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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6125

Malware-Laced Video Games Infect ~8,000 Gamers, ~$220,000 in Cryptocurrency Stolen (Federal Complaint)

highACTIVE

A federal criminal complaint filed July 10, 2026 (W.D. Washington) alleges eight malware-laden games, five named (DASHVERSE, Lunara, PirateFi, BlockBlasters, Lampy), infected about 8,000 devices between May 2024 and February 2026, giving access to about 80 cryptocurrency wallets and at least $220,000 in stolen funds.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6125
Also known asSteam malware investigation, United States v. Wilkins (Steam malware)
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsValve Steam (distribution platform used to deliver trojanized games, per press reporting; not named in the complaint); Various Windows gaming PCs with crypto wallets, browser-stored credentials and sessions
MalwareClient-built2.exe, Stealc, Vidar, telegram
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1036 Masquerading, T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File, T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers, T1566.003 Phishing: Spearphishing via Service, T1585 Establish Accounts and 3 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsgaming, cryptocurrency, consumers
Target regionsGlobal, North America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6125 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 28 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Trojanized Game Stealer C2 and Exfiltration - Known IPs, Community Domains, IP Lookups (SPL)

C2/exfiltration phase of TL-2026-6125. Detects connections to 203.188.171.156 (port 30815 /upload batch-stealer exfiltration and Python RemoteControlClient backdoor), 45.83.28.99 (StealC C2), and community-observed Vidar-linked sibling infrastructure (37.27.4.20 and throwaway-TLD domains), ipinfo.io/ip.me lookups from script hosts or game processes, and game-directory processes connecting to public IPs on non-web ports. Primary flavor: SPL.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1071.001, T1041, T1016
  • Data sources: sysmon_eventcode_3_22, defender_for_endpoint_devicenetworkevents, windows_network_connection
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h
((EventCode=3 Initiated="true"
  (DestinationIp IN ("203.188.171.156","45.83.28.99","37.27.4.20")
   OR (Image="*\\steamapps\\common\\*" NOT DestinationPort IN (80,443))
   OR (DestinationHostname IN ("ipinfo.io","ip.me") (Image="*\\wscript.exe" OR Image="*\\cscript.exe" OR Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR Image="*\\curl.exe" OR Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\steamapps\\common\\*"))))
 OR (EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("7k.iakmialor.web.id","klinhsrg.lol","sdefrsxcg.sbs","tgexvgtdsa.lol","xsvervd.sbs","vgyhtdxz.bond","ptrdfvc.sbs","slkrgtq.lol","mnyhde.sbs","lkmnhy.sbs","cdfers.sbs")))
| eval match_reason=case(
    EventCode=22, "community_stealer_domain",
    match(DestinationIp,"^(203\\.188\\.171\\.156|45\\.83\\.28\\.99|37\\.27\\.4\\.20)$"), "known_c2_ip_port_30815_upload",
    match(DestinationHostname,"(?i)^(ipinfo\\.io|ip\\.me)$"), "ip_lookup_from_script_or_game",
    true(), "game_process_nonstandard_port")
| eval is_private=if(cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8",DestinationIp) OR cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12",DestinationIp) OR cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16",DestinationIp),1,0)
| where NOT (match_reason="game_process_nonstandard_port" AND is_private=1)
| fillnull value="-" DestinationIp DestinationPort DestinationHostname QueryName Image
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by host, Image, DestinationIp, DestinationPort, DestinationHostname, QueryName, match_reason
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - count

