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Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-6626

Com-Affiliated Vishing Campaigns (Bling Libra/ShinyHunters and Related CL-CRI Clusters) Driving SSO/MFA Phishing, Data Theft and Extortion

highACTIVE

Unit 42 reports ongoing vishing campaigns by Com-affiliated actors, including Bling Libra (ShinyHunters) and CL-CRI-1116/1147/1182/1192/1264/1274, targeting financial services, healthcare and legal organizations mainly in the U.S., UK and Australia. Operators pose as IT support, steer employees to adversary-in-the-middle SSO/MFA phishing pages, enroll their own MFA devices, exfiltrate Microsoft 365 and SaaS data, and extort victims via Teams and email.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6626
Also known asThe Com, Dialing for Data
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Microsoft 365 / Entra ID / SharePoint / OneDrive / Teams; Okta Okta SSO; Cisco Duo MFA; Google Chromium-based browsers (Chrome, Edge)
AttributionBling Libra, Com-affiliated CL-CRI clusters (medium confidence)
MalwareMalicious 'Google Chrome' browser extension (v1.6.111/1.6.112), Pink, VorteX
ToolsDoko's Panel, Rclone - S1040
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1056.001 Keylogging, T1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1090 Proxy, T1098.005 Device Registration, T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception, T1113 Screen Capture, T1125 Video Capture, T1176.001 Browser Extensions, T1213.002 Sharepoint, T1530 Data from Cloud Storage, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1550.004 Web Session Cookie and 5 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsfinance, health, legal, pharmacy, construction, technology, transport
Target regionsNorth America, united kingdom, australia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources19 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6626 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 23 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Com Vishing AiTM SSO/MFA Lure Domain Access — Exploitation Phase

Detects users reaching Unit 42 reported AiTM lure domains (mfaregister.com, oskeyregister.com, ssosettings.com, settingsportal.com and related) or the connect-pages-{company}.pages.dev Cloudflare Pages redirect used by Com-affiliated vishing callers (Bling Libra/ShinyHunters, CL-CRI clusters) to relay SSO credentials and MFA approvals in real time.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1566.004, T1557, T1111, T1583.001
  • Data sources: pan:url, zscaler:nss:web, bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

```Com vishing AiTM lure domains (mfaregister.com, oskeyregister.com and Unit 42 IOC list) TL-2026-6626```
index=proxy sourcetype IN ("pan:url","zscaler:nss:web","bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog") earliest=-24h
| eval dom=lower(coalesce(url_domain, dest_host, cs_host, urldomain))
| eval lure_ioc=if(match(dom,"(^|\.)(mfaregister|oskeyregister|keyosregister|settingsportal|ssosettings|mfapasskeysetup|authenroll|installpasskey|myaccountoptions|itkeyportal|enrollmfa|apply-passkey|add-mfa|auth-sso|passkey-mfa|register-passkeys)\.com$"),1,0)
| eval lure_pages=if(match(dom,"^connect-pages-[a-z0-9-]+\.pages\.dev$"),1,0)
| where lure_ioc=1 OR lure_pages=1
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(url) as urls values(dom) as lure_domains by user src
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let lure_apex = dynamic(["mfaregister.com", "oskeyregister.com", "keyosregister.com", "settingsportal.com", "ssosettings.com", "mfapasskeysetup.com", "authenroll.com", "installpasskey.com", "myaccountoptions.com", "itkeyportal.com", "enrollmfa.com", "apply-passkey.com", "add-mfa.com", "auth-sso.com", "passkey-mfa.com", "register-passkeys.com"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (lure_apex) or RemoteUrl matches regex @"(?i)connect-pages-[a-z0-9-]+\.pages\.dev"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Com Vishing AiTM SSO/MFA Lure Domain Access
id: 6f1c2a1e-3b7d-4c52-9a10-5d8e7b0c1a01
status: experimental
description: Detects web access to adversary-in-the-middle SSO/MFA and passkey lure domains reported by Unit 42 for Com-affiliated vishing clusters (Bling Libra, CL-CRI-1192 and related).
