Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-6572
ARTEX AI-Powered Offensive Framework Abused by Criminal and State-Linked Actors to Automate Attacks Without Zero-Days (Storm-3358, UNC7228/Storm-0940, Trojanized Docker Images)
ARTEX, an open-source agentic LLM pentesting/offensive-C2 framework, is being abused by financially motivated and suspected PRC-nexus actors (Microsoft Storm-3358, Storm-0940 / GTIG UNC7228, CrowdStrike Vapor Panda) to automate attacks on ordinary weaknesses (anonymous file upload, SSRF, SQL injection, weak credentials, over-permissive cloud identities) and reach privileged access in under three hours. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6572 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | ARTEX, ARTEX PRO, ScopeWeaver |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Autumn-27 (open-source community) ARTEX AI pentesting / offensive C2 framework and forks; Various Internet-facing web applications, cloud identities (AWS/Azure) and Active Directory environments targeted by ARTEX agents |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-912 |
| Attribution | Storm-3358, UNC7228 (medium confidence) |
| Malware | AdaptixC2, Storm, VShell, WISP |
| Tools | ARTEX |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1003.006 OS Credential Dumping: DCSync, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account, T1098 Account Manipulation, T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying, T1136 Create Account, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell and 5 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | finance, banking, technology, government administration, manufacturing, telecoms, semi-conductors, industrial automation, chemicals and materials, cryptocurrency |
| Target regions | Southeast Asia, North America, Europe, south korea, india |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6572 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 28 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: ARTEX Trojanized Console Root Backdoor — Shell Spawned by /app/artex (verifyCaptcha)
Detects the backdoor in trojanized ARTEX Docker images tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex (SHA-256 d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573): the /app/artex Go binary passes a secret marker in the captcha field of POST /api/auth/login to sh -c as root before credential checks. The implant does not beacon, so the only host signal is a shell spawned by the ARTEX process. Exposed consoles default to port 8787.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1195.002, T1059.004, T1190
- Data sources: sysmon_for_linux, linux_auditd, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint_linux
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
```comment: TL-2026-6572 ARTEX trojanized console backdoor - tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex run sh -c as root from /app/artex```
index=linux sourcetype="sysmon:linux" EventID=1 earliest=-24h
(ParentImage="/app/artex" OR ParentImage="*/artex")
(Image="/bin/sh" OR Image="/usr/bin/sh" OR Image="/bin/dash" OR Image="/bin/bash" OR Image="/usr/bin/bash")
| where match(CommandLine,"(^|\s)-c(\s|$)")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as commands values(User) as users by host ParentImage Image
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
let ArtexSha = "d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573";
union
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath =~ "/app/artex" or InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "artex"
| where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "dash") and ProcessCommandLine contains " -c"
| extend Signal = "shell_spawned_by_artex"),
(DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where SHA256 =~ ArtexSha
| extend Signal = "trojanized_artex_binary_hash")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Signal, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: ARTEX Trojanized Console Spawns Root Shell (verifyCaptcha Backdoor)
id: 7c1f3a52-4d8e-4b6a-9a31-2f5e8c0d1a01
status: experimental
description: Detects a shell launched with -c by the /app/artex binary from the trojanized tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex Docker images (POST /api/auth/login captcha field backdoor).
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/06/artex-abuse-expands-as-cybercriminals-target-financial-sector/
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/artex-and-friends-enter-agentic-offensive-frameworks
- https://badbyte.io/artex-backdoor-docker-image/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/20
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1195.002
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.004
- attack.t1190
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: '/artex'
selection_shell:
Image|endswith:
- '/sh'
- '/bash'
- '/dash'
CommandLine|contains: ' -c'
condition: selection_parent and selection_shell
falsepositives:
- Legitimate ARTEX operators whose own build shells out for tool execution (verify the image digest against reviewed source)
level: critical
Known false positives:
- Legitimate, reviewed ARTEX builds that shell out via sh -c to run pentest tooling (nmap, nuclei, curl)
- Authorized red-team hosts running official ARTEX builds
Tuning notes: Allow-list hosts known to run the official ARTEX build by verified image digest. Keep the alert on any internet-exposed ARTEX console (port 8787). Pair with HTTP body inspection for POST /api/auth/login containing a captcha field where a WAF or Stream is available. On a hit, rotate LLM API keys, jwt.key, MCP tokens and webhook/SMTP secrets.
- ARTEX Agent Web Reconnaissance and Exploitation — User-Agent, Request Burst, Upload and SSRF Probes · unlock with TL Creds
- ARTEX Active Directory Compromise — Kerberoasting, DCSync and Bulk LDAP Enumeration · unlock with TL Creds
- ARTEX Command Output Exfiltration to webhook.site and LLM API Reseller · unlock with TL Creds
- Trojanized ARTEX Docker Image Pull or Run ([indicator], [indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
- MySQL General-Log Poisoning — JSP Web Shell Written by Database Process · unlock with TL Creds
- Open-Source RAT Download via curl, wget or netcat (WISP, vshell, AdaptixC2) · unlock with TL Creds
- AWS Rapid Permission Probing Burst — Agentic Discovery with AccessDenied Spike · unlock with TL Creds
- Storm-3358 ARTEX / WISP / AdaptixC2 Infrastructure Connections · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 28 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6572.
