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Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-2822

'ChainDrop' self-propagating worm compromises hundreds of popular npm packages (keyv, cacheable ecosystem) via Bun-loaded credential stealer with Ethereum dead-drop C2

criticalACTIVE

On 2026-08-04 attackers who compromised the jaredwray/keyv maintainer's GitHub account published malicious versions of keyv, cacheable, flat-cache, file-entry-cache and related packages (>150M weekly downloads for keyv alone) through the project's own release pipeline. A preinstall loader (setup.mjs) fetches the Bun runtime and runs an obfuscated stealer (math_init.js / Math_Symbol.js) that harvests npm, GitHub, AWS, Kubernetes, Vault and AI-tool credentials and re-publishes infected packages with stolen npm tokens.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2822
Also known asChainDrop, Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again, Mini Shai-Hulud (related wave)
SeverityCRITICAL
First disclosed
Affected productsnpm / jaredwray keyv; npm / jaredwray cacheable ecosystem (cacheable, @cacheable/memory, @cacheable/utils, @cacheable/node-cache, @cacheable/net, cache-manager, cacheable-request, flat-cache, file-entry-cache, ecto); npm (worm-republished victim scopes) @servicetitan, @onereach, @or-sdk, @ornikar, @qlik, @nebula.js, Picsart, Deliveroo-associated packages and others
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-506, CWE-494, CWE-522, CWE-829
MalwareChainDrop, Shai-Hulud
ToolsBun v1.3.13
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003.007 Proc Filesystem, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts, T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1546 Event Triggered Execution and 7 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorstechnology, software-development, cloud, ecommerce, finance
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2822 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 40 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: ChainDrop Stage 1 — npm Preinstall Loader (node setup.mjs) or Known-Poisoned Package Install

Detects the ChainDrop worm's entry point: the npm preinstall lifecycle script running 'node setup.mjs' (the Bun loader that downloads Bun v1.3.13 and launches the stage 2 stealer), and explicit installs of the known-poisoned releases (keyv@6.0.0, flat-cache@6.1.24, file-entry-cache@11.1.6, cacheable-request@13.0.20, cacheable@2.5.1, cache-manager@7.2.10, @cacheable/utils|memory|node-cache|net, ecto@5.0.1). Catches developer workstations and CI runners at the moment of compromise, before credential theft begins.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1195.002, T1059.007
  • Data sources: sysmon, sysmon_for_linux, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, process_creation
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype IN ("XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational","sysmon:linux") EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
```ChainDrop stage 1: npm lifecycle script runs node setup.mjs, or an explicit install of a known-poisoned release```
| eval img=lower(Image), cmd=lower(CommandLine), pimg=lower(ParentImage), pcmd=lower(ParentCommandLine)
| eval is_node=if(like(img,"%/node") OR like(img,"%node.exe"),1,0)
| eval pkg_mgr_parent=if(like(pcmd,"%npm%") OR like(pcmd,"%pnpm%") OR like(pcmd,"%yarn%") OR like(pimg,"%/sh") OR like(pimg,"%/bash") OR like(pimg,"%cmd.exe"),1,0)
| eval is_install=if(like(cmd,"%npm install%") OR like(cmd,"%npm i %") OR like(cmd,"%npm ci%") OR like(cmd,"%pnpm add%") OR like(cmd,"%pnpm install%") OR like(cmd,"%yarn add%"),1,0)
| eval bad_pkg=if(match(cmd,"(keyv@6[.]0[.]0|flat-cache@6[.]1[.]24|file-entry-cache@11[.]1[.]6|cacheable-request@13[.]0[.]20|cacheable@2[.]5[.]1|cache-manager@7[.]2[.]10|@cacheable/(utils@2[.]5[.]1|memory@2[.]2[.]1|node-cache@3[.]1[.]2|net@2[.]1[.]1)|ecto@5[.]0[.]1)"),1,0)
| eval signal=case(is_node=1 AND like(cmd,"%setup.mjs%") AND pkg_mgr_parent=1, "preinstall_loader_node_setup_mjs", is_install=1 AND bad_pkg=1, "known_poisoned_package_install", true(), null())
| where isnotnull(signal)
| stats count min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen values(signal) AS signals values(CommandLine) AS cmdlines values(ParentCommandLine) AS parent_cmdlines BY host, User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| extend img = tolower(FileName), cmd = tolower(ProcessCommandLine), pimg = tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName), pcmd = tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| extend BadPackage = cmd matches regex @"(keyv@6[.]0[.]0|flat-cache@6[.]1[.]24|file-entry-cache@11[.]1[.]6|cacheable-request@13[.]0[.]20|cacheable@2[.]5[.]1|cache-manager@7[.]2[.]10|@cacheable/(utils@2[.]5[.]1|memory@2[.]2[.]1|node-cache@3[.]1[.]2|net@2[.]1[.]1)|ecto@5[.]0[.]1)"
