Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2934
ClingSTUN Linux Backdoor Turns Unpatched IoT Devices Into Proxy Nodes via Public STUN Infrastructure
FortiGuard Labs reports ClingSTUN, a Linux back-connect proxy backdoor that exploits known, unpatched vulnerabilities in Internet-facing routers, IoT devices and Ivanti Connect Secure to turn them into remotely controlled proxy nodes. It uses legitimate public STUN servers for NAT traversal so its traffic resembles VoIP/WebRTC.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2934, CVE-2022-36553, CVE-2025-34035, CVE-2024-23625, CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887, CVE-2026-36356, CVE-2025-67038, CVE-2024-23624, CVE-2019-17621, CVE-2019-7256, CVE-2021-35394, CVE-2023-1389, CVE-2024-7029, CVE-2024-10915, CVE-2024-10914, CVE-2022-37055, CVE-2014-8361, CVE-2016-20016, CVE-2024-3721, CVE-2025-34037, CVE-2023-26801, CVE-2023-41011, CVE-2026-87827, CVE-2021-36380, CVE-2024-46048, CVE-2024-35340, CVE-2024-32314, CVE-2024-32292, CVE-2024-32281, CVE-2022-35555, CVE-2022-26289 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | ClingSTUN |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Exploitation status | Linked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2023-46805 (added ), CVE-2024-21887 (added ), CVE-2025-67038 (added ), CVE-2019-17621 (added ), CVE-2019-7256 (added ), CVE-2021-35394 (added ) and 4 more |
| EPSS | CVE-2024-21887: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2023-1389: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2023-46805: 99.9% (99.9th percentile) |
| Affected products | Hytec Inter HWL-2511-SS; EnGenius EnShare IoT Gigabit Cloud Service (ESR/EPG devices); D-Link DAP-1650, Go-RT-AC750 and other UPnP/CGI devices; Ivanti Connect Secure / Policy Secure; Lantronix EDS5000, G520, X300, E210, E220; MeiG Smart FORGE_SLT711; Linear eMerge; Realtek SDK-based devices and 2 more |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-77, CWE-78, CWE-306, CWE-94 |
| Malware | ClingSTUN |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1001.003 Protocol or Service Impersonation, T1036 Masquerading, T1037.004 RC Scripts, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1090 Proxy, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services, T1562 Impair Defenses, T1564 Hide Artifacts and 2 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | telecoms, technology, enterprise, consumer-iot, surveillance |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 7 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-11, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2934 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 48 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: ClingSTUN Self-Copy — Execution or Creation at .cling Install Paths
ClingSTUN copies itself to /root/.cling or /usr/local/bin/.cling after exploitation. Alerts on a process image, or a created file, at either hidden path, or on a command line that runs them.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1036, T1105
- Data sources: sysmon_for_linux, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint_linux
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
```Detect ClingSTUN self-copy and execution at its hidden install paths```
index=linux sourcetype="sysmon:linux" (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=11)
| eval path=coalesce(Image,TargetFilename,""), cmd=coalesce(CommandLine,"")
| where match(path,"^/(root|usr/local/bin)/[.]cling$") OR match(cmd,"/(root|usr/local/bin)/[.]cling([ ]|$)")
| fillnull value="n/a" User ParentImage
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(EventCode) as event_codes values(cmd) as cmdlines values(ParentImage) as parents by host, User, path
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
// ClingSTUN self-copy and execution at /root/.cling and /usr/local/bin/.cling
let ClingPath = @"^/(root|usr/local/bin)/[.]cling$";
union
( DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FolderPath matches regex ClingPath or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"/(root|usr/local/bin)/[.]cling( |$)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Evidence = "process", Path = FolderPath, CommandLine = ProcessCommandLine, Parent = InitiatingProcessFileName, SHA256 ),
( DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileRenamed")
| where FolderPath matches regex ClingPath
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Evidence = "file", Path = FolderPath, CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Parent = InitiatingProcessFileName, SHA256 )
| sort by Timestamp descSigma
title: ClingSTUN Backdoor Execution From Hidden .cling Install Path
id: 2f8b6c14-a9d7-4e35-8c10-6d4e1a7b9f05
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of a binary at the ClingSTUN self-copy paths /root/.cling or /usr/local/bin/.cling, or a command line that references them.
references:
- https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/clingstun-linux-backdoor-abuses-public-stun-infrastructure
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-05
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1036
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_image:
Image|endswith:
- '/root/.cling'
- '/usr/local/bin/.cling'
selection_cmd:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/root/.cling'
- '/usr/local/bin/.cling'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unrelated software that happens to use a hidden file named .cling (not observed)
level: highKnown false positives:
- Unrelated software using a hidden file named .cling at the same path
Tuning notes: Near-zero baseline expected; no tuning needed beyond confirming Sysmon for Linux or MDE coverage. Most IoT targets cannot run an agent, so also run the file-path hunt against firmware dumps and device-management logs.
- ClingSTUN Downloader — Shell Fetch-and-Execute to /tmp From Distribution Hosts or [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- ClingSTUN Masquerading — Mount Syscall From Temp/Hidden Binary and Watchdog Tampering · unlock with TL Creds
- ClingSTUN Downloader — Mass Unmount and Process Kill Sequence From a Shell · unlock with TL Creds
- ClingSTUN Payload Distribution Host Connection From a Linux Host · unlock with TL Creds
- ClingSTUN Known Sample SHA256 Executed on Linux · unlock with TL Creds
- ClingSTUN Boot Persistence — Writes to inittab, rcS and rc.boot · unlock with TL Creds
- ClingSTUN Exploitation — IoT and Ivanti Connect Secure N-Day Exploit Requests · unlock with TL Creds
- ClingSTUN C2 — Distribution Host Contact and STUN Binding Traffic From IoT Devices · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-11, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 48 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2934.
Sample indicators (3 of 48)
- IP address:
124.163.212[.]119 - File hash:
dc892f5013edb0aa1e61e808511387373d8d120348b5be0929621d21e6e9946a - IP address:
222.223.152[.]97
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 48 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Activity spans three campaign periods with no actor attribution.
ClingSTUN is a Linux back-connect proxy backdoor documented by FortiGuard Labs (published 2026-10-05) and tracked across three campaign periods, each with a different payload distribution host: 124.163.212.119 (period 1, about two days), 222.223.152.97 (period 2) and 118.145.196.225 (period 3, ongoing at time of reporting). The operators exploit publicly known, patchable command-injection, code-injection and authentication-bypass flaws in Internet-facing devices. Period 1 used CVE-2022-36553 (Hytec Inter HWL-2511-SS popen.cgi). Period 2 added CVE-2025-34035 (EnGenius EnShare), CVE-2024-23625 (D-Link UPnP SUBSCRIBE) and command-injection flaws in Linear, Realtek, TP-Link, AVTECH and D-Link devices. Period 3 expanded to 24 exploited vulnerabilities including Ivanti Connect Secure CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887, MeiG Smart CVE-2026-36356 and Lantronix CVE-2025-67038, plus seven hard-coded exploits embedded in the malware for self-propagation (Realtek SDK, MVPower, TBK and KGUARD DVRs, Linksys, LB-LINK, China Mobile). The report cites more vulnerabilities than the news article; the CVE list here carries the article's IDs plus device CVEs the report names in the vendor families listed by the hunt.
Infection chain: after exploiting the device, a shell downloader (wget.sh style) moves to /tmp and fetches and runs architecture-specific ClingSTUN builds (ARM, Intel 80386, MIPS R3000, PowerPC, AMD x86-64). In the third evolution the downloader first scans /proc/mounts and, for non-proc mount points with an associated process, unmounts them and kills the process. ClingSTUN copies itself to /root/.cling or /usr/local/bin/.cling and appends itself to /etc/inittab, /etc/init.d/rcS and /etc/rc.d/rc.boot so it runs at boot. It opens /dev/watchdog or /dev/misc/watchdog and uses ioctl to disable the watchdog timer, enumerates /proc to find and kill competing malware, clears its command-line arguments so ps shows an empty command line, and copies selected /proc/1 files to /tmp and bind-mounts /tmp over its own /proc/<pid> to look like the init process.
Command and control: ClingSTUN sends STUN binding requests to hard-coded public STUN servers (24 in the second evolution, 13 in the third) to learn its external address and port mappings, and periodically sends its group identifier and mapped-port list to the same endpoints. The STUN servers are legitimate third-party infrastructure, not attacker-owned, which makes the traffic resemble VoIP/WebRTC. It listens for a 20-byte operator packet; command 1 makes it open a separate outbound TCP connection to the endpoint given in the message, receive a command and execute it, and another command triggers self-propagation. Operator motivation and attribution are not stated; the back-connect proxy function suggests building a proxy-node network from compromised devices.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Command and Control
T1001.003 Protocol or Service Impersonation; T1090 Proxy; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
Defense Evasion
T1036 Masquerading; T1562 Impair Defenses; T1564 Hide Artifacts; T1564.001 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
Persistence
Discovery
Execution
Initial Access
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
Lateral Movement
T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services
Resource Development
Remediation
Patches
- Apply Ivanti Connect Secure / Policy Secure fixes for CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887
- Apply vendor firmware updates for the affected EnGenius, D-Link, Linear, Realtek-SDK, TP-Link, AVTECH, Lantronix, MeiG and Hytec Inter devices where fixed firmware exists
Immediate actions
- Block 124.163.212.119, 222.223.152.97 and 118.145.196.225 at the perimeter and hunt for outbound connections to them
- Hunt Linux/IoT devices for /root/.cling, /usr/local/bin/.cling and modified /etc/inittab, /etc/init.d/rcS, /etc/rc.d/rc.boot
- Look for devices with an empty process command line or /tmp bind-mounted over /proc/<pid>
- Alert on STUN binding traffic (UDP) originating from routers, DVRs and IoT devices that have no VoIP/WebRTC role
- Factory-reset and reflash compromised devices; rotate credentials stored on them
Workarounds
- Disable UPnP and remote management on Internet-facing devices
- Remove direct Internet exposure of device web interfaces; place behind VPN or allow-list
Longer-term hardening
- Inventory Internet-facing routers, IoT devices and VPN appliances and retire end-of-life models
- Segment IoT from corporate networks and restrict outbound UDP/STUN to approved servers
- Deploy network detection for the FortiGuard signatures BASH/Mirai.AEH!tr.dldr, BASH/Dloader.P!tr and Linux/Agent.BHT!tr
Affected and fixed versions
- Hytec Inter — HWL-2511-SS
Vulnerable versions: 1.05 and earlier - EnGenius — EnShare IoT Gigabit Cloud Service (ESR/EPG devices)
Vulnerable versions: 1.4.11 and earlier - D-Link — DAP-1650, Go-RT-AC750 and other UPnP/CGI devices
Vulnerable versions: DAP-1650 1.04B01 and earlier - Ivanti — Connect Secure / Policy Secure
- Lantronix — EDS5000, G520, X300, E210, E220
Vulnerable versions: EDS5000 up to 2.1.0.0R3 - MeiG Smart — FORGE_SLT711
Vulnerable versions: MDM9607.LE.1.0-00110-STD.PROD-1 - Linear — eMerge
- Realtek — SDK-based devices
- TP-Link — Archer AX21
- AVTECH — AVM1203
Timeline
Last updated · 3 updates · revalidated 3× · latest source
- CVE-2022-36553 (Hytec Inter HWL-2511-SS popen.cgi command injection), the vulnerability used in ClingSTUN's first campaign period, is published in NVD
- TP-Link Archer AX21 command injection CVE-2023-1389, later used by ClingSTUN, is added to the CISA KEV catalog after botnet exploitation (background).
- Ivanti discloses Connect Secure CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887, later exploited by ClingSTUN in period 3 (background).
- CVE-2024-23625 (D-Link DAP-1650 UPnP SUBSCRIBE command injection), later used in period 2, is published in NVD
- CVE-2025-34035 (EnGenius EnShare usbinteract.cgi command injection), later used in period 2, is published in NVD
- CVE-2025-67038 (Lantronix HTTP RPC command injection, CVSS 9.8), exploited in period 3, is published in NVD
- CVE-2026-36356 (MeiG Smart FORGE_SLT711 unauthenticated command injection, CVSS 9.1), exploited in period 3, is published in NVD
- FortiGuard Labs publishes ClingSTUN analysis; period 3 (ongoing) distributes from locked-ioc-25 with 24 exploited vulnerabilities including Ivanti Connect Secure and 13 STUN servers; Infosecurity Magazine covers it the same day
- FortiGuard reports period 2: distribution from locked-ioc-27 adding EnGenius, D-Link, Linear, Realtek, TP-Link and AVTECH exploits and 24 public STUN servers (exact dates not given)
- FortiGuard reports period 1: roughly two days of ClingSTUN distribution from locked-ioc-24 exploiting CVE-2022-36553 (exact dates not given in the sources)
- CSO Online reports ClingSTUN has multiple known entry points and continues to add vulnerabilities to its attack chain.
- Security Affairs reports on ClingSTUN, noting the reduction from 24 to 13 public STUN endpoints in the latest version.
Update history
- 2026-10-11 — ClingSTUN Linux Backdoor Abuses Public STUN Infrastructure to Proxy Traffic Through Compromised Routers and IoT Devices: What changed No severity, exploitability or status change; the existing HIGH / ACTIVE values already match the newer report. The update only adds detail. New indicators (8) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
- 2026-10-10 — ClingSTUN Linux Backdoor Exploits Multiple IoT Vulnerabilities (CVE-2022-36553, CVE-2025-34035, CVE-2024-23625, CVE-2023-1389, CVE-2024-7029) for Persistent Remote Access: What changed No severity, exploitability, status or attribution change. Existing values (HIGH / ACTIVE / unattributed, LOW confidence) are unchanged. New indicators (1) Indicator values are withheld at this access level. New CVEs (0) None.
- 2026-10-10 — ClingSTUN Linux Backdoor Turns Vulnerable IoT Devices Into Proxy Nodes via 24 Exploited Vulnerabilities: What changed No severity, exploitability or status change; HIGH / ACTIVE already reflects the report. New indicators (11) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
Sources cited
- NVD: CVE-2022-36553 (Hytec Inter HWL-2511-SS) NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2022-08-29
- NVD: CVE-2024-23625 (D-Link DAP-1650) NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2024-01-26
- NVD: CVE-2025-34035 (EnGenius EnShare) NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2025-06-24
- NVD: CVE-2025-67038 (Lantronix) NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2026-03-11
- NVD: CVE-2026-36356 (MeiG Smart FORGE_SLT711) NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2026-05-05
- ClingSTUN Linux Backdoor Abuses Public STUN Infrastructure (FortiGuard Labs) Fortinet · Research · 2026-10-05
- ClingSTUN Malware Turns Unpatched IoT Devices Into Proxy Nodes (Infosecurity Magazine) infosecurity-magazine.com · News · 2026-10-05
Other reports on CVE-2022-36553
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated .