Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-6221
OPTIMJACK: Optimizely Web Experimentation Compromise Injects Crypto Clipper, Card Skimmer and iOS Exploit-Kit Loaders (Coruna, DarkSword) into Customer Sites
On 2026-11-16 an unauthorized party exploited an undisclosed vulnerability in Optimizely Web Experimentation and added a malicious loader to the Project JavaScript of customer projects, so cdn.optimizely.com served attacker code on at least 178 organizations (188 snippets of 1,611 checked), including CNN, BBC, Zoom, Salesforce and HSBC.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6221, CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43510, CVE-2025-43520, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2026-20700 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | OPTIMJACK |
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| First disclosed | |
| Exploitation status | Linked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2025-31277 (added ), CVE-2025-43510 (added ), CVE-2025-43520 (added ), CVE-2025-43529 (added ), CVE-2025-14174 (added ), CVE-2026-20700 (added ) |
| EPSS | CVE-2025-14174: 22.3% (97.6th percentile); CVE-2025-43529: 8.7% (95.0th percentile); CVE-2025-31277: 1.6% (75.1th percentile) |
| Affected products | Optimizely Web Experimentation (Snippet Delivery / Project JavaScript); Apple iOS / iPadOS (targeted by loaded exploit kits) |
| Malware | Coruna, DarkSword |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1056 Input Capture, T1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1113 Screen Capture, T1115 Clipboard Data, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1185 Browser Session Hijacking and 11 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | banking-finance, technology, retail, news - media, streaming, travel, health, telecoms, crypto, insurance, gambling, education |
| Target regions | Global, North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6221 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 53 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: OPTIMJACK Card, Cookie and Screenshot Exfiltration POST to 1688360.cc (/card.php, /hit.php)
Detects HTTP POSTs to https://1688360.cc/card.php (card skimmer beacon: fields n, e, c, u) and /hit.php (non-HttpOnly cookies, page URL, original wallet addresses and html2canvas JPEG screenshot). A hit means the track.js payload executed in a user's browser and data left the session: input capture, screen capture and cookie theft (T1056, T1113, T1539, T1041).
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1056, T1113, T1539, T1041
- Data sources: proxy:zscalernss-web, proxy:squid:access, pan:traffic, CommonSecurityLog
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=proxy sourcetype IN ("zscalernss-web","squid:access","pan:traffic") earliest=-24h http_method=POST (url="*1688360.cc/card.php*" OR url="*1688360.cc/hit.php*") | eval exfil_type=if(like(url,"%card.php%"),"card_skimmer","cookie_screenshot_address_swap") | stats count sum(bytes_out) as bytes_out min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(http_user_agent) as user_agents by src_ip, user, exfil_type | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
CommonSecurityLog | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h) | where RequestMethod =~ "POST" | where RequestURL has "1688360.cc" and RequestURL has_any ("/card.php", "/hit.php") | extend ExfilType = iff(RequestURL has "card.php", "card_skimmer", "cookie_screenshot_address_swap") | project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, SourceUserName, DestinationHostName, RequestURL, RequestMethod, RequestClientApplication, ExfilTypeSigma
title: OPTIMJACK Data Exfiltration POST to 1688360.cc card.php or hit.php
id: 9b2e4d18-6a37-4f05-8e1c-7a3d5c9f2b22
status: experimental
description: Detects POST requests to the OPTIMJACK exfiltration endpoints /card.php (card skimmer, sendBeacon) and /hit.php (cookies, screenshot, original wallet addresses) on 1688360.cc.
references:
- https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/
- https://www.cynet.com/blog/optimjack-malicious-web-injection-across-cnn-zoom-salesforce-fox-and-more/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1056
- attack.t1113
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1539
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1041
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection_method:
cs-method: 'POST'
selection_host:
c-uri|contains: '1688360.cc'
selection_path:
c-uri|contains:
- '/card.php'
- '/hit.php'
condition: selection_method and selection_host and selection_path
falsepositives:
- Security researchers replaying the exfiltration endpoints in a lab
level: criticalKnown false positives:
- Security researchers or sandboxes replaying the exfiltration endpoints
- Automated URL-detonation services submitting the indicator URL
Tuning notes: This is near-zero-noise: any match should be treated as confirmed skimmer execution. Escalate immediately, identify the user and the page they were on (referrer), treat cards entered on 2026-11-16 as exposed and rotate secrets held in non-HttpOnly cookies. If bytes_out is not populated by your proxy sourcetype, drop that field from the stats clause.
