Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2665
Kothamine RAT Abuses Tailscale's Tailcat for Encrypted C2, Distributed via Malicious npm Packages
Kothamine, an undocumented Windows RAT with 30+ operator commands, is distributed via the malicious npm package dotnet-runtime-base and a GitHub payload repository. Recent builds extract and launch Tailscale's open-source tailcat CLI to tunnel AES-GCM-encrypted C2 to an operator-controlled node instead of registering a full Tailscale VPN device, defeating conventional network-based C2 detection.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2665 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Kothamine Agent, cphc811-ui campaign |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Unidentified npm publisher (account/package removed) dotnet-runtime-base; Generic Windows developer/build workstations with Node.js and npm |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-506 |
| Malware | Kothamine, Kothamine Agent |
| Tools | Tailscale VPN client (tailscaled.exe / tailscale.exe / tailscale-ipn.exe / wintun.dll), tailcat |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1113 Screen Capture, T1123 Audio Capture, T1125 Video Capture, T1129 Shared Modules, T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain and 7 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | technology, software-development |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-09-26, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2665 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 18 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Kothamine Post-Exploitation — Defender Exclusion, fodhelper UAC Bypass, Persistence & Explorer.exe Injection (SPL)
Detects the Kothamine injector's post-exploitation chain: Microsoft Defender path/process exclusion additions, a fodhelper.exe UAC bypass launching elevated.ps1, the MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe/.dll persistence drop and MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask scheduled task, and DLL injection of the agent into explorer.exe (plus operator-issued sysinfo/tasklist/ipconfig discovery once the agent is live).
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1562.001, T1053.005, T1548.002, T1055.001, T1027, T1129, T1082, T1057
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, windows_task_scheduler_log
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
(index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational") OR (index=windows_security sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security")
| where (EventCode=1 AND match(CommandLine, "(?i)add-mppreference") AND (match(CommandLine, "(?i)exclusionpath") OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)exclusionprocess")))
OR (EventCode=1 AND like(Image, "%\\fodhelper.exe"))
OR (EventCode=1 AND match(CommandLine, "(?i)elevated\.ps1"))
OR (EventCode=11 AND (like(TargetFilename, "%\\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe") OR like(TargetFilename, "%\\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll")))
OR (EventCode=1 AND match(CommandLine, "(?i)schtasks") AND match(CommandLine, "(?i)microsoftedgeupdatetask"))
OR (EventCode=8 AND like(TargetImage, "%\\explorer.exe") AND NOT like(SourceImage, "%\\explorer.exe"))
| eval risk_reason="Kothamine post-exploitation: Defender exclusion / fodhelper UAC bypass / MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore persistence / explorer.exe CreateRemoteThread injection"
| table _time, ComputerName, User, EventCode, Image, TargetImage, SourceImage, TargetFilename, CommandLine, risk_reason
| sort -_timeMicrosoft KQL
union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents, DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (ActionType == "ProcessCreated" and ProcessCommandLine has "Add-MpPreference" and (ProcessCommandLine has "ExclusionPath" or ProcessCommandLine has "ExclusionProcess"))
or FileName =~ "fodhelper.exe"
or ProcessCommandLine has "elevated.ps1"
or FolderPath has "MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe" or FolderPath has "MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll"
or (ProcessCommandLine has "schtasks" and ProcessCommandLine has "MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask")
or (ActionType == "ProcessInjection" and AdditionalFields has "explorer.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, AdditionalFields
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Kothamine RAT Persistence, UAC Bypass, and Explorer.exe Injection Chain
id: 4d7f9a1c-6e3b-4d2f-8a5c-9b1e3f5a7c84
status: experimental
description: Detects the Kothamine RAT post-exploitation chain — Microsoft Defender exclusion additions, a fodhelper.exe UAC bypass running elevated.ps1, MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore persistence artifacts, and the MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask scheduled task creation used for AtLogOn persistence.
