Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-6099
From C2 Detection to Possible Victim Identification: Team Cymru NetFlow Bot Tagging (Sliver 'sliver-bot' Example)
Team Cymru (Josh Picolet, 2026-07-27) describes how its Total Insights Feed matches identified C2 infrastructure against NetFlow to find sustained, high-confidence interactions and tag the communicating IPs as possible bots (e.g. 'sliver-bot' for the Sliver C2 framework). Tags are investigative leads, not proof of compromise.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6099 |
|---|---|
| Severity | LOW |
| Malware | Cobalt Strike, Sliver |
| Tools | Atera, Cobalt Strike, Sliver - S0633 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1571 Non-Standard Port, T1573.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography, T1583 Acquire Infrastructure, T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains, T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool, T1595.001 Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks, T1595.002 Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6099 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 28 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Sliver Delivery via VMware Horizon / Log4j Exploitation — Exploitation Phase (Splunk SPL)
Detects the exploitation-stage behaviour tied to Sliver delivery in Team Cymru's Campaign 1 (TL-2026-6099): shells and LOLBins spawned by the VMware Horizon Tomcat service ws_TomcatService.exe (Log4j CVE-2021-44228 / CVE-2021-45046), the Sliver implant filename vmware_kb.exe, and JNDI lookup strings on command lines. Campaign 1 swept ranges indiscriminately and compromised at least one Horizon host.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1190, T1595.002
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
| eval parent=lower(mvindex(split(ParentImage,"\\"),-1)), child=lower(mvindex(split(Image,"\\"),-1)), cmd=lower(coalesce(CommandLine,""))
| where (parent="ws_tomcatservice.exe" AND match(child,"^(cmd|powershell|pwsh|certutil|bitsadmin|mshta|curl|wget|rundll32|regsvr32)\\.exe$")) OR child="vmware_kb.exe" OR like(cmd,"%vmware_kb.exe%") OR like(cmd,"%jndi:ldap%") OR like(cmd,"%jndi:rmi%")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(cmd) as command_lines values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_cmd by host, user, ParentImage, Image
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")Microsoft KQL
// TL-2026-6099 Sliver delivery via VMware Horizon / Log4j (CVE-2021-44228) exploitation
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "ws_TomcatService.exe"
and FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","certutil.exe","bitsadmin.exe","mshta.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe"))
or FileName =~ "vmware_kb.exe"
or ProcessCommandLine has "vmware_kb.exe"
or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("jndi:ldap", "jndi:rmi")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Sliver Delivery via VMware Horizon / Log4j Exploitation
id: 6f1c2a9e-3b47-4d58-9a0e-1c5d7e2b8a01
status: experimental
description: Detects shells or LOLBins spawned by the VMware Horizon Tomcat service (ws_TomcatService.exe), execution of the Sliver implant filename vmware_kb.exe seen in Log4j/Horizon exploitation (TL-2026-6099), and JNDI lookup strings on command lines.
references:
- https://www.team-cymru.com/post/sliver-case-study-assessing-common-offensive-security-tools
- https://www.team-cymru.com/post/c2-detection-to-victim-identification
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/14
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1190
- attack.reconnaissance
- attack.t1595.002
- attack.s0633
- cve.2021-44228
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_horizon_child:
ParentImage|endswith: '\ws_TomcatService.exe'
Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\bitsadmin.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\curl.exe'
- '\wget.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
selection_sliver_name:
Image|endswith: '\vmware_kb.exe'
selection_jndi:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'jndi:ldap'
- 'jndi:rmi'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Horizon administrators running maintenance scripts through the Tomcat service account
- Vulnerability scanners that safely probe Log4j with JNDI strings in command-line arguments
level: high
Known false positives:
- Horizon administrators running maintenance scripts through the Tomcat service account
- Vulnerability scanners that safely probe Log4j and put JNDI strings in command-line arguments
Tuning notes: Allowlist known Horizon maintenance scripts by exact CommandLine and the service account. Scope to Horizon Connection/Security servers. The Sliver filename vmware_kb.exe and the ws_TomcatService.exe parent are the high-fidelity pivots; JNDI command-line matches are lower fidelity and can be dropped if noisy. Requires Sysmon EventCode 1 with ParentImage populated.
