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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2685

Sauron Loader: New DLL Side-Loading Malware-as-a-Service Deployed Against German Organizations via ClickFix, Email Bombing, and Remote-Access-Tool Vishing

highACTIVE

DCSO CyTec identified "Sauron Loader," a previously undocumented C++ loader sold as malware-as-a-service in Russian-speaking underground forums, deployed as the final stage in intrusions against German organizations. It abuses DLL side-loading via the legitimate rnpkeys.exe (part of Mozilla's RNP/OpenPGP tooling) to load rnp.dll and tdwp.dll, establishes persistence via a scheduled task named "keyroll," and communicates with C2 over HTTPS using a custom TLV protocol with Salsa20 encryption and RSA-signed messages.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2685
Also known asSauron Loader
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows; Mozilla / RNP project rnpkeys.exe (RNP OpenPGP library component bundled with Thunderbird)
AttributionS4ur0n (low confidence)
MalwareSauron Loader
ToolsAnyDesk, Microsoft Quick Assist, Sauron Loader custom TLV/Salsa20+RSA C2 protocol
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1113 Screen Capture, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste, T1218.007 Msiexec, T1219 Remote Access Tools and 8 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target regionsgermany
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-09-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2685 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 20 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Sauron Loader C2 Domain Beacon and Chunked Screenshot Exfiltration

Detects repeated outbound HTTPS connections from an endpoint to the four known Sauron Loader C2 domains, indicative of TLV/Salsa20-encrypted bot registration, task polling, or the chunked (0x4000-byte) upload path used for screenshot exfiltration over the same encrypted C2 channel.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1071.001, T1573.001, T1113, T1041
  • Data sources: proxy_logs, firewall_logs
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=proxy OR index=firewall dest_domain IN ("api.namsb-show.com","api.quinlantours.com","api.virtual-magic.com","api.lahaina-shores.com")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(url) as uris values(user_agent) as user_agents sum(bytes_out) as total_bytes_out by src_ip, dest_domain
| where count > 3
| sort -count

Microsoft KQL

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("api.namsb-show.com","api.quinlantours.com","api.virtual-magic.com","api.lahaina-shores.com")
| summarize ConnectionCount=count(), FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp), Ports=make_set(RemotePort) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl
| where ConnectionCount > 3

Sigma

title: Sauron Loader Static C2 Domain Contact
id: 1f2e3d4c-5b6a-4798-8271-9e0d1c2b3a4f
status: experimental
description: Detects any DNS resolution or network connection to a known Sauron Loader C2 domain (api.namsb-show.com, api.quinlantours.com, api.virtual-magic.com, api.lahaina-shores.com), used for bot registration, adaptive task polling, and chunked screenshot exfiltration over the custom TLV/Salsa20+RSA protocol.
references:
  - https://github.com/DCSO/Blog_CyTec/tree/main/2026_09__sauron_loader
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-27
tags:
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.collection
  - attack.exfiltration
  - attack.t1071.001
  - attack.t1573.001
  - attack.t1113
  - attack.t1041
logsource:
  category: dns
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    query|contains:
      - 'api.namsb-show.com'
      - 'api.quinlantours.com'
      - 'api.virtual-magic.com'
      - 'api.lahaina-shores.com'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - None expected; these are attacker-registered C2 domains not associated with any legitimate service
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • None expected for the exact listed domains; monitor for sinkholed/expired-domain reuse by unrelated actors

Tuning notes: Feed the domain list from a maintained C2 IOC list rather than hardcoding, since Sauron Loader operators diversify C2 domains across builds/affiliates; alert immediately on any single hit rather than waiting for count>3 once the domains are confirmed malicious in your environment.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Remote-Assistance Tool Install Following Suspected Email Bombing · unlock with TL Creds
  • 'keyroll' Scheduled Task / Service Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
  • Sauron Loader Adaptive C2 Beacon Interval (160s/600s Task Polling) · unlock with TL Creds
  • ClickFix-Style Clipboard Paste-to-Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • Secondary-Stage Execution via rundll32/regsvr32 from keyroll/Temp Paths · unlock with TL Creds
  • Sauron Loader Dynamic TLV C2 URI Pattern · unlock with TL Creds
  • Sauron Loader MSI Installer Drop to [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
  • DLL Side-Loading via [indicator] ([indicator] / [indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-09-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 20 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2685.

