Skip to navigation

Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6193

Underground Crypto-Drain Operation: Aotera/Tedy Loader with Vidar-class Stealer Drains ~$100k in Crypto

highACTIVE

Netskope Threat Labs details 'Underground', a malware builder (loader telemetry since October 2023) that delivers an Aotera/Tedy-family loader and a Vidar-class stealer via a trojanized msys-crypto-3.dll in lure archives. The operation steals browser cookies, passwords and wallets, automates exchange account drains, rewrites withdrawal confirmation emails and swaps clipboard wallet addresses, taking roughly $100,000 in on-chain value from at least 350-430 victims. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6193
Also known asUnderground
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows; Google / Microsoft Chrome and Edge browser sessions (abused, not vulnerable)
MalwareAotera, Clipper, Tedy, Vidar
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1055.012 Process Hollowing, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1113 Screen Capture, T1185 Browser Session Hijacking, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1497.001 System Checks, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers, T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation and 1 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsfinance, cryptocurrency, consumer
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6193 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 20 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Underground Loader Execution and setup.exe msys-crypto-3.dll Side-Loading (Aotera/Tedy)

Detects the Underground operation's initial execution stage: the Aotera/Tedy-family loader builds stable_superior_verified.exe / easy_exceptional_instant.exe running, or the lure-archive launcher setup.exe loading a co-located trojanized msys-crypto-3.dll from a user-writable directory (legitimate MSYS2/Git copies live under usr\bin or msys64 and are excluded). The loader then injects a self-decrypting Vidar-class stealer into a suspended dllhost.exe, so this stage is the earliest behavioural opportunity.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1204.002, T1027
  • Data sources: sysmon, index=sysmon sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational (EventCode 1, 7), DeviceImageLoadEvents, DeviceProcessEvents
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h
    ((EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\msys-crypto-3.dll" Image="*\\setup.exe") OR (EventCode=1 (Image="*\\stable_superior_verified.exe" OR Image="*\\easy_exceptional_instant.exe")))
    NOT (ImageLoaded="*\\Git\\usr\\bin\\*" OR ImageLoaded="*\\msys64\\*" OR ImageLoaded="*\\msys2\\*")
```signal 1 = Underground loader build executed; signal 2 = setup.exe side-loading a co-located trojanized msys-crypto-3.dll (TL-2026-6193)```
| eval img_dir=lower(substr(Image,1,len(Image)-len(mvindex(split(Image,"\\"),-1))))
| eval dll_dir=if(EventCode=7,lower(substr(ImageLoaded,1,len(ImageLoaded)-len(mvindex(split(ImageLoaded,"\\"),-1)))),null())
| eval signal=case(EventCode=1,"underground_loader_build_executed", EventCode=7 AND img_dir==dll_dir AND match(Image,"(?i)\\\\(Users|ProgramData|Temp)\\\\"),"setup_sideloads_msys_crypto_3_dll", true(),null())
| where isnotnull(signal)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(ImageLoaded) as loaded_dll values(Signed) as dll_signed values(CommandLine) as command_line values(ParentImage) as parent_image by host, User, Image, signal
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let LoaderBuilds = dynamic(["stable_superior_verified.exe", "easy_exceptional_instant.exe"]);
let SideLoad = DeviceImageLoadEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName =~ "msys-crypto-3.dll" and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "setup.exe"
    | where FolderPath matches regex @"(?i)\\(Users|ProgramData|Temp)\\"
    | where FolderPath !has "msys64" and FolderPath !has "msys2" and FolderPath !has @"\Git\usr\bin"
    | extend DllDir = tolower(substring(FolderPath, 0, strlen(FolderPath) - strlen(FileName)))
    | extend ExeDir = tolower(substring(InitiatingProcessFolderPath, 0, strlen(InitiatingProcessFolderPath) - strlen(InitiatingProcessFileName)))
    | where DllDir == ExeDir
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Account = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Signal = "setup_sideloads_msys_crypto_3_dll", ProcessName = InitiatingProcessFileName, Path = FolderPath, CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256;
let LoaderExec = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName in~ (LoaderBuilds)