Microsoft KQL

// TL-2026-6125 C2 / exfil: 203.188.171.156:30815/upload, 45.83.28.99 (StealC), community Vidar-linked infrastructure
let C2Ips = dynamic(["203.188.171.156", "45.83.28.99", "37.27.4.20"]);
let CommunityDomains = dynamic(["7k.iakmialor.web.id", "klinhsrg.lol", "sdefrsxcg.sbs", "tgexvgtdsa.lol", "xsvervd.sbs", "vgyhtdxz.bond", "ptrdfvc.sbs", "slkrgtq.lol", "mnyhde.sbs", "lkmnhy.sbs", "cdfers.sbs"]);
let GamePaths = dynamic(["\\steamapps\\common\\", "\\Engine\\Binaries\\ThirdParty\\Ogg\\cwe"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("ConnectionSuccess", "ConnectionAttempt", "ConnectionFound")
| extend Reason = case(
    RemoteIP in (C2Ips), "known_c2_ip",
    RemoteUrl has_any (CommunityDomains), "community_stealer_domain",
    RemoteUrl has_any ("ipinfo.io", "ip.me") and (InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "cmd.exe", "curl.exe", "powershell.exe") or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (GamePaths)), "ip_lookup_from_script_or_game",
    InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (GamePaths) and RemoteIPType == "Public" and RemotePort !in (80, 443), "game_process_nonstandard_port",
    "")
| where isnotempty(Reason)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Reason, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Trojanized Game Stealer C2 and Exfiltration Network Activity
id: 3f1c8a52-6d4e-4b7a-9c21-6125a0000003
status: experimental
description: Detects network connections matching the BlockBlasters stealer and backdoor infrastructure (203.188.171.156 on port 30815 /upload, StealC C2 45.83.28.99), community-observed Vidar-linked sibling infrastructure (37.27.4.20 and throwaway-TLD domains), victim IP lookups (ipinfo.io, ip.me) from script hosts or game processes, and game-directory processes connecting out on non-web ports.
references:
  - https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2025/09/38265-steam-blockblasters-game-downloads-malware
  - https://www.secuinfra.com/en/techtalk/infostealer-malware-vidar-spread-via-the-steam-store/
  - https://techcrunch.com/2026/07/17/fbi-arrests-man-accused-of-using-steam-games-to-drain-victims-crypto-wallets/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1071.001
  - attack.exfiltration
  - attack.t1041
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1016
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_ip:
    DestinationIp:
      - '203.188.171.156'
      - '45.83.28.99'
      - '37.27.4.20'
  selection_community_domain:
    DestinationHostname|endswith:
      - '7k.iakmialor.web.id'
      - 'klinhsrg.lol'
      - 'sdefrsxcg.sbs'
      - 'tgexvgtdsa.lol'
      - 'xsvervd.sbs'
      - 'vgyhtdxz.bond'
      - 'ptrdfvc.sbs'
      - 'slkrgtq.lol'
      - 'mnyhde.sbs'
      - 'lkmnhy.sbs'
      - 'cdfers.sbs'
  selection_lookup:
    DestinationHostname:
      - 'ipinfo.io'
      - 'ip.me'
    Image|endswith:
      - '\wscript.exe'
      - '\cscript.exe'
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\curl.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
  selection_game_process:
    Image|contains: '\steamapps\common\'
    Initiated: 'true'
  filter_web_ports:
    DestinationPort:
      - 80
      - 443
  filter_private:
    DestinationIp|cidr:
      - '10.0.0.0/8'
      - '172.16.0.0/12'
      - '192.168.0.0/16'
  condition: selection_ip or selection_community_domain or selection_lookup or (selection_game_process and not filter_web_ports and not filter_private)
falsepositives:
  - Games that use non-standard ports to reach public matchmaking or anti-cheat services
  - Administrators or scripts querying ipinfo.io or ip.me for legitimate diagnostics
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Games using non-standard ports for matchmaking, telemetry or anti-cheat on public IPs
  • Admins or scripts legitimately querying ipinfo.io or ip.me

