Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6094
Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA (ClickFix) Campaign Delivers Malware Hidden Inside PNG Images and Sideloaded DLLs
ClickFix lures posing as Cloudflare 'Verify that you are human' Turnstile checks, delivered through Bing malvertising, SEO poisoning and compromised websites, trick victims into pasting a PowerShell command. Observed chains rebuild executables hidden in PNG pixel data, sideload DLLs through signed Microsoft binaries, and lead to persistence, AD reconnaissance, credential theft and lateral movement.
Key facts
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6094 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 27 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: ClickFix Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA Paste-and-Run Execution (T1204.004)
Behaviour-first detection of the ClickFix execution stage in TL-2026-6094: PowerShell/cmd/mshta started by explorer.exe (Run dialog) or a browser, carrying fake Cloudflare/CAPTCHA verification text, hidden or encoded download-and-execute stagers, the browser-cache variant that searches for a 17635-byte file and copies it to %TEMP% .bat, or known campaign infrastructure (westlaw-signon.com, moziw.com, apirequestaccess.com, cf_verify.zip, verify_pkg.zip). Requires Sysmon process creation (EventCode 1).
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1204.004, T1059.001, T1059.003
- Data sources: sysmon, index=windows sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational, DeviceProcessEvents, windows_process_creation
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
(Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe" OR Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR Image="*\\mshta.exe")
(ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\chrome.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\firefox.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\brave.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\msedge.exe")
| eval cl=lower(CommandLine), parent=lower(ParentImage)
| eval parent_browser=if(match(parent,"\\\\(chrome|firefox|brave|msedge)\.exe$"),1,0)
| eval cache_bat=if(match(cl,"17635") AND match(cl,"t\.bat"),1,0)
| eval verify_lure=if(match(cl,"(captcha|cloudflare|turnstile|verify.{0,20}human|i am not a robot|verification id)"),1,0)
| eval download_exec=if(match(cl,"(^|[^a-z])iex([^a-z]|$)|invoke-expression|downloadstring|invoke-webrequest|(^|[^a-z])(iwr|irm)[^a-z]|bitsadmin") AND match(cl,"-w(indowstyle)?\s+h(idden)?|-enc|frombase64string|-nop"),1,0)
| eval known_ioc=if(match(cl,"westlaw-signon\.com|moziw\.com|vvestalw|apirequestaccess\.com|23\.227\.199\.41|151\.240\.151\.76|167\.148\.201\.104|cf_verify\.zip|verify_pkg\.zip"),1,0)
| where cache_bat=1 OR known_ioc=1 OR (verify_lure=1 AND download_exec=1) OR (parent_browser=1 AND download_exec=1)
| eval reason=case(cache_bat=1,"Browser-cache ClickFix: 17635-byte cached file copied to Temp t.bat", known_ioc=1,"Command line references TL-2026-6094 ClickFix infrastructure or staged archive", verify_lure=1,"Fake CAPTCHA/Turnstile lure text with download-and-execute PowerShell", true(),"Browser-spawned shell running hidden/encoded download-and-execute")
| table _time host User ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image CommandLine reasonMicrosoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cmd.exe", "mshta.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe", "chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "brave.exe", "msedge.exe")
| extend cl = tolower(ProcessCommandLine)
| extend ParentBrowser = InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "brave.exe", "msedge.exe")
| extend CacheBat = cl contains "17635" and cl contains "t.bat"
| extend VerifyLure = cl matches regex @"(captcha|cloudflare|turnstile|verify.{0,20}human|i am not a robot|verification id)"
| extend DownloadExec = (cl matches regex @"(^|[^a-z])iex([^a-z]|$)|invoke-expression|downloadstring|invoke-webrequest|(^|[^a-z])(iwr|irm)[^a-z]|bitsadmin")
and (cl matches regex @"-w(indowstyle)?\s+h(idden)?|-enc|frombase64string|-nop")
| extend KnownIoc = cl matches regex @"westlaw-signon\.com|moziw\.com|vvestalw|apirequestaccess\.com|23\.227\.199\.41|151\.240\.151\.76|167\.148\.201\.104|cf_verify\.zip|verify_pkg\.zip"
| where CacheBat or KnownIoc or (VerifyLure and DownloadExec) or (ParentBrowser and DownloadExec)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, CacheBat, VerifyLure, DownloadExec, KnownIoc
| sort by Timestamp descSigma
title: ClickFix Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA Paste-and-Run Shell Execution
id: 6f1c2a4e-3b7d-4e58-9a10-5c2d8e7f1a01
status: experimental
description: Detects shells launched from the Run dialog (explorer.exe) or a browser with fake-CAPTCHA lure text, hidden or encoded download-and-execute PowerShell, the Chrome/Firefox/Brave browser-cache 17635-byte copy to t.bat, or campaign infrastructure in the command line.
