Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2520
BambooToken Malware Uses MQTT Protocol for Cross-Platform Windows/Linux C2
BambooToken is a multi-platform (Windows and Linux) malware family active since at least February 2023 that uses the MQTT publish-subscribe protocol as its C2 channel, delivered in part via DLL side-loading of a vulnerable Tendyron OnKey banking-security-token binary, and has compromised roughly a dozen organizations across Asia and South America through July 2026.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2520 |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Tendyron OnKey (OnKeySrv authentication client software); MikroTik RouterOS devices (compromised via SNMP scanning and used as BambooToken C2 relay infrastructure); DrayTek Routers (compromised via SNMP scanning and used as BambooToken C2 relay infrastructure) |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-427 |
| Nation-state nexus | China |
| Malware | BambooToken, Tendyron |
| Tools | Mosquitto, SoftEther VPN |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1016.001 Internet Connection Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.001 Invalid Code Signature, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1055 Process Injection, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1071.005 Publish/Subscribe Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1090.002 External Proxy, T1129 Shared Modules and 5 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | technology, mobile-applications, manufacturing, hospitality, biomedical, legal, cryptocurrency, finance |
| Target regions | Asia, Southeast Asia, 005 - South America, Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-09-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2520 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 24 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: BambooToken DLL Side-Loading — OnKeyToken_KEB.dll via Tendyron OnKeySrv.exe
Detects the BambooToken initial-execution chain: the malicious OnKeyToken_KEB.dll being loaded into the process space of the legitimate, validly-signed Tendyron OnKeySrv.exe binary. This is BambooToken's primary delivery mechanism — DLL side-loading that hijacks a trusted PKI banking-token authentication client to gain execution.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1574.002, T1129
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=7
Image="*\\OnKeySrv.exe"
| eval imgloaded=lower(ImageLoaded)
| where match(imgloaded, "onkeytoken_keb\.dll$") OR NOT match(imgloaded, "(system32|syswow64|onkey)\\\\")
| eval detection_name="BambooToken DLL Side-Load: OnKeyToken_KEB.dll via OnKeySrv.exe"
| table _time, ComputerName, User, Image, ImageLoaded, Hashes, Signed, SignatureStatus
| sort -_timeMicrosoft KQL
DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "OnKeySrv.exe"
| where FileName =~ "OnKeyToken_KEB.dll"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessSHA256Sigma
title: BambooToken DLL Side-Loading via Tendyron OnKeySrv.exe
id: 7a2f4b6e-1c3d-4e5f-9a8b-2d1c3e4f5a6b
status: experimental
description: Detects OnKeyToken_KEB.dll being loaded by the legitimate Tendyron OnKeySrv.exe process, the BambooToken malware's primary DLL side-loading delivery mechanism.
references:
- https://www.lumen.com/blog/en-us/the-banana-stand-brokering-and-managing-infections-across-asia-using-mqtt
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/bambootoken-malware-uses-mqtt-to.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/09/15
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.execution
- attack.t1574.002
- attack.t1129
- attack.tool.bambootoken
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\OnKeySrv.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\OnKeyToken_KEB.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown; OnKeySrv.exe has no legitimate dependency named OnKeyToken_KEB.dll in vendor documentation
level: criticalKnown false positives:
- Legitimate OnKey software updates that install additional, vendor-signed DLLs into the same directory (verify DLL signature and hash against Tendyron's known-good release).
Tuning notes: Baseline the legitimate DLL set loaded by OnKeySrv.exe in your environment first; alert only on ImageLoaded values not in that allow-list, and pivot on file hash against the known BambooToken sample set (dffa94a0..., 329f0601..., ce4ce009..., f8b8546d...).
- BambooToken Process Injection — Update.log Remote Thread Creation into [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- BambooToken Host Discovery & Beacon Profiling — [indicator] Config Parsing and icanihazip.com IP Lookup · unlock with TL Creds
- BambooToken External Proxy Relay — SoftEther VPN and Compromised MikroTik/DrayTek Router C2 Relay Traffic · unlock with TL Creds
- BambooToken Invalid/Spoofed Code Signature — Tendyron / Zhuhai Kingsoft Masquerade · unlock with TL Creds
- BambooToken SHELL/FILEEX MQTT Command Handler Execution with File-Deletion Cleanup · unlock with TL Creds
- BambooToken Precursor SNMP Scanning of MikroTik/DrayTek Routers · unlock with TL Creds
- BambooToken WMI Antivirus Enumeration Exfiltrated via HTTP GET to [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- BambooToken MQTT C2 Beaconing to Known Infrastructure on Non-Standard Ports (1883/2883/8883) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-09-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 24 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2520.
Sample indicators (3 of 24)
- IP address:
202.144.192[.]149 - Domain:
chat5188[.]tk - File hash:
dffa94a0f9c4dc38d475a32741f7f134cc934c7b98bec581c135da1b5aa1983f
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 24 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
BambooToken is a cross-platform malware family, initially Windows-only and expanded to Linux as of December 2025, that stands out for using the MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) publish-subscribe protocol -- normally used for IoT telemetry -- as its command-and-control channel rather than conventional HTTP(S) C2. Lumen's Black Lotus Labs, which discovered the family after samples surfaced on VirusTotal in January 2026, documented the operation in the report 'The Banana Stand: Brokering and Managing Infections Across Asia Using MQTT.' The malware implements MQTT via the open-source Eclipse Mosquitto library; the broker architecture means the compromised host never communicates directly with the operators' server, only with the broker, which relays messages by GUID-scoped topic.
The primary observed delivery mechanism is DLL side-loading through Tendyron's OnKey software: the operators abuse the legitimate, validly-signed OnKeySrv.exe (used with Tendyron's PKI USB banking security tokens, popular in Chinese banking and government networks) to load a malicious OnKeyToken_KEB.dll. Initial execution begins with a file named Update.log, which spawns a remote thread and injects the payload into memory (process injection) rather than executing from disk directly. Black Lotus Labs also documented a secondary delivery variant impersonating 'Zhuhai Kingsoft Office Software Co., Ltd.' -- a legitimate Chinese office-suite vendor -- via a forged code signature; the researchers confirmed the threat actors did not obtain Zhuhai's actual code-signing certificate, and signature validation on the impersonating component fails, ruling out a supply-chain compromise of either Tendyron or Zhuhai and pointing instead to invalid/spoofed code-signature masquerading.
Once running, BambooToken extracts its C2 address from OnKeySrv.dat configuration files (parsing markers '&#'/'#&' for the C2 IP and '$@'/'@$' for beacon host profiles) or falls back to a hardcoded, XOR-encoded address; multiple samples share the same XOR key, letting Black Lotus Labs cluster them. A hardcoded, XOR-decoded GUID (e.g. '{5861573B-FF85-4C7A-BBAD-EFC01540357D}' in Version 1, '{534E19D5-434B-4cad-A0C2-8D75E0B2FBFC}' in the Linux Version 2.1) is used as a mutex to prevent multiple concurrent agent instances on the same host. The malware supports three command handlers over MQTT: SHELL (spawns a command shell in a new thread), FILEEX (download, upload, and delete files, plus stop-execution/exit), and ONLINE (a heartbeat beacon carrying extensive host enumeration). Version 2.0 (Windows) added a GUID-scoped topic structure (Plugin/unPlugin/removePlugin) and Version 2.1 (Linux) added an additional 'LUA' topic. Static analysis recovered dead, unused code referencing planned-but-unshipped plugins -- KEY_RECOURD (keylogger), COM_clipboard, and COM_ modules for audio, webcam, and desktop-screen capture -- indicating the plugin architecture evolved from a monolithic 2023 build toward a modular 2024+ design.
A dedicated Windows plugin uses WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation), polling roughly every five seconds, to enumerate installed antivirus products and exfiltrate the inventory via an HTTP GET request (not MQTT) to api80.c2iznja[.]com with a spoofed 'HTTP Downloader' user agent -- a defense-evasion and environment-profiling step ahead of further activity. The malware also queries the external service icanihazip[.]com to resolve its own public IP address.
Infrastructure analysis found a SoftEther VPN connection from a Virtual Private Server in Hong Kong to the C2 node at 202.144.192[.]149 -- Black Lotus Labs assesses SoftEther VPN usage originating from Hong Kong VPS infrastructure as 'a known TTP of various PRC-aligned actors,' and correlated timing between China Mobile IP connections to that SoftEther endpoint and subsequent C2 activity, though the entity behind the China Mobile address itself was not identified. Separately, a December 2025 SNMP (port 161) scanning campaign hit over 150 unique MikroTik and DrayTek router IPs across Southeast Asia in a single day; a subset showed sustained MQTT (port 1883) connections to BambooToken C2 nodes afterward, indicating successful compromise and use as relay/proxy infrastructure. Routers in Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam were also observed connecting via 'speedCN,' a VPN service marketed to overseas Chinese users for accessing mainland Chinese websites, suggesting a diaspora-population targeting angle. Multiple C2 domains (including cache.c2iznja[.]com and several chat5188[.]tk subdomains) sit behind Cloudflare, obscuring true origin infrastructure; chat5188[.]tk reached Cloudflare Radar's top 1,000,000 domains by December 2024 and c2iznja[.]com reached the top 500,000 by December 2025, which the researchers cite as evidence of an operator experienced at running wide-reaching campaigns.
Attribution is assessed as PRC-aligned with medium-high confidence, based on: the majority of samples being uploaded from Chinese IP space with corresponding China-based C2 telemetry; use of Tendyron OnKey tokens common in Chinese banking/government environments; the SoftEther-VPN-from-Hong-Kong TTP; deliberate anti-forensic operational security (forged PE compilation metadata claiming Windows Server 2003/Visual Studio 2005 with intentionally varied timestamps to prevent signature clustering); and a targeting pattern -- testing capability against discreet regional/diaspora targets before likely broader expansion -- that mirrors the historical playbook of PRC-nexus actors such as Volt Typhoon, GhostEmperor, and ZuoRAT. Shared RichPE header data across 2024 and 2025 campaign samples indicates a common codebase and development environment maintained by the same operator over time. No specific named threat actor or group was attributed, and Black Lotus Labs found no technical overlap with PlugX/Korplug despite both malware families having used MQTT-adjacent or MQTT-based channels historically; researchers describe BambooToken as an 'emerging threat cluster' with no public correlation to previously documented activity.
Approximately a dozen compromised entities were identified during the investigation, spanning several mobile-application backend servers, a GitLab server in Hong Kong, a portable-lifestyle-device manufacturer and a hotel in Vietnam, a biomedical company in Argentina, a legal firm in Chile, a cryptocurrency website in Lithuania, and a financial organization in Malaysia. The concentration of mobile-application-server victims suggests an extensive data-collection operation. Researchers noted BambooToken sits in a small cohort of malware families that abuse MQTT for C2, alongside MQsTTang (Mustang Panda/CeranaKeeper, 2023), Tizi (Android spyware, in some C2 modes), WailingCrab/WikiLoader (Bamboo Spider cybercrime group), and IOCONTROL/OrpaCrab (Iran-linked OT/IoT malware) -- named by the source reporting as comparators, not as related campaigns.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
Discovery
T1016.001 Internet Connection Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1518.001 Security Software Discovery
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.001 Invalid Code Signature; T1055 Process Injection; T1070.004 File Deletion; T1574.001 DLL
Execution
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1129 Shared Modules
Command and Control
T1071.005 Publish/Subscribe Protocols; T1090.002 External Proxy; T1571 Non-Standard Port
Resource Development
Reconnaissance
Remediation
Patches
- No vendor patch for the OnKeySrv DLL side-loading behavior was identified in the source reporting; contact Tendyron for guidance on hardening the OnKey client
Immediate actions
- Block the known C2 domains (chat5188.tk and its subdomains; c2iznja.com and its subdomains including api80, live-hk, turbo, cache) and C2 IPs (202.144.192.149, 210.1.231.13, 38.180.150.19) at DNS/proxy/perimeter layers
- Hunt for OnKeyToken_KEB.dll alongside a legitimate OnKeySrv.exe, for Update.log performing remote-thread process injection, and for any unexpected DLL dropped into the Tendyron OnKey install directory
- Audit egress traffic for MQTT (TCP/1883, TCP/2883, TLS/8883) connections from hosts with no legitimate IoT/telemetry use case, and for outbound HTTP GET requests to api80.c2iznja.com with a 'HTTP Downloader' user agent
- Inventory internet-exposed MikroTik and DrayTek routers, close/restrict SNMP (UDP/TCP 161) to management networks, and rotate credentials; check for sustained outbound MQTT/1883 sessions from router management VLANs
- Scan for the SHA256 samples and validate any binary claiming to be signed by Tendyron or by 'Zhuhai Kingsoft Office Software Co., Ltd.' against the vendors' actual, current signing certificates
Workarounds
- Restrict or remove the Tendyron OnKey client from systems that do not require PKI banking-token authentication
- Block outbound MQTT (1883/2883/8883) by default and allow-list only sanctioned brokers
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR/NDR signatures for MQTT-based C2 (publish/subscribe traffic to non-enterprise brokers, GUID-scoped topic patterns) rather than relying solely on HTTP(S)-centric detection
- Apply DLL side-loading mitigations (safe DLL search mode, code integrity / WDAC rules, binary allow-listing) on hosts running third-party PKI/authentication client software such as Tendyron OnKey
- Monitor for SoftEther VPN client activity originating from unexpected VPS/cloud egress points, particularly Hong Kong-hosted infrastructure
- Segment and monitor router management interfaces (SNMP, MQTT egress) separately from general network egress to detect abuse as C2 relay infrastructure
- Alert on mismatched/invalid code-signature chains rather than only on the presence or absence of a digital signature
Affected and fixed versions
- Tendyron — OnKey (OnKeySrv authentication client software)
Vulnerable versions: unspecified in source reporting -- affects environments with the OnKeySrv.exe binary installed - MikroTik — RouterOS devices (compromised via SNMP scanning and used as BambooToken C2 relay infrastructure)
Vulnerable versions: unspecified -- compromise vector observed as SNMP (port 161) scanning followed by sustained MQTT/1883 connections - DrayTek — Routers (compromised via SNMP scanning and used as BambooToken C2 relay infrastructure)
Vulnerable versions: unspecified -- compromise vector observed as SNMP (port 161) scanning followed by sustained MQTT/1883 connections
Timeline
- BambooToken Version 1 (Windows-only) is first observed active in the wild, the earliest known activity for the campaign against organizations in Asia and South America.
- The locked-ioc-14 C2 domain family climbs into Cloudflare Radar's top 1,000,000 domains, an indicator Black Lotus Labs cites as evidence of a mature, wide-reaching campaign.
- BambooToken operators begin porting the malware to Linux (Version 2.1), giving the family its current cross-platform Windows/Linux capability.
- A large-scale SNMP (port 161) scanning campaign hits over 150 unique MikroTik and DrayTek router IPs across Southeast Asia in a single day (0730-2345 UTC), identifying candidate devices for later compromise and use as C2 relay infrastructure.
- The newer c2iznja.com C2 domain family reaches Cloudflare Radar's top 500,000 domains.
- BambooToken samples surface on VirusTotal, giving Lumen's Black Lotus Labs the initial lead used to begin tracking the campaign.
- The c2iznja.com C2 domain family becomes the malware's primary infrastructure and the first victim check-ins against it are observed.
- The Linux ELF variant (protocol Version 2.1, adding a 'LUA' MQTT topic) is compiled and deployed.
- Secondary C2 node activity begins, including first contact from the SoftEther VPN-connected VPS later identified in Hong Kong.
- Continued BambooToken operations are observed on tertiary C2 nodes through this date, part of the most recent activity window in the campaign.
- Last observed victim activity tied to the SoftEther VPN VPS in Hong Kong, the most recent known point in the campaign as of the published report.
- Lumen's Black Lotus Labs publishes 'The Banana Stand: Brokering and Managing Infections Across Asia Using MQTT,' covered the same day by The Hacker News.
Sources cited
- The Banana Stand: Brokering and Managing Infections Across Asia Using MQTT lumen.com · Research · 2026-09-15
- Tendyron OnKey / 2G Token product page tendyron.com · Vendor report · 2026-09-15
- MQsTTang: Mustang Panda's latest backdoor treads new ground with Qt and MQTT ESET WeLiveSecurity · Research · 2023-03-02
- Stealthy WailingCrab Malware misuses MQTT Messaging Protocol ibm.com · Research · 2025-11-19
- Inside a New OT/IoT Cyberweapon: IOCONTROL claroty.com · Research · 2024-12-01
- Tizi: Detecting and blocking socially engineered spyware on Android security.googleblog.com · Research · 2017-11-30
- BambooToken Malware Uses MQTT to Control Windows and Linux Systems The Hacker News · News · 2026-09-15
- Iranian Hackers Use IOCONTROL Malware to Target OT, IoT Devices in US, Israel SecurityWeek · News · 2024-12-01
- Webworm Deploys EchoCreep and GraphWorm (SoftEther VPN tradecraft precedent) The Hacker News · News · 2026-05-01
Previous and next in malware
- BambooToken: Cross-Platform Windows/Linux Malware Using MQTT C2, Delivered via Tendyron OnKey DLL Side-Loading and Kingsoft Office Impersonation Previous report
- KREMLIN Banking Malware Hijacks Chrome and Edge via Phantom Extension/GhostChrome-X Integrity Bypass to Steal Brazilian Bank Credentials Next report
Further reading
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.