Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6089
SilentDelivery: China-Linked Actors Use Fake Chrome Certificate Warnings on Compromised Sites to Deliver SquadC/SparrowDoor Backdoors (Sparrow Framework)
China-linked actors inject jsjiami-obfuscated JavaScript into compromised legitimate websites that replaces the page with a fake, localized Chrome SSL certificate warning; the 'Install certificate' button downloads a malicious MSI (CertFixer.msi) that loads the previously undocumented SquadC backdoor (or a SparrowDoor variant).
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6089 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | SilentDelivery, Sparrow framework, SquadC, SquawkDoor |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows (endpoints visiting compromised websites); Various Compromised legitimate websites (government, shipping, IT, research) |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-79 |
| Attribution | CopperDragon, SilentDelivery cluster (low confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | China |
| Malware | SparrowDoor, SquadC |
| Tools | jsjiami |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript, T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1113 Screen Capture, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1202 Indirect Command Execution, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File, T1218.007 System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec, T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks and 4 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | government administration, shipping, information-technology, research, telecoms |
| Target regions | Europe, Asia, Latin America |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6089 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 29 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: SilentDelivery — CertFixer.msi / User-Path MSI Execution via Msiexec (SquadC Loader)
Detects msiexec installing CertFixer.msi, the malicious installer served by the SilentDelivery fake Chrome SSL certificate warning, or any MSI executed from Downloads/AppData/Temp paths. The MSI starts the three-stage decrypt-and-load chain that runs the SquadC (SquawkDoor) backdoor in memory. Browsers never legitimately ask users to install a certificate from a web page, so this execution is high value. No Chrome vulnerability is involved; the chain relies on user execution.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1204.002, T1218.007, T1105
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, DeviceProcessEvents
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*msiexec.exe" CommandLine="*.msi*"
| where match(CommandLine,"(?i)CertFixer[.]msi") OR match(CommandLine,"(?i)(Downloads|AppData|Temp)[^ ]*[.]msi")
| eval known_lure=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)CertFixer[.]msi"),"yes","no"), browser_parent=if(match(ParentImage,"(?i)(chrome|msedge|firefox|brave)[.]exe$"),"yes","no")
| stats count min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen values(CommandLine) AS command_line values(ParentImage) AS parent_image values(User) AS user BY host known_lure browser_parent
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - known_lureMicrosoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "msiexec.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "CertFixer.msi" or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(Downloads|AppData|Temp)[^ ]*[.]msi"
| extend KnownLure = ProcessCommandLine has "CertFixer.msi", BrowserParent = InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe", "brave.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, KnownLure, BrowserParent
| order by KnownLure desc, Timestamp descSigma
title: SilentDelivery CertFixer MSI Execution via Msiexec
id: 3c1f7a52-8e4b-4d0a-9b61-5a7d2c9e1f01
status: experimental
description: Detects msiexec installing the CertFixer.msi lure dropped by the SilentDelivery fake Chrome certificate warning, or any MSI executed from user download/temp paths, used to load the SquadC backdoor.
references:
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/not-all-that-glitters-is-gold-tracking-copperdragons-sparrow-framework-around-the-globe/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/14
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1218.007
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
selection_lure:
CommandLine|contains: 'CertFixer.msi'
selection_path:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\Downloads\'
- '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
selection_msi:
CommandLine|contains: '.msi'
condition: selection_img and (selection_lure or (selection_path and selection_msi))
falsepositives:
- Administrators or users installing legitimate MSI packages from the Downloads folder
- Software deployment tools staging MSI files in user temp paths
level: highKnown false positives:
- Users or administrators installing legitimate MSI packages from the Downloads folder
- Software deployment tooling staging MSI files under user temp paths
Tuning notes: known_lure=yes (CertFixer.msi) is near-zero false positive: alert immediately. For the generic user-path MSI branch, exclude approved deployment accounts and signed vendor installers, and consider raising priority when the host also visited an uncategorized site or S3 bucket shortly before. Adjust the index name to your Sysmon index.
