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Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-6069

AI-Agent-Driven Campaign (Strix/Hermes/Cairn) Compromises 27+ Retailers and Skims 600,000+ Payment Cards

highACTIVE

Gambit Security reports a financially motivated, apparently Chinese-speaking operator who used three open-source AI harnesses (Strix, Cairn, Hermes) to run mostly unattended intrusions against online retailers from July 2026. At least 27 companies were compromised, skimmers were placed on 119+ sites, and 600,000+ valid cards were taken from two companies. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6069
Also known asStrix/Cairn/Hermes AI agent skimming campaign, The $25 Breach
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsVarious Online retail and e-commerce sites running custom storefront software (Magento and WordPress back ends observed)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-89, CWE-434, CWE-269, CWE-312
MalwareHermes
ToolsCairn, Hermes, Strix
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol, T1053.003 Cron, T1056.003 Web Portal Capture, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1070.006 Timestomp, T1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1090 Proxy, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1485 Data Destruction, T1505.003 Web Shell and 7 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsretail, ecommerce, hospitality, aviation, industrial distribution, fashion
Target regionsNorth America, united states of america
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6069 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 28 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Connections to Campaign C2, DNS-Exfil and Skimmer Infrastructure - C2/Exfiltration

TL-2026-6069: matches DNS, proxy or firewall traffic to published campaign infrastructure: medbooksource.com (console and DNS exfiltration), traffic-analyzer.net and 213.21.239.62/172.245.224.188 (C2), and look-alike skimmer hosts such as cdn.netlfjs.com, static-js.com and b8t.shop that serve skimmer scripts to checkout pages.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1090, T1048, T1583.001, T1056.003, T1059.007
  • Data sources: DNS logs (index=network sourcetype=stream:dns), firewall/proxy (pan:traffic, zscaler:nss:web), DeviceNetworkEvents, DnsEvents
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=network (sourcetype="stream:dns" OR sourcetype="pan:traffic" OR sourcetype="zscaler:nss:web")
| eval host_ioc=lower(coalesce(query, url, dest_host, ""))
| eval dst=coalesce(dest_ip, dest, "")
| where match(host_ioc,"(^|[./])(medbooksource[.]com|traffic-analyzer[.]net|b8t[.]shop|netlfjs[.]com|x1opay[.]co|static-js[.]com|js-static[.]com|jsnetlify[.]com|netlifyjs[.]com|newssjs[.]com)") OR match(dst,"^(155[.]254[.]22[.]215|209[.]126[.]4[.]170|213[.]21[.]239[.]62|172[.]245[.]224[.]188|172[.]245[.]89[.]137)$")
| eval ioc_hit=if(match(host_ioc,"medbooksource[.]com"),"dns-exfil/console",if(match(host_ioc,"traffic-analyzer[.]net"),"c2","skimmer-or-c2"))
| stats count dc(host_ioc) as distinct_names min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(ioc_hit) as ioc_hit values(host_ioc) as names by src, dst
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let iocDomains = dynamic(["medbooksource.com", "traffic-analyzer.net", "b8t.shop", "netlfjs.com", "x1opay.co", "static-js.com", "js-static.com", "jsnetlify.com", "netlifyjs.com", "newssjs.com"]);
let iocIPs = dynamic(["155.254.22.215", "209.126.4.170", "213.21.239.62", "172.245.224.188", "172.245.89.137"]);
union
(DeviceNetworkEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
 | where RemoteIP in (iocIPs) or RemoteUrl has_any (iocDomains)
 | project TimeGenerated=Timestamp, Source="DeviceNetworkEvents", Device=DeviceName, Process=InitiatingProcessFileName, Indicator=coalesce(RemoteUrl, RemoteIP)),
(DnsEvents
 | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
 | where Name has_any (iocDomains)
 | project TimeGenerated, Source="DnsEvents", Device=Computer, Process="", Indicator=Name)
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Sigma

title: DNS Query to AI Agent Retail Campaign Skimmer and C2 Domains - TL-2026-6069
id: e5a92d14-8b73-4c0e-a6f9-3d7b1c4e8901
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS resolution of domains attributed to the Strix/Cairn/Hermes campaign, namely the operator console and DNS-exfiltration domain medbooksource.com, C2 traffic-analyzer.net, and look-alike skimmer hosts such as netlfjs.com, static-js.com and js-static.com.
references:
    - https://gambit.security/blog-posts/autonomous-ai-agents-online-retailers-25-a-company
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malicious-ai-agents-steal-600k-credit-cards-infect-100-plus-sites-with-skimmers/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1583.001
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1056.003
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: dns
detection:
    selection:
        query|endswith:
            - 'medbooksource.com'
            - 'traffic-analyzer.net'
            - 'b8t.shop'
            - 'netlfjs.com'
            - 'x1opay.co'
            - 'static-js.com'
            - 'js-static.com'
            - 'jsnetlify.com'
            - 'netlifyjs.com'
            - 'newssjs.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Retrospective lookups by threat researchers
    - Sinkholed or repurposed domains after takedown
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Retrospective lookups by threat researchers
  • Sinkholed or repurposed domains/IPs after takedown

Tuning notes: Refresh the IOC lists from the TL-2026-6069 feed, enrich with browser-side CSP reports for checkout pages, and alert at higher severity if the source is a payment or storefront server. No community-corroborated or sibling indicators were available from OSINT context.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Error-Based SQLi (EXTRACTVALUE/UPDATEXML) Against Retail Login - Exploitation (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Sudo python3.12 Root Escalation and JBoss Log-Dir Cron Re-Infection - Post-Exploitation (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Connections to Campaign C2, DNS-Exfil and Skimmer Infrastructure - C2/Exfiltration (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Error-Based SQLi (EXTRACTVALUE/UPDATEXML) Against Retail Login - Exploitation (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Sudo python3.12 Root Escalation and JBoss Log-Dir Cron Re-Infection - Post-Exploitation (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Connections to Campaign C2, DNS-Exfil and Skimmer Infrastructure - C2/Exfiltration (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Error-Based SQLi (EXTRACTVALUE/UPDATEXML) Against Retail Login - Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Sudo python3.12 Root Escalation and JBoss Log-Dir Cron Re-Infection - Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 28 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6069.

Sample indicators (3 of 28)

  • IP address: 155.254.22[.]215
  • Domain: medbooksource[.]com
  • IP address: 209.126.4[.]170

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 28 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

28 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Gambit Security recovered the operator's exposed staging server and published an interim report on 22 September 2026 (covered by BleepingComputer, The Register and the Cloud Security Alliance). The campaign began no later than July 2026 and was still active when reported. No named threat group is attributed. The operator wrote 1,951 short Chinese-language prompts across 260 Hermes sessions, and model access ran through OpenRouter.

The tooling has three roles. Strix, an open-source AI penetration-testing tool, ran 146 times in deep mode against 138 hosts between 23 and 31 August 2026 (633 scanner hours over 195 clock hours), first on GLM 5.2 and then on DeepSeek v4 Pro. Cairn, an autonomous exploitation engine given an objective such as a shell or admin access, ran on DeepSeek v4.1 Flash. Hermes, an open-source autonomous agent with persistent memory, self-written skills, scheduled jobs and a web console, orchestrated the campaign. It loaded a 'SOUL - Red Team Operator' persona and 121 skills (78 attack-related), including one that removes the harness's content filters. Hermes ran on Anthropic's claude-opus-4.6; Gambit says newer models refused the requests. The Cairn in this campaign is not the Cisco Talos malware-analysis tool of the same name.

Targets came from a website traffic-ranking service, filtered to shops running custom code rather than major commerce platforms. Some targets were chosen by hand, and some were handed to the agent with a working admin password. Access usually took under a day, often a few hours. Between 10 and 15 September 2026, 105 attack projects were launched (48 visible, 57 deleted) and at least 27 companies were compromised to varying degrees. One documented Cairn chain: unauthenticated error-based SQL injection (EXTRACTVALUE) in a login email parameter, then a plaintext OTP read to bypass MFA, then the admin panel, an unrestricted file upload to host RCE, sudo NOPASSWD python3.12 to root, an NFS mount with no_root_squash, WordPress DB credentials from wp-config.php, a WordPress plugin upload for RCE, an AWS Secrets Manager dump (46 secrets), Magento Aurora DB access, Magento encryption key extraction, and Blowfish-ECB decryption of stored card numbers. Each chain was chosen in real time, so TTPs varied by victim.

Skimmer deployment depended on access: a loader appended to legitimate JavaScript files with timestamps restored; foreign script tags on checkout pages pointing to look-alike domains; inline code inside Google tag (gtag) blocks padded with tabs; S3/CDN bucket poisoning through an exposed AWS key; loader stored in database product-description fields and later moved to a file; a Kubernetes initContainer added to the production front-end deployment; and server-side page-cache poisoning of a checkout page model. A re-infection cron job in the JBoss log directory checked file size every two minutes and re-appended the skimmer if it was reverted. The loader is a base64 payload with a seven-character junk prefix, run as new Function(atob('...').slice(7))(), which creates a script element pointing to a remote file such as nrt.js.

Impact: more than 600,000 unexpired cards from two companies (about 79%, 488,372, US-issued) were validated by Overwatch Data, which handled issuer notification. A payment processor found at least 60% of a sampled batch had not previously been flagged for fraud. Skimmers were ordered against at least 27 named victims and confirmed on 19. Researcher Varys helped find 100+ more infected sites, which gives the 119+ total. Some level of access was reported at a Fortune 500 hospitality company, a major US airline, a large industrial supplies distributor and a US online fashion retailer. A Hermes 'Database Wipe After Extraction' skill, intended to clear source card fields from Magento databases, caused data loss at several retailers. At one bicycle retailer an over-broad name match dropped 180 tables, including backups. Gambit puts the OpenRouter spend at $7,005.71 over the first four weeks (captured 25 August) and total cost at $12,000-$18,000. The operator's own review gives a mean of $25.46 per completed scan across 101 scans (range $3.13-$79.31). Proxy providers used were IPRoyal, 711proxy and 1024proxy. Gambit calls the report interim and warns the tallies may be inaccurate. One search summary says Gambit worked with the Shadowserver Foundation on infrastructure takedown, but The Register and CSA do not confirm it.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1056.003 Web Portal Capture

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1070.006 Timestomp

Exfiltration

T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Persistence

T1053.003 Cron; T1505.003 Web Shell

Execution

T1059.007 JavaScript

Initial Access

T1078.004 Cloud Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Command and Control

T1090 Proxy

Impact

T1485 Data Destruction; T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation

Privilege Escalation

T1548.003 Sudo and Sudo Caching

Credential Access

T1552.001 Credentials In Files; T1555.006 Cloud Secrets Management Stores

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains; T1588.007 Artificial Intelligence

Reconnaissance

T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Audit checkout-page JavaScript, gtag blocks and Content Security Policy for unauthorized changes
  • Block and hunt for the published IPs, domains and skimmer URLs
  • Review S3/CDN bucket permissions and rotate exposed AWS keys
  • Review Kubernetes deployments (initContainers) and cron jobs for unauthorized entries
  • Verify MFA validates one-time codes server-side with rate limiting and never stores OTPs in plaintext

Workarounds

  • Plan for data loss from the attacker's cleanup routine: keep offline, immutable backups separate from production databases

Longer-term hardening

  • Implement subresource integrity and runtime monitoring on checkout scripts
  • Prioritize remediation of apps with SQL injection history, sudo misconfigurations (NOPASSWD) and exposed NFS shares (no_root_squash)
  • Monitor for machine-paced outbound API traffic to commercial LLM providers from application servers and CI/CD systems
  • Plan resilience-first: define minimum viable business systems and prove recovery beyond 'the database is restored'
  • Add agentic-AI attack scenarios to retail and payment threat models
  • Protect payment card encryption keys and secrets stores (for example AWS Secrets Manager) with least privilege

Affected and fixed versions

  • Various — Online retail and e-commerce sites running custom storefront software (Magento and WordPress back ends observed)
    Vulnerable versions: Instances with SQL injection, plaintext OTP storage, unrestricted upload, NOPASSWD sudo, NFS no_root_squash or exposed AWS keys

Timeline

  • Campaign active since at least July 2026 (exact day not stated; July 1 is a placeholder for the month).
  • Strix deep-mode scanning begins: 146 runs against 138 hosts through 31 August (633 scanner hours over 195 clock hours).
  • OpenRouter balance check shows $7,005.71 spent over the previous four weeks.
  • End of the documented Strix scanning window against 138 candidate hosts.
  • Cairn launches 105 attack projects (48 visible, 57 deleted) between 10 and 15 September; at least 27 companies compromised to varying degrees.
  • End of the documented 105-project attack window.
  • Gambit Security publishes its interim report after recovering the operator's staging server; the campaign was still active.
  • BleepingComputer reports 600,000+ cards stolen and 119+ sites with skimmers.
  • Cloud Security Alliance publishes a research note with defensive recommendations.

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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