- OPTIMJACK Hosting IP Connections ([indicator] and iOS Kit Infrastructure) · unlock with TL Creds
- OPTIMJACK Coruna weifile.html Retry Loop (60-second Reload) · unlock with TL Creds
- OPTIMJACK Random-Label .icu Domain Lookup (Sibling Infrastructure Hunt) · unlock with TL Creds
- OPTIMJACK Payload and Injector Domain DNS Resolution · unlock with TL Creds
- OPTIMJACK html2canvas Screenshot Library Fetched from [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- OPTIMJACK Coruna and DarkSword Stage Paths on .icu Hosts · unlock with TL Creds
- OPTIMJACK Payload and Injector Domain Contact ([indicator], [indicator], [indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
- OPTIMJACK iOS Exploit-Kit Router Contact (.icu Domains, [indicator], Coruna and DarkSword Stages) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 53 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6221.
Sample indicators (3 of 53)
- IP address:
136.113.106[.]136 - Domain:
webshell[.]lol - URL:
hxxps://cdn[.]optimizely[.]com/js/6395285578973184.js
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 53 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
The payload (track.js) swaps crypto wallet addresses, skims card data and conditionally loads Coruna/DarkSword iOS exploit-kit stages. Optimizely says the flaw is fixed and the code removed.
OPTIMJACK is a supply-chain compromise of Optimizely Web Experimentation. Optimizely snippets (cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project-id>.js) contain a projectJS field for customer custom code that runs on every page. The attacker wrote a loader into projectJS for many unrelated customer projects; the rest of each snippet was unchanged. Because the code was served from Optimizely's CDN with the vendor's valid certificate, it looked trusted, and allow-listing cdn.optimizely.com in a CSP gave no protection. Customers that self-host the snippet on their own domains (e.g. opt.scheels.com, www.vodafone.com.au) were also affected because the snippet is built from the same project. Optimizely's own www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com snippets carried the code. Optimizely's incident notice (2026-11-17 01:02 UTC) says an unauthorized party 'exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation', that it fixed the flaw, removed the code, secured affected accounts and added protections; it has not disclosed how the flaw worked, how many projects were changed, or whether the attacker retains access. Smartsheet was cleaned and then re-infected with an atob()-obfuscated variant, suggesting continued access at that time. Report URI states the initial access method is unknown.
Three loader variants were seen: (1) a script element loading https://1688360.cc/track.js (most snippets); (2) the same URL hidden with atob() so a text search for the domain misses it; (3) a full inline copy of the payload run via eval if the domain is blocked (this also executes where CSP blocks track.js but allows 'unsafe-eval', e.g. HSBC). An earlier wave (first seen 2026-09-17 on Turkish sites via an SEO 'backlink panel' script on linkforge.cc, and 2026-11-13 to 11-16 via Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts) used webshell.lol/get.js as the injector; the first Optimizely injection (BBC snippet, 2026-11-16 04:21 UTC) loaded webshell.lol.
track.js was rebuilt at least 26 times on 2026-11-16 (Report URI), growing from 28,877 to 30,430 bytes (StepSecurity), so no single hash covers all versions. Capabilities: (a) crypto-address swapper for BTC, ETH/EVM, TRON, Solana, TON, LTC, BCH and DOGE that validates checksums and only swaps addresses near payment words (wallet, deposit, send) in page text, form inputs, link/image attributes, copy events, the Clipboard API, navigator.share, window.open, navigation and fetch/XHR bodies, and wraps Function.prototype.call/apply; (b) after a swap, loads html2canvas.min.js and POSTs a JPEG screenshot, page URL, up to 8,000 chars of non-HttpOnly document.cookie and up to 20 original addresses to /hit.php; (c) from 13:43 UTC a card skimmer that wraps fetch/XHR and form submits, captures Luhn-valid card numbers with expiry and CVV and sends them with navigator.sendBeacon to /card.php (fields n, e, c, u), caching them in sessionStorage under cc_-prefixed keys; it cannot read cross-origin hosted payment iframes (Stripe, Adyen); (d) on iPhone/iPad/iPod user agents it adds boot.js from .icu routers, reads the iOS version and loads an exploit chain in a hidden iframe: Coruna (iOS 13-17; /A8/ and /JIUJIU888/index.js), DarkSword (iOS 18.x; /B9/, /D11/, /D12/) and a fingerprint-only iOS 26 chain (/C10/). A hidden iframe loading /JIUJIU888/weifile.html is added for iOS 18.6 or earlier, and those pages reload every 60 seconds to retry. The Coruna loader is byte-identical to a sample from an October campaign, and kit comments indicate iOS 18.7.3+ and 26.3+ are patched. Cynet only observed conditional delivery to an emulated iPhone and did not confirm exploitation of a real device; StepSecurity did not verify the iOS payloads.
Attacker wallets (Report URI/StepSecurity): BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW; ETH/EVM 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e; TRON THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa; SOL FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n; TON UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p; LTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5; BCH qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58; DOGE DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5. Reported receipts differ by source and cut-off time: about $7,040 by 19:25 UTC on 2026-11-16 (Report URI) versus about $6,600 (StepSecurity); the ETH and TRON addresses pre-date the campaign, so not all inflows are victim funds. Stolen cards, cookies and any iOS access are not visible on-chain. No threat actor has been named or attributed.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Collection
T1056 Input Capture; T1113 Screen Capture; T1115 Clipboard Data; T1185 Browser Session Hijacking
Credential Access
T1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
Execution
T1059.007 JavaScript; T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
Command and Control
T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
Initial Access
T1189 Drive-by Compromise; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain
Impact
T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation; T1657 Financial Theft
Resource Development
T1583.001 Domains; T1608.004 Drive-by Target
Reconnaissance
T1592 Gather Victim Host Information; T1592.004 Gather Victim Host Information
Remediation
Patches
- Optimizely states the vulnerability was fixed server-side; no customer action or version number published
- iOS users: update to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later (patched per exploit-kit comments)
Immediate actions
- Fetch every served Optimizely snippet (cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project-id>.js and self-hosted copies), search for 1688360, atob(, .icu, track.js, webshell.lol and record Last-Modified headers
- Inspect Project JavaScript and experiment custom code for unknown scripts; remove injected loaders
- Block 1688360.cc, webshell.lol, linkforge.cc and the listed .icu domains (including subdomains) at DNS/proxy; do not block cdn.optimizely.com
- Search web, proxy, DNS and CSP-report logs from 2026-11-16 08:00 UTC for requests to the indicator domains
- Rotate Optimizely user credentials, API tokens and integrations with write access; review project change history and ask Optimizely which project IDs changed, when and how
- Treat cards entered on affected sites on 2026-11-16 as possibly exposed and rotate secrets stored in non-HttpOnly cookies
Workarounds
- Verify crypto payment addresses on a hardware-wallet screen and compare any payment made 2026-11-16 against the intended address
- Monitor card statements for transactions after use on affected sites
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy a strict CSP with a restrictive script-src and connect-src; avoid 'strict-dynamic' and 'unsafe-eval' where possible, since allowing cdn.optimizely.com alone did not block the payload
- Move payment entry into cross-origin hosted iframes (e.g. Stripe, Adyen) and keep third-party tags off checkout pages
- Monitor third-party script integrity and change history (Report URI-style script monitoring, hash and timestamp tracking)
- Triage iOS 18.6-or-earlier devices that visited affected sites
Affected and fixed versions
- Optimizely — Web Experimentation (Snippet Delivery / Project JavaScript)
Vulnerable versions: SaaS service as of 2026-11-16 (undisclosed vulnerability)
Fixed in: Fixed by vendor 2026-11-16/17 (timing undisclosed) - Apple — iOS / iPadOS (targeted by loaded exploit kits)
Vulnerable versions: iOS 13 - 17 (Coruna); iOS 18.x up to 18.7.2 (DarkSword)
Fixed in: iOS 18.7.3 and later; iOS 26.3 and later
Timeline
Last updated · 6 updates · revalidated 6× · latest source
Showing the 20 most recent tracked events.
