Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2836
DragonForce backdoors abuse Microsoft Teams TURN servers and MQTT for resilient C2
Lab52 reports DragonForce-linked backdoors that hide command-and-control in legitimate infrastructure: a Go-based Shell.dll injected in memory that abuses TURN (Microsoft Teams relays), and a javaw.exe/jli.dll sideloaded multi-stage loader for a second backdoor using MQTT. Both use DPAPI-bound payloads, scheduled-task persistence and encrypt their own memory while idle. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2836, CVE-2023-52271, CVE-2025-61155, CVE-2025-1055 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Backdoor.Turn |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| EPSS | CVE-2023-52271: 0.3% (21.5th percentile); CVE-2025-61155: 0.2% (18.6th percentile); CVE-2025-1055: 0.2% (12.8th percentile) |
| Affected products | Microsoft Microsoft Teams TURN relay infrastructure (abused legitimate service, not a vulnerability); Oracle javaw.exe (legitimate Java launcher abused as DLL side-loading host); Microsoft Windows (DPAPI-bound payloads, scheduled tasks); Microsoft SQL Server (suspected initial access vector, unidentified flaw) |
| Attribution | DragonForce (medium confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | Malaysia |
| Malware | ABYSSWORKER, Backdoor.Turn, DragonForce |
| Tools | ADExplore |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1055 Process Injection, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1087.002 Domain Account, T1090.002 External Proxy, T1112 Modify Registry, T1136 Create Account and 9 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | services, technology |
| Target regions | North America |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2836 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 51 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: DragonForce SQL Server Child Shell Staging Download (TechSupV18Fix3.zip / Lab52 Staging Hosts)
Detects cmd.exe/powershell.exe/pwsh.exe spawned by sqlservr.exe that downloads or unpacks payloads, flagging the exact staging artifacts reported for DragonForce (TechSupV18Fix3.zip from 192.36.27.51, 25vtps.txt and dldwuibjn_chShllcodeTrn from 188.190.4.111). Symantec assessed initial access in the observed intrusion as an unidentified SQL/MSSQL Server flaw followed by a PowerShell pull of a ZIP with sideloaded VirtualBox/DbgView binaries. SQL Server spawning a shell that fetches content is rare and high-fidelity.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1190, T1059.001, T1105
- Data sources: sysmon_process_creation, microsoft_defender_xdr_DeviceProcessEvents, windows_process_creation
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ParentImage="*\\sqlservr.exe" (Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe" OR Image="*\\cmd.exe")
(CommandLine="*TechSupV18Fix3*" OR CommandLine="*192.36.27.51*" OR CommandLine="*188.190.4.111*" OR CommandLine="*25vtps*" OR CommandLine="*dldwuibjn_chShllcodeTrn*" OR CommandLine="*DownloadFile*" OR CommandLine="*DownloadString*" OR CommandLine="*Invoke-WebRequest*" OR CommandLine="*Start-BitsTransfer*" OR CommandLine="*urlcache*" OR CommandLine="*bitsadmin*" OR CommandLine="*Expand-Archive*" OR CommandLine="*curl*")
| eval ioc_match=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)TechSupV18Fix3|192[.]36[.]27[.]51|188[.]190[.]4[.]111|25vtps|dldwuibjn_chShllcodeTrn"),"known_dragonforce_ioc","generic_sqlservr_shell_download")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as commands values(ioc_match) as ioc_match by host, User, ParentImage, Image
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
let StagingIocs = dynamic(["TechSupV18Fix3", "192.36.27.51", "188.190.4.111", "25vtps", "dldwuibjn_chShllcodeTrn"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "sqlservr.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cmd.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (StagingIocs)
or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("DownloadFile", "DownloadString", "Invoke-WebRequest", "Start-BitsTransfer", "urlcache", "bitsadmin", "Expand-Archive", "curl")
| extend KnownIoc = ProcessCommandLine has_any (StagingIocs)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, KnownIoc
| order by KnownIoc desc, Timestamp descSigma
title: DragonForce SQL Server Spawning Shell With Download Or Staging Activity
id: 7d1c2e4a-5b3f-4a86-9c21-0e8f6b1a3d01
status: experimental
description: Detects sqlservr.exe spawning cmd, powershell or pwsh with download/unpack primitives or the DragonForce staging artifacts (TechSupV18Fix3.zip, 192.36.27.51, 188.190.4.111, 25vtps.txt) reported by Symantec and Lab52.
