Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-6240
OPTIMJACK: Malicious JavaScript Web Injection Across CNN, Zoom, Salesforce and Other Sites via Third-Party (Optimizely-Hosted) Script Loader Targeting Crypto and Payment Data
Cynet reported OPTIMJACK, a malicious JavaScript campaign observed 2026-11-16 in which a script resource served from cdn.optimizely.com (assessed as the likely injection point) appended attacker scripts from 1688360.cc to trusted sites including CNN and Zoom. Reported capabilities are cryptocurrency wallet-address replacement and payment-form collection; financial theft, site breach and attribution are unconfirmed.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6240 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | OPTIMJACK |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Optimizely Optimizely-hosted web script resources (cdn.optimizely.com) - assessed likely injection point; Optimizely itself not shown to be breached; CNN edition.cnn.com (delivered malicious script; browser capture obtained); Zoom Zoom website (malicious code in Optimizely-hosted script loaded alongside Zoom resources; browser capture obtained); Salesforce www.salesforce.com (reported affected, no independent capture); Fox www.foxnews.com and www.foxsports.com (reported affected, no independent capture); Apple iPhone/iPad Safari-like browser profiles (served conditional secondary loader; no exploitation established) |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-829, CWE-79 |
| Tools | html2canvas |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1056 Input Capture, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1113 Screen Capture, T1195 Supply Chain Compromise, T1480 Execution Guardrails, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation, T1583.001 Domains |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | news - media, technology, finance, ecommerce, cryptocurrency |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 7 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6240 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 17 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: OPTIMJACK Third-Party Script Loader Fetch from 1688360.cc — Exploitation (SPL)
Detects browsers or proxies retrieving the OPTIMJACK injected script (1688360.cc/track.js, earlier-reported 1688360.cc/script.js) that the Optimizely-hosted loader appends to trusted sites such as CNN and Zoom. Fires on the attacker-controlled destination only; cdn.optimizely.com is a legitimate platform and is deliberately NOT matched. A hit shows the script was requested, not that card data or cryptocurrency was stolen.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1195, T1189, T1059.007, T1105
- Data sources: web_proxy (pan:threat, zscalernss-web, squid:access), splunk_cim_web_datamodel, microsoft_defender_endpoint (DeviceNetworkEvents), cef_proxy (CommonSecurityLog)
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
| tstats summariesonly=false count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Web.http_referrer) as referrer values(Web.http_user_agent) as user_agent from datamodel=Web.Web where earliest=-24h latest=now (Web.url="*1688360.cc/track.js*" OR Web.url="*1688360.cc/script.js*" OR Web.dest="1688360.cc" OR Web.dest="*.1688360.cc") by Web.src Web.user Web.dest Web.url
| rename Web.* as *
| eval first_seen=strftime(firstTime,"%F %T"), last_seen=strftime(lastTime,"%F %T"), detection="OPTIMJACK loader fetch"
| table first_seen last_seen src user dest url referrer user_agent count detectionMicrosoft KQL
let loader_urls = dynamic(["1688360.cc/track.js","1688360.cc/script.js"]);
let edr = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (loader_urls) or RemoteUrl matches regex @"(?i)(^|[/.])1688360\.cc(/|:|$)"
| project TimeGenerated=Timestamp, Source="MDE", Device=DeviceName, Account=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Process=InitiatingProcessFileName, Url=RemoteUrl, DestIP=RemoteIP;
let proxy = CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL has_any (loader_urls) or DestinationHostName endswith "1688360.cc"
| project TimeGenerated, Source="Proxy", Device=DeviceName, Account=SourceUserName, Process=RequestClientApplication, Url=RequestURL, DestIP=DestinationIP;
union edr, proxy
| summarize Hits=count(), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated), Urls=make_set(Url, 10), DestIPs=make_set(DestIP, 10) by Source, Device, Account, ProcessSigma
title: OPTIMJACK Third-Party Script Loader Fetch from 1688360.cc
id: e6d4c9b5-af70-4b3d-8d84-6240d3f4a004
status: experimental
description: Detects web proxy requests to the OPTIMJACK script host 1688360.cc for the injected loader script track.js (or the earlier-reported script.js). The script is appended by a script resource served from cdn.optimizely.com onto trusted sites; this rule matches only the attacker host, not Optimizely.