- locked-ioc-32 injector first seen on Turkish sites via an SEO 'backlink panel' script (locked-ioc-33) (Report URI)
- locked-ioc-24 (Coruna telemetry) registered behind Cloudflare; an October campaign used a byte-identical Coruna loader (StepSecurity, Report URI)
- Report URI ties the TRON cash-out address TMLQvDvpgSyx94maptc3TxvmCVtT5qHVup to an operation on 3 Nov 2026 and to March 2026 activity, which suggests a persistent actor.
- locked-ioc-22 (iOS router) and locked-ioc-26 registered; locked-ioc-22 served /A8/a.html by 2026-11-12
- Earlier wave (2026-11-13 to 11-16): locked-ioc-32/get.js injected via Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts
- locked-ioc-34 (23:39 UTC) and locked-ioc-29 (23:44 UTC), both hard-coded as fallback C2 in locked-ioc-38, were registered late on 2026-11-16, after the mass cleanup.
- By 23:11 UTC all known infected Optimizely snippets had been cleaned (Report URI); Smartsheet was re-infected earlier with the atob-hidden variant.
- ~20:40-21:10 UTC mass cleanup (Ledger, Smartsheet, BBC); Smartsheet later re-infected with an atob()-obfuscated variant; 21:52 UTC only TalkTalk's snippet still infected
- 19:24-19:59 UTC Report URI sweep found 186 of 1,611 snippets infected (188 snippets, 178 organizations in final tally); about $7,040 received by attacker wallets at 19:25 UTC
- 16:38 UTC locked-ioc-23 registered; 17:13-17:57 UTC second iOS host added and Coruna iframe injected for iOS 18.6-or-earlier visits; final locked-ioc-37 build live from 17:56-17:57 UTC
- 13:03-13:05 UTC attacker swept stolen crypto to exchanges (USDC to a HitBTC deposit address); 13:43 UTC card skimmer (/card.php) added to locked-ioc-37
- 04:21 UTC first Optimizely injection seen in BBC snippet loading locked-ioc-32; locked-ioc-36 registered 05:23 UTC; first locked-ioc-37 build 08:10; first seen on bbc.com 08:28 UTC
- Hudson Rock confirms delivery of iOS exploit-kit router responses and links the infrastructure to the Coruna/DarkSword (Caishen iOS C2 V2) ecosystem, but does not confirm successful iPhone exploitation, victim counts or operator identity.
- 03:37 UTC: injector domain locked-ioc-32 placed on clientHold (Report URI).
- Optimizely tells BleepingComputer the exploited weakness was in the Experimentation account signup flow; it ended sessions, revoked tokens and removed the injected code. StepSecurity notes it is unclear how a signup flaw gave write access to unrelated customer projects.
- 04:11-05:39 UTC: attacker BTC, LTC and ETH wallets emptied again; Helme estimated total take at about $7,040.
- 00:37 UTC: payload domain locked-ioc-36 placed on registry hold; payload server taken down.
- The Hacker News publishes consolidated reporting citing Report URI, Cynet and StepSecurity analyses
- 01:02 UTC Optimizely posts incident notice: unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability, fixed, code removed, accounts secured; status Monitoring
- Socket publishes static analysis of a 19,513-byte locked-ioc-37 sample: config object with reversed-base64 modules decoded via atob() and run with new Function(); module 1 is a wallet clipper (copy events, Clipboard API, MutationObserver, 50 ms interval), module 2 an iOS-gated loader for locked-ioc-38 from locked-ioc-22.
Update history
- 2026-11-18 — Optimizely Web Supply-Chain Compromise: Malicious Project JavaScript Injected into 178 Organizations to Skim Cards, Swap Crypto Addresses and Deliver Coruna/DarkSword iOS Exploit Kits: What changed No severity, exploitability, status or attribution change. New indicators (2) Indicator values are withheld at this access level. New MITRE (1) T1185 Browser Session Hijacking.
- 2026-11-18 — OPTIMJACK: Optimizely Web Experimentation Supply-Chain Attack Injecting Malicious JavaScript (Wallet Swapping, Card Skimming, iOS Exploit Kits): What changed No change to severity (existing CRITICAL; the newer report rates HIGH), exploitability (ACTIVE) or status (existing ACTIVE; newer report says MONITORING). New indicators (2) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
- 2026-11-18 — Optimizely Web Experimentation Supply Chain Attack (OptimJack): Malicious Project JavaScript Delivers Crypto Clipper, Card Skimmer and iOS Exploit Kits Across 178 Organizations: What changed No field escalation. New indicators (3) Indicator values are withheld at this access level. New MITRE (2) T1027.013 (encoded modules) and T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer: payload and locked-ioc-38 fetched from attacker hosts).
- 2026-11-17 — Optimizely Experimentation Vulnerability Exploited to Inject Crypto-Clipper, Card-Skimmer and iOS Exploit-Kit Loader JavaScript into Major Websites: What changed No field escalation. New indicators (12) Indicator values are withheld at this access level. New MITRE (0) None; the newer report's techniques are already covered (T1195 parent is covered by T1195.002).
- 2026-11-17 — OPTIMJACK: Optimizely Web Experimentation Project JavaScript Hijacking Delivers Crypto-Address Swapper, Card Skimmer and iOS Exploit Kits (BBC, CNN, Zoom Among 178 Affected Organizations): What changed No change to severity, exploitability, status or attribution fields; the existing record already reflects CRITICAL / ACTIVE / Unattributed / LOW confidence. New indicators (6) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
- 2026-11-17 — OPTIMJACK: Optimizely Web Project Script Injection Serves Crypto Clipper, Card Skimmer and iOS Exploit Loader to 178+ Sites (Zoom, BBC, CNN): What changed No severity/exploitability/status change (already CRITICAL/ACTIVE). Vendor now attributes the flaw to the Experimentation account signup flow (previously undisclosed); sessions ended and tokens revoked.
Sources cited
- Optimizely Web Experimentation Security Incident (status notice) status.optimizely.com · Vendor report · 2026-11-17
- Report URI: World's largest brands infected with malware via Optimizely blog.report-uri.com · Research · 2026-11-16
- StepSecurity: OPTIMJACK - Optimizely-hosted scripts, crypto clipper and card skimmer stepsecurity.io · Research · 2026-11-16
- Cynet: OPTIMJACK malicious web injection across CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, Fox and more cynet.com · Research · 2026-11-16
- Optimizely snippet documentation: order of activation docs.optimizely.com · Vendor report
- Hijacked Optimizely Scripts Served Card Skimmer and iOS Exploit Kits to CNN, BBC and Zoom Visitors The Hacker News · News · 2026-11-17
- Coruna iOS exploit kit uses 23 exploits (The Hacker News) The Hacker News · News · 2026-03-01
- DarkSword iOS exploit kit uses 6 flaws (The Hacker News) The Hacker News · News · 2026-03-01
Other reports on CVE-2025-31277
- Kaspersky Q3 2026 Mobile Threat Statistics: Mamont/Creduz banker droppers, Triada/Vo1d preinstalled malware, AI-assisted Android fraud, DarkSword iOS exploit kit
- Coruna and DarkSword iOS Spyware Delivered via Instagram Ads, Hijacked Expired Ad/Analytics Domains and Compromised PrestaShop Stores (DeadTag)
- Coruna and DarkSword iOS Exploit Kits Compromise iPhones via Single Malicious Website (UNC6353, UNC6691, UNC6748, PARS Defense)
- DarkSword: iOS Exploit Chain Adopted by Multiple Threat Actors (CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2025-31277)
Other reports on CVE-2025-43510
Further reading
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated .