Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-6226
Cato Networks SDP Client for Windows: Split-Tunnel Named-Pipe Abuse and SID Path Traversal Lead to SYSTEM Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-10739)
Quarkslab researcher Lucas Laise documented a local privilege escalation in the Cato Networks SDP Client for Windows (CVE-2026-10739, CVSS 4.0 8.5). A low-privileged user impersonates a Cato-signed process to pass the \\.\pipe\cato-VPN named pipe's certificate check, supplies an attacker-controlled SID in a split-tunnel protobuf message to traverse the output path of a SYSTEM-level cleanup delete, redirects that delete via an NT object-manager symlink to C:\Config.Msi, and rides the resulting Windows Installer rollback to a SYSTEM shell.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6226, CVE-2026-10739, CVE-2026-10726, CVE-2025-48799 |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| CVSS | 8.5 (CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) |
| Affected products | Cato Networks Cato SDP Client for Windows (Cato Client) |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-23, CWE-59, CWE-73 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1055 Process Injection, T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection, T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion, T1106 Native API, T1559 Inter-Process Communication, T1574 Hijack Execution Flow, T1620 Reflective Code Loading |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | all sectors using cato sase sdp vpn clients |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 10 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6226 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 10 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Cato Client SDP Named Pipe Abuse — Non-Cato Pipe Client or CatoClient.exe Unexpected Parent (CVE-2026-10739)
Behaviour-first detection of the CVE-2026-10739 entry point. Fires when a process other than CatoClient.exe or winvpnclient.cli.exe opens the privileged \\.\pipe\cato-VPN named pipe (Sysmon 17/18), or when the Cato-signed CatoClient.exe — the trusted host the Quarkslab PoC manually maps its payload DLL into — is started by an unexpected parent. Either condition indicates an attempt to reach the SYSTEM-level winvpnclient.cli.exe IPC channel (UiRegister / SplitTunnelUpload) and start the SID path-traversal to Config.Msi rollback privilege-escalation chain. Sigma flavour covers the pipe branch only; the KQL flavour covers both.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1559, T1068, T1055, T1055.001
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h
((EventCode IN (17,18) PipeName="\\cato-VPN" NOT Image IN ("*\\CatoClient.exe","*\\winvpnclient.cli.exe"))
OR (EventCode=1 Image="*\\CatoClient.exe" NOT ParentImage IN ("*\\explorer.exe","*\\winvpnclient.cli.exe","*\\CatoClient.exe","*\\userinit.exe","*\\services.exe")))
| eval signal=if(EventCode=1,"catoclient_unexpected_parent","cato_vpn_pipe_non_cato_client")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(ParentImage) as parent values(CommandLine) as cmd by host User Image signal
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
let LegitCato = dynamic(["catoclient.exe","winvpnclient.cli.exe"]);
let ExpectedParents = dynamic(["explorer.exe","winvpnclient.cli.exe","catoclient.exe","userinit.exe","services.exe"]);
let PipeHits = DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "NamedPipeEvent"
| extend PipeName = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).PipeName)
| where PipeName has "cato-VPN"
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) !in (LegitCato)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Process = InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessPath = InitiatingProcessFolderPath, CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Signal = "cato_vpn_pipe_non_cato_client";
let ParentHits = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "CatoClient.exe"
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) !in (ExpectedParents)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Process = FileName, ProcessPath = FolderPath, CommandLine = ProcessCommandLine, Signal = "catoclient_unexpected_parent";
union PipeHits, ParentHits
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Non-Cato Process Connects to cato-VPN Named Pipe
id: 5b0e7f3a-2c41-4d8e-9a67-1f3c8d2e6a01
status: experimental
description: Detects a process other than CatoClient.exe or winvpnclient.cli.exe creating or connecting to the privileged Cato Client named pipe \\.\pipe\cato-VPN, the IPC entry point abused in CVE-2026-10739 to forge a UiRegister SID and trigger a SYSTEM-level file delete.
references:
- http://blog.quarkslab.com/cato-vpn-client-split-tunnel-and-privilege-escalation-cve-2026-10739.html
- https://knowledge.catonetworks.com/docs/cve-2026-10726-cve-2026-10739-impacts-windows-client-versions-lower-than-6126
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2022/3/16/abusing-arbitrary-file-deletes-to-escalate-privilege-and-other-great-tricks
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.t1559
- attack.t1068
- cve.2026.10739
logsource:
category: pipe_created
product: windows
detection:
selection:
PipeName|endswith: '\cato-VPN'
filter_main_cato:
Image|endswith:
- '\CatoClient.exe'
- '\winvpnclient.cli.exe'
condition: selection and not filter_main_cato
falsepositives:
- Cato-provided helper or diagnostic binaries not in the filter list
- Endpoint security tools enumerating named pipes
level: high
Known false positives:
- Cato-provided helper or diagnostic executables (e.g. updater, support tools) connecting to the pipe
- Cato Client launched by an enterprise software-deployment agent or RMM tool
- EDR/AV products that enumerate or probe named pipes
Tuning notes: Requires Sysmon EventID 17/18 (PipeEvent) to be enabled for the cato-VPN pipe in the Sysmon config. Add your software-deployment/RMM parent images to the ParentImage exclusion list and any Cato helper binaries to the Image list after a 7-day baseline. Index name 'sysmon' is a placeholder for your Sysmon index.