Sample indicators (3 of 28)
- IP address:
199.19.95[.]66 - Domain:
xcai[.]pro - File hash:
d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 28 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Community OSINT corroboration
12 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.
Technical analysis
Trojanized third-party Docker images (tomicdd/artex, congdonglinux/artex) additionally expose operators' consoles to unauthenticated root command execution.
ARTEX is an autonomous multi-agent LLM pentesting and offensive command-and-control platform written in Go with an embedded Next.js web console (GTIG, 2026-10-30). The model proposes an action, the framework executes it with common tooling (subfinder, httpx, Nmap, nuclei, ffuf, curl/wget, Python HTTP clients, Playwright/headless Chromium), and the output feeds the next decision. The framework holds model API keys, target data and captured sessions. The original developer's repository was taken down in October 2026, but forks (ScopeWeaver, a commercial 'ARTEX PRO', and many copycat GitHub/Docker Hub namespaces) continue to circulate. More than 1,600 ARTEX consoles were internet-exposed by early November 2026 (BadByte).
Abuse is multi-actor. Microsoft (2026-11-06) tracks Storm-3358, a financially motivated, Cambodia-based cluster targeting financial organizations since October 2026, mainly in Southeast Asia, which pairs ARTEX with conventional scanners to exploit anonymous file upload and SSRF flaws and installs the open-source RATs WISP, vshell and AdaptixC2 (downloaded with netcat/curl) for persistence and lateral movement. Google Threat Intelligence Group / Mandiant (2026-10-30) document ARTEX in intrusion investigations: rapid AWS permission probing, MySQL general-log poisoning to write JSP web shells, Kudu/SCM command execution, Kerberoasting and DCSync, enumeration of over 110,000 AD objects, command output posted to rotating webhook.site URLs, and tight execution bursts (e.g., 27 events in 23 seconds). GTIG tracks the Wiz-reported campaign as UNC7228, overlapping Microsoft's PRC-nexus Storm-0940 (also reported targeting M365 tenants via compromised ConnectWise application credentials). CrowdStrike reporting cited by BadByte covers 'Vapor Panda' and ARTEX use against South Korean banks; CERT-In tracks an AI-assisted actor 'Crafty Falcon' against Indian BFSI. An FBI FLASH (reported 2026-11-13 by Cyber Security News; primary PDF not independently verified) says abuse has occurred since at least August 2026 and that some intrusions reached privileged access in under three hours. Shared ARTEX use does not by itself prove these actors are connected.
Supply-chain dimension: BadByte (2026-11-04/05) found the third-party Docker images tomicdd/artex (account created 2026-10-08; ~9,131 pulls) and congdonglinux/artex (~45 pulls) contain a trojanized /app/artex binary. A new function server.verifyCaptcha passes a secret marker in a 'captcha' field of POST /api/auth/login to sh -c as root, before credential checks, returning command output in the response. The implant does not beacon; it waits for requests. 62 backdoored consoles were observed Nov 2-4 (26 US, 17 Hong Kong, 7 China). Exposed secrets include LLM API keys, JWT signing key, MCP tokens and webhook/SMTP secrets. Docker removed both images on 2026-11-05.
A benign-but-instructive incident: WorkOS disclosed that a researcher running ARTEX benchmark evaluations had an agent reach an internal sales/support tool (public API, predictable development credential, no rate limiting, telemetry gaps) between Oct 25 and Oct 30, 2026; WorkOS attributes it to non-malicious activity. WorkOS published user-agent and JA4 indicators.
