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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2426

BloodAlchemy RAT Traced to Deed RAT/ShadowPad Lineage via VPN Account Compromise and DLL Side-Loading

highACTIVE

ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence's code-level analysis of the BLOODALCHEMY backdoor (first named by Elastic Security Labs in October 2023 as part of the REF5961 intrusion set) traces it to Deed RAT, a backdoor exclusive to the Space Pirates actor, which in turn descends from ShadowPad and PlugX. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2426
Also known asBLOODALCHEMY
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsBrother Industries BrDifxapi.exe (device driver installer utility)
AttributionREF5961 (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusChina
MalwareBloodAlchemy, PlugX, SNAPPYBEE, ShadowPad, ShadowPad (POISONPLUG.SHADOW), Voidoor
ToolsAcunetix, Portmap, ShadowPad
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1027.011 Obfuscated Files or Information: Fileless Storage, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1055.004 Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1090 Proxy, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1106 Native API, T1112 Modify Registry and 6 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration
Target regionsSoutheast Asia, mongolia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-09-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2426 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 20 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: BLOODALCHEMY DLL Side-Loading Infection Chain (BrDifxapi.exe / BrLogAPI.dll / DIFX)

Detects the BLOODALCHEMY initial infection chain: the legitimate but revoked-certificate Brother Industries utility BrDifxapi.exe executing from C:\windows\, side-loading the malicious BrLogAPI.dll, alongside creation of the AES-128-CBC-encrypted DIFX shellcode container in the same directory. This triad, dropped outside any legitimate Brother installer path, is the ground-truth infection-chain signature documented for REF5961/BLOODALCHEMY.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1574.002, T1133, T1078, T1027.011
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint_image_load
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

(index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="C:\\windows\\BrLogAPI.dll")
  OR (index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="C:\\windows\\BrDifxapi.exe")
  OR (index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=11 TargetFilename="C:\\windows\\DIFX")
| eval infection_component=case(
    EventCode=7, "BrLogAPI.dll side-loaded",
    EventCode=1, "BrDifxapi.exe launched from C:\\windows\\",
    EventCode=11, "DIFX AES-encrypted shellcode container written")
| eval revoked_cert_flag=if(EventCode=1 AND (SignatureStatus="Revoked" OR Signed="false"), 1, 0)
| stats count values(infection_component) as chain_components max(revoked_cert_flag) as revoked_signature min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, TargetFilename, User, Hash
| where mvcount(chain_components) >= 1
| eval risk_reason="BLOODALCHEMY infection-chain artifact(s) (BrDifxapi.exe/BrLogAPI.dll/DIFX) observed in C:\\windows\\"
| sort - count

Microsoft KQL

let sideload = DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FolderPath has @"c:\windows\" and FileName =~ "BrLogAPI.dll";
let host = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FolderPath has @"c:\windows\" and FileName =~ "BrDifxapi.exe";
let difxfile = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FolderPath has @"c:\windows\" and FileName =~ "DIFX";
sideload
| join kind=inner host on DeviceId
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, HostProcess=FileName1, SideloadedDll=FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| union (difxfile | project Timestamp, DeviceName, HostProcess="BrDifxapi.exe (assumed)", SideloadedDll="DIFX (shellcode container)", FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessAccountName=RequestAccountName)
| sort by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: BLOODALCHEMY DLL Side-Loading Infection Chain via BrDifxapi.exe / BrLogAPI.dll
id: 7c2e4a1a-9f3d-4b6e-8a2c-1d5e7f9b3c01
status: experimental
description: Detects the BrDifxapi.exe (revoked-certificate Brother Industries utility) DLL side-loading of BrLogAPI.dll and/or the DIFX AES-encrypted shellcode container being written to C:\windows\, the documented BLOODALCHEMY/REF5961 infection chain.
references:
  - https://blog-en.itochuci.co.jp/entry/2024/05/23/090000
  - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/disclosing-the-bloodalchemy-backdoor
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-10
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1133
  - attack.t1078
  - attack.defense-evasion
  - attack.t1574.002
  - attack.t1027.011
  - attack.tool.bloodalchemy
  - attack.tool.deed_rat
logsource:
  category: image_load
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_sideload:
    ImageLoaded|endswith: '\windows\BrLogAPI.dll'
  selection_host:
    Image|endswith: '\windows\BrDifxapi.exe'
  selection_difx:
    TargetFilename|endswith: '\windows\DIFX'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate Brother Industries driver installation from an official signed installer path outside C:\windows\
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate Brother Industries printer/scanner driver installation using a currently valid (non-revoked) BrDifxapi.exe/BrLogAPI.dll pair from the official Brother installer path outside C:\windows\

Tuning notes: Allowlist verified Brother Industries install paths (e.g. Program Files) with a currently valid, non-revoked code-signing certificate thumbprint; alert only on the C:\windows\ path combination since that location is never a legitimate Brother install target.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • BLOODALCHEMY VPN Maintenance Account Abuse (Valid Accounts + External Remote Services) · unlock with TL Creds
  • BLOODALCHEMY Registry-Resident Fileless Payload Storage (Commands 0x1302/0x1303) · unlock with TL Creds
  • BLOODALCHEMY Multi-Protocol C2 Beaconing (/Inform/logger/ URI, SOCKS Proxy, DNS Channel) · unlock with TL Creds
  • BLOODALCHEMY Reconnaissance Command Activity (CPU/OS/Network Discovery via Backdoor Commands) · unlock with TL Creds
  • BLOODALCHEMY Sandbox/Anti-Analysis Evasion Probing (Trellix Artifact Checks) · unlock with TL Creds
  • PlugX-Lineage Sibling Infrastructure Correlated to BLOODALCHEMY (Aliyun OSS Domain / IP:8383, Community-OSINT-Tier) · unlock with TL Creds
  • BLOODALCHEMY Persistence Establishment (Scheduled Task \Dell\BrDifxapi / Service "Test" / Run Key) · unlock with TL Creds
  • BLOODALCHEMY Fileless Shellcode Execution + Early Bird APC Injection into System Processes · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-09-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 20 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2426.

Sample indicators (2 of 20)

  • File hash: e14ee3e2ce0010110c409f119d56f6151fdca64e20d902412db46406ed89009a
  • File hash: 25268bc07b64d0d1df441eb6f4b40dc44a6af568be0657533088d3bfd2a05455

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 20 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

20 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Observed intrusions begin with a compromised VPN maintenance account and use DLL side-loading (BrDifxapi.exe loading BrLogAPI.dll) to run a fileless, AES/LZNT1-decrypted shellcode payload.

ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence researchers (published 2024-05-23) analyzed BLOODALCHEMY, a Windows x86 remote access trojan first named by Elastic Security Labs in October 2023 as part of the China-nexus REF5961 intrusion set that targeted an ASEAN member state's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with secondary targeting observed in Mongolia. ITOCHU's code-level analysis traced BLOODALCHEMY's lineage backward through Deed RAT -- a backdoor exclusively attributed to the Space Pirates threat actor and documented in depth by Positive Technologies -- to ShadowPad (aka POISONPLUG.SHADOW), itself the successor to PlugX/Korplug. The lineage is evidenced by near-identical custom (non-PE) payload header structures, matching plugin-ID/magic-number schemes, shared shellcode-loading routines, comparable exception-handling patterns immediately following the payload entry point, and reused hardcoded persistence directory/filenames ("Test") across BLOODALCHEMY and Deed RAT samples.

Observed intrusions begin with compromise of a victim's VPN maintenance/vendor-support account, giving the actor an initial foothold without exploiting any software vulnerability. From there, three files are dropped into C:\windows\: the legitimate but certificate-revoked Brother Industries utility BrDifxapi.exe, a malicious loader DLL (BrLogAPI.dll) that BrDifxapi.exe side-loads, and an AES-128-CBC-encrypted shellcode container named DIFX whose decryption key is the file's own first 16 bytes. BrLogAPI.dll decrypts DIFX, applies a custom FNV-1a-hash-based decryption pass, and LZNT1-decompresses the result via RtlDecompressBuffer to recover a non-standard, non-PE payload (magic number 45 AB 45 AB) that is mapped with VirtualAlloc and executed entirely in memory -- BLOODALCHEMY's payload never exists as a standalone file on disk. Persistence is established via a scheduled task at C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Dell\BrDifxapi, a Windows service named "Test" (description "Digital Imaging System"), and/or a CurrentVersion\Run registry key, selectable through a persistence-mode flag in the malware's configuration.

BLOODALCHEMY implements 7 operational run modes (ranging from bare C2 beaconing to full persistence + injection + anti-analysis) and 15 backdoor commands covering configuration management, self-update of all three toolset components, uninstall, registry-resident payload storage, proxy configuration, and victim reconnaissance (CPU/OS/network). Code execution into legitimate host processes (SearchIndexer.exe, wininit.exe, taskhost.exe, svchost.exe, taskeng.exe) uses Early Bird APC-queue injection (WriteProcessMemory + QueueUserAPC + ResumeThread). A configuration flag optionally activates Trellix-sandbox-detection logic (process names, file artifacts, DNS results) before the implant fully activates. The malware's configuration supports up to 10 configurable C2 destinations across eight protocols (DNS, HTTP, HTTPS, MUX, UDP, SMB, SOCKS4/5, TCP), though the ITOCHU-analyzed sample used only one; configuration data is itself protected with a rotating single-byte XOR key.

ITOCHU's code lineage points to the same malware ecosystem behind Deed RAT/Space Pirates, while Elastic separately assesses REF5961 as a distinct but related China-nexus, espionage-motivated intrusion set with high confidence, based on tooling and infrastructure correlation with earlier REF2924 activity. Subsequent media coverage noted that the February 2024 leak of Chinese state contractor I-Soon's internal materials plausibly explains why these outwardly separate Chinese clusters (REF5961/BLOODALCHEMY and Space Pirates/Deed RAT) share deeply similar tooling: the leak points to hack-for-hire "digital quartermaster" entities that build and distribute a shared malware toolkit across multiple state-directed campaigns rather than each actor independently engineering its own implants. No CVE is associated with this threat -- the abused weakness is a compromised third-party VPN maintenance credential, not a software vulnerability.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1027.011 Obfuscated Files or Information: Fileless Storage; T1055.004 Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion; T1574.001 DLL

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service; T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Command and Control

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS; T1090 Proxy; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

Execution

T1106 Native API

defense-impairment

T1112 Modify Registry

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Audit and rotate credentials for all VPN maintenance/vendor-support accounts; enforce MFA on VPN administrative access
  • Hunt for BrDifxapi.exe co-located with BrLogAPI.dll and a DIFX file outside expected Brother Industries install paths, especially under C:\windows\
  • Alert on scheduled task creation under C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Dell\BrDifxapi
  • Alert on Windows service creation named "Test" with description "Digital Imaging System"

Workarounds

  • Restrict execution of BrDifxapi.exe and other Brother Industries device-driver utilities to systems where legitimately required
  • Network-segment VPN maintenance/vendor-access channels away from core infrastructure and monitor their authentication logs closely

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR detection for QueueUserAPC/Early Bird APC-queue injection targeting SearchIndexer.exe, wininit.exe, taskhost.exe, svchost.exe, and taskeng.exe
  • Implement application control / code-signing allowlisting to catch DLL side-loading via binaries with revoked or otherwise anomalous signatures
  • Monitor for fileless shellcode execution patterns (VirtualAlloc following LZNT1 decompression via RtlDecompressBuffer)
  • Baseline and alert on unexpected writes to CurrentVersion\Run and other registry-resident payload storage locations

Affected and fixed versions

  • Brother Industries — BrDifxapi.exe (device driver installer utility)
    Vulnerable versions: signed release with a since-revoked code-signing certificate, abused as a DLL side-loading host

Timeline

  • ShadowPad, the earliest identifiable ancestor in BLOODALCHEMY's code lineage, is first identified after being delivered via a backdoored build of NetSarang's server management software in a supply-chain compromise.
  • Positive Technologies first documents the Space Pirates threat actor's exclusive use of Deed RAT, the direct code-lineage predecessor of BLOODALCHEMY (year-level precision only; exact date not given in source material).
  • Positive Technologies publishes a detailed report on Space Pirates' Deed RAT operations against Russian and Serbian government, education, aerospace, defense, energy, and healthcare organizations, including the related Voidoor and Portmap tools.
  • The Hacker News reports on Positive Technologies' Space Pirates/Deed RAT findings.
  • Elastic Security Labs first names and discloses the BLOODALCHEMY backdoor as part of the China-nexus REF5961 intrusion set targeting an ASEAN Ministry of Foreign Affairs, publishing sample hashes and the locked-ioc-5/locked-ioc-6 DLL side-loading chain.
  • The Register covers Elastic's BLOODALCHEMY/REF5961 disclosure.
  • ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence publishes code-level analysis tracing BLOODALCHEMY's lineage through Deed RAT to ShadowPad, detailing the VPN-maintenance-account-compromise infection vector, the DIFX shellcode container, 7 run modes, 15 backdoor commands, and QueueUserAPC-based process injection.
  • The Hacker News covers ITOCHU's lineage findings and connects the shared tooling to the February 2024 I-Soon leak's revelation of centralized 'digital quartermaster' hack-for-hire tool-sharing among Chinese threat clusters.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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