references:
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/the-evolving-tradecraft-of-clickfix
- https://gbhackers.com/fake-cloudflare-captcha-2/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.004
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1059.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
selection_parent_explorer:
ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
selection_parent_browser:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\chrome.exe'
- '\firefox.exe'
- '\brave.exe'
- '\msedge.exe'
selection_cache_bat:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '17635'
- 't.bat'
selection_ioc:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'westlaw-signon.com'
- 'moziw.com'
- 'vvestalw'
- 'apirequestaccess.com'
- '23.227.199.41'
- '151.240.151.76'
- '167.148.201.104'
- 'cf_verify.zip'
- 'verify_pkg.zip'
selection_lure:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'captcha'
- 'cloudflare'
- 'turnstile'
- 'i am not a robot'
- 'verification id'
selection_download:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'iex '
- 'iex('
- 'invoke-expression'
- 'downloadstring'
- 'invoke-webrequest'
- 'iwr '
- 'irm '
- 'bitsadmin'
selection_hidden:
CommandLine|contains:
- '-w hidden'
- '-windowstyle hidden'
- '-enc'
- '-nop'
- 'frombase64string'
condition: selection_img and (selection_cache_bat or selection_ioc or (selection_parent_explorer and selection_lure and selection_download) or (selection_parent_browser and selection_download and selection_hidden))
falsepositives:
- Administrators pasting legitimate hidden PowerShell one-liners into the Run dialog
- Software installers launched from a browser that use cmd.exe with -enc style bootstrap commands
level: high
Known false positives:
- Administrators or helpdesk staff pasting legitimate hidden/encoded PowerShell into the Run dialog
- Browser-launched installers or enterprise software agents that bootstrap through cmd.exe with -enc style commands
- Security awareness phishing simulations that reproduce fake CAPTCHA lures
Tuning notes: Change index=windows to the index that holds your Sysmon data. Exclude known software-deployment parents and admin accounts via a lookup. Raise the parent_browser branch to alert-only for users without developer roles. Add additional browser binaries (vivaldi.exe, opera.exe) if used. Requires Sysmon EventCode 1 with CommandLine and ParentImage populated.
- ClickFix Stager Chain: Browser-Cache [indicator], PNG Steganography Loader and [indicator] / [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix Post-Compromise AD Recon (nltest/net/whoami) and Local Account Creation · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix Lateral Movement: WinRM, PsExec Service and SMBExec to Servers and Domain Controllers · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix Signed-Binary DLL Sideloading (LockScreenContentServer.exe/dui70.dll, [indicator]/[indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] Node.js RAT Execution and Run Key Persistence ([indicator] / [indicator] / [indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix Reverse SSH Tunnel C2 (SysyService task, ShService r.ps1, [indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix Persistence via Run Keys and Scheduled Tasks (SysyService / LockScreenContentServer_ / CertEnrollCtrl_ / [indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix C2 Network Activity: [indicator] node.exe TCP/3861, Published IOC IPs and Sibling Domains · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 27 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6094.
Sample indicators (3 of 27)
- IP address:
23.227.199[.]41 - Domain:
vvestalw[.]ghost[.]io - URL:
hxxps://moziw[.]com/vvestalw/
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 27 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Huntress (Nov 10, 2026, 'Beyond the clipboard: The evolving tradecraft of ClickFix') and GBHackers (Nov 11, 2026) describe several ClickFix intrusion chains. Victims reach fake Cloudflare Turnstile pages via a Bing malvertising ad for 'Westlaw' (redirect through vvestalw.ghost.io and moziw.com/vvestalw/ to westlaw-signon.com), SEO-poisoned spoofed LinkedIn and real-estate sites, and a compromised dental practice website that shows a fake 'Manage Consent' pop-up. Ticking the box copies a PowerShell command to the clipboard and the victim pastes it into the Run dialog or a terminal. Some lures print fake colored 'verification' output or animated progress bars while the payload runs.
Steganographic chain: the stager downloads benign-looking PNG files whose pixel data contains complete executables (an earlier variant carried only shellcode). The stager rebuilds and runs them. verify_pkg.zip is dropped in Temp, 1.bat launches a multi-stage PowerShell stager, and the signed Microsoft binary LockScreenContentServer.exe sideloads the malicious dui70.dll. Persistence is a scheduled task and Run key named LockScreenContentServer_qQrRrJiHX. Post-compromise activity includes persistence, reconnaissance, credential theft and lateral movement.
Browser-cache chain (credited to John Hammond): a compromised site silently caches a 17,635-byte file. The ClickFix command, which varies by browser (Firefox, Chrome, Brave), searches that browser's cache for a file of that exact size, copies it to %TEMP%\t.bat and executes it, launching multiple second-stage payloads. One resulting payload is DuskDesk, a Node.js RAT disguised as a remote monitoring tool (LimeMint.js, launch.js, UmberOceanTan.dat; Run key 'DuskDesk'; TCP C2 167.148.201.104:3861; MSI delivered from apirequestaccess.com / 151.240.151.76).
