Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-6396
Malicious npm package indexed-btree evades install-script restrictions via BTree.prototype.set runtime trigger and Sepolia smart-contract C2
A supply chain campaign published the malicious npm package indexed-btree, which mimics the legitimate sorted-btree library and hides its loader in BTree.prototype.set instead of install scripts, so it runs when the library is used. It fingerprints hosts, beacons to Slack and Telegram, and retrieves an encrypted second stage from an Ethereum Sepolia smart contract (EtherHiding). First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6396 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | indexed-btree campaign, npm btree malware campaign |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | npm (community registry) indexed-btree; npm (community registry) ordered-kv-index, btree-leaderboard, priority-slot-queue, btree-range-store, btree-core, btree-time-index, btree-lru-cache, neighbor-key-map, sliding-score-window, mutex-forge |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-506, CWE-829 |
| Malware | sharedLoad.min.js |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1195 Supply Chain Compromise, T1480 Execution Guardrails, T1573.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | technology, software development, finance |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6396 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 21 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: indexed-btree Runtime Loader — Node Child Executing sharedLoad.min.js (Exploitation)
Detects a node process whose command line runs extended/sharedLoad.min.js, the obfuscated first-stage loader that indexed-btree and its sibling npm packages spawn as a detached child from BTree.prototype.set() when the key equals 100. The package has no install scripts, so this runtime execution is the earliest reliable host signal. Flags the key-100 execution guardrail argument for higher fidelity.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1195, T1059.007
- Data sources: sysmon (EventCode 1), microsoft_defender_for_endpoint (DeviceProcessEvents), windows_process_creation
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*\\node.exe" CommandLine="*sharedLoad.min.js*" ```TL-2026-6396 indexed-btree loader: detached node child executing extended/sharedLoad.min.js```
| eval guardrail_key_100=if(match(CommandLine, "sharedLoad\\.min\\.js\\W{1,3}100\\b"), "yes", "no")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parent_images values(User) as users by host, Image, guardrail_key_100
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - countMicrosoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("node.exe", "node", "nodejs")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "sharedLoad.min.js"
| extend GuardrailKey100 = ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"sharedLoad\.min\.js\W{1,3}100\b"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, GuardrailKey100, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileNameSigma
title: Node.js Executing sharedLoad.min.js Loader (indexed-btree Campaign)
id: 6f1b0c52-3a7d-4e8a-9c41-2d5e7a10b601
status: experimental
description: Detects node.exe executing sharedLoad.min.js, the obfuscated loader spawned at runtime by the malicious indexed-btree npm package family (TL-2026-6396).
references:
- https://checkmarx.com/zero-post/npm-btree-malware-campaign-affects-millions-of-downloads-no-need-for-install-script/
- https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/csa-research-note-npm-runtime-execution-supply-chain-2026092/
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/malicious-npm-package-indexed-btree-hid.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-19
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1195
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.007
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\node.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'sharedLoad.min.js'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate project that ships its own file named sharedLoad.min.js
level: high
Known false positives:
- An internal project that legitimately names a bundled script sharedLoad.min.js and runs it with node
- Security researchers detonating the sample in a lab
Tuning notes: Windows-focused (Sysmon EventCode 1). On Linux/macOS extend Image to */node and use auditd execve or EDR process telemetry. Any hit with guardrail_key_100=yes should be treated as confirmed execution: isolate the host, rotate reachable credentials and rebuild. Allow-list only after confirming the file hash is not the obfuscated loader.
- Malicious [indicator] Package Family Written to node_modules (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] Stage-1 Fingerprint Beacon — Node to Telegram/Slack API (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- EtherHiding Contract Polling — Repeated Sepolia RPC Connections by Non-Browser Process (C2) · unlock with TL Creds
- npm/yarn/pnpm Installing [indicator] Family Package (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- Detached Node Child Spawned by Node Running a .min.js File (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- Non-Browser Web Traffic to Sepolia RPC Endpoints — EtherHiding C2 via Proxy (C2) · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] Anti-Forensics — Node Deleting sharedLoad.min.js After Execution (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- EtherHiding C2 — Node Resolving Sepolia RPC Endpoints (C2) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 21 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6396.
Sample indicators (3 of 21)
- Domain:
eth-sepolia[.]g[.]alchemy[.]com - File hash:
bad013df6eec5d686f4cc8551e0a5c87a0135164bdd1dafb1c75141d1b526702 - Domain:
sepolia[.]infura[.]io
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 21 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Checkmarx Zero (Bruno Dias) documented a campaign in which the npm package indexed-btree impersonates the legitimate sorted-btree B-tree library. Per Cloud Security Alliance and The Hacker News reporting, the package was first uploaded on 2026-06-18 by the npm account charlessadler25 and was pulled from the registry around 2026-09-03. The attacker also created a GitHub organization/repository (INDEXED-BTREE/indexed-btree) with commit history and a low-activity developer profile with an AI-generated photo. The public repository does not contain the malicious code.
The package.json has no preinstall, install or postinstall script, so it sidesteps npm v12's default disabling of lifecycle scripts and install-time scanners. Instead the loader is injected into BTree.prototype.set(), a method applications call routinely. The loader runs only if extended/sharedLoad.min.js exists and the key passed to set() equals 100 (an execution guardrail). It then spawns a detached node child process (detached: true, stdio: ignore, windowsHide: true, unref()) that runs the heavily obfuscated loader (string-array encoding with self-checksumming array rotation), and swallows all errors.
