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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2708

Infostealer Market Resilience: Law Enforcement Takedowns Displace, Not Eliminate, RedLine/META/LummaC2/Rhadamanthys Activity

mediumACTIVE

An interrupted-time-series analysis of 44 million infostealer logs (June 2024-June 2026) found that three of four law-enforcement takedowns against RedLine, META, LummaC2, and Rhadamanthys infrastructure produced net-positive displacement rather than suppression, with RedLine volume rising roughly +70-200% in the 14-90 days after Operation Magnus (p<=0.045).

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2708
SeverityMEDIUM
First disclosed
Affected productsVarious (criminal MaaS operators) RedLine Stealer / META Stealer / LummaC2 (Lumma Stealer) / Rhadamanthys - Windows information-stealing malware families; Microsoft Windows desktop endpoints (any supported version running a targeted browser)
AttributionDistributed MaaS operator (medium confidence)
MalwareBumblebee - S1039, IcedID, Lumma Stealer - S1213, LummaC2 (Lumma Stealer), MetaStealer, Pikabot - S1145, RedLine Stealer - S1240, Rhadamanthys, Smoke Loader - S0226, SystemBC - S9001, Venom RAT
ToolsTrick Bot
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027.002 Software Packing, T1036 Masquerading, T1055.012 Process Hollowing, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1119 Automated Collection, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1217 Browser Information Discovery, T1497.001 System Checks, T1518.001 Security Software Discovery, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie and 6 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsfinancial services, cryptocurrency, gaming, technology, retail, government administration
Target regionsGlobal, North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources17 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-09-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2708 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 28 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: LummaC2 dllhost.exe COM-Surrogate Injection, iphlpapi.dll Masquerading & Browser Credential/Session-Cookie Theft

Detects the LummaC2 post-exploitation pattern documented in CISA/FBI AA25-141B: dllhost.exe (a legitimate COM surrogate) spawning an unexpected child process or opening an outbound network connection, iphlpapi.dll being side-loaded by a non-standard host process (masquerading/hijack execution flow), a new autorun registry key being written, and subsequent access to browser credential-store or session-cookie files — the persistence, defense-evasion, discovery, and credential-theft chain shared across RedLine/META/LummaC2/Rhadamanthys.

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=3 OR EventCode=7 OR EventCode=13 OR EventCode=11)
| eval indicator=case(
    EventCode=1 AND ParentImage="*\\dllhost.exe" AND NOT match(Image, "(?i)dllhost\.exe$"), "dllhost_unexpected_child",
    EventCode=3 AND Image="*\\dllhost.exe", "dllhost_network_connection",
    EventCode=7 AND ImageLoaded="*\\iphlpapi.dll" AND NOT Image IN ("*\\svchost.exe", "*\\explorer.exe", "*\\lsass.exe", "*\\services.exe"), "iphlpapi_sideload_masquerade",
    EventCode=13 AND TargetObject="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*", "registry_run_key_persistence",
    EventCode=11 AND match(TargetFilename, "(?i)(Login Data|Cookies|Web Data|Local State)$") AND match(Image, "(?i)(chrome|msedge|firefox)\.exe$")=0, "browser_credential_store_file_access")
| where isnotnull(indicator)
| stats count values(indicator) as indicators values(CommandLine) as command_lines by ComputerName, User, Image, ParentImage, TargetObject, ImageLoaded, TargetFilename
| where count >= 1

Microsoft KQL

let dllhostAnomaly = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "dllhost.exe" and FileName !~ "dllhost.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Indicator = "dllhost_unexpected_child", Detail = FileName;
let dllhostNetwork = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "dllhost.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Indicator = "dllhost_network_connection", Detail = RemoteUrl;
let sideload = DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "iphlpapi.dll" and InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("svchost.exe","explorer.exe","lsass.exe","services.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Indicator = "iphlpapi_sideload_masquerade", Detail = InitiatingProcessFileName;
let persistence = DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RegistryKey has @"CurrentVersion\Run" and ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Indicator = "registry_run_key_persistence", Detail = RegistryValueData;
let credAccess = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","Web Data","Local State") and InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Indicator = "browser_credential_store_file_access", Detail = InitiatingProcessFileName;
union dllhostAnomaly, dllhostNetwork, sideload, persistence, credAccess
| summarize Indicators = make_set(Indicator), Occurrences = count() by DeviceName, AccountName
| where Occurrences >= 1

