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Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-6568

Signal Restricts Screenshots to Protect Chats from On-Device AI Assistants (Siri AI, Gemini, Windows Recall)

lowMONITORING

Signal is restricting screenshots on iOS 27 and some Android devices so built-in AI assistants such as Apple's Siri AI and Google Gemini cannot read private chats from the screen. End-to-end encryption is not broken; an assistant with screen access can read the decrypted text the app must display, and Signal cannot control how a captured copy is handled. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6568
SeverityLOW
First disclosed
Affected productsApple iOS (Siri AI, onscreen awareness); Google Android (Gemini screen context); Microsoft Windows 11 (Recall); Apple macOS (no Signal screenshot block); Signal Messenger Signal (iOS, Android, desktop)
ToolsSignal
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1113 Screen Capture, T1513 Screen Capture, T1517 Access Notifications, T1533 Data from Local System, T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorsgovernment administration, journalism, civil society, technology
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6568 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 15 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Microsoft Recall Snapshot Store (ukg.db / CoreAIPlatform) Staged or Archived Outside the Recall Service

Detects the Microsoft Recall searchable snapshot database ukg.db being created, copied or renamed outside the CoreAIPlatform directory (Sysmon EventCode 11), or command lines that copy, archive or query the CoreAIPlatform store with robocopy, xcopy, Compress-Archive, 7z, rar or sqlite3 (EventCode 1). This indicates local collection and staging of captured screen content (T1005, T1074.001) and archiving (T1560.001) that may include decrypted Signal chat text (TL-2026-6568). Legitimate Recall writes occur inside CoreAIPlatform by AIXHost.exe and are excluded.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1005, T1074.001, T1560.001
  • Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: medium
  • Confidence: medium

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" ((EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*ukg.db*" NOT TargetFilename="*CoreAIPlatform*") OR (EventCode=1 CommandLine="*CoreAIPlatform*" (CommandLine="*robocopy*" OR CommandLine="*xcopy*" OR CommandLine="*copy*" OR CommandLine="*Compress-Archive*" OR CommandLine="*7z*" OR CommandLine="*rar*" OR CommandLine="*sqlite3*"))) NOT Image="*AIXHost.exe" | eval signal_type=if(EventCode=11,"recall_db_staged_outside_store","recall_store_touched_by_cmdline"), detail=coalesce(TargetFilename, CommandLine) | stats count min(_time) as first_seen values(Image) as process values(User) as user values(detail) as detail by host, signal_type | convert ctime(first_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let StagedDb = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileRenamed", "FileModified")
| where FileName startswith "ukg.db"
| where FolderPath !has "CoreAIPlatform"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Actor = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Process = InitiatingProcessFileName, Detail = strcat(FolderPath, " :: ", FileName), SignalType = "recall_db_staged_outside_store";
let StoreAccess = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has "CoreAIPlatform"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("robocopy", "xcopy", "copy", "Compress-Archive", "7z", "rar", "sqlite3")
| where FileName !~ "AIXHost.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Actor = AccountName, Process = FileName, Detail = ProcessCommandLine, SignalType = "recall_store_touched_by_cmdline";
union StagedDb, StoreAccess
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Microsoft Recall Snapshot Database Staged Outside CoreAIPlatform
id: b4d92f68-1a7c-4e35-9c80-2e6f51a7d0b3
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of a ukg.db Recall snapshot database file outside the CoreAIPlatform directory, indicating staging of captured screen content that may contain decrypted Signal chats (TL-2026-6568).
references:
    - https://cybersecuritynews.com/signal-restricts-screenshots/
    - https://signal.org/blog/signal-doesnt-recall/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-20
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
    - attack.t1074.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: 'ukg.db'
    filter_recall:
        TargetFilename|contains: 'CoreAIPlatform'
    condition: selection and not filter_recall
falsepositives:
    - Backup or forensic tooling copying the Recall store
    - Recall data migration performed by IT
level: medium

Known false positives:

  • Backup or forensic tooling copying the Recall snapshot store
  • IT-driven Recall data migration or troubleshooting

Tuning notes: Add approved backup/forensics processes to an exclusion list on Image. A renamed copy will evade the filename match; pair with file-hash or size-based hunting if needed. The generic 'copy' substring is intentionally broad on the command-line branch: restrict it to your sensitive-communications host group if noisy.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account)
  • macOS Silent Screen Capture or Accessibility Scripting Against Signal by Non-Interactive Parent (AI Agent Tooling) · unlock with TL Creds
  • PowerShell Scripted Screen Capture via CopyFromScreen / Get-TimedScreenshot / BitBlt · unlock with TL Creds
  • Signal Desktop Data Files Referenced in Upload-Capable Command Line · unlock with TL Creds
  • Android Notification Listener or Accessibility Service Granted to Non-Allowlisted App (Signal Exposure) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Signal [indicator] / [indicator] Protection Disabled or Signal Not in Siri Excluded Apps · unlock with TL Creds
  • Gemini Screen Context (Use screen and app data) Enabled on Managed Android Device · unlock with TL Creds
  • Microsoft Recall Enabled via WindowsAI Policy or Optional Feature (Signal Chat Exposure Surface) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Screen Capture / Recall Component Outbound Connection to Non-Microsoft Destination · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 15 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6568.

Sample indicators (1 of 15)

  • Domain: eff[.]org

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 15 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

15 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

This is a privacy and exposure-surface item, not a vulnerability or an active campaign. No CVE, CVSS score, threat actor, malware, network IOC or confirmed exploitation is stated in any source.

According to Cyber Security News (Guru Baran, 2026-11-20), Signal is restricting screenshots on iOS 27 and some Android devices to stop built-in AI assistants from reading private chats through screen capture. End-to-end encryption protects messages in transit, but Signal must show readable text once a chat is opened, so an assistant that can read the screen sees the same text the recipient sees without breaking any encryption. On iOS 27, Signal's 'Block Siri AI' setting prevents Siri from scanning Signal content and blocks screenshots inside the app and in the App Switcher. On Android, Signal automatically enables 'Screen security' when it detects an assistant seeking screen access; Signal says detection varies across Android versions, so protection is not uniform. Users can turn the protection off in Signal's privacy settings, but doing so can expose messages from other people in the chat. Apple says Siri's onscreen awareness lets it answer questions about or act on what the user is viewing. Google's Gemini help page says some screen actions upload visible content to give the assistant context. The article states neither assistant routinely records every Signal chat; the residual risk is that once an assistant captures a message, Signal cannot control how that copy is handled.

The EFF documented the iOS side in two posts. On 2026-09-18 (Thorin Klosowski) it described Siri AI at iOS 27 launch: it searches Apple apps by default, third-party app content depends on the developer indexing it via App Intents, processing runs on-device or in Apple's Private Cloud Compute with no immediate visual indication of which, and at that time there was no way for users or developers to block onscreen awareness. On 2026-10-28 EFF reported that iOS 27.2 added Settings > Siri > Excluded Apps, so that an excluded app's contents are inaccessible to Siri AI, including through onscreen awareness; for Signal this means Siri cannot be invoked to discern information in the app. On Android, EFF says control is less straightforward: Signal does not support Gemini's app-access feature, so it does not appear under Gemini's Connected Apps, but Gemini can still read notifications through the 'Device Assistance' connected app and can use screen context unless 'Use screen and app data' is turned off under Device controls > Screen context.

Signal's own earlier precedent: on 2025-05-21 Signal (Joshua Lund) announced that 'Screen security' is on by default in Signal Desktop for Windows 11. The setting sets the Windows DRM flag on the window so screenshots show nothing, which keeps chats out of Microsoft Recall's searchable history; Signal called Microsoft's lack of granular developer controls 'a glaring omission'. Recall was first announced 2024-05-20, returned to Windows Insiders in April 2025 (Build 26100.3902) and was made opt-in with added local protections. Brave (v1.81, announced 2025-07-23, scheduled for 2025-08-05) took a narrower approach by marking tabs private to Windows so only Recall is blocked while ordinary screenshots keep working; Brave argued Signal's DRM flag also blocks accessibility tools.

Related: Cyber Security News (2026-11-19, citing a Reuters report of 2026-11-18) reports Meta's Muse agent read Signal message text on Android through notifications and on macOS through accessibility and screenshot tools without breaking Signal's encryption; it was blocked on an iPhone during testing.

Limits stated in the source: screenshot blocking does not control what a notification displays, permissions granted to other apps, or content already saved on the device; Signal says it cannot offer the same protection on macOS. Signal is asking Apple, Google and Microsoft for a clear developer opt-out from AI access to screens, files and notifications and for better documentation of what assistants can read and where that data goes.

Defender relevance: treat OS-level AI assistants as a data-exposure surface for decrypted content; review MDM/endpoint policy for assistant screen access, notification previews, accessibility and screen-recording permissions, and screen-capture features on devices handling sensitive communications. Detection content is necessarily speculative because there is no malicious artifact.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1113 Screen Capture; T1513 Screen Capture; T1517 Access Notifications; T1533 Data from Local System

collection

T1517 Access Notifications

Exfiltration

T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • On iOS 27, enable Signal's 'Block Siri AI' setting
  • On iOS 27.2, add Signal under Settings > Siri > Excluded Apps (per EFF)
  • On Android, keep Signal 'Screen security' enabled (Settings > Privacy)
  • On Android, review Gemini 'Device Assistance' connected app and turn off Device controls > Screen context > 'Use screen and app data' where sensitive chats are handled (per EFF)
  • Disable or restrict notification content previews for Signal
  • On Android review 'Notification access' grants; on macOS review accessibility and screen-recording grants under Privacy & Security (per Cyber Security News on Muse)

Workarounds

  • Keep Signal's 'Screen security' enabled on Windows 11 to keep chats out of Microsoft Recall
  • Be aware that protection varies across Android versions and does not exist on macOS
  • Review permissions granted to other apps and assistants, since screenshot blocking does not cover notifications or saved on-device content

Longer-term hardening

  • Review OS-level AI assistant screen, file and notification access policies for devices handling sensitive communications
  • Track vendor (Apple, Google, Microsoft) developer opt-out mechanisms for AI access to screens and notifications

Affected and fixed versions

  • Apple — iOS (Siri AI, onscreen awareness)
    Vulnerable versions: iOS 27
    Fixed in: iOS 27.2 adds Excluded Apps setting
  • Google — Android (Gemini screen context)
    Vulnerable versions: Varies by Android version
  • Microsoft — Windows 11 (Recall)
    Vulnerable versions: Windows 11 with Recall
    Fixed in: Signal desktop blocks capture by default since 2025
  • Apple — macOS (no Signal screenshot block)
    Vulnerable versions: All
  • Signal Messenger — Signal (iOS, Android, desktop)
    Fixed in: Builds with Block Siri AI / Screen security

Timeline

  • Microsoft first announces Recall, the Windows feature that snapshots the screen into a searchable history (date per Signal blog).
  • Microsoft returns Recall to Windows Insiders via Windows 11 Build 26100.3902 on Copilot+ PCs (date from The Register's citation of the Microsoft post); made opt-in with new local data protections on 2025-04-25.
  • Signal announces 'Screen security' is on by default in Signal Desktop for Windows 11, using the Windows DRM flag so Recall cannot capture chats.
  • SecurityWeek reports Signal 'on Friday shipped' the screenshot blocker, quoting Signal developer Joshua Lund.
  • Brave announces it will block Microsoft Recall by default in v1.81 (scheduled for 2025-08-05), using a narrower approach than Signal's all-screenshot DRM flag.
  • EFF publishes guidance on Apple's iOS 27 Siri AI, noting at launch no way for users or developers to block onscreen awareness.
  • EFF reports iOS 27.2 adds Settings > Siri > Excluded Apps, blocking Siri AI access to an app's contents including onscreen awareness; also documents Gemini screen-context and notification paths on Android.
  • Reuters report (as cited by Cyber Security News) that Meta's Muse agent read Signal text via Android notifications and macOS accessibility/screenshot tools.
  • Cyber Security News publishes 'Meta's Muse reads encrypted messages', stating Signal's encryption was not shown to be broken and iPhone testing was blocked.
  • Cyber Security News reports Signal is restricting screenshots on iOS 27 and some Android devices to keep AI assistants from reading chats, and is asking Apple, Google and Microsoft for a developer opt-out.

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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