Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-6001
ARTEX open-source agentic AI pentest framework abused by Chinese-nexus state and criminal actors to automate intrusions at machine speed (FBI Flash Alert)
An FBI flash alert warns that ARTEX, an open-source agentic AI penetration-testing framework that can drive any LLM, is being used by cybercriminals and nation-state actors to automate intrusions from reconnaissance through data exfiltration, with some intrusions reaching privileged access in under three hours. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6001, CVE-2025-3248, CVE-2026-28797 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | ARTEX, ARTEX Agent Security Workbench, ScopeWeaver |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Exploitation status | Linked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2025-3248 (added ) |
| EPSS | CVE-2025-3248: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2026-28797: 0.5% (48.4th percentile) |
| Affected products | ConnectWise Cloud Backup (and shared-integration SaaS Security / Cloud Management services); Microsoft Microsoft 365 / Entra ID tenants (OAuth apps, service principals); Langflow Langflow; InfiniFlow RAGFlow; Various LLM gateways and AI app builders (One API, New API, Veloera, Sub2API, LiteLLM, Dify, FastGPT, Open WebUI, LobeChat, Ollama) |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-94, CWE-306, CWE-78, CWE-20, CWE-1336 |
| Attribution | Storm-0940 (medium confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | China |
| Malware | Troj/Bckdr-SDA |
| Tools | ARTEX, ConnectWise - S0591 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1090 Proxy, T1098.001 Additional Cloud Credentials, T1110.003 Password Spraying, T1136.003 Create Account, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1199 Trusted Relationship, T1496.004 Resource Hijacking, T1505.003 Web Shell, T1526 Cloud Service Discovery, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1530 Data from Cloud Storage and 12 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | government administration, finance, technology, defense, semi-conductors, energy, health, manufacturing, telecoms, legal, aerospace, automotive |
| Target regions | North America, south korea, japan, Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 10 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6001 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 48 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: ARTEX-Style Cross-Tenant Entra ID Password Spray (Machine-Speed Failed Sign-ins)
Detects password-spray behaviour against Microsoft Entra ID / Microsoft 365 characteristic of ARTEX-assisted Storm-0940 activity (TL-2026-6001): one source IP generating failed sign-ins against 10+ distinct accounts within 5 minutes, at machine speed (Microsoft observed up to 2,900 attempts/minute), frequently from scripted user agents. Maps to T1110.003 (Password Spraying) and T1078.004 (Cloud Accounts). ARTEX is dual-use; this rule keys on behaviour, not on the tool.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1110.003, T1078.004
- Data sources: azure:aad:signin (Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services), SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs, Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=azure sourcetype="azure:aad:signin" earliest=-60m ("status.errorCode"=50126 OR "status.errorCode"=50053 OR "status.errorCode"=50034 OR "status.errorCode"=50057) | bin _time span=5m | stats count AS failures dc(userPrincipalName) AS distinct_users values(userAgent) AS user_agents values(appDisplayName) AS apps by _time ipAddress | where distinct_users>=10 AND failures>=20 | eval scripted_ua=if(match(mvjoin(user_agents,"|"),"(?i)(python-requests|python-httpx|aiohttp|go-http-client|curl/|axios|node-fetch|okhttp)"),"yes","no") | eval attempts_per_min=round(failures/5,1) | sort - failures | table _time ipAddress failures distinct_users attempts_per_min scripted_ua user_agents appsMicrosoft KQL
union SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs | where TimeGenerated > ago(1h) | where ResultType in ("50126","50053","50034","50057") | summarize Failures=count(), DistinctUsers=dcount(UserPrincipalName), UserAgents=make_set(UserAgent, 5), Apps=make_set(AppDisplayName, 5) by IPAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 5m) | where DistinctUsers >= 10 and Failures >= 20 | extend ScriptedUA = tostring(UserAgents) matches regex @"(?i)(python-requests|python-httpx|aiohttp|go-http-client|curl/|axios|node-fetch|okhttp)" | extend AttemptsPerMin = round(todouble(Failures) / 5, 1) | project TimeGenerated, IPAddress, Failures, DistinctUsers, AttemptsPerMin, ScriptedUA, UserAgents, AppsSigma
title: Entra ID Failed Sign-in Base - Password Spray Indicator
name: tl_6001_entra_failed_signin
id: 6001a000-0001-4000-8000-000000000001
status: experimental
description: Failed Entra ID sign-ins with invalid-password, locked, disabled or bad-credential result codes. Consumed by the correlation rule below to detect ARTEX-style machine-speed password spraying (T1110.003).