references:
  - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/com-affiliate-vishing-attacks/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-20
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.004
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1557
    - attack.t1111
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1583.001
logsource:
  category: proxy
detection:
  selection_sub:
    cs-host|endswith:
      - '.mfaregister.com'
      - '.oskeyregister.com'
      - '.keyosregister.com'
      - '.settingsportal.com'
      - '.ssosettings.com'
      - '.mfapasskeysetup.com'
      - '.authenroll.com'
      - '.installpasskey.com'
      - '.myaccountoptions.com'
      - '.itkeyportal.com'
      - '.enrollmfa.com'
      - '.apply-passkey.com'
      - '.add-mfa.com'
      - '.auth-sso.com'
      - '.passkey-mfa.com'
      - '.register-passkeys.com'
  selection_apex:
    cs-host:
      - 'mfaregister.com'
      - 'oskeyregister.com'
      - 'keyosregister.com'
      - 'settingsportal.com'
      - 'ssosettings.com'
      - 'mfapasskeysetup.com'
      - 'authenroll.com'
      - 'installpasskey.com'
      - 'myaccountoptions.com'
      - 'itkeyportal.com'
      - 'enrollmfa.com'
      - 'apply-passkey.com'
      - 'add-mfa.com'
      - 'auth-sso.com'
      - 'passkey-mfa.com'
      - 'register-passkeys.com'
  selection_pages:
    cs-host|startswith: 'connect-pages-'
    cs-host|endswith: '.pages.dev'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Security awareness tooling that deliberately resolves lure-style domains
    - Threat-intel sandbox or URL-scanning hosts visiting IOC domains
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Security awareness or red-team exercises that simulate passkey/MFA lure domains
  • Threat-intel sandboxes and URL scanners visiting IOC domains

Tuning notes: Extend the domain list from the full ~56 FQDN Unit 42 IOC list. Community (TL_OSINT_Scan) corroborates settingsportal.com and ssosettings.com. Any hit should trigger a help-desk callback and credential/session reset for the user; correlate with Entra sign-ins within 30 minutes.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account)
  • Doko's Panel Okta AiTM Handler api_FyekIDWY.php — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Malicious Chrome Extension Package Dropped (folderextension) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Session Token Replay and Proxy-Infrastructure Sign-ins — C2 / Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
  • UNC6671 Malicious Chrome Extension Download ([indicator]) — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Chromium Unpacked Extension Sideload via Command Line — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Rclone Cloud Exfiltration Tool Execution — C2 / Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
  • Rogue MFA Device Enrollment After Vishing AiTM Sign-in — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Scripted Graph SDK Bulk M365 Exfiltration — C2 / Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 23 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6626.

Sample indicators (3 of 23)

  • IP address: 31.42.184[.]213
  • Domain: oskeysetup[.]com
  • File hash: ea8d30c42e758559e78bd1fe97f8849011beb7f24c7f092a066a5a62fa7fbe6f

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 23 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

23 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

2 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

CL-CRI-1192 (Helix, tracked by Google as UNC6671) additionally used a sideloaded malicious Chrome-branded browser extension.

Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks, published 2026-11-20) documents a set of financially motivated, Com-affiliated clusters that have run high-volume voice-phishing (vishing) operations since early 2026. The named clusters are Bling Libra (ShinyHunters, first observed 2019), CL-CRI-1116 (Redact, formerly BlackFile, January 2026), CL-CRI-1147 (Pink, May 2026), CL-CRI-1182 (Falcon, mid-2026), CL-CRI-1192 (Helix, June 2026), CL-CRI-1264 (Vortex, September 2026) and CL-CRI-1274 (Cinder, September 2026). Unit 42 states that CL-CRI-1192 is the cluster Google tracks as UNC6671, and that Vortex and Cinder overlap with UNC6671 activity; the article does not fully reconcile these statements. Attribution is criminal only, with no nation-state link and no CVE involved.

Initial access is social engineering rather than exploitation. Callers impersonate internal IT support resolving an authentication problem and direct the employee to an organization-specific phishing subdomain (for example {company}.mfaregister.com, or a Cloudflare Pages redirect of the form connect-pages-{company}.pages.dev leading to {company}.oskeyregister.com). These pages act as adversary-in-the-middle proxies, relaying credentials and MFA approvals in real time. Unit 42 observed Doko's Panel, an operator-controlled AiTM kit that some Com actors share; Okta-targeting variants rename the default backend.php handler to api_FyekIDWY.php (previously reported by Push Security). Lure domains are registered mostly via NiceNIC (and Cnobin, Tucows, Dominet) behind Cloudflare, with SSO, MFA, passkey, oskey, enroll and portal keywords. Harvested credentials and tokens are used from residential proxy networks and commercial VPNs.

After authentication, actors enroll their own MFA devices within minutes (device names such as Pixel 10a and Pixel 9 Pro XL were reused across accounts), authorize unapproved OAuth apps or data-sync utilities, generate cloud temporary credentials, stage secondary accounts, modify mailbox rules and calendar settings, and clear security alerts. CL-CRI-1274 (Cinder) avoided Duo re-prompts by replaying a persistent keep-me-signed-in session token from proxy infrastructure. Exfiltration relies on native cloud utilities and APIs rather than custom malware: Rclone, SaaS-to-SaaS transfers, and Python scripts (python-httpx, python-requests with the Microsoft Graph SDK) pulling Microsoft 365 mailbox, OneDrive and SharePoint data. Extortion messages are sent to employees over Teams and internal email from compromised accounts, directing them to Tor-hosted negotiation sites, with threats of regulatory reporting against healthcare victims.