Defensive takeaways: ARTEX does not need zero-days. Defenders should harden exposed apps (file upload, SSRF), enforce least-privilege cloud identities, remove weak/predictable credentials, add rate limiting, monitor for high-volume varied requests, egress to webhook/OAST services and curl-driven downloads, and use decoys/tarpits to waste agent effort. Sparse primary IOCs mean behavioral detection is essential.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
T1003.006 OS Credential Dumping: DCSync; T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying; T1558.003 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
Discovery
T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account; T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
Execution
T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
Command and Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
Persistence
T1098 Account Manipulation; T1136 Create Account; T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell
Exfiltration
T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
Resource Development
T1588.007 Obtain Capabilities: Artificial Intelligence
Reconnaissance
Remediation
Patches
- No CVE or vendor patch: ARTEX abuses ordinary misconfigurations and weak credentials
Immediate actions
- Block and hunt the published ARTEX/WISP C2 and server IPs and the WorkOS-published IPs, user agents and JA4 fingerprints in proxy, firewall, Entra sign-in and Graph logs
- Check hosts and registries for Docker images tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex and for /app/artex with SHA-256 d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573; rebuild from reviewed source and rotate all secrets (LLM API keys, jwt.key, MCP tokens, webhook/SMTP secrets) if found
- Remove internet exposure of ARTEX consoles (default port 8787) and other admin/internal tools
- Alert on POST /api/auth/login with a 'captcha' field and on sh -c spawned by /app/artex
Workarounds
- Pin container images by reviewed digest and verify provenance before pulling third-party ARTEX forks
- Restrict egress from AI-agent/pentest tooling hosts
Longer-term hardening
- Remove anonymous file upload paths and harden SSRF-prone endpoints; apply rate limiting and strong, non-predictable credentials on all APIs including internal tools
- Use managed identities and short-lived credentials, restrict iam:PassRole, protect Kudu/SCM control planes and disable basic publishing auth where not required
- Remove ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT on AD CS client-auth templates; mitigate Kerberoasting and DCSync exposure
- Monitor egress to webhook.site and other OAST/webhook services; alert on behavioral and volumetric anomalies (many varied requests in seconds, fast retries)
- Deploy honeypots, decoys, tarpits and 'fake wins' to divert AI agents from real assets; enable Entra ID Protection verified-threat-actor-IP risk detections and Conditional Access
- Scan repositories for secrets and reduce application permissions
Affected and fixed versions
- Autumn-27 (open-source community) — ARTEX AI pentesting / offensive C2 framework and forks
Vulnerable versions: Trojanized third-party images tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex (binary module v0.3.16-0.20261008134550-5c0dbd4bec94+dirty)
Fixed in: No official fix; rebuild from reviewed source - Various — Internet-facing web applications, cloud identities (AWS/Azure) and Active Directory environments targeted by ARTEX agents
Vulnerable versions: Instances with anonymous file upload, SSRF, SQL injection, weak/predictable credentials, over-permissive identities
Fixed in: Remediate misconfigurations
Timeline
- Earliest reported malicious ARTEX use (month precision): FBI cites abuse since at least August 2026; GTIG/Wiz-reported campaign activity dates to August 2026.
- tomicdd Docker Hub account created and tomicdd/artex pushed; a GitHub commit swaps the compose image from autumn27/artex to tomicdd/artex (BadByte).
- ARTEX server locked-ioc-4 first seen in Microsoft's Storm-3358 IOC table.
- First unauthorized access to a WorkOS internal sales/support tool by a researcher's ARTEX agent during benchmark evaluations.
- GTIG/Mandiant publishes 'ARTEX and Friends'; WorkOS bulk retrieval occurs and access is removed the same day.
- WISP C2 nodes locked-ioc-8-68 first seen; 62 backdoored ARTEX consoles observed Nov 2-4.
- BadByte discloses the verifyCaptcha backdoor in tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex; 1,645 ARTEX consoles live.
- Docker removes both trojanized images; The Hacker News reports CERT-In advisory CIAD-2026-0058.
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence publishes Storm-3358 ARTEX campaign against financial organizations; WorkOS publishes incident update with IOCs.
- FBI FLASH alert on ARTEX-enabled intrusions reaching privileged access in under three hours (as reported by Cyber Security News on 2026-11-14).
- TrustedSec publishes 'Accuracy Through Volume of Fire' analyzing LLM-driven offensive frameworks.
- Cyber Security News reports ARTEX abuse by criminal and state-linked actors without zero-days.
Sources cited
- ARTEX abuse expands as cybercriminals target financial sector (Microsoft Threat Intelligence) Microsoft · Vendor report · 2026-11-06
- ARTEX and Friends: Enter Agentic Offensive Frameworks (GTIG / Mandiant) Google Cloud · Research · 2026-10-30
- ARTEX Backdoor: Trojanized Docker Image Handing Out Root Shells (BadByte) badbyte.io · Research · 2026-11-04
- Update for October 30th, 2026 Data Security Incident (WorkOS) workos.com · Vendor report · 2026-11-06
- Accuracy Through Volume of Fire (TrustedSec) trustedsec.com · Blog · 2026-11-19
- Hackers Use AI-Powered ARTEX Framework to Automate Cyberattacks Without Relying on Zero-Day Exploits cybersecuritynews.com · News · 2026-11-20
- FBI Reveals How Hackers Use ARTEX AI Agents to Gain Privileged Access in Under Three Hours cybersecuritynews.com · News · 2026-11-14
- CERT-In Flags AI-Driven Attacks as Backdoored ARTEX Exposes 62 Consoles to Root Access (The Hacker News) The Hacker News · News · 2026-11-05
More from Storm-3358
- ARTEX open-source agentic AI pentest framework abused by threat actors (Storm-3358, Storm-0940, others) for automated recon and exploitation
- ARTEX open-source AI pentesting framework weaponized by China-aligned and criminal actors (Storm-0940, VAPOR PANDA, Storm-3358, Crafty Falcon); leaked secrets are the primary entry vector; backdoored Docker images
- ARTEX agentic AI offensive framework abuse expands as Storm-3358 targets financial sector
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.