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Account = AccountName, Signal = "underground_loader_build_executed", ProcessName = FileName, Path = FolderPath, CommandLine = ProcessCommandLine, SHA256;
union SideLoad, LoaderExec
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Underground Aotera/Tedy Loader Build Execution
id: 3f7a1c52-8d4e-4b09-a6f3-2c91e5d07b18
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of the Underground loader builds stable_superior_verified.exe and easy_exceptional_instant.exe (Aotera/Tedy loader family) tracked as TL-2026-6193. Covers only the loader-build branch; the msys-crypto-3.dll side-load branch is covered by the image_load rule.
references:
    - https://threatlabs.netskope.com/blog/2026/09/underground-crypto-drain-operation
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\stable_superior_verified.exe'
            - '\easy_exceptional_instant.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, file names are build-specific; a renamed legitimate tool reusing the name would be the only source
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Portable MSYS2/Git/Cygwin-style toolchains unpacked in a user profile that ship a legitimate msys-crypto-3.dll next to a binary named setup.exe
  • A legitimate installer named setup.exe bundled with an MSYS2 runtime DLL by a software vendor

Tuning notes: Requires Sysmon EventCode 7 (image load) enabled for setup.exe or unsigned DLLs. Add vendor-approved installer paths to the NOT clause. Loader build names rotate per build, so treat the file-name branch as a high-precision supplement and keep the side-load branch as the durable behaviour. The Sigma flavor covers the loader-build branch only; the side-load branch is in TL-2026-6193-SIG-001.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Underground Lure Archive Extraction ([indicator] + [indicator] + [indicator] Co-located) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Underground Loader Artifacts - ProgramData\Underground Log Folder and PNG-Named Droppings · unlock with TL Creds
  • Connections to Underground Gate Domains, Loader Telemetry IP and Drain Log Endpoint · unlock with TL Creds
  • Suspicious [indicator] Loaded From User-Writable Path (DLL Side-Loading) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Chrome/Edge Spawned by dllhost.exe - Section-Injected Stealer Host (Underground) · unlock with TL Creds
  • DNS Resolution of Underground Gate Domains and Binance Drain Log Endpoint · unlock with TL Creds
  • Non-Browser Process Harvesting Browser Credentials and Cookies (Vidar-class Stealer) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Underground C2 Gate Polling ([indicator], /injections) and Loader Telemetry · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 20 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6193.

Sample indicators (3 of 20)

  • IP address: 95.164.53[.]76
  • Domain: quick-neo[.]com
  • Domain: slow-sky[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 20 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

20 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

No named actor attribution.

Netskope Threat Labs (published 2026-10-01) tracks a financially motivated operation it labels 'Underground' (the label is the researchers', not a named actor). Victims receive a versioned lure archive (unencrypted 7z or zip) containing setup.exe, a trojanized msys-crypto-3.dll and an encrypted data.bin. The delivery vector is unknown. The setup binary runs the Underground loader (stable_superior_verified.exe, with a sibling build easy_exceptional_instant.exe), which belongs to the Aotera/Tedy loader family. The loader decrypts an embedded stage using per-build AES keys and uses section-based injection to place a self-decrypting payload into a suspended dllhost.exe. That process launches Chrome or Edge under the victim's own profile, and the stealer stage is never written to disk as a file. The loader logs to C:\ProgramData\Underground\, and the malware deletes this folder after use.

Before running, the loader checks running processes against a hard-coded list of 67 names covering debuggers and disassemblers, instrumentation frameworks, network sniffers, process monitors and VM/sandbox agents (the article shows 28, including x64dbg.exe, frida.exe, wireshark.exe, fiddler.exe and vmtoolsd.exe). The payload is Vidar-class: it collects Chromium and Gecko cookies and passwords, Discord and Telegram data, desktop and extension wallets, and screenshots. Unlike Vidar's usual dead-drop configuration, it uses a custom /api/machine/* protocol against a single hardcoded gate per sample. AV labels vary and may include Rhadamanthys, LummaStealer or Tedy.

The C2 gate runs nginx/FastCGI behind Cloudflare, returns 404 at the root and responds only on /api/machine/* paths. Each machine polls /api/machine/commands with a per-machine UUID. /api/machine/injections returns a roughly 9 MB JSON configuration containing injection scripts for more than 15 exchange and web targets, clipper rules and file-finder logic. Seven rotating gate domains were tracked from November 2025 to June 2026. Loader telemetry to 95.164.53.76 under /new/log/<build ID>/<stage>/<timestamp> (stages include startCrypt, startLoader, success) spans October 2023 to January 2026.

For Binance, the injected script displays a fake two-factor-style overlay in about 25 languages over the logged-in page, disables the withdrawal allow list, converts balances to USDC then BTC and withdraws to an 11-address Bitcoin pool (100% of small balances, 90% of large ones), reporting each step to a log endpoint on easybooters.com. A webmail injection covering Gmail, Outlook, Yahoo and Proton watches for withdrawal confirmations in about 24 languages and rewrites them so they look routine. A 32-rule clipboard clipper covering about two dozen coins swaps copied wallet addresses for operator addresses; the served configuration lists more than 80 destination addresses across about two dozen chains, identical on every gate tested.

Lifetime on-chain proceeds are estimated at about $100,000 (first-hop inbound transactions at spot prices, so conservative), with a mean receipt of about $82 and one Bitcoin address receiving about $18,800, mostly one 0.21 BTC deposit. At least 350-430 paying victims were identified; exchange-sourced withdrawals are excluded, so the true count is higher. Blocking a gate does not remove the implant: treat a blocked gate as an active infection. Note: a separate Cyderes report describes a different chain that also abuses a malicious msys-crypto-3.dll (Direct-Sys loader / CGrabber); it is not shown to be the same campaign.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1113 Screen Capture; T1185 Browser Session Hijacking

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1055.012 Process Hollowing; T1070.004 File Deletion; T1497.001 System Checks

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols

Execution

T1204.002 Malicious File

Credential Access

T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers

Impact

T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation; T1657 Financial Theft

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Treat any blocked or observed /api/machine/* request as an active infection and isolate the host
  • Hunt for dllhost.exe with injected sections and for chrome.exe/msedge.exe spawned by dllhost.exe
  • Hunt for chrome.exe or msedge.exe requests to /api/machine/* paths
  • Look for PNG-named artifacts in AppData\Local and for C:\ProgramData\Underground\
  • Block the gate domains and loader IP listed in the IOCs
  • Reset passwords, revoke sessions and re-enroll MFA for exchange, webmail and wallet accounts used on affected hosts

Workarounds

  • Enable exchange withdrawal address allow-lists with out-of-band approval
  • Use hardware wallets and verify pasted wallet addresses before sending

Longer-term hardening

  • Verify exchange withdrawals through a separate channel, since inbox confirmation notices can be rewritten
  • Enable network detection for the ET MALWARE Unknown Info Stealer URI Structure signature (matches /api/machine/* on any domain)
  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for process injection into dllhost.exe
  • Educate users not to run software from unsolicited archives

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: Windows endpoints running Chrome/Edge with signed-in exchange or webmail sessions
  • Google / Microsoft — Chrome and Edge browser sessions (abused, not vulnerable)

Timeline

  • Earliest loader telemetry to locked-ioc-11 (/new/log/<build ID>/<stage>/<timestamp>) begins in October 2023 (exact day not stated by source).
  • Gate domain locked-ioc-10 registered in June 2024 (exact day not stated); first seen in use in November 2025.
  • Netskope begins tracking seven rotating Cloudflare-fronted /api/machine/* gate domains (November 2025; day not stated).
  • Loader telemetry to locked-ioc-11 ends in January 2026 (day not stated).
  • Tracked gate-domain activity window closes in June 2026 (day not stated).
  • Clipper destination addresses (a bc1qwenpr55... Bitcoin address and a 0x4cC35b... Ethereum address) still receiving deposits in September 2026.
  • Netskope Threat Labs publishes '$100k in Crypto Drained by the Underground Operation', estimating ~$100,000 in proceeds from at least 350-430 victims.

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

// threat_feed
$ sort --newest
Showing all threats

Live intelligence console

Threat level

Latest Threats