Early-September hands-on-keyboard chain: cf_verify.zip; 1.bat runs CertEnrollCtrl.exe, which sideloads a malicious CertEnroll.dll and launches PowerShell. A Base64 command in 6341434163416441.txt writes C:\ProgramData\ShService\r.ps1 for a reverse SSH tunnel to 23.227.199.41 (scheduled task SysyService). The operator ran nltest, net, whoami and findstr for AD recon, used WinRM to reach the primary domain controller, created a new user and attempted to add it to local administrators, and opened a second tunnel. Earlier incidents: February (Matanbuchus 3.0 then AstarionRAT, credential theft, PsExec to a Windows Server and two domain controllers) and May (Potemkin loader, RMMProject, EtherRAT, SMBExec spreading to 11 hosts). The articles also mention an Amazon-themed lure abusing the Windows finger utility to deliver Lumma Stealer and NetSupport RMM, a ChatGPT Custom GPT lure leading to a Cloudflare-themed lure and a DLL-sideloaded RAT (at least 40 related incidents), and a fake Google Doc prompt delivering AMOS (macOS) and NetSupport RAT (Windows). Attribution is not stated in the sources. Month references in the sources carry no year; timeline dates for them are approximate. BeaconBeagle lookups for the two published IPs returned HTTP 502 and no C2 correlation was obtained.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Lateral Movement
T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares; T1021.006 Remote Services: Windows Remote Management
Defense Evasion
T1027.003 Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography; T1574.001 DLL
Persistence
T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1136.001 Create Account: Local Account; T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Execution
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell; T1204.004 User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste; T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution
Discovery
T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account; T1482 Domain Trust Discovery
Command and Control
Resource Development
T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains; T1583.008 Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising; T1608.006 Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block and hunt for vvestalw.ghost.io, moziw.com, westlaw-signon.com, apirequestaccess.com, 23.227.199.41, 151.240.151.76 and 167.148.201.104:3861
- Alert when browsers (chrome, firefox, brave, msedge) spawn cmd.exe or powershell.exe
- Hunt for batch files copied from browser cache directories to Temp (e.g. t.bat) and for cf_verify.zip / verify_pkg.zip in Temp
- Review unexpected Run keys and scheduled tasks such as CertEnrollCtrl_Y0db6oZq9, LockScreenContentServer_qQrRrJiHX, SysyService and DuskDesk
- Alert on outbound SSH from workstations and on new local/domain accounts created from unusual hosts
Workarounds
- Use Group Policy to disable the Run dialog (Start menu Run) where operationally acceptable
- Enforce PowerShell Constrained Language Mode and script block logging on workstations
Longer-term hardening
- Restrict the Windows Run dialog for users who do not need it (attackers can still ask users to open PowerShell or Command Prompt)
- Educate users that legitimate CAPTCHAs never ask them to paste commands into Run, PowerShell or a terminal
- Monitor signed Microsoft binaries (LockScreenContentServer.exe, CertEnrollCtrl.exe) executing from user-writable paths
- Restrict WinRM, PsExec and SMB admin share use between workstations and domain controllers
Affected and fixed versions
Timeline
- February incident (month only stated; day and year approximate): Matanbuchus 3.0 loader then AstarionRAT installed; credentials stolen and PsExec used to reach a Windows Server and two domain controllers.
- May incident (month only stated; day and year approximate): Potemkin loader, RMMProject and EtherRAT used; SMBExec spread the malware to 11 hosts.
- Early August (approximate): Huntress published several earlier ClickFix blog posts preceding the current analysis.
- Early September incident (approximate): locked-ioc-17 staged, locked-ioc-15 sideloaded via locked-ioc-9, AD recon with nltest/net/whoami/findstr, reverse SSH tunnel to locked-ioc-16, WinRM to the primary domain controller, new account created, second tunnel opened.
- Huntress publishes 'Beyond the clipboard: The evolving tradecraft of ClickFix' covering the steganographic, browser-cache and DuskDesk chains.
- GBHackers publishes coverage of the fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA ClickFix campaign delivering malware hidden in PNG images.
Sources cited
- Beyond the clipboard: The evolving tradecraft of ClickFix (Huntress) Huntress · Research · 2026-11-10
- ClickFix Gets Creative: Malware Buried in Images (Huntress) Huntress · Research
- Hackers Use Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA Checks to Deploy Malware Hidden Inside PNG Images (GBHackers) gbhackers.com · News · 2026-11-11
- From ClickFix to Metastealer: Dissecting Evolving Threat Actor Techniques (Huntress via BleepingComputer) BleepingComputer · News
- Huntress, Microsoft Detail the Continued Popularity, Evolution of ClickFix Attacks (Security Boulevard) securityboulevard.com · News · 2026-02-01
- GBHackers: related fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA coverage gbhackers.com · News
- GBHackers: macOS AMOS stealer coverage gbhackers.com · News
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.