Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-2829
Operation KillSwitch: International Takedown of the KillSec Data-Theft Extortion Ransomware Group
On 30 September 2026 an international law enforcement action led by the Hamburg State Criminal Police Office and Hamburg Public Prosecutor's Office, coordinated by Europol and Eurojust with Bitdefender and Group-IB support, took over the KillSec leak site and seized five central servers. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2829 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Operation KillSwitch |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Multiple Internet-facing software and cloud storage (buckets and shares) |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-732 |
| Attribution | KillSec (high confidence) |
| Malware | Kill Security, killsec, killsec3 |
| Tools | MEGAsync, Rclone - S1040 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1021.001 Remote Services, T1110 Brute Force, T1133 External Remote Services, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact, T1489 Service Stop, T1490 Inhibit System Recovery, T1530 Data from Cloud Storage, T1566 Phishing, T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage, T1657 Financial Theft, T1685 Disable or Modify Tools and 1 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | health, finance, insurance, technology, education, government administration |
| Target regions | North America, Europe, Asia, Oceania |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-07, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2829 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 19 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: KillSec Pre-Encryption Recovery Inhibition — Shadow Copy and Backup Catalog Deletion
Detects deletion or shrinking of Volume Shadow Copies, backup catalogs and system-state backups, and disabling of boot recovery, via vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, diskshadow, bcdedit or PowerShell Win32_ShadowCopy (including Remove-WmiObject/Remove-CimInstance). Open reporting on KillSec's Windows locker describes shadow copy deletion before encryption (T1490), preceding data encryption for impact (T1486); wmic/WMI-driven deletion also maps to T1047. Treat as secondary-source behaviour, not confirmed by the law enforcement release.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1490, T1486, T1047
- Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, windows_security_4688
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
```T1490 / T1486 / T1047 precursor: shadow copy, backup catalog and recovery-option deletion```
index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
((Image="*\\vssadmin.exe" ((CommandLine="*delete*" CommandLine="*shadows*") OR (CommandLine="*resize*" CommandLine="*shadowstorage*")))
OR (Image="*\\wmic.exe" CommandLine="*shadowcopy*" CommandLine="*delete*")
OR (Image="*\\wbadmin.exe" CommandLine="*delete*" (CommandLine="*catalog*" OR CommandLine="*backup*" OR CommandLine="*systemstatebackup*"))
OR (Image="*\\diskshadow.exe" CommandLine="*delete*" CommandLine="*shadows*")
OR (Image="*\\bcdedit.exe" (CommandLine="*recoveryenabled*no*" OR CommandLine="*ignoreallfailures*"))
OR ((Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe") CommandLine="*Win32_ShadowCopy*" (CommandLine="*Delete*" OR CommandLine="*Remove-WmiObject*" OR CommandLine="*Remove-CimInstance*")))
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(Image) as tools by host, User, ParentImage
| convert ctime(first_seen)
| sort - countMicrosoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ "vssadmin.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine has_all ("delete", "shadows") or ProcessCommandLine has_all ("resize", "shadowstorage")))
or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all ("shadowcopy", "delete"))
or (FileName =~ "wbadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "delete" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("catalog", "backup", "systemstatebackup"))
or (FileName =~ "diskshadow.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all ("delete", "shadows"))
or (FileName =~ "bcdedit.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("recoveryenabled no", "ignoreallfailures"))
or (FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has "Win32_ShadowCopy" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Delete", "Remove-WmiObject", "Remove-CimInstance"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Shadow Copy, Backup Catalog or Boot Recovery Deletion - Ransomware Pre-Encryption
id: a3f90d17-62c4-4b8e-b5d7-1e49c0a27f83
status: experimental
description: Detects commands that delete or shrink Volume Shadow Copies, delete backup catalogs or system-state backups, or disable Windows recovery, reported as pre-encryption behaviour of the KillSec Windows locker (secondary-source reporting).
