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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2235

Superior Campaign: 19 Chrome and Edge Extensions Weaponized to Drain Crypto Wallets and Steal Browser/Exchange Data

highACTIVE

Socket's threat research team identified 19 malicious browser extensions (18 Chrome, 1 Edge) tied to a framework it tracks as 'Superior', active since approximately February 2024. The framework hijacks wallet-connect/swap buttons to drain EVM, Solana, and Tron wallets, phishes Ledger/Trezor seed phrases, steals sessions from Binance, Coinbase, Kraken, OKX, MEXC, KuCoin, Bybit, and MetaMask, harvests Facebook/LinkedIn credentials and browser history, and deploys ClickFix-style fake update lures, all coordinated over encrypted WebSocket C2 channels.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2235
Also known asSuperior
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsGoogle Chrome Web Store extension platform; Microsoft Edge Add-ons store extension platform
MalwareKraken, Superior
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1056 Input Capture, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1090 Proxy, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1176 Software Extensions, T1185 Browser Session Hijacking, T1195 Supply Chain Compromise, T1217 Browser Information Discovery, T1528 Steal Application Access Token and 4 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorscryptocurrency, financial services, consumer individual users, web3 and defi
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2235 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 24 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Superior Campaign — Malicious Chrome/Edge Extension Install or Enable (Known Extension ID Match)

Detects installation, enabling, or forced-update of any of the eight confirmed Superior-framework extension IDs (both threat-actor-created listings and acquired-then-trojanized extensions such as 'Enable Right Click & Copy') across managed Chrome/Edge fleets, using Chrome/Edge enterprise extension telemetry.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1195, T1176, T1608, T1583
  • Data sources: chrome_enterprise_extension_telemetry, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint_deviceevents, edge_managed_extension_reporting
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=chrome_extensions OR index=edge_extensions sourcetype IN ("chrome:browser:extensions","edge:browser:extensions")
| eval ext_id=coalesce(extension_id, id, ExtensionId)
| eval ext_action=coalesce(action, event_type, install_state)
| where ext_id IN ("pkoccklolohdacbfooifnpebakpbeipc","inmkjedjdhgpknjogbjomhnbgdccckkg","fegckejpfnlmfgkfjpinlbgmeeijjkel","jamminefolhgepgihbmcjjhgldbfcikp","lhmcajhgadanidbopgaoobjlldegjmke","ahpnnnjbnfbhoikhohglpohnoocjcoco","pcngchfbfgejllcbhmeadjhiebebiome","fcgdejjichpgfaaafflplhfijcnieopb")
| where ext_action IN ("install","enable","update","force_installed")
| stats earliest(_time) as first_seen, latest(_time) as last_seen, count by host, user, ext_id, extension_name, browser
| eval risk="critical", campaign="Superior wallet-drainer framework"

Microsoft KQL

DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in~ ("BrowserExtensionInstallEvent","ChromeExtensionInstalled","EdgeExtensionInstalled","BrowserExtensionEnabled")
| extend ExtensionId = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).ExtensionId), ExtensionName = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).ExtensionName)
| where ExtensionId in (
    "pkoccklolohdacbfooifnpebakpbeipc","inmkjedjdhgpknjogbjomhnbgdccckkg",
    "fegckejpfnlmfgkfjpinlbgmeeijjkel","jamminefolhgepgihbmcjjhgldbfcikp",
    "lhmcajhgadanidbopgaoobjlldegjmke","ahpnnnjbnfbhoikhohglpohnoocjcoco",
    "pcngchfbfgejllcbhmeadjhiebebiome","fcgdejjichpgfaaafflplhfijcnieopb")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ExtensionId, ExtensionName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Superior Campaign Malicious Browser Extension Installed or Enabled
id: 7c1e6f2a-4b3d-4e91-9a5c-1f2d3e4a5b6c
status: experimental
description: Detects installation or enabling of a Chrome/Edge extension ID confirmed as part of the Socket-tracked 'Superior' wallet-drainer and credential-theft framework.
references:
    - https://socket.dev/blog/chrome-edge-extension-wallet-drainer
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/chrome-web-store-extensions-caught-stealing-crypto-browser-data/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-30
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1583
    - attack.t1608
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1195
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1176
logsource:
    category: browser_extension
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ExtensionId:
            - 'pkoccklolohdacbfooifnpebakpbeipc'
            - 'inmkjedjdhgpknjogbjomhnbgdccckkg'
            - 'fegckejpfnlmfgkfjpinlbgmeeijjkel'
            - 'jamminefolhgepgihbmcjjhgldbfcikp'
            - 'lhmcajhgadanidbopgaoobjlldegjmke'
            - 'ahpnnnjbnfbhoikhohglpohnoocjcoco'
            - 'pcngchfbfgejllcbhmeadjhiebebiome'
            - 'fcgdejjichpgfaaafflplhfijcnieopb'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - None expected — these are specific, disclosed malicious extension IDs
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • None expected for an exact extension-ID match; verify the telemetry source is not replaying stale/cached inventory data from before the Chrome Web Store removal on 2026-08-30