Stage 1 fingerprints the host (OS architecture, hostname, CPU, memory, uptime) and sends it to a hardcoded Slack channel and Telegram chat. Stage 2 uses a smart contract on the Ethereum Sepolia testnet as the C2 channel rather than a domain or IP: the loader polls the contract's getter/setter functions, which can be repointed to a new address if the old one is taken down. It generates an X25519 keypair, fetches the operator's public key from the contract, derives an ECDH shared secret and an AES key, and decrypts two ciphertext blobs stored in the contract, which are merged into the second-stage payload. Afterwards it deletes its own files and removes the trigger code from BTree.prototype.set, which hinders forensics.
Checkmarx linked nine other packages, all since removed, with a combined 5+ million cumulative downloads (indexed-btree itself reportedly reached nearly 2 million weekly downloads). The same smart contract was previously seen in the mutex-forge package. About 109 ETH (roughly EUR 230,933) was reported as received by the operators. The campaign was described as ongoing, and Checkmarx's Darren Meyer says it is not limited to the btree packages and the C2 infrastructure is still active. No actor attribution is stated in any source. Defenders should treat any environment that ran an affected package as compromised, rotate reachable credentials, and prioritize network/log indicators because the malware deletes its artifacts.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1480 Execution Guardrails
Execution
Discovery
T1082 System Information Discovery
Initial Access
Command and Control
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Search package.json, lockfiles and node_modules for indexed-btree, ordered-kv-index, btree-leaderboard, priority-slot-queue, btree-range-store, btree-core, btree-time-index, btree-lru-cache, neighbor-key-map, sliding-score-window and mutex-forge
- Hunt for extended/sharedLoad.min.js and unexpected detached node child processes spawned from application processes
- Search network, proxy and DNS logs for Sepolia RPC traffic (eth-sepolia.g.alchemy.com, sepolia.infura.io) and the contract 0xE390863Dac96a7118C71227C2b099B50cF602D31 from build runners and servers that should not use Ethereum
- Treat affected hosts, CI runners and containers as compromised; rotate all reachable credentials (cloud keys, CI/CD tokens, API keys)
Workarounds
- Keep npm lifecycle scripts disabled (npm v12 default) but do not rely on it alone
- Pin and vet dependencies; review packages that mimic popular libraries and have sudden download spikes
Longer-term hardening
- Add runtime behavioral monitoring for dependencies in addition to install-time script scanning
- Restrict outbound egress from build runners and production systems to known-necessary destinations
- Treat runtime dependency behavior as a separate control objective from install-time script governance
- Rebuild affected environments from trusted sources; removing the dependency alone does not remediate
Affected and fixed versions
- npm (community registry) — indexed-btree
Vulnerable versions: all published versions (not enumerated in sources)
Fixed in: removed from npm registry - npm (community registry) — ordered-kv-index, btree-leaderboard, priority-slot-queue, btree-range-store, btree-core, btree-time-index, btree-lru-cache, neighbor-key-map, sliding-score-window, mutex-forge
Vulnerable versions: all published versions (not enumerated in sources)
Fixed in: removed from npm registry
Timeline
- npm account charlessadler25 first uploads the malicious package indexed-btree, mimicking sorted-btree (per CSA / The Hacker News).
- indexed-btree is pulled from the npm registry (approximate date per CSA), after roughly eleven weeks available.
- Checkmarx Zero (Bruno Dias) publishes its analysis of the npm btree campaign, with the Sepolia contract, Slack/Telegram identifiers and related package list; the post states the campaign is ongoing.
- The Hacker News, SecurityWeek and others report the campaign: indexed-btree reached nearly 2 million weekly downloads, related packages exceed 5 million cumulative downloads, and operators received about 109 ETH.
- Cloud Security Alliance publishes a research note on the shift of npm malware to runtime execution, recommending credential rotation and egress restriction.
- ReversingLabs reports the install-script restriction (npm v12 default) has been defeated; Checkmarx says the C2 infrastructure remains active and the campaign extends beyond the btree packages.
Sources cited
- Checkmarx Zero: npm btree malware campaign affects millions of downloads, no need for install script checkmarx.com · Research · 2026-09-17
- CSA Research Note: npm's indexed-btree Campaign Moves Malware to Runtime labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org · Research · 2026-09-23
- Attacker GitHub repository INDEXED-BTREE/indexed-btree (no malicious code in repo) GitHub · Code repository · 2026-09-17
- Dependency installation security measure already defeated on npm reversinglabs.com · Blog · 2026-10-06
- The Hacker News: Malicious npm package indexed-btree hid malware in runtime code The Hacker News · News · 2026-09-22
- SecurityWeek: Malicious B-tree npm package accumulates millions of downloads SecurityWeek · News · 2026-09-22
- DevOps.com: New npm threat bypasses install script protections devops.com · News · 2026-09-22
- BleepingComputer: Malicious npm packages evade install script defenses at runtime BleepingComputer · News · 2026-09-22
Further reading
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.