references:
- https://therecord.media/artex-ai-tool-fbi-flash-alert
- https://www.silicon.co.uk/cybersecurity/microsoft-connectwise-artex-631988
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-13
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1110.003
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: azure
service: signinlogs
detection:
selection:
ResultType:
- 50126
- 50053
- 50034
- 50057
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Users mistyping passwords after a forced reset
level: low
---
title: Entra ID Password Spray - 10+ Distinct Accounts From One IP in 5 Minutes (ARTEX / Storm-0940)
id: 6001a000-0001-4000-8000-000000000002
status: experimental
description: One source IP failing sign-in against 10 or more distinct accounts within 5 minutes, consistent with ARTEX-automated cross-tenant password spraying attributed by Microsoft to Storm-0940 (TL-2026-6001).
references:
- https://therecord.media/artex-ai-tool-fbi-flash-alert
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-13
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1110.003
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1078.004
correlation:
type: value_count
rules:
- tl_6001_entra_failed_signin
group-by:
- IPAddress
timespan: 5m
condition:
gte: 10
field: UserPrincipalName
falsepositives:
- Corporate NAT/VPN egress after a mass password expiry or SSO outage
- Authorized password-spray assessments by internal red team
level: highKnown false positives:
- Corporate NAT or VPN egress IP producing many failures after a mass password expiry or SSO outage
- Authorized internal red-team password-spray exercises
- Misconfigured service or mail clients retrying stale credentials for many mailboxes
Tuning notes: Tune distinct_users (10) and failures (20) per 5-minute bin to tenant baseline; allow-list corporate egress IPs and registered red-team infrastructure; raise severity when scripted_ua=yes or the IP also appears in TL-2026-6001 network IOCs. Ensure the index/sourcetype names match your Splunk Microsoft Cloud Services inputs.
- Langflow CVE-2025-3248 Code-Validation Exploitation and Cloud-Metadata SSRF Probing · unlock with TL Creds
- ARTEX Agent Host Artifacts - artx Temp Paths, Intent-ID Scripts and MARKER123/ARTX123 Commands · unlock with TL Creds
- ARTEX Console Listener and Non-Browser LLM API Egress from Hosts · unlock with TL Creds
- Scripted-User-Agent Successful Entra ID Sign-ins (ARTEX Valid Cloud Account / Token Abuse) · unlock with TL Creds
- ARTEX Container Image Pull or Run - Untrusted and Trojanized Image Risk (Troj/Bckdr-SDA) · unlock with TL Creds
- Web Proxy Access to [indicator] LLM Reseller or Exposed ARTEX Open Directory ([indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
- Entra ID Service Principal Credential Addition / OAuth Grant Burst (ARTEX Privilege Escalation) · unlock with TL Creds
- ARTEX Infrastructure Egress - Reported Proxy/C2 IPs, [indicator] LLM Reseller and Console Ports · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 48 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6001.
Sample indicators (3 of 48)
- IP address:
38.244.50[.]120 - Domain:
xcai[.]pro - IP address:
101.53.80[.]20
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 48 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Microsoft ties it to Storm-0940's ConnectWise Cloud Backup supply-chain compromise; CrowdStrike, Amazon, Check Point and GMO document further campaigns.
ARTEX (also written Artex) is an open-source, multi-agent penetration-testing framework written in Go with a Next.js web console and PostgreSQL backend. It was published to GitHub as Autumn-27/ARTEX under AGPL-3.0 on 2026-07-26 (Censys; some press reports say August). A Planner agent turns a high-level goal into attack 'intents', Worker agents claim intents, run tools (the Docker image ships with nmap) and write results back, and verification/compression agents plus a persistent asset/exploration knowledge graph let multiple sessions run in parallel with minimal human input. It integrates Anthropic, OpenAI and OpenAI-compatible endpoints and has been used with DeepSeek, GLM, Grok and Kimi models; the FBI found Chinese models, especially DeepSeek Flash-family models, most prevalent in attacker-controlled instances because of capability, low cost and no observable guardrails when framed as pentesting. After abuse reports the developer posted a statement on 2026-10-08 disclaiming responsibility and moved the project to closed source; the repository was later removed, but the FBI says the framework persists via community forks, localized variants, archived copies and a commercial version. Sophos additionally reports a trojanized ARTEX Docker image (Troj/Bckdr-SDA), so unofficial mirrors should be treated as untrusted.
The FBI flash alert (as reported by The Record on 2026-11-13; the alert text itself was not retrieved) says ARTEX automates multiple intrusion phases at machine speed, lets low-skill actors run multi-target operations, and has been used against government agencies and dozens of critical sectors worldwide. Some intrusions reached privileged access in under three hours; Microsoft independently measured under three hours from initial targeting to privileged cloud access in several ARTEX-assisted intrusions observed since September. The FBI notes ARTEX generates high volumes of attempts that can trigger defensive sensors, and that actors map trust relationships and compromise weak third-party vendors and less-secured systems (partner/supplier portals, mobile backends, employee apps, sales-support systems, legacy services, third-party integrations).
Reported campaigns: (1) Microsoft attributes ARTEX use to Storm-0940, a China state-aligned group active since 2021, reaching more than 2,250 Microsoft 365 tenants (up to 2,900 sign-in attempts per minute) via cross-tenant password spraying and abuse of OAuth application identities, including the ConnectWise Cloud Backup compromise around 2026-10-14/15 that led ConnectWise to suspend Cloud Backup and related services; Microsoft advises revoking tokens, refresh tokens, sessions and OAuth grants tied to Cloud Backup. (2) CrowdStrike (2026-10-07) documents a likely financially motivated, Chinese-speaking unnamed actor breaching a broker-facing loan inquiry service at one South Korean bank and an employee mobile work-support system at another, using ARTEX configured with a Chinese-language pentest prompt in CLAUDE.md, DeepSeek as primary backend with GLM and Grok supplementary, an LLM API reseller (xcai.pro) and nine proxy IPs. (3) GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae (2026-10-19) found one attack infrastructure targeting about 20 Japanese companies (insurance, finance, logistics, e-commerce, retail, education), with Android/Flutter app reverse engineering (jadx, Blutter) and SSRF testing; operators are unknown and ARTEX's Chinese origin does not by itself establish Chinese or state-backed operators. (4) Amazon Threat Intelligence (MadPot telemetry, 2026-10-03 to 2026-11-05, moderate confidence in ARTEX use and Chinese-nexus attribution) observed AI-model-credential theft that funded further key hunting via LLM gateways and AI app builders (One API, New API, Veloera, Sub2API, LiteLLM, Dify, FastGPT, Langflow, RAGFlow, Open WebUI, LobeChat, Ollama; CVE-2025-3248, CVE-2026-28797, default credentials, SSRF to cloud metadata, secrets in client-side JS) and a separate deepfake-based KYC-bypass effort against two cryptocurrency exchanges. (5) Check Point Research (2026-11-05) found criminal operators using ARTEX against iOS app-signing services (300+ certificates obtained), 13 gaming-account marketplaces (190,000+ Honor of Kings credentials) and 292 crypto-related domains (exposed AWS credentials used to alter S3-hosted iOS distribution assets).
Exposure: Censys counted 1,465 hosts with an exposed ARTEX console around 2026-11-03/04 (about 815 distinct-looking deployments after removing two identical hosting blocks; US 726, Hong Kong 387, China 177, Japan 51, Singapore 38, South Korea 21), default port 8787/tcp; Check Point reports 2,557 systems that hosted panels, 1,608 live. The FBI/The Record cite over 1,600 exposed console instances. Counts differ by scan date and deduplication, and some hosts may be authorized testers. Censys also saw Cobalt Strike, Adaptix C2, Vshell, FRP, NPS, CyberStrikeAI, PentAGI and HexStrike AI on ARTEX hosts. Defender note: ARTEX itself is dual-use; presence of the tool does not prove malicious intent, and attribution to a specific operator or to the Chinese state applies only where a vendor explicitly states it. No hashes were published in the sources reviewed; the BeaconBeagle lookups for 38.244.50.120 and 144.172.64.60 failed (HTTP 502) and should be re-run by the correlation phase.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Initial Access
T1078.004 Cloud Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1199 Trusted Relationship
Command and Control
Persistence
T1098.001 Additional Cloud Credentials; T1136.003 Create Account; T1505.003 Web Shell
Credential Access
T1110.003 Password Spraying; T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1552.001 Credentials In Files; T1552.005 Unsecured Credentials
Impact
T1496.004 Resource Hijacking; T1657 Financial Theft
Discovery