| extend Signal = case(
    img in ("node", "node.exe") and cmd contains "setup.mjs" and (pimg in ("npm", "npm.cmd", "pnpm", "yarn", "sh", "bash", "cmd.exe") or pcmd has_any ("npm", "pnpm", "yarn")), "preinstall_loader_node_setup_mjs",
    BadPackage and cmd has_any ("install", "add", "ci", "i"), "known_poisoned_package_install",
    "")
| where Signal != ""
| summarize FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), Events = count(), Signals = make_set(Signal), CommandLines = make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 10), ParentCommandLines = make_set(InitiatingProcessCommandLine, 10) by DeviceName, AccountName

Sigma

title: ChainDrop npm Preinstall Loader or Known-Poisoned Package Install
id: b7a1c2d4-3e5f-4a60-8b71-9c0d1e2f3a41
status: experimental
description: Detects the ChainDrop npm worm stage 1 loader (node setup.mjs launched from an npm/pnpm/yarn lifecycle script or shell) and explicit installs of the known-poisoned keyv/cacheable ecosystem releases published on 2026-08-04.
references:
  - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/chaindrop-npm-worm-analysis/
  - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/chaindrop-npm-worm
  - https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/npm-worm-compromises-popular-npm-packages/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-01
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1195.002
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_node:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/node'
      - 'node.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: 'setup.mjs'
  selection_parent_pkgmgr:
    ParentCommandLine|contains:
      - 'npm'
      - 'pnpm'
      - 'yarn'
  selection_parent_shell:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '/sh'
      - '/bash'
      - 'cmd.exe'
  selection_install_verb:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'npm install'
      - 'npm i '
      - 'npm ci'
      - 'pnpm add'
      - 'pnpm install'
      - 'yarn add'
  selection_known_bad_package:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'keyv@6.0.0'
      - 'flat-cache@6.1.24'
      - 'file-entry-cache@11.1.6'
      - 'cacheable-request@13.0.20'
      - 'cacheable@2.5.1'
      - 'cache-manager@7.2.10'
      - '@cacheable/utils@2.5.1'
      - '@cacheable/memory@2.2.1'
      - '@cacheable/node-cache@3.1.2'
      - '@cacheable/net@2.1.1'
      - 'ecto@5.0.1'
  condition: (selection_node and 1 of selection_parent_*) or (selection_install_verb and selection_known_bad_package)
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate projects that ship their own setup.mjs and invoke it from an npm script
  - Developers deliberately installing the affected versions in an isolated analysis sandbox
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Internal packages that legitimately run a setup.mjs from a preinstall/postinstall script
  • Security researchers detonating the poisoned versions in a lab

Tuning notes: Allow-list internal repos that own a setup.mjs by ParentCommandLine working directory or package name. Treat the preinstall_loader signal as high fidelity when Image resolves inside node_modules. Extend the poisoned-version regex as the maintainers' clean re-releases and additional republished victim packages (@servicetitan, @onereach, @or-sdk, @ornikar, @qlik, @nebula.js) are catalogued.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • ChainDrop Payload Artifacts on Disk — [indicator], math_init.js, [indicator] and Known SHA256s · unlock with TL Creds
  • ChainDrop Cloud Credential Harvest — AWS Secrets Manager / SSM Sweep Across Many Regions · unlock with TL Creds
  • ChainDrop Ethereum Dead-Drop C2 — node/bun Contacting Public Ethereum RPC Endpoints · unlock with TL Creds
  • ChainDrop Stage 2 — Bun Runtime Executing Obfuscated math_init.js / [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
  • ChainDrop Repo-Level Persistence — [indicator], [indicator] Hooks, Injected Workflow and Token Monitor · unlock with TL Creds
  • ChainDrop C2 — Known C2 Domains, /router Encrypted Envelope and GitHub Commit-Search Dead Drop · unlock with TL Creds
  • ChainDrop Post-Exploitation — Runner.Worker Memory Scraping via sudo/Python (/proc/<pid>/mem) · unlock with TL Creds
  • ChainDrop GitHub Propagation and Exfiltration — Dune-Themed Repos and 'Run Copilot' Secret-Dump Workflow · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 40 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2822.

Sample indicators (3 of 40)

  • Domain: npm-cache[.]com
  • File hash: 9fc2570b7cef51c1b8df116d144d11ff4096357be7d2c4c6367cfc2509cf1bcc
  • Domain: awqhnjewqjkl[.]icu

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 40 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

40 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Package-count estimates range from ~444 (StepSecurity) to 1,300+ (press).

ChainDrop is a self-propagating npm supply-chain worm that surfaced on 2026-08-04. Attackers took over the GitHub account of the keyv/cacheable maintainer and pushed an unsigned commit (ee2681a, replaying a 27-file delta onto main) adding setup.mjs, Math_Symbol.js and a preinstall script, plus camouflage commits by a fake 'claude' bot adding IDE/AI hooks. keyv@6.0.0 was then published at ~09:35 UTC through the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publishing pipeline, carrying genuine SLSA provenance in Rekor; the same payloads were reused across ten cacheable workspaces (nine versions published 10:09-10:14 UTC) and ecto@5.0.1. Eleven 'worm carrier' packages were hit directly (keyv 6.0.0, flat-cache 6.1.24, file-entry-cache 11.1.6, cacheable-request 13.0.20, cacheable 2.5.1, cache-manager 7.2.10, @cacheable/utils 2.5.1, @cacheable/memory 2.2.1, @cacheable/node-cache 3.1.2, @cacheable/net 2.1.1, ecto 5.0.1). StepSecurity counted 444 poisoned packages / 2,212 malicious versions (433 victim packages republished with stolen credentials, incl. scopes @servicetitan, @onereach, @or-sdk, @ornikar, @qlik, @nebula.js); BleepingComputer and others cite 868-1,300+ packages and ~2 billion monthly downloads. npm began rolling unpublishes at ~10:39 UTC.

Stage 1, setup.mjs, is run by the npm preinstall lifecycle script. It accepts any working 'bun' binary or downloads official Bun v1.3.13 from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases (Linux x64/arm64 glibc/musl, macOS, Windows) with no integrity verification, then executes stage 2 (math_init.js / Math_Symbol.js, ~727 KB, Bun-bundled). Stage 2 is protected by Base91 string tables with 73 alphabet permutations, a PBKDF2-SHA256 (200k iterations) custom cipher and AES-256-GCM+gzip blobs. Outside CI it respawns itself detached (_NODE_RUNTIME_INIT=1 guard, single-instance lock tmp.dpkg_14527.lock) and contains an unreachable Russian-language geofence.

Stage 2 scans the filesystem (290 Linux / 129 macOS / 50 Windows path patterns: env files, shell history, SSH keys, git/npm/PyPI creds, AWS/Azure/GCP, Kubernetes, Docker, Vault, Terraform, CI/CD secrets, Copilot/Claude configs, crypto wallets, VPN configs, /etc/shadow, /proc/self/environ). On GitHub Actions Linux runners with sudo it dumps Runner.Worker memory via /proc/<pid>/mem with an embedded Python script and extracts isSecret:true values (dropping github_token). It walks the AWS credential chain (env, web identity, ECS, IMDSv2, profiles), reads Secrets Manager across 17 regions and SSM Parameter Store with decryption, queries STS, dumps in-cluster Kubernetes Secrets and HashiCorp Vault KV values. With a classic GitHub token holding workflow scope it pushes a branch (dependabot/github_actions/format/setup-formatter) with a workflow (codeql_analysis.yml, named 'Run Copilot') that writes toJSON(secrets) to format-results.txt as an artifact, downloads it and deletes the run and branch.

Propagation is triple-pronged: (1) stolen granular npm tokens with bypass_2fa and write permission are used to download the latest tarball, inject setup.mjs/math_init.js, replace scripts with {"preinstall":"node setup.mjs"}, bump the patch version and republish; (2) with GitHub credentials it commits .vscode/tasks.json, .claude/settings.json, .claude/setup.mjs, .vscode/setup.mjs and .claude/math_init.js to up to 50 branches per repo, so the loader re-runs when a developer opens the folder in VS Code or starts a Claude session (cross-linked persistence); (3) when running in an opensearch-js release-drafter workflow it mints a valid Sigstore/SLSA provenance and OIDC npm publish token to publish a poisoned @opensearch-project/opensearch with an optional dependency pinned to a GitHub commit.

C2: stage 2 calls eth_call (selector 0x53ed5143) on Ethereum contract 0xE1f2395ee43e45A1556EC6438a88c31B83493103 across 73-75 public RPC endpoints to retrieve current C2 domains, health-checks GET /router (HTTP 400/404 = healthy) and POSTs an RSA-OAEP-SHA256 + AES-256-GCM encrypted, gzipped JSON envelope to /router. The response may carry a 'code' field that is passed to eval() (unsigned, arbitrary remote JavaScript execution). Fallback: GitHub commit search for 'thebeautifulmarchoftime' with RSA-signed commit markers, and GitHub exfiltration repositories (Dune-themed names, description 'Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again') with a token-relay marker in commit messages. Unit 42 found 453 public exfiltration repositories, domains registered 2026-05-22 and a resolver contract deployed 2026-05-25, and a new DGA-like C2 domain awqhnjewqjkl.icu registered on 2026-08-04.

Attribution: none confirmed. Tooling overlaps Shai-Hulud / Shai-Hulud 2.0 / Mini Shai-Hulud (Bun at preinstall, isSecret:true Runner.Worker memory grep, self-republish with stolen tokens, Bun 1.3.13 pin, PBKDF2 decoder); Unit 42 states it cannot definitively attribute it to TeamPCP. Dormant token-monitor persistence (gh-token-monitor LaunchAgent/systemd) is embedded but not invoked; OPSWAT notes the malware may monitor for credential revocation, so image systems before rotating.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003.007 Proc Filesystem; T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1552.001 Credentials In Files; T1552.005 Cloud Instance Metadata API; T1552.007 Container API; T1555.006 Cloud Secrets Management Stores

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567.001 Exfiltration to Code Repository

Execution

T1059.007 JavaScript

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography

Initial Access

T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts; T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain

Persistence

T1546 Event Triggered Execution

Lateral Movement

T1550.001 Application Access Token

Remediation

Patches

  • Pin to last known-good versions preceding the 2026-08-04 releases and consume the maintainers' clean re-releases once published

Immediate actions

  • Identify installs of the malicious versions (keyv@6.0.0, flat-cache@6.1.24, file-entry-cache@11.1.6, cacheable-request@13.0.20, cacheable@2.5.1, cache-manager@7.2.10, @cacheable/*, ecto@5.0.1 and republished victim packages) via SBOM/lockfiles; purge lockfiles, caches, mirrors and tarballs
  • Image affected hosts/runners before revoking credentials (malware may monitor for revocation), then rotate all npm, GitHub, AWS, Kubernetes, Vault, SSH and cloud credentials reachable from them
  • Block C2 domains npm-cache.com, pypi-get.com, js-mirror.com, awqhnjewqjkl.icu at DNS/SNI (avoid IP blocking: Cloudflare CDN)
  • Search GitHub for repositories described 'Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again' and commits containing the IfYouBlockThisAPIKeyItWillCrashTheLiveProductionServersOfAllThirdPartyClients / thebeautifulmarchoftime markers