- SilentDelivery — Spearphishing LNK Abusing ftp.exe Script Execution (SquadC Indonesia Lure) · unlock with TL Creds
- SilentDelivery — SquadC Loader DLL Sideloading (MSVCR110 / dtfbase / WTSAPI32) · unlock with TL Creds
- SilentDelivery — Browser Download of [indicator] / MSI from Amazon S3 (Fake Certificate Warning) · unlock with TL Creds
- SilentDelivery — Injected Script C2 Beacons (/image-check, /report-url, /register-ip) · unlock with TL Creds
- SilentDelivery — SquadC Tasking: cmd /C dir and systeminfo from User-Writable Parent · unlock with TL Creds
- SilentDelivery — DNS Resolution of Published Infrastructure Domains (Microsoft Typosquats) · unlock with TL Creds
- SilentDelivery — SquadC [indicator] Run Key Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
- SilentDelivery — Outbound Connections to Published SquadC C2 Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 29 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6089.
Sample indicators (3 of 29)
- IP address:
135.136.135[.]54 - Domain:
microsfot[.]vip - File hash:
715c206629f59ff5b0134a33362162ce7a40a9b25aa17f0543dc9648d51a67cf
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 29 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Check Point Research (2026-11-10) ties the SilentDelivery cluster to the Sparrow framework and the suspected supplier CopperDragon; no Chrome vulnerability is involved and attribution to a single operator is not established.
SilentDelivery is one of three clusters (with OceanGate and DarkWire) that Check Point Research linked to the cross-platform Sparrow malware framework, assessed to be developed and supplied by a suspected 'digital quartermaster' tracked as CopperDragon. The framework is used by several China-nexus actors, including FamousSparrow, Earth Estries, Tropic Trooper and UAT-9244. SilentDelivery activity has been tracked since early 2026.
Initial access and lure: operators compromise legitimate websites in government, shipping, IT and research sectors (one site was reportedly compromised via XSS on an unsanitized input field) and inject JavaScript obfuscated with the public jsjiami service. The script checks that the visitor is on Windows and, in some versions, that the domain matches the intended site. It then polls the C2 at /image-check?t=<datetime>: an HTTP 200 leaves the page untouched (victim filtering by IP/geolocation), while no response triggers the fake Chrome SSL certificate warning, rendered in the site's language. Clicking 'Install certificate' reports to /report-url (POST, JSON with page URL) and downloads CertFixer.msi from an attacker-controlled Amazon S3 bucket (Check Point observed three buckets it believes were compromised). After infection the warning no longer appears on later visits, which may make the 'fix' seem to have worked and discourage reporting. The chain depends on user execution and does not demonstrate a Chrome vulnerability.
Payload: the MSI installs a three-stage decrypt-and-load chain that executes SquadC (also reported as SquawkDoor by other vendors) in memory. Observed loader DLLs include MSVCR110.dll, dtfbase.dll and WTSAPI32.dll. SquadC is a C/C++ Windows backdoor that registers to /register-ip, persists through a Run key named WindowsUpdateAssist, and supports directory listing (cmd /C dir), file deletion, file write, command execution with or without output, systeminfo, full-screen screenshots and status checks. Optional anti-analysis checks cover VM artifacts in the filesystem/registry, blacklisted MAC addresses, screen resolutions and disk sizes, and an option to run only if a browser (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe, brave.exe) is running. SquadC was also delivered by spear-phishing against Indonesian organizations via RAR archive Strategi_AS_Referensi_April2026.rar containing an LNK that abuses ftp.exe to run a batch script, a CAB with loader components and an empty decoy PDF. Some SilentDelivery cases deliver a SparrowDoor variant instead.
Infrastructure and attribution: SilentDelivery C2 shares layout, exposed ports, HTTP banners and a reused TLS certificate (serial 0x4872589ca964eac0776b1e9617e9813cb1da49dc, SHA-1 760be920fad07881b8ce9d94e074a35b4f806717) with FamousSparrow and OceanGate infrastructure. Victims observed in Check Point telemetry: Czech Republic, Germany, France, Taiwan, Nepal, Hong Kong and Indonesia; Positive Technologies reported possible targeting in Egypt and the Philippines. Check Point cautions that shared malware and infrastructure can blur the boundaries between operators and campaigns, so attribution to one operator is tentative.
