1547.001/T1112 Registry Run Key (Roaming random path)",EventCode=11,"T1564.001 Hidden NTUSER.MAN",EventCode=8,"T1055 Process Injection into Browser")
| stats count values(technique) as techniques_observed min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by ComputerName User Image TargetObject TargetFilename Details SourceImage TargetImage
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| table ComputerName User techniques_observed Image TargetObject TargetFilename Details SourceImage TargetImage count first_seen last_seen

Microsoft KQL

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RegistryKey has @"CurrentVersion\Run" and RegistryValueData has @"\AppData\Roaming\" and RegistryValueData endswith ".exe"
| where RegistryValueData !has @"\Roaming\Microsoft\" and RegistryValueData !has @"\Roaming\Google\"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, Technique="T1547.001/T1112", RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData
| union (
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName =~ "NTUSER.MAN"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, Technique="T1564.001", RegistryKey="", RegistryValueName="NTUSER.MAN", RegistryValueData=FolderPath
)
| union (
    DeviceEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where ActionType == "ProcessInjection" and InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("chrome.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, Technique="T1055", RegistryKey="", RegistryValueName="Browser Process Injection", RegistryValueData=InitiatingProcessFileName
)
| sort by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: GoCaracal/Bandook Persistence via Registry Run Key Pointing to Randomized AppData Roaming Path
id: 9d2f5b81-6c4a-4e17-8b3d-2a7f1c9e5b02
status: experimental
description: Detects a Registry Run key referencing a randomized subfolder/executable under %AppData%\Roaming, and/or creation of a concealed NTUSER.MAN artifact, consistent with GoCaracal/Bandook persistence mechanics.
references:
    - https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/dark-caracal-reloaded-new-malware-same-hunting-grounds/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-29
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.t1564.001
    - attack.t1055
    - attack.g0070
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_run_key:
        TargetObject|contains: '\CurrentVersion\Run\'
        Details|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\'
        Details|endswith: '.exe'
    filter_known_good:
        Details|contains:
            - '\Roaming\Microsoft\'
            - '\Roaming\Google\'
    condition: selection_run_key and not filter_known_good
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate applications that install per-user autostart entries under AppData\Roaming
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate per-user applications that install autostart entries under AppData\Roaming outside the vendor's own subfolder (e.g. some installer frameworks)
  • Endpoint security agents that legitimately inject into browser processes for DLP/inspection purposes

Tuning notes: Baseline and exclude known-good vendor autostart subfolder names under AppData\Roaming (e.g. Slack, Zoom, Teams update helpers) before enabling in blocking mode; validate SourceImage/TargetImage pairs for EventCode=8 against an approved DLP/EDR agent allowlist to suppress expected security-tool injection.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • GoCaracal SVG-Lure Phishing Delivery Chain — Domain Contact to Archive Payload Execution (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • GoCaracal/Bandook Post-Exploitation — Registry Run Key Persistence, NTUSER.MAN Concealment, Browser Process Injection (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • GoCaracal/Bandook C2 Beaconing and BulletproofC2 Ethereum Dead-Drop Fallback (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • GoCaracal SVG-Lure Phishing Delivery Chain — Archive Payload Execution (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • GoCaracal/Bandook Post-Exploitation — Registry Run Key Persistence and Concealed NTUSER.MAN (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Dark Caracal GoCaracal/Bandook C2 Communication and BulletproofC2 Ethereum Fallback (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • GoCaracal SVG-Lure Phishing Delivery Chain — Domain Contact to Archive Payload Execution (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • GoCaracal/Bandook C2 Beaconing and BulletproofC2 Ethereum Dead-Drop Fallback (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-29, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 30 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2219.

Sample indicators (3 of 30)

  • IP address: 109.120.187[.]217
  • Domain: getpdfdigital[.]cloud
  • File hash: 1E499C815146124C4A6D2B48C99068B980AD74E1A2CFD16013F8D75A9425A0CA

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 30 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

30 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Arctic Wolf Labs' "Dark Caracal Reloaded: New Malware, Same Hunting Grounds" report (published August 27, 2026) documents a June 2026 intrusion into a Venezuelan communications organization by Dark Caracal, a persistent espionage actor Lookout and EFF first attributed in 2018 to a building belonging to Lebanon's General Directorate of General Security (GDGS) in Beirut. Analysis of 249 related samples spanning January-July 2026 revealed two build profiles of a new modular Go framework, GoCaracal: a lightweight implant (host profiling, AES-GCM encrypted custom-protocol C2, file execution/retrieval, an interactive shell, shellcode loading and process injection, payload download) that establishes a foothold, and an extended build with 34 command handlers (v1.0.1-v1.0.6) that adds targeted file search, Chrome/Brave/Firefox browser-credential harvesting, keylogging, WebRTC-based desktop access, hidden-VNC behavior, cloning of the victim's Chrome profile into a separate hidden session, a SOCKS5 proxy, self-update, and persistence via registry manipulation and a concealed NTUSER.MAN artifact.

GoCaracal runs in parallel with, rather than replacing, an updated Bandook backdoor (~82 obfuscated command handlers, randomized command identifiers replacing the historical sequential @0001-@0136 scheme, browser-credential collection) delivered by a Delphi loader.

The infection chain begins with Spanish-language, financial/tax-themed phishing emails carrying weaponized SVG attachments that embed a Base64-encoded shortened link; opening the SVG redirects the browser through an intermediate redirector to a document-themed staging domain (e.g., getpdfdigital[.]cloud, one of seven identified delivery domains, two of which were previously attributed to the group), which serves a 7-Zip archive containing the lightweight GoCaracal implant (TF-OFICINA004A9.exe). That implant deploys the Delphi loader, which in turn drops Bandook and the extended GoCaracal build.

The headline innovation is GoCaracal's Ethereum-based C2 resilience mechanism: operators deployed a custom Solidity smart contract named "BulletproofC2" (first on Sepolia testnet, later on Ethereum mainnet, from wallet 0x7D321FE277f8c25aaC14aF1BA3Fc34953242052F) whose mutable storage holds a replacement C2 address. After repeated failures against the primary control server, the malware issues eth_getStorageAt JSON-RPC requests to public Ethereum nodes to retrieve that address, letting operators rotate infrastructure via a blockchain transaction rather than redeploying malware to victims. Twenty-three of the 24 identified GoCaracal C2 IPs are hosted on AEZA Group networks; Bandook's C2 sits on AlexHost, a provider previously linked to the group. Beyond the confirmed Venezuelan victim, Arctic Wolf assesses broader Latin American targeting (Brazil, Ecuador, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Uruguay) is under investigation, consistent with Dark Caracal's historical reach across 21+ countries and thousands of victims documented by Lookout/EFF since 2012.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Lateral Movement

T1021.005 VNC

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1055 Process Injection; T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories

Collection

T1056.001 Keylogging

Discovery

T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1518.001 Security Software Discovery

Command and Control

T1090 Proxy; T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver; T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography

defense-impairment

T1112 Modify Registry

Execution

T1204.002 Malicious File

Persistence

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Credential Access

T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers

Initial Access

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block the identified GoCaracal/Bandook C2 IP ranges and the seven Spanish-language document-themed phishing-redirect domains at the network perimeter
  • Alert on outbound Ethereum JSON-RPC traffic (eth_getStorageAt calls to public nodes) occurring immediately after repeated failed connections to a blocked/known C2 IP - a strong indicator of BulletproofC2 dead-drop fallback lookups
  • Hunt Windows endpoints for the identified file hashes and for persistence artifacts under %AppData%\Roaming\<random>\<random>.exe plus concealed NTUSER.MAN files

Workarounds

  • Restrict or disable SVG rendering/active-content execution in email clients and browsers for at-risk user populations
  • Block or heavily scrutinize the seven identified delivery domains at DNS/web-proxy layer

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy attachment filtering/sandboxing that inspects SVG file content for embedded scripts and redirect URLs rather than trusting the image MIME type
  • Harden browser credential stores (OS keychain / Application-Bound Encryption integration) to reduce the value of stolen Chrome, Brave, and Firefox login databases
  • Run Spanish-language phishing-simulation and awareness training for finance/tax-adjacent staff, focused on SVG-attachment and shortened-link lures

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: all supported desktop/server versions - PE-based implant
  • Google — Chrome
    Vulnerable versions: stored credentials/cookies targeted for harvesting
  • Brave Software — Brave Browser
    Vulnerable versions: stored credentials/cookies targeted for harvesting
  • Mozilla — Firefox
    Vulnerable versions: stored credentials/cookies targeted for harvesting

Timeline

  • Earliest samples in Arctic Wolf's 249-sample GoCaracal/Bandook analysis set date to this period; the analysis window runs January-July 2026.
  • The BulletproofC2 Solidity contract locked-ioc-8 is deployed, first appearing on Ethereum's Sepolia testnet before a later mainnet deployment.
  • Confirmed intrusion into a Venezuelan communications organization using the GoCaracal lightweight and extended builds alongside Bandook - the incident that anchored Arctic Wolf's investigation.
  • A new Spanish-language, document-themed domain is registered and begins delivering GoCaracal, one of seven identified phishing-redirect domains (two previously attributed to Dark Caracal).
  • Arctic Wolf's sample-analysis window across 249 related GoCaracal/Bandook samples closes, feeding into the August report.
  • Arctic Wolf Labs publishes "Dark Caracal Reloaded: New Malware, Same Hunting Grounds," documenting GoCaracal and the Ethereum-based BulletproofC2 fallback mechanism.
  • Cyber Security News, Security Affairs, GBHackers, and Cyberpress publicly report on the Arctic Wolf findings, disclosing GoCaracal's Ethereum smart-contract C2 resilience technique.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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