Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2689
CARBONATO Botnet Exploits Exposed Docker Daemons to Deploy AI Agent Framework, Prioritizes AI API Key Theft
CARBONATO is a self-propagating Docker-worm botnet, documented by ThreatDown, that compromises unauthenticated Docker Engine API endpoints on port 2375, installs the legitimate open-source Hermes Agent AI framework with an overwritten persona file, and uses Telegram as an interactive command channel.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2689 |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Docker Docker Engine API (dockerd); Nous Research Hermes Agent (open-source AI agent framework) |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-306, CWE-284, CWE-522 |
| Malware | CARBONATO, xmrig |
| Tools | Hermes Agent, auto-persist-host.sh, gh0st |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1021.004 SSH, T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1037.004 RC Scripts, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1053.003 Cron, T1053.006 Systemd Timers, T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1098.004 SSH Authorized Keys, T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application and 11 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | financial services, cloud hosting infrastructure, technology |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-09-29, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2689 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 34 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: CARBONATO — Redundant Persistence via Cron, Systemd Timer, rc.local, OpenRC with Immutable Flag
Detects installation of redundant autostart persistence across cron, systemd timers, rc.local, and OpenRC combined with chattr +i marking the files immutable, matching CARBONATO's auto-persist-host.sh persistence layer designed to resist tampering and cleanup.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1053.003, T1053.006, T1037.004, T1222.002
- Data sources: auditd, sysmon_for_linux, syslog
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=linux_audit sourcetype="linux:audit"
( (path="/etc/cron.d/*" OR path="/var/spool/cron/*")
OR (path="/etc/systemd/system/*.timer")
OR path="/etc/rc.local"
OR (path="/etc/init.d/*" AND comm="openrc") )
(action=created OR action=modified)
| join type=left host [
search index=linux_audit sourcetype="linux:audit" comm=chattr args="*+i*"
| rename argv as chattr_target
]
| where isnotnull(chattr_target) OR match(path, "cron|timer|rc\.local|init\.d")
| stats count values(path) as persistence_paths by host, user, chattr_targetMicrosoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where FileName in ("crontab", "chattr", "systemctl", "openrc")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/etc/cron.d", "/var/spool/cron", ".timer", "/etc/rc.local", "/etc/init.d", "chattr +i")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| summarize Techniques = make_set(FileName), Count = count() by DeviceIdSigma
title: CARBONATO Redundant Persistence via Cron, Systemd Timer, rc.local, OpenRC with Immutable Flag
id: 4d5e6f7a-8b9c-4d0e-1f2a-3b4c5d6e7f8a
status: experimental
description: Detects installation of redundant autostart persistence (cron, systemd timer, rc.local, OpenRC) combined with chattr +i marking the files immutable, matching CARBONATO's auto-persist-host.sh persistence layer.
references:
- https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-27
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1053.003
- attack.t1053.006
- attack.t1037.004
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1222.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_persist:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/etc/cron.d'
- '/var/spool/cron'
- '.timer'
- '/etc/rc.local'
- '/etc/init.d'
selection_immutable:
Image|endswith: '/chattr'
CommandLine|contains: '+i'
condition: selection_persist or selection_immutable
falsepositives:
- Legitimate hardening scripts applying immutable attributes to system configuration files
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate system administration setting immutable attributes on configuration files for hardening purposes
Tuning notes: Correlate chattr +i events with the specific autostart file paths (cron.d, systemd timer units, rc.local, OpenRC init.d) rather than alerting on chattr alone to reduce noise from routine hardening scripts.
- CARBONATO — Worm /24 Subnet Sweep for Exposed Docker Port 2375 · unlock with TL Creds
- CARBONATO — SSH Authorized Keys Persistence and Kernel-Thread Process Masquerading · unlock with TL Creds
- CARBONATO — Reverse SSH Tunnel and Lateral Movement to Known C2 Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
- CARBONATO — Hermes Agent SOUL.md Persona Overwrite and GH0ST Deployment · unlock with TL Creds
- CARBONATO — Plaintext Credential Loot Directory and XMRig Disguised as systemd-logind · unlock with TL Creds
- CARBONATO — AI API Key Enumeration Followed by LLM Gateway Callback · unlock with TL Creds
- CARBONATO — Unauthenticated Docker API Abuse and Privileged Container Creation · unlock with TL Creds
- CARBONATO — Telegram Bot API Bidirectional C2 from Server Host · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-09-29, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 34 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2689.