Sample indicators (3 of 20)

  • Domain: api[.]namsb-show[.]com
  • File hash: ee727d639eaa4ee2e0d7cafbe496e14aaac8df0955d9fb599f2c11dfa1d0f8f2
  • Domain: api[.]quinlantours[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 20 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

20 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Sauron Loader is a professionally engineered C++ loader family first documented by DCSO CyTec (published 2026-09-24) after observing it as the final payload in multiple intrusions against German organizations. Victims are reached through deception-based initial access rather than a software vulnerability. DCSO documents two distinct chains: (1) ClickFix-style fake browser "verification" prompts that trick users into pasting and executing attacker-supplied commands, and (2) an email-bombing (mail-flood) precursor followed by a vishing call in which the attacker impersonates IT support and talks the victim into starting a remote-assistance session via Microsoft Quick Assist or AnyDesk, at which point the attacker drives installation directly. DCSO explicitly ties this second pattern to a broader industry trend: eSentire's 2026 threat report documents a 1,450% year-over-year increase in email-bombing-into-IT-impersonation attacks with a 72% observed success rate.

The payload is delivered as an MSI installer that drops three files into a hardcoded directory, C:\ProgramData\keyroll: the legitimate signed binary rnpkeys.exe (associated with the RNP OpenPGP library used by Mozilla Thunderbird), and two malicious libraries, rnp.dll and tdwp.dll. When rnpkeys.exe executes, Windows DLL search-order behavior causes it to load rnp.dll instead of (or in addition to) its legitimate dependency. rnp.dll carries the loader's real functionality in an encrypted form; tdwp.dll decrypts that code directly in memory (no plaintext loader code ever touches disk) and hands off execution, then creates a Windows scheduled task named "keyroll" that relaunches the chain at regular intervals for persistence. Researchers observed a deliberate execution delay during the in-memory decryption step, assessed as a sandbox/analysis-frustration measure, and the loader also fingerprints victim keyboard layout to detect CIS-region systems (the embedded config additionally carries a disable-able CIS-country and government-domain check flag; in the analyzed sample this flag was set to False, consistent with deliberate targeting of German organizations rather than CIS states).

Once running, the loader registers the infected host with its C2 infrastructure (four HTTPS endpoints: api.namsb-show.com, api.quinlantours.com, api.virtual-magic.com, api.lahaina-shores.com), sending hostname, username, and Windows version, with the bot identified by an MD5 hash of computer name, username, and volume serial number. Communication uses a custom binary Type-Length-Value (TLV) protocol over dynamically generated HTTPS paths (pattern /<prefix>/v<1-9>/<action><resource>?<params>, with randomized prefixes, actions, resource names, and 0-3 decoy query parameters to blend into normal API traffic) and browser-spoofing User-Agent strings. Outbound requests are Salsa20-encrypted (16-byte key/8-byte nonce) with an RSA signature (1192-byte private key / 294-byte public key) over the ciphertext plus random padding (1111-9999 bytes); inbound responses use a 32-byte Salsa20 key with RSA signature verification before decryption. Four message types drive the protocol: registration (0x01), task polling with adaptive sleep (160s on failure, 600s after success; 0x02), chunked task-result upload in 0x4000-byte segments (0x03), and payload retrieval (0x04).

Operator tasking supports ten distinct execution handlers: EXE (CreateProcessW), DLL (via rundll32/regsvr32 or a manual PE loader), Driver (.sys installed as a Windows service), Shellcode (executed in-memory or injected into attrib.exe), MSI (MsiInstallProductW), ZIP (extracted to %TEMP%\<random 6-16 chars>.<ext> and executed), plus CMD, PowerShell (with ExecutionPolicy Bypass), VBScript, and JavaScript command execution. Discovery telemetry beyond the registration fields includes domain-membership, privilege level, installed security-product enumeration, and network configuration. The loader also supports PNG screenshot capture (primary monitor or full virtual desktop), chunked and exfiltrated over the same encrypted C2 channel with bot ID, task ID, and chunk metadata attached to each transmission.