Sigma

title: dllhost.exe COM-Surrogate Spawning Unexpected Child Process (LummaC2 Post-Exploitation)
id: 9f2c6a1e-5d8b-4c3a-9e7f-2a6d4b8c1f55
status: experimental
description: Detects dllhost.exe, a legitimate COM surrogate process, spawning an unexpected child process or making an outbound network connection — a masquerading and defense-evasion pattern documented for LummaC2 in CISA/FBI advisory AA25-141B.
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-141b
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-27
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1055.012
    - attack.t1497.001
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1555.003
    - attack.t1539
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1217
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1518.001
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1119
    - attack.tool.lummac2
cve.2025.141b: aa25-141b
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\dllhost.exe'
    filter_expected:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\WerFault.exe'
    condition: selection_parent and not filter_expected
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate COM+ application activation spawning a documented child process in a hardened enterprise image
    - Third-party COM-based software update mechanisms
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate COM+ application activation spawning a documented child process in a hardened enterprise image
  • Endpoint security or backup agents that legitimately enumerate browser profile directories
  • IT-managed autorun entries deployed via GPO or software deployment tooling

Tuning notes: Build a baseline of legitimate dllhost.exe COM+ child processes per fleet image before enforcing this at high severity; correlate the composite indicator count (dllhost anomaly + iphlpapi sideload + browser file access on the same host/session within a short window) to suppress single-indicator noise while still catching the full LummaC2 chain.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Phishing-Delivered Script Interpreter Spawn — Infostealer Stage-1 Execution (RedLine/META/LummaC2/Rhadamanthys) · unlock with TL Creds
  • LummaC2 dllhost.exe COM-Surrogate Injection, [indicator] Masquerading & Browser Credential/Session-Cookie Theft · unlock with TL Creds
  • Infostealer C2 Beaconing to Known RedLine/META/LummaC2 Backend Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • Suspicious Script Interpreter Spawned from Office/Browser/Archiver (Infostealer Stage-1) · unlock with TL Creds
  • dllhost.exe COM-Surrogate Spawning Unexpected Child Process (LummaC2 Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • DNS/Proxy Resolution to Known RedLine/META/LummaC2 Backend Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • Phishing-Delivered Script Interpreter Spawn — Infostealer Stage-1 Execution (RedLine/META/LummaC2/Rhadamanthys) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Infostealer C2 Beaconing to Known RedLine/META/LummaC2 Backend Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-09-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 28 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2708.

Sample indicators (3 of 28)

  • Domain: fivto[.]online
  • File hash: 4AFDC05708B8B39C82E60ABE3ACE55DB
  • Domain: spasshik[.]xyz

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 28 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

28 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Only the coordinated FBI/DOJ/Europol/Microsoft action against LummaC2 in May 2025 - which struck technical infrastructure, distribution, monetization, and criminal trust simultaneously - produced statistically significant, lasting suppression (-46% at 14 days, -39% at 90 days).

Flare Academy's 'Real-World Impact of Takedowns on the Infostealer Market' (25 September 2026) applies an interrupted time series (ITS) design with symmetric +/-14/30/60/90-day windows to a corpus of ~44 million infostealer logs collected June 2024-June 2026, one record per compromised host, attributed via syntactic fingerprinting and telemetry-based classification. The study evaluates four distinct law-enforcement operations against the infostealer malware-as-a-service (MaaS) ecosystem: Operation Magnus (28 October 2024, Dutch National Police/FBI/Eurojust coalition against RedLine and META Stealer infrastructure), the original Operation Endgame (27-29 May 2024, France/Germany/Netherlands-led action against the dropper ecosystem - IcedID, SystemBC, Pikabot, Bumblebee, Smokeloader, Trickbot - that feeds infostealer distribution), Operation Secure (INTERPOL-led, January-April 2025, 26-country Asia-Pacific action against LummaC2 and related stealer infrastructure), and the FBI/DOJ/Europol/Microsoft action against LummaC2 (19-21 May 2025). Three of the four produced net-positive volume changes in the targeted or adjacent families: RedLine rose ~+70% at 14 days and ~+200% at 90 days after Magnus (p=0.032 / p=0.045); total dropper-ecosystem-linked stealer volume rose +41% at 90 days after the original Endgame (p=0.042); LummaC2 volume rose +75% at 90 days despite Operation Secure (p=0.004); and Rhadamanthys showed no measurable statistical response to the later Operation Endgame Phase 3 action because its market share was still negligible at that time. Only the May 2025 FBI/DOJ/Europol/Microsoft LummaC2 action - which seized 2,300+ domains (five core panel domains plus subdomains) and disabled five C2 servers, corroborated by the joint FBI/CISA advisory AA25-141B published the same week - produced a statistically significant and durable drop: -46% at 14 days (p=0.042), -34% at 30 days, and -39% at 90 days (p=0.001/0.011 depending on window). Flare's structural explanation is that the LummaC2 action degraded technical infrastructure, distribution channels, monetization mechanisms, and criminal-forum trust simultaneously, whereas the other three operations struck only a single layer (infrastructure alone) and left distribution/monetization/trust intact, letting affiliates and buyers migrate to the next available family. This is corroborated by independent reporting: ESET's backend analysis of the RedLine/META operation (8 November 2024) found both stealers shared a single creator, a common dead-drop-resolver scheme (GitHub-hosted encrypted server lists), and REST-API backends (fivto[.]online for RedLine, spasshik[.]xyz for META) that were largely intact at seizure time outside the three Dutch servers and two domains actually taken; and the November 2025 Operation Endgame Phase 3/3.0 action against Rhadamanthys, VenomRAT, and the Elysium botnet (1,025 servers, 20 domains, one arrest in Greece) came after Rhadamanthys had already absorbed significant displaced volume from the earlier, less-durable takedowns. For SOC and threat-intel consumers, the operational takeaway is that a single-family takedown announcement should not be scored as an overall reduction in infostealer exposure risk; defenders should expect volume migration to remaining active families (RedLine, META, Rhadamanthys, StealC, Vidar) unless the action visibly targets infrastructure, distribution, and monetization together, as the May 2025 LummaC2 action did.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027.002 Software Packing; T1036 Masquerading; T1055.012 Process Hollowing; T1497.001 System Checks

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1204.002 Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery; T1217 Browser Information Discovery; T1518.001 Security Software Discovery

Collection

T1119 Automated Collection

Credential Access

T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers

Persistence

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Initial Access

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment; T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

Impact

T1657 Financial Theft

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block/sinkhole known LummaC2 C2 domains and RedLine/META backend domains (e.g., fivto[.]online, spasshik[.]xyz) at DNS and perimeter egress filtering
  • Hunt for the CISA AA25-141B LummaC2 hash and domain indicators across EDR telemetry and proxy logs
  • Force credential rotation and browser-session/cookie invalidation on any host with stealer-log indicators, given confirmed session-cookie theft (T1539) capability
  • Alert on dllhost.exe (COM surrogate) spawning unexpected child processes or making outbound network connections, a documented LummaC2 masquerading pattern

Workarounds

  • Enforce enterprise browser policy to disable built-in password-manager autofill and shorten session-token lifetimes, reducing the resale value of any successful stealer-log capture
  • Restrict outbound access to Telegram Bot API endpoints and raw IP-literal HTTP destinations from standard user workstations to disrupt common infostealer exfiltration channels