Sample indicators (3 of 34)
- IP address:
45.79.183[.]61 - Domain:
carbonato-proxy-drab[.]vercel[.]app - IP address:
91.99.195[.]164
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 34 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
The agent, renamed "GH0ST," prioritizes stealing AI API keys from 14 providers over SSH credentials and databases, and evidence from an exposed container registry (language, timezone, ASN, and a Telegram handle referencing Costa Rica's country code) points to Costa Rica-based operators.
CARBONATO targets Docker Engine API instances that are reachable over the network without authentication on the default TCP port 2375. Once it locates an exposed daemon, the implant instructs it to launch a privileged container with the host filesystem mounted, giving the operators direct command execution on the underlying machine (Docker API abuse / container escape). From that foothold, a deployment script (`entry.sh`, observed at v5.3) installs the open-source, MIT-licensed Hermes Agent framework from Nous Research completely unmodified, then overwrites only its `SOUL.md` persona file with a 39-line prompt that renames the agent "GH0ST" and instructs it to follow operator tasking delivered over Telegram, establish persistence, and harvest credentials without restriction, hashing, or masking.
Operators issue tasks through a Telegram channel (chat ID 750752697); the agent forwards the objective and persona file to an operator-run LLM gateway, which interprets the goal, writes terminal commands, executes them, and reports results back through the same Telegram loop -- an interactive, LLM-mediated command-and-control cycle rather than a traditional static C2 protocol. The persona explicitly ranks AI API keys from 14 providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google/Gemini, OpenRouter, Together, Groq, Mistral, Cohere, LocalAI, Ollama, vLLM, LiteLLM, and One API) above SSH credentials and database access, and all stolen material is written in plaintext under `/root/.hermes/loot/` with descriptive filenames. ThreatDown assesses the stolen AI credentials are used to subsidize the operators' own LLM gateway, which was still live and advertising 12 models on a free tier as of September 3, 2026.
Every five minutes, a worm component enumerates attached networks and Docker bridges and scans each reachable /24 subnet for port 2375, checking for prior infection before redeploying the same implant chain -- allowing the botnet to expand without operator intervention. Persistence is layered: a reverse SSH tunnel is opened from the victim to a Costa Rica-hosted relay (with the local tunnel port deterministically derived from an MD5 hash of the victim's IP), an SSH server is installed with an operator-controlled key, and redundant autostart hooks are placed via cron, systemd timers, rc.local, and OpenRC, with the underlying files marked immutable to resist tampering. Evasion includes disguising the watchdog process as the kernel thread `[kworker/u2:0]`, naming the malicious container `systemd-resolved` with a fake banner, and disguising a bundled XMRig cryptominer as `systemd-logind`.
ThreatDown discovered the operation after finding one of the operators' own container registries exposed to the internet without authentication, yielding 4.3 GB of image data across 59 repositories, 234 tags, and 605 verified file blobs -- effectively the attackers' entire toolchain, spanning an archived operational window from October 2024 through at least August 2026. Attribution to Costa Rica rests on three independent, converging signals: Voseo Spanish-language strings (a dialect using "vos" rather than "tu", characteristic of Central/South American Spanish) in build artifacts; 14 of 162 recovered image configurations set to the UTC-06:00 America/Costa_Rica timezone; and a Telegram operator handle, "Carbo506," where 506 is Costa Rica's international calling code, together with reverse-tunnel traffic terminating at AS262145, a Costa Rica-registered network. ThreatDown was unable to attribute the campaign to any previously tracked threat cluster or group.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
Lateral Movement
T1021.004 SSH; T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
Defense Evasion
T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Persistence
T1037.004 RC Scripts; T1053.003 Cron; T1053.006 Systemd Timers; T1098.004 SSH Authorized Keys; T1543.002 Systemd Service
Discovery
T1046 Network Service Discovery
Execution
T1059.004 Unix Shell; T1609 Container Administration Command; T1610 Deploy Container
Command and Control
T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication; T1572 Protocol Tunneling
Initial Access
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
defense-impairment
T1222.002 Linux and Mac Permissions
Impact
Credential Access
T1552.001 Credentials In Files
Resource Development
Reconnaissance
T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning
Privilege Escalation
Remediation
Patches
- No vendor patch applies; unauthenticated Docker API exposure is a deployment misconfiguration, not a software vulnerability
Immediate actions
- Firewall or disable the Docker Engine API (TCP port 2375) from the internet and from untrusted internal networks immediately
- Rotate and revoke any AI/LLM API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google/Gemini, OpenRouter, Together, Groq, Mistral, Cohere, LocalAI, Ollama, vLLM, LiteLLM, One API) and SSH credentials that were reachable from an internet-exposed Docker host
- Hunt for /root/.hermes/SOUL.md containing the string 'GH0ST', .env files defining CARBONATO_API_KEY, unexpected outbound Telegram Bot API traffic, and reverse SSH tunnels terminating toward AS262145
- Inspect running containers for one named systemd-resolved with a mounted host filesystem, and processes masquerading as [kworker/u2:0] or systemd-logind
Workarounds
- Bind the Docker daemon to a Unix socket only (remove any -H tcp://0.0.0.0:2375 flag) and require an authenticated SSH tunnel or reverse proxy for any legitimate remote Docker API access
Longer-term hardening
- Require mutual TLS (dockerd --tlsverify with client certificates) or restrict the Docker Engine API to a local Unix socket; never bind it to 0.0.0.0 without authentication
- Deploy container/runtime security tooling that alerts on privileged container creation with host filesystem bind-mounts
- Store AI/LLM API keys and SSH credentials in a managed secrets store rather than plaintext .env files or filesystem loot directories, with periodic rotation
- Monitor for newly created cron jobs, systemd timers, rc.local edits, and OpenRC hooks with the immutable (chattr +i) flag set on hosts running container workloads
Affected and fixed versions
- Docker — Docker Engine API (dockerd)
Vulnerable versions: any version reachable with the TCP API exposed on port 2375 without TLS client authentication
Fixed in: N/A -- misconfiguration; enable --tlsverify or restrict the API to a local Unix socket - Nous Research — Hermes Agent (open-source AI agent framework)
Vulnerable versions: framework is abused unmodified; risk is persona-file (SOUL.md) overwrite after host compromise, not a code vulnerability
Fixed in: N/A -- legitimate software; mitigation is preventing the initial Docker host compromise
Timeline
Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source
- Earliest CARBONATO-related build artifacts recovered from the exposed container registry date to October 2024, marking the start of the archived operational window ThreatDown was able to reconstruct.
- Internet-wide scanning services first index the unauthenticated CARBONATO container registry, though it goes unnoticed by defenders for months.
- ThreatDown researchers discover the exposed, unauthenticated Docker registry, gaining visibility into the botnet's full toolchain: 59 repositories, 234 tags, and 605 verified file blobs totaling 4.3 GB.
- Six of the seven identified CARBONATO registries, plus associated phishing sites, a CDN, and the operators' free-tier LLM gateway (advertising 12 models), are confirmed still live.
- ThreatDown publishes 'CARBONATO: a botnet built around an AI agent,' detailing the Docker exploitation chain, the Hermes Agent/GH0ST payload, Telegram-based C2, the AI-API-key theft priority list, and the Costa Rica attribution signals.
- BleepingComputer and Security Affairs publish independent technical write-ups corroborating the privileged-container exploitation of Docker port 2375, the 14-provider AI API key priority list, and the Costa Rica attribution evidence.
- SecurityWeek, SC Media, CyberPress, and Cybersecurity News reference the CARBONATO findings in industry news coverage, surfacing the campaign for wider security-community awareness.
- The Hacker News, Dark Reading and GBHackers republish the ThreatDown findings and place CARBONATO in a wider wave of AI-agent-driven intrusions (Hermes Agent 'knaithe' campaigns and a Hunt.io-reported Thailand Ministry of Finance intrusion, July 2026).
Update history
- 2026-09-29 — Carbonato Botnet Compromises Exposed Docker Hosts to Deploy Telegram-Controlled Hermes AI Agent: What changed No severity, exploitability, status or attribution change; the record is enriched with host-level behavioral detail. New indicators (10) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
Sources cited
- CARBONATO: a botnet built around an AI agent threatdown.com · Research · 2026-09-23
- Hermes Agent -- Open-Source AI Agent That Grows With You hermes-agent.nousresearch.com · Vendor report · 2026-09-27
- NousResearch/hermes-agent GitHub · Code repository · 2026-09-27
- In Other News: Clop Leak Site Takeover, Docker Botnet Hunts AI Keys, Water Utility Exposure SecurityWeek · News · 2026-09-25
- New Carbonato malware uses AI agents to hijack exposed Docker hosts BleepingComputer · News · 2026-09-24
- AI-Powered CARBONATO Botnet Steals Credentials to Fund Its Own LLM Gateway securityaffairs.com · News · 2026-09-24
- New Carbonato botnet uses AI framework to target insecure Docker daemons scworld.com · News · 2026-09-25
- Researchers Found a Botnet That Uses an AI Agent to Operate Inside Compromised Servers cybersecuritynews.com · News · 2026-09-25
- CARBONATO Botnet Uses AI Agent to Hijack Exposed Docker Hosts and Steal Cloud Credentials cyberpress.org · News · 2026-09-25
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated .