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Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-2826

ScreenConnect Client Abused by Attackers via Mejuri-Themed Payment Receipt Phishing

mediumACTIVE

A phishing email impersonating jewelry brand Mejuri (fake $5,745.65 'EFT Wire Transfer' payment receipt) lures recipients to download ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe from a compromised Australian domain. The file is a genuine, validly ConnectWise-signed ScreenConnect client preconfigured to call back to an attacker-operated ConnectWise-hosted instance via a relay on port 443.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2826
SeverityMEDIUM
Affected productsConnectWise ScreenConnect (abused as legitimate RMM; no vulnerability)
ToolsConnectWise - S0591, ScreenConnect, ScreenConnect relay
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1036 Masquerading, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1090 Proxy, T1204.001 Malicious Link, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1219.002 Remote Desktop Software, T1566.002 Spearphishing Link, T1584.001 Domains, T1684.001 Impersonation
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorsretail, finance, general enterprise
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2826 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 11 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: DNS Resolution of ScreenConnect Cloud Relay (Attacker Instance v2e3e2) — C2

Detects DNS queries for ScreenConnect cloud relay hostnames (instance-<id>-relay.screenconnect.com). The campaign's client calls back to instance-v2e3e2-relay.screenconnect.com over TCP/443; the legitimate vendor domain blends into normal traffic, so detection keys on the instance-specific hostname. Works on hosts or networks without endpoint network telemetry.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1071.001, T1090, T1219.002
  • Data sources: sysmon EventCode 22, stream:dns, DnsEvents, DeviceEvents DnsQueryResponse, sigma dns_query windows
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

``` DNS lookups of ScreenConnect cloud relay hostnames; v2e3e2 is the attacker instance (SANS ISC 33388) ```
earliest=-24h ((index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=22) OR (index=dns sourcetype="stream:dns"))
| eval query_name=lower(coalesce(QueryName, query))
| where like(query_name, "%-relay.screenconnect.com")
| eval client=coalesce(Computer, src)
| rex field=query_name "^instance-(?<instance_id>[a-z0-9]+)-relay[.]screenconnect[.]com$"
| eval campaign_match=if(query_name="instance-v2e3e2-relay.screenconnect.com", "known_campaign_relay", "unsanctioned_candidate")
| stats count as queries min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(Image) as processes by client, query_name, instance_id, campaign_match
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - queries

Microsoft KQL

// DNS resolution of ScreenConnect cloud relay instances
let ApprovedInstances = dynamic(['replace-with-org-instance-id']);
union
(
    DnsEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
    | where Name endswith '-relay.screenconnect.com'
    | project EventTime = TimeGenerated, Device = Computer, QueryName = tolower(Name), ClientIP, Source = 'DnsEvents'
),
(
    DeviceEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where ActionType == 'DnsQueryResponse'
    | extend QueryName = tolower(tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).DnsQueryString))
    | where QueryName endswith '-relay.screenconnect.com'
    | project EventTime = Timestamp, Device = DeviceName, QueryName, ClientIP = LocalIP, Source = 'DeviceEvents'
)
| extend InstanceId = extract('^instance-([a-z0-9]+)-relay[.]screenconnect[.]com$', 1, QueryName)
| where isnotempty(InstanceId) and InstanceId !in (ApprovedInstances)
| extend KnownCampaignRelay = QueryName == 'instance-v2e3e2-relay.screenconnect.com'
| summarize Queries = count(), FirstSeen = min(EventTime), LastSeen = max(EventTime) by Device, ClientIP, QueryName, InstanceId, KnownCampaignRelay, Source
| order by KnownCampaignRelay desc, LastSeen desc

Sigma

title: DNS Query for ScreenConnect Cloud Relay Instance
id: f2c85b74-0a9e-4136-b7d1-8e4c6a2d9f05
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS queries for ScreenConnect cloud relay hostnames, including the attacker-operated instance v2e3e2 used by a preconfigured ScreenConnect client delivered via Mejuri-themed phishing.
references:
  - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/33388
  - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-025a
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/01
tags:
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1219.002
  - attack.t1071.001
  - attack.t1090
  - attack.s0591
logsource:
  category: dns_query
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_campaign:
    QueryName: 'instance-v2e3e2-relay.screenconnect.com'
  selection_generic:
    QueryName|endswith: '-relay.screenconnect.com'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Sanctioned ScreenConnect agents of the organization or its MSP resolving their own approved instance
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Sanctioned ScreenConnect agents resolving the organization's or MSP's own approved relay
  • Vendor support sessions initiated by IT

Tuning notes: Treat instance-v2e3e2-relay.screenconnect.com as a confirmed IOC (high confidence). For the generic branch, populate the approved instance list from your RMM inventory and alert on everything else. Do not block the whole screenconnect.com domain unless the business does not use it (CISA AA23-025A guidance); block the instance hostname instead.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • [indicator] Downloaded From Non-Vendor Host — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Unsanctioned ScreenConnect Instance in Process Command Line — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Endpoint Connection to ScreenConnect Cloud Relay on TCP/443 — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • [indicator] Executed From User Path or Browser — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • ScreenConnect Client Spawning Command Interpreters or LOLBins — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Proxy or Firewall Traffic to ScreenConnect Cloud Relay Instance — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • Mejuri-Themed 'EFT Wire Transfer' Phishing Lure (ScreenConnect Delivery) — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • ScreenConnect Client Service Installed Against Attacker Relay Instance — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 11 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2826.

Sample indicators (1 of 11)

  • Domain: thelittlecupandsaucer[.]com[.]au

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 11 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

11 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

On 2026-10-01 SANS ISC handler Xavier Mertens documented a phishing email spoofing the sender contact@mejuri.com with the subject 'EFT Wire Transfer'. The body claims a payment of $5745.65 was received and urges the recipient to view order information; it also lists a phone number (+1(332)638474823), a typical callback-phishing/refund-scam element. The call-to-action points to hxxps://thelittlecupandsaucer.com.au/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe, a download hosted on a .com.au domain that appears to be a compromised, unrelated website.

The downloaded executable is not tampered malware. It is a legitimate ScreenConnect client installer signed by 'ConnectWise, LLC' (DigiCert G4 Code Signing CA1) whose Authenticode digest matches and which has no overlay. The attacker-specific part is the embedded client configuration, extracted from the PE: relay instance-v2e3e2-relay.screenconnect.com, port 443, instance ID v2e3e2 (ConnectWise-hosted cloud instance), and an RSA-2048 instance key (SHA256 beginning 16b1cec1, ending 9b00ead7; the diary shows a truncated value). Per the analyst, this is a client preconfigured to call back to a (trial/test) account operated by the attacker. At the time of analysis the sample was unknown on VirusTotal.

Abusing a signed, commercially available RMM tool lets the actor skip custom malware: the valid signature and the trusted screenconnect.com relay domain blend into normal enterprise traffic, and once installed the actor has interactive remote control of the endpoint. The source gives no attribution, malware family, CVE, or follow-on activity. The pattern matches earlier RMM-abuse campaigns described by CISA/NSA/MS-ISAC in advisory AA23-025A (ScreenConnect and AnyDesk delivered via phishing for refund scams) and by Abnormal Security in 2025 (ScreenConnect delivered as fake Zoom/Teams installers). Defenders should treat any unsanctioned ScreenConnect client, especially one calling an instance not owned by the organization, as a potential intrusion.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1036 Masquerading; T1684.001 Impersonation

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1090 Proxy; T1219.002 Remote Desktop Software

Execution

T1204.001 Malicious Link; T1204.002 Malicious File

Initial Access

T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

Resource Development

T1584.001 Domains

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block/alert on DNS and TLS connections to instance-v2e3e2-relay.screenconnect.com and any ScreenConnect instance ID not owned by the organization
  • Block thelittlecupandsaucer.com.au and the URL path /ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe at web proxy/DNS
  • Search email logs for sender contact@mejuri.com with subject 'EFT Wire Transfer' and purge matching messages
  • Hunt endpoints for ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe executions and ScreenConnect client services/ClickOnce artifacts, then isolate and reimage hosts that ran it

Workarounds

  • Where ScreenConnect is not used by the business, block *.screenconnect.com relay traffic at the perimeter

Longer-term hardening

  • Allowlist only approved RMM tools with application control and audit RMM software inventory
  • Restrict outbound RMM relay traffic to sanctioned instances only (per CISA AA23-025A)
  • Train users on fake payment-receipt and wire-transfer lures and on verifying brand senders via SPF/DKIM/DMARC alignment

Affected and fixed versions

  • ConnectWise — ScreenConnect (abused as legitimate RMM; no vulnerability)

Timeline

  • Start of the financially motivated help-desk/refund-scam phishing campaign later described by CISA (AA23-025A), delivering ScreenConnect and AnyDesk as portable executables to victims (CISA: activity 'since June 2022').
  • CISA, NSA and MS-ISAC publish AA23-025A on phishing campaigns delivering ScreenConnect and AnyDesk portable executables for refund scams.
  • Abnormal Security reports a ScreenConnect abuse campaign (fake Zoom/Teams installers, Zoom.ClientSetup.exe) targeting 900+ organizations.
  • SANS ISC Diary 33388 (Xavier Mertens) published with IOCs; last updated 2026-10-01 05:32 UTC.
  • Linked locked-ioc-3 hosted on locked-ioc-4 found to be a validly ConnectWise-signed client with an embedded config for instance v2e3e2 (relay port 443); unknown on VirusTotal.
  • Phishing email spoofing locked-ioc-5, subject 'EFT Wire Transfer', claiming $5745.65 received, observed and analyzed.

Sources cited

Previous and next in phishing

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.

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