references:
- https://reddogsecurity.substack.com/p/killsec-from-hacktivist-roots-to
- https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/teenager-suspected-of-leading-killsec-ransomware-group-law-enforcement-seizes-servers-and-leak-site
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-01
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
- attack.t1486
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_vssadmin_delete:
Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'delete'
- 'shadows'
selection_vssadmin_resize:
Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'resize'
- 'shadowstorage'
selection_wmic:
Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'shadowcopy'
- 'delete'
selection_wbadmin:
Image|endswith: '\wbadmin.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'delete catalog'
- 'delete backup'
- 'delete systemstatebackup'
selection_diskshadow:
Image|endswith: '\diskshadow.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'delete'
- 'shadows'
selection_bcdedit:
Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'recoveryenabled no'
- 'ignoreallfailures'
selection_powershell_delete:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'Win32_ShadowCopy'
- 'Delete'
selection_powershell_remove:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'Win32_ShadowCopy'
- 'Remove-'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Backup software or administrators intentionally pruning shadow copies
- Disk-space clean-up scripts
level: highKnown false positives:
- Backup/storage tooling pruning shadow copies on a schedule
- Administrators freeing disk space
Tuning notes: Allowlist known backup service accounts and parent processes. Correlate with KQL-002 (backup agent and AV termination) and SIG-002 (event log clearing) within 30 minutes on the same host: the combination is a near-certain ransomware precursor and should auto-isolate the host.
- KillSec Cloud Storage Exposure — Public Access Block Removed or Storage Opened to Everyone (AWS S3 / Azure Blob) · unlock with TL Creds
- KillSec Defense Impairment — Veeam, Acronis and Sophos Service/Process Termination · unlock with TL Creds
- KillSec Exfiltration — Non-Browser Connections to MEGA and Outbound Rclone Network Activity · unlock with TL Creds
- KillSec Data Collection — Bulk S3 Object Download or Bulk-Transfer Client Access from a Single Principal · unlock with TL Creds
- KillSec Anti-Forensics — Windows Event Log Clearing and Logging Disablement · unlock with TL Creds
- KillSec ESXi Locker Precursor — Mass VM Process Kill and Power-Off on ESXi Hosts · unlock with TL Creds
- KillSec Initial Access — Web/Application Server Spawning Shell or LOLBin · unlock with TL Creds
- KillSec Exfiltration — Rclone and MEGAsync Execution, Renamed Binaries and Rclone Config Creation · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-07, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 19 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2829.
Sample indicators (1 of 19)
- Domain:
ks5424y3wpr5zlug5c7i6svvxweinhbdcqcfnptkfcutrncfazzgz5id[.]onion
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 19 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
KillSec, active since about 2024, stole data by exploiting software vulnerabilities and poorly secured access points (particularly cloud storage) and threatened to publish it unless victims paid.
Operation KillSwitch targeted the KillSec (also tracked as Kill Security / KillSec3) data-theft extortion and ransomware-as-a-service group. The action day was 30 September 2026 and was announced by Europol and Eurojust on 1 October 2026. Ten countries took part: Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Law enforcement took control of the group's leak site, which was redirected to a seizure notice, secured at least 110 TB of data against further unauthorised access, gained control of associated domains and seized five central servers. Three suspects were provisionally arrested and eight property searches were carried out in four countries (Spain, Greece, the United Kingdom and Romania per press reporting).
Investigators identified a 16-year-old as the suspected administrator and main operator. A suspected developer turned 18 in August 2026 and was a minor during part of the alleged offending; a suspected negotiator and an affiliate were also identified, and inquiries into further members are ongoing. CyberScoop reports the negotiator as a Dutch national arrested in the UK and facing extradition to the US. National investigations began in early 2025. Investigators linked KillSec to about 1,000 suspected attacks worldwide, of which about 500 were identified as successful (subject to change). Close to 300 victims were posted on the leak site: 126 in 2025 and 25 in 2026, with the last known posting on 18 September 2026.
Per Bitdefender and Europol, KillSec exploited software vulnerabilities and poorly secured access points, particularly cloud storage, copied sensitive data and threatened to publish it unless victims paid. The group reportedly used AI to build and maintain its infrastructure and to identify potential victims. Earlier open reporting describes KillSec emerging in late 2023 as a self-styled Anonymous offshoot doing DDoS and defacement against government sites (India, Poland, Brazil) before becoming a RaaS operation by mid-2024 with affiliate dashboards and custom Windows and VMware ESXi lockers (AES-256-CBC with RSA-2048 key wrapping), exfiltrating with MEGAsync and Rclone, terminating Veeam/Acronis/Sophos processes and deleting shadow copies and event logs. These secondary-source details were not confirmed by the law enforcement announcement. No CVEs or technical IOCs (IPs, domains, hashes) were published by the sources. Defender guidance from Bitdefender: patch internet-facing software first, because that is where the scanning happens, then audit cloud storage access, with attention to buckets and shares nobody owns. The takedown reduces immediate risk, but affiliates and stolen data (110 TB secured, other copies may exist) remain a residual concern.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Lateral Movement
Credential Access
Initial Access
T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1566 Phishing
Impact
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1489 Service Stop; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1657 Financial Theft
Collection
Exfiltration
T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
defense-impairment
T1685 Disable or Modify Tools; T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs
Remediation
Patches
- Apply vendor security updates to all internet-facing applications, VPNs and gateways
Immediate actions
- Patch internet-facing software first, since that is where scanning and exploitation occur
- Audit cloud storage access, including buckets and shares with no clear owner
- Check whether your organization was listed on the KillSec leak site or contacted by law enforcement
Workarounds
- Restrict public access on cloud storage and require authenticated, least-privilege access
Longer-term hardening
- Maintain an inventory of cloud storage and assign an owner to every bucket and share
- Monitor for bulk data egress to consumer cloud-sync services (MEGA, Rclone-based transfers)
- Keep offline, immutable backups and protect backup agents from tampering
Affected and fixed versions
- Multiple — Internet-facing software and cloud storage (buckets and shares)
Vulnerable versions: Unpatched or poorly secured deployments
Timeline
Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source
- KillSec emerges (approx. late 2023) as a self-styled Anonymous offshoot conducting DDoS and defacement against government sites (secondary reporting; date approximate)
- By mid-2024 (approx.) the group operates a RaaS portal with affiliate dashboards and Windows/ESXi lockers; active as a ransomware group since about 2024
- KillSec 2.0 affiliate platform analyzed by Group-IB (October 2024): Tor-based panel managing victims, negotiations and payload configuration; KillSec 3.0 followed (day-level date approximate).
- VMware ESXi locker announced (November 2024), able to shut down VMs, delete snapshots and erase logs (day-level date approximate).
- From January 2025 affiliate recruitment required forum reputation or a USD 1,000 deposit and shifted toward skilled pentesters; healthcare software targeting noted (day-level date approximate).
- National investigations into KillSec begin in early 2025 (approx.)
- Victims such as Instituto de Ojos (Puerto Rico) and US BioTek Laboratories (Washington) are hit in March 2025; 126 victims are posted to the leak site over 2025
- Accelerated Academy (Louisiana) is among the victims reported in September 2025
- Suspected KillSec developer turns 18 in August 2026, having been a minor during part of the alleged offending
- Last known victim posting on the KillSec leak site (25 victims posted in 2026)
- Operation KillSwitch action day: leak site taken over, five central servers and domains seized, at least 110 TB of data secured, three provisional arrests, eight property searches
- Europol and Eurojust announce the takedown; a 16-year-old is named as the suspected administrator and main operator
Update history
- 2026-10-07 — Operation KillSwitch: Police dismantle KillSec ransomware gang allegedly led by a 16-year-old: What changed No severity, exploitability or status change. New indicators (8) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
Sources cited
- Teenager suspected of leading KillSec ransomware group as law enforcement seizes servers and leak site (Europol) europol.europa.eu · Advisory · 2026-10-01
- Bitdefender Supported Operation KillSwitch: What the KillSec Takedown Changes for Defenders bitdefender.com · Vendor report · 2026-10-01
- KillSec: From Hacktivist Roots to Ransomware Franchise reddogsecurity.substack.com · Research · 2025-01-01
- Authorities seize KillSec extortion group infrastructure, arrest 3 alleged members (CyberScoop) cyberscoop.com · News · 2026-10-01
- Operation KillSwitch: Police Dismantle KillSec Ransomware Group (Security Affairs) securityaffairs.com · News · 2026-10-01
- KillSec Ransomware Group Dismantled, 16-Year-Old Suspected Admin Arrested (Hackread) hackread.com · News · 2026-10-01
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated .