Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2525
KREMLIN Banking Malware Hijacks Chrome and Edge via Phantom Extension/GhostChrome-X Integrity Bypass to Steal Brazilian Bank Credentials
Elastic Security Labs (tracked as REF9334) exposed KREMLIN, a Brazilian banking-malware toolkit active since May 2025 that impersonates about a dozen Brazilian banks to sideload a malicious Chrome/Edge extension using the publicly documented Phantom Extension/GhostChrome-X Secure Preferences integrity bypass. Later campaigns abuse a legitimate SentinelOne binary (SentinelMemoryScanner.exe) to DLL-sideload an unsigned payload (SentinelAgentCore.dll) and resolve C2 endpoints via an Ethereum smart contract acting as a dead-drop resolver.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2525 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | REF9334 |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Google Chrome; Microsoft Edge; SentinelOne SentinelMemoryScanner.exe (Sentinel Agent component) |
| Attribution | REF9334 (medium confidence) |
| Malware | DonutLoader, PULSAR, Pulsar RAT, REMCOS |
| Tools | cdgcjghdeinagopbaobhmaefigoafaaa, djodclnjknbpambeaaapadmdfhmbpeog, ndpbidppejfanjbhfgjlohfanbfbklff |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1053 Scheduled Task/Job, T1055 Process Injection, T1056 Input Capture, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1176 Software Extensions, T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, T1518 Software Discovery and 5 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | financial services, banking |
| Target regions | brazil, Latin America |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-09-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2525 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 29 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Certutil Payload Decode Invoked by Script Interpreter — KREMLIN Loader
Detects certutil.exe used with -decode/-urlcache flags when spawned by wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe, matching KREMLIN's (REF9334) first-stage obfuscated JavaScript loader that decodes an embedded payload via certutil before downloading a Node.js runtime.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1566, T1059.001, T1497.001
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_telemetry
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| where match(Image, "(?i)\\certutil\.exe$")
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(-decode|-urlcache)")
| where match(ParentImage, "(?i)\\(wscript|cscript|powershell)\.exe$")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by ComputerName, User, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, CommandLine
| table first_seen, last_seen, ComputerName, User, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, CommandLine, countMicrosoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "certutil.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-decode", "-urlcache")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("wscript.exe","cscript.exe","powershell.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Certutil Payload Decode Invoked by Script Interpreter (KREMLIN Loader)
id: a1b2c3d4-1111-4a2b-8c3d-000000000001
status: experimental
description: Detects certutil.exe used to decode/download an embedded payload when spawned by wscript/cscript/powershell, consistent with the KREMLIN (REF9334) multi-stage JavaScript loader.
references:
- https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/malicious-browser-extension-kremlin-banking-malware
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-15
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1497.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_certutil:
Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- '-decode'
- '-urlcache'
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
condition: selection_certutil and selection_parent
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PKI/certificate deployment scripts that wrap certutil decode operations
level: highKnown false positives:
- IT automation or PKI deployment scripts that legitimately use certutil -decode for certificate handling
- Security tooling that wraps certutil output parsing
Tuning notes: Baseline any legitimate certutil decode usage tied to PKI/cert-deployment tooling and exclude by exact parent path + command-line signature; escalate priority if the decoded output writes to %TEMP% or %APPDATA% immediately followed by a Node.js download.
- PowerShell Downloads Node.js Runtime Following Office/Browser Spawn — KREMLIN Second-Stage Loader · unlock with TL Creds
- Unsigned [indicator] Side-Loaded by [indicator] — KREMLIN Campaign 7 · unlock with TL Creds
- Malicious Extension C2 via /google_ws/ WebSocket or /google_api/ CSS-Disguised Polling · unlock with TL Creds
- JSE Loader Executed from Temp/Downloads with Sandbox-Canary Network Probe — KREMLIN · unlock with TL Creds
- Chrome/Edge Secure Preferences Tampered by Non-Browser Process — Phantom Extension / GhostChrome-X Integrity Bypass · unlock with TL Creds
- Non-Browser Process Making Ethereum JSON-RPC Calls — Dead-Drop Resolver C2 (KREMLIN) · unlock with TL Creds
- Malicious Scheduled Task 'MicrosoftNodeRuntimeUpdater' Persistence — KREMLIN · unlock with TL Creds
- Outbound Traffic to Known KREMLIN C2 Infrastructure & Credential-Exfiltration Endpoints · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-09-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 29 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2525.
Sample indicators (3 of 29)
- IP address:
185.221.23[.]133 - Domain:
volmira[.]site - URL:
hxxps://orange-sun-195a[.]checkeligibitily[.]workers[.]dev
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 29 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Elastic identified 1,515 infected systems (>98% in Brazil) via a disrupted network-canary domain.
KREMLIN is a Brazilian banking-malware ecosystem tracked by Elastic Security Labs under the moniker REF9334, active since at least May 2025 across seven distinct, evolving campaigns. Infection begins with a multi-stage obfuscated JavaScript loader (delivered as a fake banking/invoice document) that performs sandbox evasion (desktop file count, running process count, and a network canary check against an unregistered domain), decodes an embedded payload via certutil, and downloads a Node.js runtime. A second-stage loader installs persistence via a scheduled task (MicrosoftNodeRuntimeUpdater, triggered one minute after logon) and, in the newest campaign, queries an Ethereum smart contract (0xCD7360A83E5cdbBbbbcEB0e78748babA6740d07b) to resolve installer, sideload-carrier, and RunPE-carrier URLs, with payloads embedded as Base64/RC4-encoded data inside JPEG steganographic carriers (several hosted on Internet Archive).
A C++ installer (SHA-256 c8c38634dd44d7c6162c66174a6ee23ee404265125166e8d757681bdd66a4268) performs extensive sandbox/VM evasion (process, account, hardware, and VMware/VirtualBox artifact checks) and uses indirect syscalls (via the open-source PigSyscall technique, resolving NTDLL gadgets and API hashes) to evade EDR hooking. It then installs a malicious Chrome/Edge extension using the Phantom Extension/GhostChrome-X technique: it recovers the browser's App-Bound OSCrypt key via a debugger-attached LOAD_DLL_DEBUG_EVENT/pattern-scan of chrome.dll or msedge.dll, then rewrites the Secure Preferences file (enabling developer mode, injecting the malicious extension's settings, and forging protection.macs/*_encrypted_hash/super_mac HMAC integrity values) so Chrome accepts the unauthorized extension without triggering its tamper-detection. The extension (most recently ID ndpbidppejfanjbhfgjlohfanbfbklff, masquerading as "AVSync System Inc.") communicates over a WebSocket channel (/google_ws/) and an HTTP polling channel disguised as .css requests (/google_api/), and supports screenshot capture, tab/cookie/session/local-storage theft, browsing-history collection, full HTML injection, keylogging via input-event listeners, and domain-hash-matched HTTP request interception/redirection. Separately, the installer exfiltrates Login Data, Cookies, Web Data, and derived OSCrypt keys (keys.json) to volmira[.]site and zaviro[.]online, RC4-encrypted via the undocumented SystemFunction032 API.
In its seventh and current campaign (May 2026-present), KREMLIN operators abuse a legitimate SentinelOne binary, SentinelMemoryScanner.exe, to DLL-sideload an unsigned payload disguised as SentinelAgentCore.dll, and also deploy REMCOS RAT and PULSAR RAT alongside the extension. Financial analysis of the Ethereum smart contract's admin wallet (0x5C32A09873be70a92fd8bB5A9fED7967dE06BdE6) shows $20,778.97 USDT in / $19,016.96 USDT out across 149 transactions between June 2025 and August 2026, with transaction timing clustering around São Paulo working hours (UTC-3). Portuguese-language code artifacts, lure filenames, mutex names, and the toolkit author handle Kr3mlin4rt1st (first appearing in loader v1.33, February 2026) indicate a Brazil-based, financially motivated criminal operation -- the "KREMLIN" branding is not evidence of Russian state involvement. Elastic Threat Command disrupted over 1,500 active infections by registering the malware's unregistered sandbox-canary domain (creamp1eonlyfans[.]net).