references:
- https://www.security.com/blog-post/dragonforce-msteams-backdoor
- https://lab52.io/blog/backdoors-in-the-dungeon-turn-mqtt-abused-by-dragonforce/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/02
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1190
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: '\sqlservr.exe'
selection_child:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
selection_ioc:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'TechSupV18Fix3'
- '192.36.27.51'
- '188.190.4.111'
- '25vtps'
- 'dldwuibjn_chShllcodeTrn'
selection_download:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'DownloadFile'
- 'DownloadString'
- 'Invoke-WebRequest'
- 'Start-BitsTransfer'
- 'urlcache'
- 'bitsadmin'
- 'Expand-Archive'
- 'curl'
condition: selection_parent and selection_child and (selection_ioc or selection_download)
falsepositives:
- SQL Server maintenance jobs using xp_cmdshell for approved file transfer
- Database administrators staging backups or patches
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate xp_cmdshell jobs that download patches, scripts or backups
- DBA automation using PowerShell from SQL Agent job steps
Tuning notes: Allowlist known SQL Agent job command lines and approved internal download hosts. Keep the IOC branch unfiltered. Enable Sysmon EventCode 1 with command line capture on SQL Server hosts, and consider disabling xp_cmdshell where unused.
- DragonForce DLL Side-Loading - javaw.exe/[indicator] and DbgView/VirtualBox/[indicator] From Non-Standard Paths · unlock with TL Creds
- DragonForce Scheduled-Task Persistence From Sideloaded Java/DbgView/VirtualBox Hosts · unlock with TL Creds
- DragonForce Microsoft Teams TURN Relay And Skype Identity Abuse By Non-Teams Process · unlock with TL Creds
- DragonForce Staged Payload And DPAPI-Bound Stage File Creation (rvsdiqw.txt, 25vtps.txt, dldwuibjn_chShllcodeTrn) · unlock with TL Creds
- DragonForce Hands-On-Keyboard Signals - LimitBlankPassword, Account/Group Add, Firewall Rule, ADExplore · unlock with TL Creds
- DragonForce Known C2 And Staging Infrastructure (Lab52 and Symantec IOCs) · unlock with TL Creds
- DragonForce BYOVD Security-Tool Killer Drivers (HWAuidoOs2Ec, wsftprm, GameDriverx64, K7RKScan, ABYSSWORKER) · unlock with TL Creds
- DragonForce TURN/STUN and MQTT Covert C2 Channels From Non-Approved Processes · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 51 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2836.
Sample indicators (3 of 51)
- IP address:
188.190.4[.]111 - Domain:
prolabgest[.]it - URL:
hxxps://accesscapfunding[.]com/wp-content/themes/twentytwentyfour/v4wwy9.php
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 51 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Community OSINT corroboration
2 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.
Technical analysis
Symantec's earlier Backdoor.Turn report ties the same TURN technique to a DragonForce ransomware intrusion that used BYOVD to kill security tools.
On 2026-10-01 Lab52 published 'Backdoors in the dungeon: TURN & MQTT abused by DragonForce', documenting two custom backdoors attributed to the DragonForce ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation (active since around 2023, since evolved into a cartel/infrastructure-provider model for affiliates). Lab52 relates the work to Symantec's earlier reporting on Backdoor.Turn (published 2026-06-16).
Backdoor 1 is a Go binary with metadata name Shell.dll that is injected directly into memory. It supports SSH-based communications authenticated with an embedded private key and abuses the TURN protocol for C2. The TURN channel uses messages of the form TRN1<UUID:16> with numeric command codes (22222222 C2 initiation; 33300000 task check, answered 'nocmd' when idle; 33299999 block download request; 3320 block retransmit; 33100000 task-receipt confirmation; 4440 beacon-to-C2 transfer initiation with blocks of up to 930 bytes; 4410 transfer status), with nonces generated via BCryptGenRandom. A TURN endpoint at 62.164.177.145:3478 is listed as an IOC.
Backdoor 2 is a multi-stage chain: the legitimate javaw.exe sideloads a malicious jli.dll (first-stage loader, three SHA256 variants published), which loads a DPAPI-encrypted, system-bound stage (rvsdiqw.txt) that runs the second backdoor. Staging payloads (25vtps.txt, dldwuibjn_chShllcodeTrn.txt/.bin) were fetched from http://188.190.4.111/. The second backdoor uses MQTT (described by Lab52 as a fallback channel) with a 16-character random session identifier, JSON commands validated by a 'cmdnum' field, and topic-based block retrieval with four-digit decimal indexes. Commands: cmdnum 1 inserts a URL (shk_url, tedByUID), cmdnum 2 runs a PowerShell line (ps_line, cmdid), cmdnum 3 executes a payload directly, cmdnum 4 inserts a remote host/port (rhost, rport). The MQTT endpoint 217.156.8.181:7586 is listed as an IOC.
Shared tradecraft: DLL sideloading via a legitimate executable, in-memory execution (CreateThread, VirtualProtect), XOR and Base64 payload obfuscation, DPAPI encryption that ties payloads to the host, scheduled-task persistence, and encryption of the memory region of the running code while sleeping (5-minute sleep before retry). Lab52 also lists several WordPress-hosted PHP endpoints (plus prolabgest.it) as IOCs; their precise role is not stated in the retrieved text.
Symantec (2026-06-16) analyzed Backdoor.Turn in a December 2025 DragonForce intrusion at a U.S. services company: a Go RAT that obtains an anonymous Teams visitor token from Microsoft's Skype-backed identity services, uses a legitimate Microsoft TURN relay, then runs a QUIC session to the real C2, so defenders see only outbound traffic to Microsoft. It was injected into DbgView64.exe and supports command execution, process creation, network scanning, TLS certificate capture, web page title collection, LDAP/Active Directory searching, credential-based lateral movement and browser credential theft. Symantec described it as the first known malware to abuse Teams TURN relays; the technique resembles Praetorian's 2025 'Ghost Calls' research on TURN credential hijacking. Initial access was likely an unknown SQL/MSSQL Server flaw (or an access broker). A PowerShell command pulled a ZIP (TechSupV18Fix3.zip from 192.36.27.51) containing legitimate VirtualBox/DbgView executables with malicious DLLs (vboxrt.dll) that fetched code from a list of C2 domains for recon, persistence and evasion. The actors modified LimitBlankPassword, added users/groups and altered firewall rules, used ADExplore and network scanners, and ran BYOVD to kill security tools with Huawei HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys ('Havoc Process Terminator'), Topaz Antifraud wsftprm.sys (CVE-2023-52271), Tower of Fantasy GameDriverx64.sys (CVE-2025-61155), K7 Security K7RKScan.sys (CVE-2025-1055) and a custom driver, ABYSSWORKER, masquerading as a Palo Alto driver. DragonForce ransomware was then deployed, with Backdoor.Turn reportedly installed afterwards for continued access. Dwell time was roughly 1-2 months. Press coverage links DragonForce to Scattered Spider; The Hacker News names the actor behind DragonForce as 'Hackledorb'. No CVE is assigned to the backdoors themselves; severity is analyst-assigned.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File; T1055 Process Injection; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1480.001 Environmental Keying; T1574.001 DLL; T1620 Reflective Code Loading
Discovery
T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1087.002 Domain Account
Persistence
T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1136 Create Account
Execution
Command and Control
T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090.002 External Proxy; T1572 Protocol Tunneling
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
defense-impairment
T1112 Modify Registry; T1685 Disable or Modify Tools; T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall
Credential Access
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Hunt for javaw.exe loading jli.dll from a non-Java directory and for VirtualBox/DbgView executables loading vboxrt.dll from user-writable paths; block/quarantine the published SHA256 hashes
- Block outbound connections to 188.190.4.111, 62.164.177.145, 62.164.177.25, 217.156.8.181 and 192.36.27.51 and alert on the listed URLs and C2 domains
- Review scheduled tasks created by unexpected parents and investigate hosts with unexplained long-lived TURN (UDP/TCP 3478), QUIC or MQTT sessions
- Audit for LimitBlankPassword registry changes, unexpected new local accounts/groups and new firewall rules on hosts near internet-facing SQL Server
Workarounds
- Where Teams is not used, block Microsoft Teams relay endpoints at the egress proxy/firewall
Longer-term hardening
- Restrict outbound TURN/STUN and MQTT to approved services and baseline Teams relay use per host
- Deploy EDR with detection for DLL side-loading, in-memory injection and sleep-time memory encryption
- Harden internet-facing SQL Server instances and enforce a vulnerable-driver blocklist (HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys, wsftprm.sys, GameDriverx64.sys, K7RKScan.sys, ABYSSWORKER)
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Microsoft Teams TURN relay infrastructure (abused legitimate service, not a vulnerability)
- Oracle — javaw.exe (legitimate Java launcher abused as DLL side-loading host)
- Microsoft — Windows (DPAPI-bound payloads, scheduled tasks)
- Microsoft — SQL Server (suspected initial access vector, unidentified flaw)
Timeline
- DragonForce RaaS emerges (approximately 2023; exact date not specified), later evolving into a cartel-style/infrastructure-provider model for affiliates.
- DragonForce intrusion begins at a U.S. services company (month-level date): likely SQL/MSSQL Server exploitation, ZIP with sideloaded locked-ioc-45, BYOVD security-tool kill, recon with ADExplore; dwell time reportedly 1-2 months.
- Huntress documents abuse of the Huawei locked-ioc-32 driver (month-level date, after the Symantec-observed attack), per Symantec's reference to the technique.
- Symantec publishes 'Hidden in Teams' on Backdoor.Turn, the first known malware abusing Microsoft Teams TURN relays for C2 (Teams visitor token, TURN relay, QUIC session to real C2); BleepingComputer and Help Net Security cover it the same day.
- The Hacker News coverage of the Symantec/Carbon Black findings, including the BYOVD driver set and post-encryption Backdoor.Turn deployment.
- Threadlinqs hunt identifies the Lab52 report; IOCs and TTPs recorded for detection engineering.
- Lab52 publishes 'Backdoors in the dungeon: TURN & MQTT abused by DragonForce' with locked-ioc-46 (TURN/SSH) and locked-ioc-47/javaw.exe sideloaded MQTT backdoor analysis and IOCs.
Sources cited
- Backdoors in the dungeon: TURN & MQTT abused by DragonForce (Lab52) lab52.io · Research · 2026-10-01
- Hidden in Teams: DragonForce Attackers Weaponize Microsoft Teams Relays to Stay Hidden (Symantec) security.com · Vendor report · 2026-06-16
- DragonForce Hackers Exploit Microsoft Teams TURN Relays to Conceal Backdoor.Turn C2 (Rescana) rescana.com · Research
- Ransomware gang abuses Microsoft Teams relays to hide malicious traffic (BleepingComputer) BleepingComputer · News · 2026-06-16
- Cybercriminals mask malicious communications through Microsoft Teams relays (Help Net Security) Help Net Security · News · 2026-06-16
- DragonForce Hackers Abuse Microsoft Teams Relays (The Hacker News) The Hacker News · News · 2026-06-18
- DragonForce ransomware backdoor weaponises legit Microsoft Teams servers (Techfinitive) techfinitive.com · News
- Ransomware Operators Use Microsoft Teams Servers to Hide Their Traffic (Hackmag) hackmag.com · News
- How DragonForce Weaponized Microsoft Teams to Outlast Its Own Ransomware (Security Buzz) securitybuzz.com · News
More from DragonForce
- DragonForce Ransomware Cartel Windows Payload Analysis (.df_win, ChaCha20/RSA-4096, ARP/SMB Discovery)
- Top 10 Critical Threat Actors to Watch in 2026: Akira, DragonForce, Qilin, LockBit, Scattered Spider, Cl0p, Lazarus, Volt Typhoon, APT29, OilRig (CVE-2024-40766, CVE-2025-61882, CVE-2023-34362, CVE-2024-39717, CVE-2024-30088)
- DragonForce Ransomware Claims Victim lyserp.com (ERP Software Provider)
- Q1 2026 Industrial Cybersecurity Incidents: Sandworm/Static Tundra Polish Energy Wiper Attempts, Handala Intune Wipe of Stryker, DragonForce Ransomware at Hazeldenes
- Bitdefender Threat Debrief June 2026: Ransomware Landscape (Qilin, The Gentlemen, DragonForce, KryBit) and Actively Exploited SolarWinds Serv-U Flaw CVE-2026-28318
- Healthcare Sector Ransomware Targeting and Expanding Attack Surface (Qilin, Akira, DragonForce, LockBit, The Gentlemen)
Other reports on CVE-2023-52271
Previous and next in malware
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.