- Remote Memory Injection / Manual DLL Mapping into CatoClient.exe (CVE-2026-10739 Trusted-Process Abuse) · unlock with TL Creds
- Non-msiexec Process Writes Rollback Files in [indicator] (Windows Installer Rollback Hijack) · unlock with TL Creds
- NT Object-Manager Symlink Tooling — '[indicator]' Redirection or Symlink Helper Execution · unlock with TL Creds
- Unsigned or Out-of-Path Module Loaded into CatoClient.exe · unlock with TL Creds
- SYSTEM Shell or Script Host Spawned by msiexec.exe (Config.Msi Rollback Escalation) · unlock with TL Creds
- CVE-2026-10739 Public PoC Artifacts — CatoPipePayload, CatoEOP and [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] SYSTEM Writes or Deletes .stp File Outside Cato Storage (SID Path Traversal) · unlock with TL Creds
- CVE-2026-10739 Exploit Chain Correlation — cato-VPN Pipe, Out-of-Storage .stp and Config.Msi Staging on One Host · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 10 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6226.
Technical analysis
A working, publicly released proof of concept exists.
The Cato Networks SDP (Secure Distributed Perimeter) Client for Windows exposes a privileged named pipe, \\.\pipe\cato-VPN, served by winvpnclient.cli.exe running as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. The pipe's protobuf-based IPC protocol backs the GUI-to-service channel used for registration (UiRegister, command ID 34) and for the administrator-enabled split-tunnel upload feature (SplitTunnelUpload/UploadStFile, command ID 49), through which a user can upload a .ccst text file describing include/exclude routing ranges (e.g. "include 10.10.10.0/24").
When the pipe server validates a connecting client, it resolves the caller's process image via GetNamedPipeClientProcessId/GetNamedPipeClientSessionId and compares the image's signing certificate to Cato's expected certificate; an arbitrary unsigned process is rejected. Quarkslab's PoC defeats this by first launching the legitimately Cato-signed CatoClient.exe and then manually mapping a payload DLL into that process's address space (bypassing standard LoadLibrary-based loading so no on-disk DLL path is recorded for the mapped module), after which the DLL opens the pipe from inside the trusted, signed process and is accepted.
Once inside the trusted channel, the PoC sends a UiRegister message (C2sUiRegister, with UiProcessId, UiSessionId, and a client-supplied UserSidString field) carrying an attacker-chosen SID string rather than the caller's real token SID — the service does not verify the asserted SID against the actual process token. The service subsequently builds a per-user split-tunnel storage filename as <split-tunnel-storage>\ccst_<SID>.stp, embedding the unverified, attacker-controlled SID directly into a filesystem path with no sanitization of path-traversal sequences ("..\"), so a crafted SID value such as one ending in "..\..\poc\deleteme" causes Windows to normalize the resulting path to C:\poc\deleteme.stp.
Uploading a syntactically valid CCST file via this traversed path grants an arbitrary file WRITE as SYSTEM (constrained to a .stp suffix); uploading an invalid/unparseable CCST file causes the privileged backend's error-handling cleanup routine to DELETE the traversed .stp path as SYSTEM instead. Because the destination directory (C:\poc in the PoC) and the final path component are attacker-controlled up to the forced extension, the attacker pre-stages an NT object-manager symlink chain: C:\poc is redirected to \RPC Control, and \RPC Control\deleteme.stp is further redirected to \??\C:\Config.Msi. When the SYSTEM-level cleanup delete fires against C:\poc\deleteme.stp, the OS resolves the redirection chain and the privileged process instead deletes C:\Config.Msi — the directory in which Windows Installer stores rollback (.rbs/.rbf) state for in-progress installations. Removing C:\Config.Msi while a prepared rollback script is pending is a long-documented local-EoP primitive (credited by the authors to Zero Day Initiative's 2022 "Abusing Arbitrary File Deletes to Escalate Privilege" research and demonstrated previously by Quarkslab against Avira and K7 AV products): the Windows Installer service recreates the folder with weak/attacker-writable permissions and subsequently executes attacker-supplied rollback actions with SYSTEM privileges, yielding a SYSTEM shell.
Quarkslab's autonomous PoC chains all of the above automatically: it prepares the MSI rollback payload under a controllable Config.Msi state, creates the C:\poc\deleteme.stp -> C:\Config.Msi symlink redirection, manually maps the pipe-payload DLL into a freshly launched, legitimately signed CatoClient.exe, triggers the split-tunnel upload path with deliberately invalid CCST content to force the cleanup delete, waits for winvpnclient.cli.exe (SYSTEM) to delete C:\Config.Msi, and then runs the second MSI rollback stage to launch an attacker-chosen command as SYSTEM. Quarkslab confirmed the chain on Cato Windows Client versions 6.2.0 and 6.4.6; Cato Networks' advisory states all versions prior to 6.12.6 are affected, with 6.12.6 remediating the issue. The vendor advisory additionally lists a second CVE (CVE-2026-10726) alongside this one but does not describe it, and it is not covered by Quarkslab's write-up or this research. No in-the-wild exploitation has been reported; this is a disclosed research finding with public PoC code and demonstration video, not an observed campaign.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Privilege Escalation
Defense Evasion
T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion; T1620 Reflective Code Loading
Execution
T1106 Native API; T1559 Inter-Process Communication
stealth
Remediation
Patches
- Cato SDP Client for Windows 6.12.6
Immediate actions
- Upgrade all Cato SDP Client for Windows installs to version 6.12.6 or later, which fully remediates CVE-2026-10739, via Cato's upgrade service or the Client Rollout page in the Cato Management Application (CMA)
- Use the CMA Access Overview Dashboard, filtered by Access Methods > Cato Client on Windows > Top Client Version, to identify endpoints still running versions below 6.12.6
Workarounds
- No vendor-documented interim workaround beyond upgrading; where feasible, restrict or disable administrator-enabled split-tunnel file upload policy on endpoints pending upgrade to reduce exposure to the cleanup-delete primitive
Longer-term hardening
- Monitor and alert on client connections to \\.\pipe\cato-VPN originating from unexpected child processes of, or manually-mapped modules inside, CatoClient.exe
- Audit other endpoint-security, VPN, and SDP/ZTNA client software for privileged named-pipe IPC servers that trust client-supplied identity fields (e.g., a SID string) without validating them against the actual connecting process token
- Harden or monitor C:\Config.Msi permissions and Windows Installer rollback behavior as a generic defense against the arbitrary-file-delete-to-SYSTEM technique class
Affected and fixed versions
- Cato Networks — Cato SDP Client for Windows (Cato Client)
Vulnerable versions: before 6.12.6 (confirmed on 6.2.0 and 6.4.6)
Fixed in: 6.12.6
Timeline
- Quarkslab reports the Cato Windows Client named-pipe/SID path-traversal privilege-escalation chain to Cato Networks.
- Cato Networks acknowledges receipt of Quarkslab's vulnerability report.
- Quarkslab requests a status update; Cato indicates remediation work is in progress.
- Quarkslab requests a remediation timeline; Cato states the fix is being developed internally, rollout expected end of August, and asks Quarkslab to hold public disclosure.
- Quarkslab requests a further status update and release date for the fix.
- Quarkslab asks Cato Networks whether a CVE identifier has been assigned.
- Cato Networks assigns CVE-2026-10739 and publishes a Security Announcement advisory (jointly covering CVE-2026-10726), confirming the fix in Cato Windows Client 6.12.6.
- Quarkslab publishes its technical blog post and public proof-of-concept artifacts (locked-ioc-6, demonstration video locked-ioc-9) detailing the full exploit chain.
Sources cited
- CVE-2026-10739 Record CVE Program · Government advisory · 2026-09-30
- Cato VPN Client: Split-Tunnel and Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-10739) - Quarkslab (Lucas Laise) blog.quarkslab.com · Research · 2026-10-01
- CVE-2026-10726 & CVE-2026-10739 Impacts Windows Client Versions Lower Than 6.12.6 - Cato Networks Knowledge Base Advisory knowledge.catonetworks.com · Vendor report · 2026-09-30
- Routing with the Cato Client - Split Tunnel Policy support.catonetworks.com · Vendor report · 2026-10-01
- CVE-2026-10739 Aggregated Record - OpenCVE app.opencve.io · Research · 2026-09-30
- ZDI PoC: FolderOrFileDeleteToSystem GitHub · Proof of concept · 2026-10-01
- CVE-2025-48799 (PoC automation technique credited by authors) GitHub · Code repository · 2026-10-01
- K7 Antivirus: Named Pipe Abuse, Registry Manipulation, and Privilege Escalation - Quarkslab blog.quarkslab.com · Blog · 2026-10-01
- Avira: Deserialize, Delete, and Escalate - The Proper Way to Use an AV - Quarkslab blog.quarkslab.com · Blog · 2026-10-01
- Abusing Arbitrary File Deletes to Escalate Privilege and Other Great Tricks - Zero Day Initiative zerodayinitiative.com · Blog · 2022-03-16
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.