references:
- https://www.cynet.com/blog/optimjack-malicious-web-injection-across-cnn-zoom-salesforce-fox-and-more/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/17
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1195
- attack.t1189
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.007
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1105
- attack.campaign.optimjack
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection_url:
c-uri|contains:
- '1688360.cc/track.js'
- '1688360.cc/script.js'
selection_host:
cs-host|endswith: '1688360.cc'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Security researchers or sandboxes deliberately fetching the sample
- Threat-intel enrichment tooling resolving the URL
level: high
Known false positives:
- Security researchers, sandboxes or URL-scanning services intentionally requesting 1688360.cc
- Threat-intel enrichment or EDR cloud lookups that resolve the URL without browser rendering
Tuning notes: Schedule every 15 minutes over the last 24h. Exclude known analyst/sandbox source IPs. Do not extend the match to cdn.optimizely.com (benign platform). Pivot on the referrer field to identify which first-party pages loaded the script, then review Optimizely-hosted tags and account access for those sites.
- OPTIMJACK Third-Party Script Loader Fetch from [indicator] — Exploitation (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- OPTIMJACK Payment-Form and Page-Data Collection Endpoint Contact — Post-Exploitation (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- OPTIMJACK Infrastructure Contact and iOS Device-Selective [indicator] Loader — C2 / Secondary Loader (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- OPTIMJACK Third-Party Script Loader Fetch from [indicator] — Exploitation (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- OPTIMJACK Payment-Form and Page-Data Collection Endpoint Contact — Post-Exploitation (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- OPTIMJACK Infrastructure Contact and iOS Device-Selective [indicator] Loader — C2 / Secondary Loader (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- OPTIMJACK Payment-Form and Page-Data Collection Endpoint Contact — Post-Exploitation (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
- OPTIMJACK Infrastructure Contact and iOS Device-Selective [indicator] Loader — C2 / Secondary Loader (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 17 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6240.
Sample indicators (3 of 17)
- IP address:
136.113.106[.]136 - Domain:
1688360[.]cc - Domain:
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 17 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
OPTIMJACK is a third-party script injection (supply-chain style) campaign documented by Cynet researchers Joseph Bryant and Shivtej Tata on 2026-11-17. Cynet EDR alerts for browser connections to 1688360.cc on 2026-11-16 were correlated with browsing history and traced to a loader served from cdn.optimizely.com. The Optimizely-hosted resource contained instructions to append a script from 1688360.cc/track.js (an earlier analyst note references 1688360.cc/script.js; the report does not confirm the two are identical or from the same revision). Similar insertion code was seen while browsing Optimizely's own website. Browser captures were obtained for edition.cnn.com, Zoom (code inside an Optimizely-hosted script loaded alongside Zoom resources) and the Optimizely website. www.salesforce.com, www.foxnews.com and www.foxsports.com are listed as affected, but no independent request/response captures exist for them.
Reported script capabilities: (1) substitution of cryptocurrency wallet addresses in page content or through clipboard interactions, which could redirect a payment if the user accepted the altered destination; (2) payment-form collection that may transmit entered card details to external endpoints (1688360.cc/hit.php and 1688360.cc/card.php were identified in JavaScript review), overlapping with Magecart-style skimmer techniques; (3) collection of cookies and page data accessible to the page context (no evidence of HttpOnly, cross-origin or cross-tab access); (4) html2canvas-based rendering capture of page content; and (5) device-selective secondary payload loading. A Safari-like iPhone/iPad profile retrieved boot.js from .icu domains (5vobauua3ojpklx.icu, later eil786npto9u5bq.icu), with iOS-version checks and an iframe selecting a subsequent page (eil786npto9u5bq.icu/JIUJIU888/weifile.html). This demonstrates conditional delivery only; no iOS exploit, CVE, affected iOS range or successful device compromise is asserted. Page JavaScript remains inside browser security boundaries unless a separate vulnerability is exploited.