Related clusters (context): OceanGate (2025-2026, mainly Asia) entered via internet-facing Linux servers, using AnnobinDoor, SparrowShell (Linux counterpart of SparrowDoor, with a modified Reptile rootkit), trojanized OpenSSH, FRP/Chisel, RDP brute force, and Windows tools CopperAdu, CopperList, CopperLogger and CopperLsa plus WinDivert-based passive SparrowDoor. DarkWire (mid-2025 onward) targets Latin American telecoms and government with CopperLoader (DLL sideloading), CopperDoor (aka SparroWocky), CopperDNS (C2 over DNS MX queries), CopperProxy, PyProxy and CopperLsass.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion; T1202 Indirect Command Execution; T1218.007 System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec; T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks; T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
Execution
T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell; T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
Command and Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
Discovery
T1082 System Information Discovery
Collection
Initial Access
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
Persistence
T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Resource Development
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block the published domains, IPs and hashes at proxy, DNS, firewall and EDR
- Hunt for CertFixer.msi, msiexec launched from browser download folders, and the WindowsUpdateAssist Run key
- Isolate and reimage hosts where the MSI was executed; reset credentials used on them
- Inspect owned websites for injected jsjiami-obfuscated JavaScript and requests to /image-check, /report-url
- Review S3 bucket ownership and access policies for unexpected objects
Workarounds
- Block downloads of .msi files from uncategorized or newly registered domains and cloud storage buckets at the web proxy
- Enforce AppLocker/WDAC rules for msiexec-installed binaries in user profile paths
Longer-term hardening
- Train users that browsers never ask them to install a certificate or 'certificate fix' from a web page
- Restrict MSI execution from user-writable paths via application control
- Patch and harden internet-facing web applications (input sanitization against XSS) and Linux servers
- Monitor for DLL sideloading and unusual DNS MX query volume
- Use Content Security Policy and Subresource Integrity to detect script tampering
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows (endpoints visiting compromised websites)
Vulnerable versions: Windows endpoints where the user runs the downloaded MSI - Various — Compromised legitimate websites (government, shipping, IT, research)
Vulnerable versions: Sites with injectable/compromised content, including an unsanitized input field exploited via XSS
Timeline
- FamousSparrow, known for SparrowDoor, first identified (year only per source; day approximated).
- TLS certificate later reused across SilentDelivery, OceanGate and FamousSparrow C2 infrastructure becomes valid (valid to 2024-04-27).
- DarkWire cluster (Latin American telecom/government, CopperDoor/CopperDNS) first identified in mid-2025 (day approximated).
- SilentDelivery activity begins; fake Chrome certificate warning campaign on compromised sites tracked from early 2026 (day approximated).
- Check Point Research publishes 'Not All That Glitters Is Gold' linking SilentDelivery, OceanGate and DarkWire to CopperDragon's Sparrow framework.
- Cyber Security News, The Hacker News and Infosecurity Magazine report on the campaign.
Sources cited
- Not All That Glitters Is Gold: Tracking CopperDragon's Sparrow Framework Around the Globe Check Point Research · Research · 2026-11-10
- China-Linked Hackers Use Fake Chrome Certificate Warnings to Infect Victims With Sparrow Backdoor cybersecuritynews.com · News · 2026-11-11
- Three China-Nexus Espionage Campaigns (The Hacker News) The Hacker News · News · 2026-11-11
- Suspected Chinese Malware Supplier Tied to Three Hacking Campaigns (Infosecurity Magazine) infosecurity-magazine.com · News · 2026-11-11
- Chinese spies are hacking the services you rely on, and your data is the target (Cybernews) cybernews.com · News · 2026-11-11
- FamousSparrow: two backdoors and attacks on seven countries (SecurityLab, SquawkDoor naming) securitylab.ru · News · 2026-11-11
More from CopperDragon
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.