references:
- https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/09/kothamine-malware-uses-tailscales-tailcat-to-evade-network-detection
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-26
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1562.001
- attack.t1027
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1548.002
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1053.005
- attack.execution
- attack.t1129
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1057
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_defender_exclusion:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'Add-MpPreference'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'ExclusionPath'
- 'ExclusionProcess'
selection_fodhelper:
Image|endswith: '\fodhelper.exe'
selection_elevated_ps1:
CommandLine|contains: 'elevated.ps1'
selection_persistence_task:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'schtasks'
- 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask'
selection_persistence_path:
CommandLine|contains: 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- IT-approved Microsoft Defender exclusion changes pushed via endpoint management tooling
- Genuine Microsoft Edge updater scheduled tasks running from the correct Program Files path
level: criticalKnown false positives:
- IT-approved Microsoft Defender exclusion changes pushed via endpoint management/RMM tooling (verify against a change ticket or the pushing service account)
- Genuine Microsoft Edge updater scheduled tasks running from the correct %ProgramFiles(x86)%\Microsoft\Edge path rather than Roaming AppData
Tuning notes: Exclude Defender exclusion changes made by your MDM/RMM service accounts; require an explicit allow-list for any *UpdateTask*-named scheduled task whose action path is NOT under %ProgramFiles(x86)%\Microsoft\Edge. Alert at highest priority on any explorer.exe target of Sysmon EventCode 8 (CreateRemoteThread) where the source image is unsigned or resides under %APPDATA%\Roaming — that combination alone is a near-unique Kothamine indicator. Hash 74eca3973ad72a6ddc9397aff8250d9ee287211fc9a055d5ee290d01cf76a70c (agent DLL) and mutex Local\KothamineAgentInstance are additional hard-match confirmations.
- Kothamine npm Supply-Chain Loader — PowerShell WebClient Payload Retrieval (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Kothamine Post-Exploitation — Defender Exclusion, fodhelper UAC Bypass, Persistence & Explorer.exe Injection (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Kothamine C2 — Tailcat Portable Tunnel & Encrypted Operator Channel (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Kothamine npm Supply-Chain Loader — PowerShell WebClient Payload Retrieval (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Kothamine Post-Exploitation — Defender Exclusion, fodhelper UAC Bypass, Persistence & Explorer.exe Injection (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Kothamine C2 — Tailcat Portable Tunnel & Encrypted Operator Channel (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Kothamine npm Supply-Chain Loader — PowerShell WebClient Payload Retrieval (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Kothamine C2 — Tailcat Portable Tunnel & Encrypted Operator Channel (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-09-26, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 18 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2665.
Sample indicators (2 of 18)
- File hash:
ec4219a7ecf132c29080fbb20e4ab410c57faa85aeed7acade1eb15d905a6ee0 - File hash:
74eca3973ad72a6ddc9397aff8250d9ee287211fc9a055d5ee290d01cf76a70c
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 18 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Kothamine Agent is an undocumented C/C++ Windows remote-access Trojan first observed via VirusTotal uploads and GitHub commit activity in July 2026. It is distributed through the malicious npm package dotnet-runtime-base (versions 1.0.4-1.0.5, published 2026-07-13, tracked as GHSA-9gr8-wg29-9wvv / OSV MAL-2026-10217, discovered by Amazon Inspector), whose Windows-only postinstall script (install.js) writes a PowerShell script to the temp directory and uses WebClient.DownloadFile to silently retrieve and launch npm-sc-legit.exe from an unauthorized GitHub account (github.com/cphc811-ui), which also hosts build/compilation instructions for a companion project named kothamine-stub-cpp. At least two other packages from the same npm publisher were removed by npm.
On execution, an injector adds Microsoft Defender path/process exclusions, copies itself to %ROAMING%\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe, extracts an agent DLL to %ROAMING%\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll, writes a launcher script to %TEMP%\up.ps1, registers persistence via a scheduled task ("MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask", triggered AtLogOn, RunLevel Limited), and injects the agent DLL into explorer.exe using OpenProcess/VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory/CreateRemoteThread/LoadLibraryA. The running agent creates a single-instance mutex (Local\KothamineAgentInstance) and, in recent builds, decrypts internal strings using XOR at runtime.
The agent exposes 30+ operator commands covering system/process/network enumeration (sysinfo, systeminfo, tasklist, ipconfig, ping), file operations (mkdir/rmdir/cp/mv/ls/readfile/writefile_*/delfile/download), shell execution (exec, shell_exec), and data theft (getdiscord, getsessions for browser cookies, screenshot/screenshare, camera, plus clipboard, Steam and Minecraft configuration theft, and microphone recording). A dynamic plugin system (load_feature/exec_feature/list_features/unload_feature) lets the operator push a base64-encoded DLL that is written to a temp path (GetTempPath/SHGetFolderPathA, falling back to C:\Windows\Temp), loaded via LoadLibraryA, and resolved through a GetFeatureApi export exposing init/exec/cleanup callbacks - allowing capability expansion without redeploying the core agent.
Some builds bypass UAC via fodhelper.exe to run an elevated.ps1 PowerShell script, which launches tailscaled.exe from a portable Tailscale install and issues "tailscale up" with an auth key, polling the resulting IP for a 100.x.x.x prefix (45 iterations / ~90s timeout) to confirm the Tailscale network came up. Earlier Kothamine builds used this full Tailscale VPN client (tailscaled.exe, tailscale.exe, tailscale-ipn.exe, wintun.dll) connecting over the Tailscale network to an operator node on port 4444. Recent builds instead extract Tailscale's open-source tailcat utility to %ROAMING%\TailscalePortable\tailcat.exe and launch it via CreateProcessA with arguments equivalent to "forward tcp 18080:4444", forwarding a local listener (port 18080) to the operator's port 4444 over tailcat's data plane (WireGuard + NAT traversal + DERP relay, no Tailscale control plane, no account/device registration required). C2 messages are encrypted with AES-GCM using a hardcoded 32-byte key base64-decoded from "mrowPsW2P5kzFGCNWeKAd+kYpo8Yy5c2pzaOSRuzisU="; the agent identifies itself to the operator with a JSON blob of the form {"name":"base_<rand>","os":"Windows","ip":"0.0.0.0","auth_token":"...","type":"base"}. Because tailcat rides a trusted, already-encrypted transport with no conventional C2 domain to block, network defenses are unlikely to flag the traffic.
Malwarebytes (analyst Gabriele Orini) published the first public technical writeup on 2026-09-25. No specific threat actor, group, or nation-state attribution has been established; the only identifying artifact is the npm/GitHub publisher handle cphc811-ui. Activity has been continuous since at least July 2026 with incremental feature additions and obfuscation improvements, and remains active as of the report's publication date.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection
Persistence
Discovery
T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery
Execution
T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.007 JavaScript; T1129 Shared Modules
Collection
T1113 Screen Capture; T1123 Audio Capture; T1125 Video Capture
Initial Access
T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain
Command and Control
T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1572 Protocol Tunneling; T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography
credential-access
T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
Privilege Escalation
T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control
Resource Development
defense-impairment
Remediation
Patches
- No vendor patch applies - dotnet-runtime-base is a malicious package with no legitimate patched release; remediation is removal, not patching (GHSA-9gr8-wg29-9wvv)