What is not established: how the code was inserted into the Optimizely-hosted resource (compromised account, altered tag configuration, abused integration or another supply-chain path), any breach of Optimizely or of the named companies (Optimizely's CDN must not be treated as malicious), whether any card data or cryptocurrency was actually stolen, and attribution. A recheck about 30 minutes later did not reproduce the scripts on the tested sites, which is a point-in-time result and not confirmed removal. Cynet compares the delivery model to the earlier Adform advertising-script abuse. No file hashes were published. The 136.113.106.136 address is a historical association from an observed connection and should be validated for hosting and collateral impact before blocking. Severity is an analyst assessment (HIGH) not stated by the source.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
T1056 Input Capture; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
Collection
T1056 Input Capture; T1113 Screen Capture
Execution
Command and Control
Initial Access
Defense Evasion
Impact
T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation
Resource Development
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block validated malicious domains/URLs (1688360.cc, 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu, eil786npto9u5bq.icu) at DNS, secure web gateway and endpoint layers and verify enforcement with controlled tests
- Hunt historical browser, DNS and proxy logs for connections to the listed infrastructure; distinguish blocked requests from delivered and executed scripts and from confirmed data transmission
- Preserve UTC timestamps, request/response bodies, headers, initiator chains and script hashes for analysis in an isolated environment
- Website operators: audit Optimizely-hosted scripts, tag configurations, account access and integrations for unauthorized changes
- Validate 136.113.106.136 hosting and collateral impact before blocking
Workarounds
- Scope blocks to validated malicious infrastructure; do not block legitimate news sites, shared hosting or CDNs (including cdn.optimizely.com) solely because they appeared in a request chain
- Base financial/credential responses on evidence of exposure, not on a domain alert alone; escalate confirmed sensitive-data exposure through incident response
Longer-term hardening
- Review and minimize third-party script dependencies and tag-manager/experimentation platform permissions
- Apply Content Security Policy (script-src/connect-src allowlists) and Subresource Integrity where feasible to limit unauthorized script loading and exfiltration endpoints
- Monitor first-party pages for unexpected script insertions and DOM changes to payment forms and wallet-address fields
- Keep browsers and mobile operating systems updated
Affected and fixed versions
- Optimizely — Optimizely-hosted web script resources (cdn.optimizely.com) - assessed likely injection point; Optimizely itself not shown to be breached
- CNN — edition.cnn.com (delivered malicious script; browser capture obtained)
- Zoom — Zoom website (malicious code in Optimizely-hosted script loaded alongside Zoom resources; browser capture obtained)
- Salesforce — www.salesforce.com (reported affected, no independent capture)
- Fox — www.foxnews.com and www.foxsports.com (reported affected, no independent capture)
- Apple — iPhone/iPad Safari-like browser profiles (served conditional secondary loader; no exploitation established)
Timeline
- Using a Safari-like iPhone profile and device emulation, analysts retrieved a device-selective locked-ioc-15 loader from locked-ioc-7 and later locked-ioc-8, plus the page locked-ioc-12locked-ioc-11. Exact date not separately stated in the report.
- Loader traced to a script resource served from cdn.optimizely.com that appends a script from locked-ioc-5; similar insertion code seen on Optimizely's own website. Date of tracing is per the Cynet report of the same observation window; exact date not separately stated.
- Cynet EDR alerted on browser connections to locked-ioc-13; alerts were correlated with browsing history.
- Cynet researchers observed malicious JavaScript loading on trusted sites including CNN and Zoom.
- Cynet published the OPTIMJACK analysis (Joseph Bryant, Shivtej Tata); Cyber Security News reported it the same day. Root cause, theft, device exploitation and attribution remain unresolved.
- Reported in the 2026-11-17 publication: an analyst recheck about 30 minutes after discovery did not reproduce the scripts on tested sites; this is a point-in-time result, not confirmed removal.
Sources cited
- OPTIMJACK: Malicious web injection across CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, Fox and more (Cynet) cynet.com · Vendor report · 2026-11-17
- MITRE ATT&CK T1195 - Supply Chain Compromise MITRE · Research · 2026-11-17
- MITRE ATT&CK T1189 - Drive-by Compromise MITRE · Research · 2026-11-17
- MITRE ATT&CK T1059.007 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript MITRE · Research · 2026-11-17
- MITRE ATT&CK T1565.002 - Transmitted Data Manipulation MITRE · Research · 2026-11-17
- Optimizely: Implement the one-line JavaScript snippet (legitimate deployment reference) support.optimizely.com · Vendor report · 2026-11-17
- CNN, Zoom and Salesforce Websites Exposed to OPTIMJACK JavaScript Attack Targeting Crypto and Payment Data (Cyber Security News) cybersecuritynews.com · News · 2026-11-17
Further reading
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.