- Sliver Delivery via VMware Horizon / Log4j Exploitation — Exploitation Phase (Sentinel KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Sliver Implant Artifacts and Atera RMM Install — Post-Exploitation Phase (Sentinel KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Sliver mTLS C2 Contact and Non-Standard Ports — C2 / Lateral Movement Phase (Sentinel KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Sliver Delivery via VMware Horizon / Log4j Exploitation — Exploitation Phase (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Sliver Implant Artifacts and Atera RMM Install — Post-Exploitation Phase (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Sliver mTLS C2 Contact and Non-Standard Ports — C2 / Lateral Movement Phase (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Sliver Implant Artifacts and Atera RMM Install — Post-Exploitation Phase (Splunk SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Sliver mTLS C2 Contact and Non-Standard Ports — C2 / Lateral Movement Phase (Splunk SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 28 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6099.
Sample indicators (3 of 28)
- IP address:
193.27.228[.]127 - Domain:
nationalhelpdesk[.]pk - File hash:
1f95397c4634f3348f3001a02eab269148f4c08271c2e2461905a4359f7c4761
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 28 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
This record documents a defensive methodology, not a discrete incident. Per Team Cymru, when an IP is identified as C2 infrastructure, analysts review available NetFlow for sustained, high-confidence interactions with that controller. If the behavior meets analytic criteria, the communicating IP may be tagged as a possible bot tied to the relevant malware or C2 family. The only tag named in the source is 'sliver-bot', applied to IPs interacting with infrastructure attributed to the Sliver C2 framework. The post gives no ports, certificates, protocols, IPs, domains or hashes for Sliver.
The post names these inputs to the process: NetFlow observations, open ports and service fingerprints, custom internet probes, infrastructure relationships, and analyst-developed detections and validation. It states that scanning finds controller-like infrastructure while NetFlow shows how that infrastructure is used. Classification is incremental: new C2 families extend the work and can surface related infrastructure, higher-tier management servers and communication patterns. Results depend on having sufficient network telemetry covering the infrastructure; without it a provider may find a possible C2 server but cannot observe meaningful interactions with it.
Two workflows are suggested: (1) check an organization's IP ranges against the Total Insights Feed for possible contact with known malicious controllers; (2) for a given controller, review associated bot tags to identify potential downstream victims and gauge the infrastructure's operational reach. Team Cymru's related post 'Fingerprinting Malware C2s with Tags' (Will Thomas, 2025-08-04) explains that tags come from IP attribute fingerprinting (open ports, banners, X.509 certificates, TLS handshakes, passive DNS, WHOIS) and from NetFlow behavioral analysis (e.g. ORB tagging), reports over 2,100 context tags, and describes a Scout workflow using comms.peer queries, Refine Search Pivot and the router tag to find enterprise gateways that may front internal beaconing endpoints.
Background on Sliver comes from Team Cymru's 2022 case study (S2 Research Team, 2022-05-03). It describes a Golang implant that runs on Linux, macOS and Windows, with TCP/8888 as the default mTLS configuration and later use of TCP/13338, 23338 and 33338 (about 14 days after initial C2 traffic). Campaign 1 ('Scan & Exploit', samples first seen 2022-02-03 to 2022-03-04) indiscriminately swept ranges from 193.27.228.127, was flagged by GreyNoise for Log4j and Exchange ProxyShell targeting, and compromised at least one VMware Horizon host (likely CVE-2021-44228 / CVE-2021-45046). Victims moved to 176.113.115.107 about 30 days after first contact; an Atera sample and a Virlock sample (possible ransomware capability) were seen alongside Sliver, though the article says it is unclear whether ransomware was the end goal. Campaign 2 used government-themed domains and Cobalt Strike alongside Sliver, aimed at Pakistan and Turkey and likely at intelligence on Pakistan-Gulf collaboration, and was mapped via passive DNS and registrant-email pivots. The case study counted 143 Sliver samples versus 4,455 Cobalt Strike samples in Q1 2022 (called anecdotal). Those indicators are historical and are included here only as clearly labeled context; they may be inactive.
Defender takeaway: a 'sliver-bot' tag on an internal or customer IP is a lead for validation, containment and response. Corroborate with host telemetry before declaring compromise. This record has no CVE of its own, no confirmed exploitation by the 2026 post, no PoC and no attribution.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Command and Control
T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1571 Non-Standard Port; T1573.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography
Initial Access
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
Resource Development
T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains; T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool
Reconnaissance
T1595.001 Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks; T1595.002 Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Check organization IP ranges against the Total Insights Feed (or equivalent NetFlow-to-C2 matching) for 'sliver-bot' and other bot tags
- Treat bot tags as leads: validate with EDR, DNS and proxy telemetry before declaring compromise
- Isolate and triage any host confirmed to be communicating with Sliver-attributed infrastructure
Workarounds
- Block or alert on egress to controllers attributed to Sliver at the perimeter, and review flows to uncommon high ports such as TCP/8888, 13338, 23338 and 33338
Longer-term hardening
- Retain NetFlow and egress telemetry with enough coverage and retention to support C2 contact review
- Hunt internally for Sliver as an initial payload or alongside tools such as Cobalt Strike using community Snort and YARA rules
- Use attack surface management to track remediation of vulnerable internet-facing assets
Timeline
- Earliest Campaign 1 ('Scan & Exploit') Sliver samples tied to locked-ioc-15 (SELECTEL, RU) per Team Cymru's 2022 case study; the cluster sweeps ranges indiscriminately, flagged by GreyNoise for Log4j and Exchange ProxyShell targeting.
- Sliver sample ugly.exe (SHA-256 1f95397c...) first detected, contacting locked-ioc-15.
- Sliver sample SENIOR_REALITY.exe first detected, contacting locked-ioc-15.
- Atera remote management sample associated with locked-ioc-15 first uploaded to VirusTotal, suggesting a switch to legitimate remote management software after initial compromise.
- Sliver sample PRIMARY_FLUTE.exe first detected, contacting locked-ioc-15.
- Sliver sample install.exe first detected, contacting locked-ioc-15; about 14 days after initial C2 traffic the actor shifted from TCP/8888 to 13338, 23338 and 33338 for long-lived victim communications.
- End of the window (2022-02-03 to 2022-03-04) in which Campaign 1 samples using locked-ioc-15 were discovered; victims later moved (about 30 days after first contact) to locked-ioc-14 (Red Bytes LLC, RU), with locked-ioc-18 samples pointing to Log4j/VMware Horizon exploitation.
- Virlock sample (possible ransomware capability) associated with locked-ioc-14 first uploaded to VirusTotal; the case study notes it is unclear whether ransomware was the end goal.
- Team Cymru S2 Research Team publishes 'Sliver Case Study: Assessing Common Offensive Security Tools', reporting 143 Sliver samples versus 4,455 Cobalt Strike samples in Q1 2022 and a second Pakistan/Turkey government-themed cluster using Sliver and Cobalt Strike.
- Will Thomas of Team Cymru publishes 'Fingerprinting Malware C2s with Tags', describing fingerprint-based and NetFlow behavioral tagging, over 2,100 context tags, and a Scout victim identification workflow.
- Josh Picolet of Team Cymru publishes 'From C2 Detection to Possible Victim Identification', describing NetFlow-based bot tagging such as 'sliver-bot' in the Total Insights Feed.
Sources cited
- Sliver Case Study: Assessing Common Offensive Security Tools team-cymru.com · Research · 2022-05-03
- Team Cymru NetFlow Advantage Use Case: Botnet and Malware Ecosystem team-cymru.com · Vendor report
- Immersive Labs: Detecting and Decrypting Sliver C2 - A Threat Hunter's Guide immersivelabs.com · Research · 2023-04-24
- Rapid7 InsightIDR Network Traffic Analysis (Sliver C2 IP list detection) Rapid7 · Vendor report
- Team Cymru Total Insights Threat Intelligence Feed team-cymru.com · Vendor report
- Team Cymru: The NetFlow Advantage team-cymru.com · Vendor report
- From C2 Detection to Possible Victim Identification team-cymru.com · Blog · 2026-07-27
- Fingerprinting Malware C2s with Tags team-cymru.com · Blog · 2025-08-04
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.