CL-CRI-1192 (Helix/UNC6671) was linked, with moderate confidence, to a malicious browser extension named 'Google Chrome' (versions 1.6.111 and 1.6.112, shared hard-coded API key and C2), downloaded from oskeysetup.com (31.42.184.213) as folderextension.zip/.crx and sideloaded via Developer Mode. It provides global keylogging, theft of local/session storage and IndexedDB, Microsoft and Google auth-cookie harvesting, QR-code scanning on pages, webcam streaming, and full remote control through chrome.debugger (DevTools Protocol) including hidden screenshots, input dispatch, clipboard theft and navigation. Targeting is concentrated on financial services (about twice healthcare in August 2026), shifted toward healthcare from September 2026, and also covers legal, construction, high-tech and transportation/logistics; the U.S. is the most targeted country, with Australian targeting rising to roughly 13% of observed subdomains in October 2026. Law-enforcement actions against suspected Bling Libra members were reported (Rey detained in Jordan per Reuters 2026-10-03; Umbreon arrested by Dutch police; an alleged extortion-site operator per Krebs). Unit 42 recommends tighter help-desk verification, phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys), browser extension allowlisting, identity-action visibility and alerting on unauthorized data exports.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1056.001 Keylogging; T1113 Screen Capture; T1125 Video Capture; T1213.002 Sharepoint; T1530 Data from Cloud Storage

Initial Access

T1078.004 Cloud Accounts; T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice

Command and Control

T1090 Proxy

Persistence

T1098.005 Device Registration; T1176.001 Browser Extensions

Credential Access

T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle

lateral-movement

T1550.004 Web Session Cookie

Exfiltration

T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains

Defense Evasion

T1684.001 Impersonation

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block or sinkhole the lure domains, oskeysetup.com, 31.42.184.213 and 193.149.176.62 at DNS/proxy/firewall and hunt historical logs for them
  • Audit recent MFA device registrations and OAuth app consents for unfamiliar entries (e.g. devices named Pixel 10a or Pixel 9 Pro XL enrolled right after a sign-in from an unfamiliar network) and revoke them
  • Revoke refresh tokens and persistent keep-me-signed-in sessions for accounts with suspicious sign-ins
  • Hunt for Chrome extensions named 'Google Chrome' loaded unpacked via Developer Mode and for folderextension.crx/.zip
  • Review Teams and email for internal messages claiming data theft or pointing to Tor sites

Workarounds

  • Restrict OAuth app consent to admin-approved apps
  • Conditional Access policies limiting sign-ins from residential proxy/VPN ranges where feasible

Longer-term hardening

  • Move to phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) and restrict MFA enrollment to trusted networks/compliant devices
  • Tighten help-desk identity verification and out-of-band callback procedures
  • Enforce browser extension allowlists and block Developer Mode extension loading
  • Alert on unauthorized bulk exports from Microsoft 365, SharePoint, OneDrive and SaaS platforms and on python-httpx, python-requests, kiota-dotnet and Microsoft.Graph.Client user agents from unexpected sources
  • Establish identity threat detection and response visibility for identity actions

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Microsoft 365 / Entra ID / SharePoint / OneDrive / Teams
    Vulnerable versions: cloud tenants without phishing-resistant MFA and help-desk verification controls
  • Okta — Okta SSO
    Vulnerable versions: tenants targeted by Doko's Panel Okta variants
  • Cisco — Duo MFA
    Vulnerable versions: tenants allowing persistent session token replay
  • Google — Chromium-based browsers (Chrome, Edge)
    Vulnerable versions: endpoints permitting Developer Mode sideloaded extensions

Timeline

  • Bling Libra (ShinyHunters) first observed per Unit 42 (year only stated; month approximate)
  • CL-CRI-1116 (Redact, formerly BlackFile) first observed; Unit 42 begins responding to Com data-theft and extortion cases in early 2026 (month approximate)
  • CL-CRI-1147 (Pink) first observed (month approximate)
  • CL-CRI-1192 (Helix, tracked by Google as UNC6671) first observed (month approximate)
  • Unit 42 publishes timely threat intel on CL-CRI-1182 (Falcon), first observed mid-2026
  • Early September 2026: targeting shifts from financial services toward healthcare; CL-CRI-1264 (Vortex) and CL-CRI-1274 (Cinder) identified (day approximate)
  • Microsoft publishes passkey-themed social engineering report describing locked-ioc-10-style lures
  • Reuters reports key suspected ShinyHunters member 'Rey' detained in Jordan
  • October 2026: Australia reaches about 13% of observed lure subdomains; healthcare and financial services remain top sectors (day approximate)
  • Unit 42 publishes 'Dialing for Data: Inside the Com's High-Profile Heists' with IOCs

Sources cited

Showing 15 of 19 sources, primary sources first.

More from Bling Libra

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 19 sources; published ; last updated —.

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