Tuning notes: Do not block ipinfo.io or ip.me globally - alert only when initiated by script hosts or game processes. The three C2 IPs and community domains are hard indicators (high fidelity); the game_process_nonstandard_port branch is behavioral and should be baselined and allow-listed per title. Refresh community domains from TL_OSINT_Scan as the campaign evolves; the community-observed domains and 37.27.4.20 are medium-confidence sibling infrastructure.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Trojanized Game Loader Chain - Script Host Spawned From Game Directory (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Stealer Post-Exploitation - Defender Exclusion, AV Discovery and Browser/Wallet Data Collection (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Trojanized Game Stealer C2 and Exfiltration - Known IPs, Community Domains, IP Lookups (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Trojanized Game Loader Chain - Script Host Spawned From Game Directory (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Stealer Post-Exploitation - Defender Exclusion, AV Discovery and Browser/Wallet Data Collection (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Trojanized Game Stealer C2 and Exfiltration - Known IPs, Community Domains, IP Lookups (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Trojanized Game Loader Chain - Script Host Spawned From Game Directory (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Stealer Post-Exploitation - Defender Exclusion, AV Discovery and Browser/Wallet Data Collection (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 28 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6125.

Sample indicators (3 of 28)

  • IP address: 203.188.171[.]156
  • Domain: ipinfo[.]io
  • File hash: aa1a1328e0d0042d071bca13ff9a13116d8f3cf77e6e9769293e2b144c9b73b3

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 28 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

28 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

The allegations are unproven.

According to the criminal complaint and subsequent press coverage, a group allegedly published eight playable but trojanized games through a legitimate digital distribution platform between at least May 2024 and February 2026. The complaint does not name the platform; reporting (TechCrunch, Tom's Hardware, PC Gamer and others) identifies Steam. Developer accounts were allegedly opened with stolen identities of American citizens, which gave the operators access to the platform's publishing process. Five titles are named: DASHVERSE, Lunara, PirateFi, BlockBlasters and Lampy. Lampy allegedly received a malicious update in January 2026, i.e. existing software was modified after release.

Per the complaint, the malware was built to infect computers, steal passwords and other data, and drain crypto wallets. The stealers allegedly harvested account credentials, autofill data, user tokens and cookies, and participants reviewed the stolen data for material that could unlock cryptocurrency accounts. The complaint and the GBHackers article name no malware family, C2 infrastructure, domains, hashes or wallet addresses. Messages allegedly show that in November 2025 participants discussed buying a $10,000 remote-access Trojan to deploy alongside stealers; whether one was deployed is not confirmed. The complaint is not linked to Lumma Stealer and is not part of the separate Steam Workshop malware campaign.

Distribution and targeting: the games were promoted on Discord, Telegram, X and LinkedIn, and bots were used to identify cryptocurrency holders and send targeted messages to high-value victims. Reporting indicates one defendant allegedly financed and marketed the malware while an unidentified developer wrote it. Investigators allegedly traced a crypto account used to buy gift cards (including Uber Eats cards) to the defendant through Uber subpoena records, and seized devices on arrest. The charge is conspiracy to obtain information by computer for private financial gain; the defendant was arrested on July 14, 2026. None of this has been proven in court.

Technical context from separate public analyses of two named titles (these are NOT described in the complaint, so attribution of these artifacts to the same operators is inferred from the game names only): G DATA analysed the August 30, 2025 BlockBlasters patch (build 19799326) and found a multi-stage chain: a batch stealer (game2.bat) that queried ipinfo.io and ip.me, checked for AV processes, collected Steam login data and uploaded it to 203.188.171.156:30815/upload; VBS loaders (launch1.vbs, test.vbs) that ran 1.bat and test.bat hidden; password-protected archives (password 121); a Microsoft Defender exclusion for a folder under the game's Engine\Binaries\ThirdParty\Ogg\cwe path; a Python-compiled backdoor (Client-built2.exe, RemoteControlClient class) talking to 203.188.171.156; and a packed Win64 StealC stealer (Block1.exe) reporting to 45.83.28.99 and targeting Chrome, Brave and Edge Local State files. The real game executable was launched afterwards to mask activity. Separately, SECUINFRA identified the February 2025 PirateFi payload as Vidar, delivered via an InnoSetup installer by the developer account Seaworth Interactive; Valve removed the game on February 12, 2025 and notified roughly 1,500 users. BlockBlasters losses were estimated by ZachXBT and vx-underground at about $150,000 across several hundred victims. BeaconBeagle returned no record for the two C2 IPs at research time.

Defender relevance: trojanized games on trusted storefronts bypass reputation-based trust. Hunt for game-directory child processes spawning cmd/wscript/powershell, Defender exclusions added by non-admin tooling, browser Local State/Login Data/Cookies access by game processes, and outbound HTTP to bare IPs on non-standard ports.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Defense Evasion

T1036 Masquerading

Execution

T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell; T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

Discovery

T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery

Credential Access

T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers

Initial Access

T1566.003 Phishing: Spearphishing via Service

Resource Development

T1585 Establish Accounts; T1588.001 Obtain Capabilities: Malware

Impact

T1657 Financial Theft

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Patches

  • No CVE or vendor patch: platform operators removed the offending titles; apply platform notices and AV signature updates

Immediate actions

  • Identify hosts that installed DASHVERSE, Lunara, PirateFi, BlockBlasters, Lampy or other recently removed titles; isolate them
  • Move crypto assets to new wallets generated on a clean device and rotate seed phrases
  • Revoke and reset passwords, session cookies and tokens (Steam, Discord, browser-stored accounts, exchanges) from a clean device
  • Block 203.188.171.156 and 45.83.28.99 at the perimeter and search proxy/DNS/netflow logs for historical contact
  • Review Microsoft Defender exclusion lists for unexpected game-directory paths

Workarounds

  • Avoid installing new or unknown games with little history, especially ones promoted by direct message on Discord, Telegram, X or LinkedIn
  • Do not install games on machines holding wallet software or logged-in browser sessions for crypto services

Longer-term hardening

  • Reinstall the OS on confirmed-infected devices rather than relying on AV cleanup
  • Enable MFA with hardware keys or app-based codes on exchange and email accounts
  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for script-host execution from application directories
  • Keep crypto wallets and gaming activity on separate devices/profiles

Affected and fixed versions

  • Valve — Steam (distribution platform used to deliver trojanized games, per press reporting; not named in the complaint)
    Vulnerable versions: Windows clients that installed the trojanized titles
    Fixed in: Titles removed by the platform; no client fix required
  • Various — Windows gaming PCs with crypto wallets, browser-stored credentials and sessions
    Vulnerable versions: Windows hosts that installed DASHVERSE, Lunara, PirateFi, BlockBlasters, Lampy and three unnamed titles

Timeline

  • Start of the period (at least May 2024) in which the complaint alleges eight malware-laden games were distributed; exact day not stated.
  • PirateFi, a free game by developer account Seaworth Interactive, is uploaded to Steam; SECUINFRA later identifies its payload as Vidar.
  • Valve removes PirateFi after finding malware in its build files and notifies roughly 1,500 users; the developer account is banned.
  • BlockBlasters patch build 19799326 introduces the malicious batch, VBS, backdoor and StealC files (G DATA analysis); the game had been released July 31, 2025.
  • G DATA publishes its BlockBlasters analysis; the game is removed from Steam. Losses of about $150,000 are later estimated by ZachXBT and vx-underground.
  • In November 2025, per recovered messages cited in the complaint, participants allegedly discuss buying a $10,000 remote-access Trojan to deploy alongside stealers; day not stated.
  • Lampy allegedly receives a malicious update in January 2026; day not stated.
  • End of the alleged distribution period (February 2026); exact day not stated.
  • In March 2026 the FBI Seattle office publicly asks victims of a 'Steam malware investigation' to come forward; day not stated.
  • Federal criminal complaint filed in the Western District of Washington alleging conspiracy to obtain information by computer for private financial gain.
  • The defendant is arrested in Florida; devices and digital wallets are seized.
  • Charges become public via press coverage; allegations remain unproven.

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.

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