Tuning notes: Extend the extension-ID list as Socket/BleepingComputer/vendor telemetry identifies additional Superior-framework extension IDs; also alert on any extension ownership/publisher-account change event for extensions with >1000 installs, since acquisition-then-weaponization is this campaign's core distribution vector.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Superior Campaign — Acquired Extension Weaponized via Silent Auto-Update During Confirmed Window · unlock with TL Creds
  • Exchange/Wallet Session Cookie and Access Token Exfiltration to Superior C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • Persistent WebSocket Connection to Superior Campaign C2 with Endpoint Rotation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Newly Installed Browser Extension Requests CSP-Stripping-Capable Permission Combination · unlock with TL Creds
  • Content-Security-Policy Header Stripped from Cryptocurrency Exchange or Wallet Response · unlock with TL Creds
  • Outbound Traffic to Superior Campaign Abused Cloudflare Workers.dev Exfiltration Sink · unlock with TL Creds
  • Seed Phrase / Wallet Recovery Data Posted to Superior Campaign Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • DNS/Proxy Beaconing to Confirmed Superior Campaign C2 Domain Set · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 24 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2235.

Sample indicators (3 of 24)

  • Domain: active-enable-right-click[.]top
  • Domain: enable-right-click[.]click
  • Domain: payload[.]siteinsight[.]bond

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 24 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

24 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Socket security researcher Karlo Zanki published findings on August 27, 2026 detailing a coordinated malware framework distributed through 19 browser extensions on the Chrome Web Store and Microsoft Edge Add-ons store, tracked under the name 'Superior'. Fourteen of the extensions were built from scratch by the threat actor under innocuous branding (crypto price trackers, SEO/traffic checkers, ad-library spy tools, screenshot/OCR utilities), while five were legitimate, previously benign extensions with real install bases that the actor purchased from their original developers and later updated with malicious code — most notably 'Enable Right Click & Copy — Smart Unlock + OCR', which had accumulated roughly 70,000 Chrome installs and 10,000 Edge installs before weaponization.

Once activated, the malicious code opens a persistent WebSocket connection to actor-controlled infrastructure and pulls down JavaScript payload modules on demand, keeping the bulk of the malicious logic off the extension package itself to evade Chrome Web Store review. Deployed modules include a multi-chain wallet drainer that detects EVM-compatible, Solana, and Tron wallet activity and silently rewrites the destination of legitimate 'Connect Wallet' and 'Swap' button transactions; a hardware-wallet phishing module that renders fake Ledger and Trezor firmware-update or recovery pages to capture seed phrases; a session-theft module that harvests authentication cookies and account data from Binance, Coinbase, Kraken, OKX, MEXC, KuCoin, Bybit, and MetaMask; a universal form grabber; a Facebook/LinkedIn credential and session harvester; a browser-history exfiltration module; and a ClickFix-style lure that injects a fake browser-update modal instructing victims to paste and run attacker-supplied commands. Several modules strip Content-Security-Policy protections from visited pages to make the injected scripts function on sites that would otherwise block them.