  • Hunt for .vscode/tasks.json, .claude/settings.json, setup.mjs, math_init.js, Math_Symbol.js and .github/workflows/codeql_analysis.yml containing toJSON(secrets); remove malicious branches such as dependabot/github_actions/format/setup-formatter

Workarounds

  • Monitor the Ethereum resolver contract 0xE1f2395ee43e45A1556EC6438a88c31B83493103 for domain changes
  • Alert on bun processes executing math_init.js/Math_Symbol.js and on sudo python3 reading /proc/<pid>/mem of Runner.Worker

Longer-term hardening

  • Use npm install --ignore-scripts / pnpm script allow-lists and a package-age (cooldown) policy for new releases
  • Enforce egress filtering and ephemeral, least-privilege CI runners; avoid passwordless sudo on runners
  • Prefer short-lived, workload-bound credentials (OIDC) over long-lived npm/GitHub tokens; require granular tokens without bypass_2fa
  • Treat SLSA provenance as evidence not a safety verdict: review source, workflow and artifact referenced by attestations
  • Review repo-level IDE/AI-agent config (.vscode/tasks.json, .claude/settings.json) in code review and EDR policy

Affected and fixed versions

  • npm / jaredwray — keyv
    Vulnerable versions: 6.0.0
  • npm / jaredwray — cacheable ecosystem (cacheable, @cacheable/memory, @cacheable/utils, @cacheable/node-cache, @cacheable/net, cache-manager, cacheable-request, flat-cache, file-entry-cache, ecto)
    Vulnerable versions: cacheable@2.5.1; @cacheable/memory@2.2.1; @cacheable/utils@2.5.1; @cacheable/node-cache@3.1.2; @cacheable/net@2.1.1; cache-manager@7.2.10; cacheable-request@13.0.20; flat-cache@6.1.24; file-entry-cache@11.1.6; ecto@5.0.1
  • npm (worm-republished victim scopes) — @servicetitan, @onereach, @or-sdk, @ornikar, @qlik, @nebula.js, Picsart, Deliveroo-associated packages and others
    Vulnerable versions: patch-bumped versions published 2026-08-04

Timeline

Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source

  • Shai-Hulud 1.0 npm worm wave (September 2025); Shai-Hulud 2.0 'The Second Coming' follows in November 2025 and shares the Bun-at-preinstall, Runner.Worker memory scraping and self-republishing design (OPSWAT, StepSecurity)
  • Earliest public GitHub exfiltration repository identified by Unit 42 (Mini Shai-Hulud Wave Four period)
  • Three C2 domains (locked-ioc-24, locked-ioc-26, locked-ioc-25) registered within 8 seconds (13:40:28-13:40:36 UTC)
  • Ethereum resolver contract 0xE1f2395e...3103 deployed and domains written to it; list narrowed to locked-ioc-24 about 2h35m later
  • 10:28 UTC: ecto@5.0.1 published carrying the same payload.
  • Datadog Security Labs, StepSecurity, Unit 42, Aikido, Wiz, Socket and others publish analyses; Unit 42 identifies 453 public exfiltration repositories and new C2 domain locked-ioc-20 (registered 2026-08-04 via NameSilo)
  • ~10:39 UTC: npm begins rolling unpublish of malicious versions
  • From 09:38 UTC: automated second-wave propagation republishes hundreds of victim packages with stolen npm tokens (@servicetitan, @onereach, @or-sdk, @ornikar, @qlik, @nebula.js, Picsart and others)
  • 10:06-10:14 UTC: payloads reused across ten cacheable workspaces and nine versions published; ecto@5.0.1 published ~10:28 UTC
  • 09:29-09:35 UTC: malicious keyv@6.0.0 published through GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publishing with genuine SLSA provenance
  • 09:02 UTC: unsigned commit pushed to jaredwray/keyv main adding locked-ioc-27, locked-ioc-23 and preinstall script via compromised maintainer account; camouflage 'claude' bot commits add IDE/AI hooks
  • Datadog updates its ChainDrop article, adding the C2 domain locked-ioc-20.
  • Elastic Security Labs publishes its analysis of the campaign, reporting over 400 compromised packages and detection rules; it does not explain how the maintainer account was compromised.

Update history

Sources cited

Previous and next in supply chain

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated .

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