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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2367

WordlistLoader Delivering Amatera (ACR Stealer) via ClearFake FakeCaptcha Campaigns

highACTIVE

WordlistLoader is a novel loader delivering the Amatera infostealer (rebranded ACR Stealer) through ClearFake campaigns using FakeCaptcha social engineering. The ClickFix infection chain tricks victims into pasting a malicious clipboard command that mounts a remote WebDAV share and executes WordlistLoader via rundll32.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2367
Also known asACR Stealer, AcridRain Stealer, GrMsk Stealer
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows; Google Chrome; Microsoft Edge; Various Chromium-based browsers (65 families including Brave, Opera, Vivaldi, Perplexity Comet, GhostBrowser, Naver Whale, and others); Various Gecko-based browsers (Firefox, Zen, Mullvad Browser, LibreWolf, SeaMonkey, and others)
MalwareACR Stealer, Amatera, ClearFake
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1053 Scheduled Task/Job, T1055 Process Injection, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1106 Native API, T1204 User Execution, T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution, T1555 Credentials from Password Stores, T1573 Encrypted Channel, T1583 Acquire Infrastructure and 2 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsgeneral, cryptocurrency, enterprise
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources13 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2367 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 33 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: ClickFix WebDAV Payload Execution via pushd @SSL and Rundll32

Detects the ClickFix command-execution chain used by WordlistLoader/Amatera ClearFake FakeCaptcha campaigns. The three documented command variants all leave command-line artifacts in Sysmon process creation telemetry: the @SSL WebDAV syntax (pushd \\server@SSL or direct rundll32 from a mounted share), the headless conhost.exe --headless variant that masks pushd/rundll32 via delayed variable expansion, and the mshta.exe HTTP HTA dropper variant. Any one of these firing on a workstation indicates the user executed a pasted clipboard command, the earliest defensive signal in the infection chain.

Splunk SPL

index=windows_xmlwineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| where CommandLine="*@SSL*" OR CommandLine="*--headless*" OR CommandLine="mshta*http*" OR (CommandLine="*pushd*" AND CommandLine="*\\*")
| eval clickfix_sig=case(CommandLine="*@SSL*","webdav_ssl", CommandLine="*--headless*","conhost_headless", CommandLine="*pushd*","pushd", CommandLine="mshta*http*","mshta_remote", true(),"rundll32_remote")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(clickfix_sig) as sigs values(ParentImage) as parent_images by ComputerName, User, Image, CommandLine
| where count >= 1
| table ComputerName User Image CommandLine sigs parent_images count first_seen last_seen
| sort - count

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where (FileName =~ "mshta.exe" and CommandLine has "http://")
    or (FileName =~ "rundll32.exe" and CommandLine has "@SSL")
    or (FileName =~ "cmd.exe" and (CommandLine has "pushd" and CommandLine has "@SSL"))
    or (FileName =~ "conhost.exe" and CommandLine has "--headless")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine = CommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

Sigma

title: ClickFix WebDAV Payload Execution via pushd @SSL and Rundll32
id: 8f42c1a9-3d7e-4b5a-9c6d-2e8f1a4b5c6d
status: experimental
description: Detects ClickFix-style commands observed in WordlistLoader/Amatera (ClearFake FakeCaptcha) campaigns where a victim pastes a crafted command that mounts a remote WebDAV (@SSL) share via pushd and executes a loader DLL with rundll32, or uses the headless conhost variant masking pushd/rundll32 through environment variable expansion.
references:
  - https://www.gendigital.com/blog/insights/research/wordlistloader-delivering-amatera-via-clearfake-campaigns
  - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/07/16/acr-stealer-two-observed-intrusion-chains-amid-increased-threat-activity/
  - https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/wordlistloader-delivers-amatera-via.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/09/07
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1204
  - attack.t1059.003
  - attack.t1218.011
  - attack.t1189
  - attack.tool.amatera
  - attack.tool.wordlistloader
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_webdav_ssl:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'pushd'
      - '@SSL'
  selection_conhost_headless:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '--headless'
  selection_mshta_remote:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'mshta'
      - 'http'
  filter_known_legit:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'teams'
      - 'onedrive'
  condition: (selection_webdav_ssl or selection_conhost_headless or selection_mshta_remote) and not filter_known_legit
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administration of WebDAV shares using @SSL syntax and pushd
  - Internal HTA deployments invoking mshta.exe with HTTP URLs
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Administrators mounting legitimate WebDAV shares with pushd and @SSL syntax
  • Internal HTAs invoking mshta