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1055 Process Injection; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion; T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
Persistence
T1053 Scheduled Task/Job; T1176 Software Extensions
Credential Access
T1056 Input Capture; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
Discovery
T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1518 Software Discovery
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
Command and Control
T1071 Application Layer Protocol
Initial Access
defense-impairment
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block and hunt for the identified KREMLIN C2 domains/IPs at DNS and perimeter layers (volmira.site, zaviro.online, luizestrelhashapr.online, lojinhadoluiz.online, cremeb.com, granderevolucao.store, seguranca.versionnova.site, 178.92.162.38, 37.16.74.100, 37.16.74.34, 144.172.112.239, 45.90.13.210, 185.221.23.133)
- Force-remove and blocklist the malicious extension IDs via enterprise Chrome/Edge management (ndpbidppejfanjbhfgjlohfanbfbklff, djodclnjknbpambeaaapadmdfhmbpeog, cdgcjghdeinagopbaobhmaefigoafaaa)
- Audit endpoints for an unsigned SentinelAgentCore.dll co-located with or loaded by SentinelMemoryScanner.exe outside the expected SentinelOne installation directory
- Hunt for the scheduled task 'MicrosoftNodeRuntimeUpdater' and unexpected 'conhost.exe --headless node.exe' process chains
Workarounds
- Disable Chrome/Edge developer mode via enterprise policy (ExtensionDeveloperModeSettings) to close the Secure Preferences tampering surface
- Restrict execution of SentinelMemoryScanner.exe via application control to its signed installation path only
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for process hollowing (RunPE) and indirect/hashed syscall usage (PigSyscall-style NTDLL gadget resolution)
- Enforce browser management policy (ExtensionInstallBlocklist, disabled developer mode) to prevent Secure Preferences tampering and unauthorized extension sideloading
- Monitor for debugger attachment to browser processes and LOAD_DLL_DEBUG_EVENT-based App-Bound key extraction as a credential-theft precursor
- Add outbound monitoring for anomalous Ethereum JSON-RPC/Web3 calls from endpoint processes as a dead-drop-resolver C2 indicator
Affected and fixed versions
- Google — Chrome
Vulnerable versions: All Chromium-based releases relying on Secure Preferences/protection.macs integrity, including >=144 with resources.pak-seeded hashing - Microsoft — Edge
Vulnerable versions: Chromium-based Microsoft Edge - SentinelOne — SentinelMemoryScanner.exe (Sentinel Agent component)
Vulnerable versions: Abused as an unsigned-DLL sideloading host for SentinelAgentCore.dll
Timeline
- Earliest RunPE-module JPEG steganographic carrier (output_image_202505.jpg) uploaded to Internet Archive by uploader account 'Radduxx'.
- Campaign 1 ('Codecaudiog A') begins: PowerShell to RunPE to Installer chain delivering the malicious extension, DonutLoader, and PULSAR 1.6.6/1.7.3, C2 at locked-ioc-15.
- Financial activity begins on the Ethereum admin wallet (locked-ioc-4) that later funds and controls the KREMLIN C2 smart contract.
- Campaign 3 ('Acrobat') begins: Adobe-plugin lure delivering PULSAR 1.7.1/1.7.2 only (no extension) via JavaScript to PowerShell to RunPE to DonutLoader chain.
- Campaign 4 ('Framesync') begins: FrameSync-branded extension (ID djodclnjknbpambeaaapadmdfhmbpeog) with dynamic C2 resolution via an abused Cloudflare Workers endpoint.
- Campaign 5 ('Donalurdesconfeitos to Cremeb') begins, migrating infrastructure across donalurdesconfeitos.site, locked-ioc-13, harialurdes.site, and locked-ioc-22 through March 2026.
- First 'KREMLIN' branding (version 1.33) appears in the JSE-encoded loader, attributed to toolkit author 'Kr3mlin4rt1st'.
- Campaign 6 ('Cremeb') begins: QR-code-themed extension (ID cdgcjghdeinagopbaobhmaefigoafaaa) targeting web.whatsapp.com and sicoob.com.br, delivering PULSAR 2.4.5 via Early Cascade Injection into explorer.exe.
- KREMLIN operators deploy their first Ethereum smart contract (0x902Edb...) as a C2/payload dead-drop resolver.
- Rubrik Zero Labs publicly discloses the GhostChrome-X Chrome extension integrity-bypass technique later leveraged by KREMLIN's Phantom Extension installer.
- Campaign 7 ('Ethereum Transition') begins: current smart contract locked-ioc-3 deployed with main-v2/sentinel/sub-module config variables; locked-ioc-6 DLL-sideloading installer variant and REMCOS RAT introduced.
- Last transaction recorded in Elastic's observed window on the KREMLIN C2 smart contract's admin wallet ($20,778.97 USDT in / $19,016.96 USDT out across the tracked period).
- Elastic Security Labs publishes REF9334/KREMLIN research; The Hacker News reports 1,515 infected systems (>98% in Brazil) identified after Elastic Threat Command registered the malware's sandbox-canary domain to disrupt infections.
Sources cited
- Malicious Browser Extension: KREMLIN Banking Malware elastic.co · Vendor report · 2026-09-15
- Inside GhostChrome-X: A Chrome Extension Integrity Bypass zerolabs.rubrik.com · Research · 2026-06-04
- The extension you never installed: KREMLIN forges Chrome's own integrity checks to steal banking sessions hendryadrian.com · Blog · 2026-09-15
- Malware bancario del Kremlin secuestra Chrome y Edge para robar credenciales y tokens de sesión blog.elhacker.net · Blog · 2026-09-15
- KREMLIN Banking Malware Hijacks Chrome and Edge to Steal Credentials and Session Tokens The Hacker News · News · 2026-09-15
- KREMLIN Banking Malware Hijacks Chrome and Edge to Steal Credentials and Session Tokens nuclearcoffee.org · News · 2026-09-15
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.