Immediate actions
- Remove/block the npm package 'dotnet-runtime-base' (versions 1.0.4 and 1.0.5) across all developer workstations and CI/CD pipelines
- Hunt for SHA-256 ec4219a7ecf132c29080fbb20e4ab410c57faa85aeed7acade1eb15d905a6ee0 (injector) and 74eca3973ad72a6ddc9397aff8250d9ee287211fc9a055d5ee290d01cf76a70c (agent DLL)
- Hunt for file artifacts %ROAMING%\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe, %ROAMING%\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll, and %ROAMING%\TailscalePortable\tailcat.exe
- Check Windows Task Scheduler for an unexpected 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask' entry (AtLogOn trigger, RunLevel Limited) pointing at a Roaming AppData executable
- Treat any host that installed dotnet-runtime-base 1.0.4/1.0.5 as fully compromised and rotate all secrets/keys handled on that host from a separate, uncompromised device, per GHSA-9gr8-wg29-9wvv guidance
Workarounds
- Block execution of tailcat.exe and unapproved Tailscale binaries via application allow-listing/EDR
- Restrict PowerShell execution policy and enable ScriptBlock/Module logging to catch elevated.ps1/up.ps1-style launcher scripts and fodhelper.exe-based UAC bypass chains
Longer-term hardening
- Add install-time postinstall-script auditing / dependency vetting to CI/CD so packages that download and silently execute binaries are blocked before merge
- Monitor endpoints for unauthorized tailcat.exe or portable Tailscale client execution and unexpected outbound WireGuard/DERP traffic from developer or build workstations
- Alert on Microsoft Defender exclusion-path additions made via PowerShell outside of approved change management
- Enforce a private/mirrored npm registry with package allow-listing for build and developer environments
Affected and fixed versions
- Unidentified npm publisher (account/package removed) — dotnet-runtime-base
Vulnerable versions: 1.0.4; 1.0.5 - Generic — Windows developer/build workstations with Node.js and npm
Vulnerable versions: any host that ran `npm install dotnet-runtime-base` at 1.0.4-1.0.5
Timeline
- Malicious npm package dotnet-runtime-base (versions 1.0.4-1.0.5) published to the npm registry with a Windows-only postinstall script that downloads and launches locked-ioc-7; later tracked as GHSA-9gr8-wg29-9wvv / OSV MAL-2026-10217, credited to Amazon Inspector.
- Earliest Kothamine agent/injector samples appear on VirusTotal, with corresponding commit activity on the cphc811-ui GitHub repository hosting kothamine-stub-cpp build instructions.
- Earlier Kothamine builds are observed installing the full Tailscale VPN client (tailscaled.exe, tailscale.exe, tailscale-ipn.exe, wintun.dll) and connecting to an operator node on port 4444 over the Tailscale network.
- Kothamine builds incorporate a fodhelper.exe-based UAC bypass that silently runs elevated.ps1 to launch the Tailscale client with elevated privileges and an auth key.
- Recent Kothamine builds replace the full Tailscale VPN client with the lightweight open-source tailcat CLI, tunneling AES-GCM-encrypted C2 without registering a Tailscale account or device.
- TL-Intel-Harness ingests the Malwarebytes report from the RSS backlog and opens threat TL-2026-2665 for analysis.
- Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence (Gabriele Orini) publishes the first public technical analysis, 'Kothamine malware uses Tailscale's tailcat to evade network detection.'
Sources cited
- GHSA-9gr8-wg29-9wvv: dotnet-runtime-base embedded malicious code GitHub · Advisory · 2026-07-13
- MAL-2026-10217: dotnet-runtime-base (npm) osv.dev · Advisory · 2026-07-13
- Kothamine RAT Abuses Tailscale Tailcat for Covert Windows C2 mallory.ai · Research · 2026-09-25
- Tailcat: An open-source CLI for Tailscale's WireGuard, NAT traversal, and DERP tailscale.com · Vendor report
- GitHub - tailscale/tailcat GitHub · Code repository
- cphc811-ui GitHub account (malicious payload/build-instructions host) GitHub · Code repository
- Kothamine malware uses Tailscale's tailcat to evade network detection malwarebytes.com · Blog · 2026-09-25
- Kothamine malware uses Tailscale's tailcat to evade network detection (aggregator repost) malware.news · News · 2026-09-25
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.