Tuning notes: Exclude known admin WebDAV pushd commands by account or source IP. For the --headless variant, correlate with subsequent process creation events (rundll32, mshta) to confirm follow-through. The @SSL signature is the strongest single indicator across all three variants.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • ClearFake ClickFix Remote Payload Execution via mshta and WebDAV · unlock with TL Creds
  • Amatera Credential and Wallet Data Access via Non-Browser Processes · unlock with TL Creds
  • Amatera C2 HTTPS Beaconing to Cloudflare-Fronted Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • ClickFix Command Execution with Obfuscated pushd and WebDAV Mounting · unlock with TL Creds
  • WordlistLoader Reflective Code Loading and PoolParty Thread Pool Injection · unlock with TL Creds
  • Amatera C2 Domain Queries to Blockchain-Rotated .cc Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • WordlistLoader Process Tampering via DLL Unhooking and ETW Bypass · unlock with TL Creds
  • Amatera C2 Communications to Blockchain-Rotated .cc Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 33 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2367.

Sample indicators (3 of 33)

  • IP address: 104.21.80[.]1
  • Domain: health[.]luminexus[.]cc
  • URL: hxxps://download[.]version-516[.]com/other

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 33 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

33 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

WordlistLoader reconstructs shellcode from an English wordlist of 256 words (or UUIDs), unhooks loaded EDR modules, bypasses ETW via hardware breakpoints, and reflectively loads Amatera 4.3.3-alpha1 — an advanced MaaS credential stealer targeting Chromium browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, and over 65 browser families with sophisticated evasion including hardened WoW64 syscalls, runtime-generated x64 indirect-syscall trampolines via Heaven's Gate, and a Remus/Lumma-inspired App-Bound Encryption bypass.

WordlistLoader is a Python-origin intermediate-stage loader first documented by Gen Digital researchers in August 2026, deployed in active ClearFake campaigns using the EtherHiding technique — where malicious JavaScript injected into compromised legitimate websites retrieves second-stage payloads from blockchain smart contracts (BNB Smart Chain, Polygon). Victims visiting compromised sites are presented with a fake CAPTCHA overlay via injected JavaScript; clicking 'I'm not a robot' triggers the ClickFix social engineering flow, copying a malicious command to the clipboard and instructing the victim to paste it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R, Ctrl+V, Enter).

Three ClickFix command variants have been documented: direct rundll32 invocation from a WebDAV share, pushd-mounted WebDAV share with transparent drive mapping, and a headless variant using 'conhost.exe --headless' to suppress console windows with environment-variable obfuscation via delayed variable expansion masking pushd and rundll32. The commands use @SSL WebDAV syntax over HTTPS to mount remote shares GUID-named directories hosting randomly named DLL files (e.g., gmwmvymdzgqgptwvbslq.dll).

WordlistLoader performs three defense-evasion operations before decoding shellcode: (1) single-instance check via a named event, (2) DLL unhooking by enumerating loaded modules via CreateToolhelp32Snapshot and restoring hook-identified functions from clean disk copies — detecting E9/EB/EA/FF jump opcodes with legacy prefix skipping and x64 syscall stub-aware comparison, and (3) ETW bypass by setting a hardware breakpoint on ntdll!NtTraceEvent with a Vectored Exception Handler that redirects execution to a stub returning STATUS_SUCCESS.

The loader reconstructs shellcode from an encoded wordlist of 256 English words (address-matching rather than string-comparison) or a UUID array decoded via UuidFromStringA. The shellcode includes a NOP sled, anti-emulation stub with time-burning nested loops and self-patching, an XOR decryption stub processing 33-byte records (1-byte key, 32-byte payload), and finally a reflective loader identical to one eSentire documented in April 2026 — suggesting Amatera authorship.