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy phishing-resistant MFA so stolen browser credentials alone cannot be replayed for account takeover
  • Application allowlisting to block unsigned/unauthorized PE and PowerShell execution, the dominant initial-execution path for all four families
  • Subscribe to continuous infostealer-log-market monitoring (Flare, Group-IB, Trend Micro, KELA-class feeds) rather than treating any single takedown announcement as a standalone risk-reduction signal
  • Track displacement, not just suppression: after any single-family infostealer takedown, re-baseline detection coverage against the remaining active families (RedLine, META, Rhadamanthys, StealC, Vidar) rather than assuming reduced overall exposure

Affected and fixed versions

  • Various (criminal MaaS operators) — RedLine Stealer / META Stealer / LummaC2 (Lumma Stealer) / Rhadamanthys - Windows information-stealing malware families
    Vulnerable versions: All actively-sold builds, 2020-2026
    Fixed in: N/A - malware families, not a vendor patchable product
  • Microsoft — Windows desktop endpoints (any supported version running a targeted browser)
    Vulnerable versions: Any Windows host that executes an untrusted binary or malicious script
    Fixed in: N/A

Timeline

  • France, Germany, and the Netherlands, with Europol/Eurojust support, launch the original Operation Endgame (27-29 May 2024) against the dropper ecosystem feeding infostealer distribution - IcedID, SystemBC, Pikabot, Bumblebee, Smokeloader, and Trickbot - seizing 100+ servers and ~2,000 domains and making 4 arrests.
  • Flare's 44-million-log infostealer dataset analysis window begins (June 2024).
  • locked-ioc-21, the META Stealer REST-API backend panel domain, is first observed active per ESET's later infrastructure analysis.
  • locked-ioc-20, the RedLine Stealer REST-API backend panel domain, is first observed active per ESET's later infrastructure analysis.
  • Operation Magnus: Dutch National Police, FBI, and international partners (Belgium, Portugal, UK, Australia), coordinated by Eurojust, seize 3 servers and 2 domains supporting RedLine and META Stealer infrastructure in the Netherlands; alleged RedLine administrator Maxim Rudometov is indicted in the US Western District of Texas and two suspected customers are arrested in Belgium.
  • ESET Research publishes 'Life on a crooked RedLine,' a backend infrastructure analysis showing RedLine and META Stealer share a single creator, a GitHub-hosted dead-drop-resolver scheme, and 1,000+ unique control-panel-hosting IP addresses largely untouched by Operation Magnus.
  • INTERPOL-led Operation Secure runs January-April 2025 across 26 countries (Asia-Pacific focus), seizing 41 servers and 20,000+ malicious IPs/domains and arresting 32 suspects linked to LummaC2, RisePro, and META Stealer infrastructure.
  • US authorities seize the first two core LummaC2 user-panel domains.
  • LummaC2 administrators stand up three replacement panel domains after the initial seizure; these are seized the following day.
  • CISA and FBI jointly publish advisory AA25-141B detailing LummaC2 TTPs, MITRE ATT&CK mappings, and IOCs (hashes and 100+ C2 domains).
  • DOJ, Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit, Europol, Japan's Cybercrime Control Center, Cloudflare, and Bitsight complete the coordinated LummaC2 takedown: 2,300+ domains disrupted (1,300+ sinkholed) and 5 C2 servers disabled; FBI identifies 394,000 LummaC2 infections between 16 March and 16 May 2025 alone, against a lifetime total of 1.7 million compromised devices.
  • Operation Endgame Phase 3 ('Endgame 3.0'): international law enforcement (Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, US) takes down 1,025 servers and 20 domains tied to Rhadamanthys, VenomRAT, and the Elysium botnet, searches 11 locations, and arrests the alleged VenomRAT administrator in Greece; 525,303 unique Rhadamanthys infections are identified across 226 countries/territories between March and November 2025.
  • Flare's 44-million-log infostealer dataset analysis window closes (June 2026).
  • Flare Academy publishes 'Real-World Impact of Takedowns on the Infostealer Market,' the interrupted-time-series analysis showing 3 of 4 operations produced net displacement rather than suppression.

Sources cited

Showing 15 of 17 sources, primary sources first.

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 17 sources; published ; last updated —.

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