DCSO CyTec found Sauron Loader advertised under the alias "S4ur0n" on Russian-speaking underground forums as a malware-as-a-service offering, with the seller claiming restrictions against targeting CIS countries and public-sector organizations — a claim that does not itself establish attacker nationality or affiliation, and multiple observed C2 infrastructure variants (differing domains, shared core behavior) suggest resale or use by more than one operator/affiliate, and are deliberately diversified to prevent single-point network blocking. No CVE or software vulnerability is involved; this is a social-engineering-driven malware deployment. DCSO published a MISP event and a Python 3 configuration-extraction utility (get_config.py) alongside the analysis, which parses the embedded encrypted config to recover the magic value, flag bits (including the CIS/government-domain check), RSA key material and its SHA-256 fingerprints, group/build identifiers, and the C2 URL array. Defensive guidance from the source focuses on detecting unexpected installer/msiexec activity, anomalous DLL loads by signed binaries, unexpected new scheduled tasks or services, unexplained encrypted egress with dynamically-shaped API-like paths, unauthorized AnyDesk/Quick Assist sessions, and verifying any unsolicited IT-support contact through established internal channels before following remote-access instructions.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1218.007 Msiexec; T1497.003 Time Based Checks; T1574.001 DLL

Discovery

T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1614.001 System Language Discovery

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1543.003 Windows Service

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography

Collection

T1113 Screen Capture

Initial Access

T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice

Resource Development

T1588.001 Malware

impact

T1667 Email Bombing

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block or alert on outbound connections to known Sauron Loader C2 domains: api.namsb-show.com, api.quinlantours.com, api.virtual-magic.com, api.lahaina-shores.com
  • Hunt across endpoints for the C:\ProgramData\keyroll directory and a scheduled task named "keyroll"
  • Alert on execution of rnpkeys.exe or loading of rnp.dll/tdwp.dll outside expected Thunderbird/RNP installation paths
  • Match the published SHA-256 hashes for the MSI installer, rnpkeys.exe, rnp.dll, tdwp.dll, and the embedded RSA key material against EDR/AV telemetry
  • Restrict AnyDesk and Microsoft Quick Assist installation/usage to IT-authorized sessions only, and alert on ad-hoc remote-assistance sessions initiated shortly after a spam/mail-flood event
  • Train staff to verify any unsolicited IT-support phone contact through a known-good internal channel before starting a remote-assistance session, and to distrust browser "verification" prompts that instruct pasting commands into Run/PowerShell (ClickFix)

Workarounds

  • Restrict or monitor msiexec.exe execution of installers from user-writable/temp locations
  • Restrict creation of new scheduled tasks and services by non-administrative processes via GPO/AppLocker policy

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy application allow-listing to prevent unsigned/side-loaded DLLs from executing alongside trusted signed binaries
  • Deploy EDR behavioral detection for scheduled-task/service creation combined with newly-dropped, unsigned DLLs loaded by a signed executable
  • Implement email-bombing/mail-flood detection and rate-limiting to blunt the vishing precursor pattern (per eSentire's 2026 reporting, this precursor pattern rose 1,450% YoY with a 72% success rate industry-wide)
  • Monitor for anomalous rundll32.exe/regsvr32.exe invocations and driver-service installations originating from user-writable directories
  • Ingest the DCSO CyTec MISP event and config-extraction tooling (github.com/DCSO/Blog_CyTec) for ongoing IOC and C2-config tracking

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: Windows 8; Windows 10; Windows 11; Windows Server
  • Mozilla / RNP project — rnpkeys.exe (RNP OpenPGP library component bundled with Thunderbird)
    Vulnerable versions: abused via DLL side-loading; the binary itself is not vulnerable, only reused as a signed side-loading vector

Timeline

  • Mallory.ai publishes an aggregated intelligence summary of the DCSO CyTec findings, noting the malware-as-a-service distribution model and stated CIS/public-sector targeting restrictions.
  • DCSO CyTec publishes "Sauron Loader: A New Loader Lurking in Underground Forums," including a MISP event and a Python configuration-extraction tool (get_config.py) on GitHub.
  • DCSO CyTec observes Sauron Loader as the final-stage payload in multiple incident-response engagements at German organizations.
  • Threadlinqs Intelligence harness ingests the report via the HUNT phase RSS pipeline and opens threat TL-2026-2685.
  • Malware.news mirrors/syndicates the DCSO CyTec analysis to its community threat-intel forum.
  • Cryptika Cybersecurity publishes a technical summary of the DCSO CyTec findings, including the full IOC set.
  • Cyber Security News publishes a technical summary of the DCSO CyTec findings.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.

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