The Amatera stealer (version 4.3.3-alpha1) has evolved significantly from earlier builds. It incorporates control-flow flattening (doubling binary size since v4.1.0-alpha.1), per-resolver API hashing (dozens of multiply-rotate-XOR hash variants making precomputation impractical), splitmix64-round string obfuscation, WoW64 syscall hardening with indirect calls routed through global variables and junk instruction padding (eliminating the detectable fs:0C0h reference), runtime-generated 24-byte x64 indirect-syscall trampolines via Heaven's Gate using double-mapped RW+RX sections, and a redesigned App-Bound Encryption bypass inspired by Remus/Lumma — scanning Chromium memory for the os_crypt_async::Encryptor vftable and hijacking browser thread pools via PoolParty variant 7 (TP_DIRECT remote insertion via NtSetIoCompletion).

The stealer targets 65 Chromium- and Gecko-based browsers (up from 37), 165 browser extension crypto wallets, 137 desktop wallets, messaging apps (Discord, Signal), password managers, and general files matching seed-phrase/crypto key patterns. C2 communication uses ECDH (NIST P-256) key exchange + ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD — since v4.0.2 Beta — communicated over HTTPS through NTSockets directly interfacing with \Device\Afd\Endpoint to bypass Winsock hooks, with Cloudflare CDN fronting C2 infrastructure. RecycledGate (FreshyCalls+Hell's Gate) resolves 44 syscall SSNs.

The campaign's infrastructure includes over 100 blockchain-rotated C2 domains on .cc TLD, WebDAV servers on dynamic infrastructure, dead drops on telegra.ph, and over 5,400 compromised websites (primarily WordPress and PrestaShop) serving FakeCaptcha payloads. No named threat actor is attributed to current operations beyond the original developer SheldIO; the ACR Stealer source code was sold in July 2024 leading to the Amatera rebranding.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1055 Process Injection; T1620 Reflective Code Loading

Persistence

T1053 Scheduled Task/Job

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1106 Native API

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1573 Encrypted Channel

execution

T1204 User Execution

stealth

T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution

Credential Access

T1555 Credentials from Password Stores

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Patches

  • No vendor patches applicable — campaign exploits user behavior, not software vulnerabilities

Immediate actions

  • Block .cc TLD domains at network perimeter or apply strict HTTP inspection
  • Monitor for WebDAV pushd commands with @SSL syntax in process creation logs (conhost --headless, pushd \\server@SSL)
  • Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging and Module Logging across all endpoints
  • Deploy hunting queries for suspicious rundll32.exe execution loading DLLs from remote WebDAV paths
  • Block known IOC hashes and domains at perimeter and endpoint security controls
  • Review and restrict outbound SMB/WebDAV connections (TCP 445, 443 WebDAV) from workstations

Workarounds

  • Educate users: never paste clipboard content into Run dialog from a web page prompt
  • Disable WebDAV client service (WebClient) on workstations where not business-required
  • Restrict PowerShell execution policy via GPO to constrained language mode
  • Block mshta.exe execution via attack surface reduction rules
  • Enforce browser policies disabling automatic execution of downloaded content

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection rules for DLL unhooking (CreateToolhelp32Snapshot + module restoration), ETW bypass via hardware breakpoints, and Heaven's Gate WoW64 transitions
  • Enforce AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control to restrict rundll32, mshta, msbuild execution from non-system paths
  • Implement network segmentation limiting workstation-to-workstation SMB/WebDAV access
  • Deploy AMSI in conjunction with PowerShell constrained language mode
  • Conduct regular user security awareness training on ClickFix/FakeCaptcha social engineering variants
  • Monitor for PoolParty variant thread-pool injection indicators (NtSetIoCompletion on non-system handles)

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: 7; 8.1; 10; 11; Server 2008; Server 2012; Server 2016; Server 2019; Server 2022
  • Google — Chrome
    Vulnerable versions: All versions with Chromium App-Bound Encryption
  • Microsoft — Edge
    Vulnerable versions: All Chromium-based versions
  • Various — Chromium-based browsers (65 families including Brave, Opera, Vivaldi, Perplexity Comet, GhostBrowser, Naver Whale, and others)
    Vulnerable versions: All
  • Various — Gecko-based browsers (Firefox, Zen, Mullvad Browser, LibreWolf, SeaMonkey, and others)
    Vulnerable versions: All with stored credentials

Timeline

  • Threat actor SheldIO begins selling GrMsk Stealer precursor to ACR/Amatera as a private MaaS on Russian-language cybercrime forums
  • ACR Stealer first marketed as a separate MaaS product by SheldIO on Russian-speaking underground forums, written in C++, targeting Windows 7-10
  • ACR Stealer sales suspended; source code reportedly sold via Telegram announcement, leading to subsequent Amatera Stealer rebranding and continued evolution by new operators
  • Amatera Stealer rebranded version first surfaces; public MaaS panel scans detected, offering monthly ($199) and yearly ($1,499) subscription plans with Telegram-based customer support
  • Proofpoint publishes analysis of Amatera Stealer as rebranded ACR Stealer, documenting MaaS model, NTSockets networking, WoW64 syscalls, and ClearFake distribution via EtherHiding blockchain dead drops
  • eSentire TRU documents EVALUSION campaign delivering Amatera Stealer and NetSupport RAT via ClickFix; Amatera uses WoW64 syscalls, targets 165+ crypto wallet extensions; NetSupport license file references cluster name 'EVALUSION' and licensee 'KAKAN'
  • Earliest observed Amatera dead drops on telegra[.]publishing platform (Jewel-03-06, Catnap-Skimmed-03-06); BleepingComputer reports over 5,400 compromised WordPress and PrestaShop sites delivering ClearFake ClickFix payloads via BNB Smart Chain EtherHiding
  • Amatera 4.0.2 Beta documented by eSentire; major upgrades include ECDH NIST P-256 + ChaCha20-Poly1305 C2 encryption (replacing AES-256-CBC), RecycledGate (FreshyCalls+Hell's Gate) syscall resolution, 44 resolved SSNs, expanded browser targets from 37 to 65, wallet extensions from 132 to 165, desktop wallets from 41 to 137, Discord/Signal harvesting
  • Reflective loader first observed in ClickFix campaign delivering Amatera 4.0.2 Beta (per eSentire) — identical loader later used in WordlistLoader campaign, suggesting common Amatera authorship
  • Microsoft Defender Experts observe increased ACR Stealer activity beginning, lasting through mid-June 2026; two distinct intrusion chains documented: WebDAV-based ClickFix with Python loaders and blockchain dead-drop C2, and fileless MSHTA-initiated PowerShell with JPEG steganography
  • ClearFake smart contract payload zeroed out on BNB Smart Chain; compromised websites remain infected but temporarily stop serving ClickFix prompts — infrastructure can be reactivated with single on-chain transaction
  • Additional Amatera dead drops observed (Executing-modules-as-scripts-06-16, Using-Python-as-a-Calculator-06-05); Python-based loaders in ACR Stealer chain active per Microsoft tracking
  • Microsoft publishes detailed analysis of ACR Stealer intrusion chains, documenting three ClickFix command variants (direct rundll32, pushd-mounted WebDAV, headless conhost obfuscation), 97+ unique C2 domains with blockchain rotation, and steganographic payload delivery via JPEG images on image-hosting services
  • Gen Digital (Vojtěch Krejsa) publishes WordlistLoader analysis documenting Amatera 4.3.3-alpha1 — novel loader with wordlist-to-byte shellcode reconstruction, DLL unhooking, hardware-breakpoint ETW bypass, UUID variant, hardened WoW64 with indirect calls and Heaven's Gate x64 trampolines, Remus/Lumma-inspired ABE bypass via memory scanning and PoolParty variant 7 thread-pool injection; Broadcom/Symantec publishes concurrent protection bulletin
  • WordlistLoader/Amatera campaign continues actively; PhishEye research documents 97 unique C2 domains across 113 on-chain rotations on Polygon from March to June 2026; campaign scales with single-transaction domain rotation allowing rapid infrastructure refresh

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 13 sources; published ; last updated —.

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