At time of Socket's disclosure and BleepingComputer's follow-up coverage (August 30, 2026), Google had removed the identified extensions from the Chrome Web Store, but the Microsoft Edge Add-ons versions — including 'Allow Copy - Select & Enable Right Click' — remained live and installable. The reliance on Chrome's default silent auto-update mechanism to push the malicious versions to an already-large installed base is the campaign's core distribution technique, and the acquisition of legitimate extensions from their original developers is a supply-chain compromise pattern Socket has documented in related campaigns.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1185 Browser Session Hijacking

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Credential Access

T1056 Input Capture; T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Persistence

T1176 Software Extensions

Initial Access

T1195 Supply Chain Compromise

Discovery

T1217 Browser Information Discovery

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1608 Stage Capabilities

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Remove/uninstall the 19 identified extension IDs from all managed Chrome and Edge browsers immediately, including the five acquired extensions still functioning as trojanized updates of previously legitimate tools
  • Force-revoke and rotate session cookies/API tokens for Binance, Coinbase, Kraken, OKX, MEXC, KuCoin, Bybit, and MetaMask accounts used on any browser that had one of the flagged extensions installed
  • Treat any Ledger or Trezor seed phrase entered through a browser-rendered 'recovery' or 'firmware update' page during the exposure window as compromised and migrate funds to a new wallet
  • Block the identified C2 and payload-hosting domains at the DNS/proxy layer

Workarounds

  • Disable non-essential browser extensions, particularly right-click/copy-enablers, screenshot/OCR tools, and crypto price-tracking extensions, until vetted

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy enterprise extension allowlisting/blocklisting via Chrome/Edge managed policy (ExtensionInstallBlocklist / ExtensionInstallAllowlist) rather than relying on marketplace vetting alone
  • Monitor for extension ownership/publisher changes on installed extensions, since actor acquisition of dormant or actively-maintained extensions from original developers is the primary distribution vector here
  • Educate crypto-holding users that hardware wallet recovery/firmware flows should never be completed inside a browser tab prompted by a webpage or extension pop-up
  • Add browser extension WebSocket C2 behavior (persistent background-worker sockets to non-vendor domains) to EDR/network detection content

Affected and fixed versions

  • Google — Chrome Web Store extension platform
    Vulnerable versions: 18 identified extension listings, current at time of report
    Fixed in: Extensions removed from Chrome Web Store by Google following disclosure
  • Microsoft — Edge Add-ons store extension platform
    Vulnerable versions: 1 identified extension listing ('Allow Copy - Select & Enable Right Click'), live at time of report
    Fixed in: Not yet removed as of publication

Timeline

  • Socket assesses the earliest Superior campaign extension activity to approximately February 2024 (precise day not disclosed), marking the start of the wallet-drainer framework's deployment via browser extensions.
  • Approximate start of the roughly six-month window Socket describes in which previously legitimate, high-install extensions such as 'Enable Right Click & Copy — Smart Unlock + OCR' (70,000 Chrome / 10,000 Edge installs) were purchased from their original developers and pushed malicious updates.
  • The Hacker News publishes independent coverage corroborating Socket's findings, the 'Superior' campaign name, and Karlo Zanki's attribution.
  • Socket security researcher Karlo Zanki publishes technical analysis identifying 19 malicious extensions (18 Chrome, 1 Edge) tied to the 'Superior' wallet-drainer and credential-theft framework.
  • The Microsoft Edge Add-ons version of the acquired extension ('Allow Copy - Select & Enable Right Click') remains available for download at time of publication, unlike its removed Chrome counterparts.
  • Google removes the 18 identified malicious extensions from the Chrome Web Store following disclosure.
  • BleepingComputer reports on the Socket findings, summarizing the framework's wallet-connect hijacking, seed-phrase phishing, exchange session theft, and ClickFix-style lures.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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