T1526 Cloud Service Discovery; T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery; T1619 Cloud Storage Object Discovery
Collection
Lateral Movement
T1550.001 Application Access Token
Resource Development
T1583.003 Virtual Private Server; T1588.007 Artificial Intelligence
Reconnaissance
T1593.003 Search Open Websites/Domains; T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning; T1596.003 Search Open Technical Databases
Defense Evasion
Remediation
Patches
- Patch Langflow (CVE-2025-3248) and RAGFlow (CVE-2026-28797) per vendor advisories
Immediate actions
- Audit Microsoft Entra ID service principals and enterprise applications; review all credential additions and role assignments since September 2026 and remove unused third-party consents
- Revoke tokens, refresh tokens, sessions and OAuth grants tied to ConnectWise Cloud Backup (Microsoft guidance)
- Alert on application sign-ins using scripted user agents and on authentication failure rates above baseline
- Hunt for host artifacts: files named i<intentID>[variant]_<purpose>.<ext>, paths beginning with artx under C:\Windows\Temp, and command markers such as MARKER123 or ARTX123
- Block and hunt the CrowdStrike, Microsoft and Amazon reported IPs and xcai.pro
Workarounds
- Treat unofficial ARTEX Docker images, mirrors and forks as untrusted (trojanized image detected as Troj/Bckdr-SDA)
- Restrict who can modify downloads, manifests and landing pages; alert on unexpected changes
Longer-term hardening
- Apply Conditional Access to workload identities to limit sign-ins to expected locations
- Automate containment playbooks that disable service principals or revoke credentials on fast privilege escalation
- Remove default and hardcoded credentials; keep secrets out of code, public repos, frontend JavaScript and build artifacts
- Require authentication on management interfaces, LLM gateways and inference endpoints; monitor for unexpected AI service spend
- Harden partner/supplier portals, mobile backends and third-party integrations; assume high-volume machine-speed probing
- Register authorized red-team agentic tooling and infrastructure with the SOC; enable Active Adversary Protection on endpoints
Affected and fixed versions
- ConnectWise — Cloud Backup (and shared-integration SaaS Security / Cloud Management services)
Vulnerable versions: SaaS service compromised via application identities, October 2026 - Microsoft — Microsoft 365 / Entra ID tenants (OAuth apps, service principals)
Vulnerable versions: Tenants with exposed or abusable app identities or weak passwords - Langflow — Langflow
Vulnerable versions: Versions affected by CVE-2025-3248
Fixed in: See vendor advisory - InfiniFlow — RAGFlow
Vulnerable versions: Versions affected by CVE-2026-28797
Fixed in: See vendor advisory - Various — LLM gateways and AI app builders (One API, New API, Veloera, Sub2API, LiteLLM, Dify, FastGPT, Open WebUI, LobeChat, Ollama)
Vulnerable versions: Default-credential, uninitialized or unauthenticated deployments
Timeline
Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source
- CVE-2025-3248 (Langflow unauthenticated code injection in /api/v1/validate/code, CVSS 9.8) published; fixed in Langflow 1.3.0.
- CISA adds CVE-2025-3248 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- CVE-2026-28797 (RAGFlow <= 0.24.0 authenticated SSTI leading to OS command execution) published on NVD.
- ARTEX published to GitHub as Autumn-27/ARTEX under AGPL-3.0 (Censys; some reports say August)
- Censys records the earliest open directory on the ARTEX host later named by CrowdStrike
- Microsoft reports Storm-0940 used ARTEX as early as September 2026; South Korean financial organizations begin experiencing breaches in late September
- Start of Amazon MadPot observation window for ARTEX-driven credential-theft and KYC-bypass campaigns (through 2026-11-05)
- CrowdStrike publishes ARTEX use against South Korean financial institutions by an unnamed Chinese-speaking actor
- ARTEX developer disclaims responsibility for abuse and moves the project to closed source; repository later removed
- Cross-tenant password-spray window begins (2026-10-10 to 2026-10-14 per secondary reporting of Microsoft's findings)
- Earliest Amazon-listed IOC activity: locked-ioc-41 (Campaign 1) and locked-ioc-29 (Campaign 2).
- Storm-0940 uses ARTEX to compromise Microsoft 365 environments of ConnectWise Cloud Backup customers; ConnectWise suspends affected services (some sources date discovery to 2026-10-14)
- Campaign 2 activity from locked-ioc-30, locked-ioc-31 and locked-ioc-32; locked-ioc-19 active 2026-10-18 to 2026-10-19.
- GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae discloses ARTEX-enabled attack infrastructure targeting about 20 Japanese companies
- Microsoft attributes the ConnectWise activity to Storm-0940, reporting more than 2,250 Microsoft 365 tenants reached
- Censys reports 1,465 exposed ARTEX consoles; Check Point Research reports 2,557 systems that hosted panels (1,608 live) and criminal campaigns against signing-certificate, gaming and crypto targets
- Datadog Security Labs publishes analysis of ARTEX attacks on AWS environments (October 2026): initial access via compromised IAM keys and anonymous Cognito sign-up, CloudWatch Logs hunting, mostly failed for lack of permissions.
- FBI flash alert warns ARTEX automates intrusions at machine speed for cybercriminals and nation-states; Amazon publishes its ARTEX campaign analysis
Update history
- 2026-11-14 — Chinese-nexus actors use stolen LLM API keys to power ARTEX agentic framework for credential theft and crypto-exchange KYC deepfake fraud (CVE-2025-3248, CVE-2026-28797): What changed No severity, exploitability or status change; existing values (HIGH / ACTIVE / ACTIVE) already match the newer report. Content is purely additive. New indicators (20) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
Sources cited
- ARTEX: Agentic Asbestos (Censys) censys.com · Research · 2026-11-05
- Amazon Threat Intelligence observes threat actors running cybercrime campaigns with ARTEX AI agents (AWS Security Blog) aws.amazon.com · Vendor report · 2026-11-13
- Unknown threat actor uses ARTEX to target South Korean finance (CrowdStrike) CrowdStrike · Vendor report · 2026-10-07
- ARTEX attackers apply agentic AI (Sophos) Sophos · Vendor report · 2026-11-01
- ARTEX Cyberattacks: AI Agents Steal Credentials and Signing Certificates (eSecurity Planet, citing Check Point Research) esecurityplanet.com · Research · 2026-11-09
- Autumn-27 GitHub account (ARTEX developer; repository removed) GitHub · Code repository · 2026-07-26
- FBI flash alert says Artex tool automating cyberattacks at 'machine speed' (The Record) The Record · News · 2026-11-13
- Microsoft links ARTEX-assisted Storm-0940 activity to ConnectWise compromise (Silicon UK) silicon.co.uk · News · 2026-10-22
- ARTEX AI cyberattacks on Japanese companies (eSecurity Planet, citing GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae) esecurityplanet.com · News · 2026-10-22
- ConnectWise suspends cloud backup service after supply chain attack (The Record) The Record · News · 2026-10-20
More from Storm-0940
- ~45 Open-Source AI Hacking Frameworks Mapped; Hundreds of Agent Attack Consoles Exposed Online (ARTEX Family)
- ARTEX Agentic AI Penetration-Testing Framework Abused by China-Aligned Actors Storm-0940 and VAPOR PANDA to Automate Enterprise and Cloud Intrusions
- ARTEX Autonomous AI Pentest Framework Weaponized by UNC7228 / Storm-0940 for Automated Network Intrusions, Cloud Abuse and Data Theft
- Storm-0940 Uses ARTEX Agentic AI Framework in ConnectWise/SkyKick OAuth Supply-Chain Compromise of Microsoft 365 Tenants
Other reports on CVE-2025-3248
- Rapid7 Q3 2026 Threat Landscape: High-Severity Flaws Exploited in 3 Days as The Gentlemen and Qilin Ransomware Dominate
- Abliterated and Resold AI Models Fueling Cybercrime Underground; ARTEX-Assisted Intrusions at South Korean Banks (Flare Quantitative Analysis)
- Q3 2026 Record Ransomware Surge: 2,627 Claimed Attacks, Qilin and The Gentlemen Lead, Clop Resurgence via PTC Windchill CVE-2026-12569
- AI-accelerated intrusions: Microsoft 2026 Digital Defense Report on phishing, public-facing app exploitation, and AI-enabled attacker tooling (s1ngularity, PromptLock, JADEPUFFER/ENCFORGE)
- GTIG: AI-Era Vulnerability Discovery and Exploitation Surge — In-the-Wild Exploitation of BeyondTrust CVE-2026-1731, LiteLLM CVE-2026-42271 and Langflow CVE-2026-5027
- Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER): Agentic-Driven Destructive Cloud Attacks Against Azure via Compromised Service Principals
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated . Reviewed .