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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0218

Storm-2561 SEO Poisoning Campaign Distributing Fake Ivanti VPN Clients for Credential Theft

highMONITORING

Storm-2561, tracked by Microsoft Threat Intelligence, conducts an ongoing SEO poisoning campaign that pushes trojanized Ivanti Pulse Secure VPN installers through manipulated Bing search results. The signed MSI installers deploy credential-stealing DLLs that exfiltrate VPN credentials to attacker-controlled C2 infrastructure, with historical correlation to Akira ransomware deployment.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0218
Also known asFake Ivanti VPN Campaign, Spoofed Ivanti Pulse Secure Campaign
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsIvanti Pulse Secure VPN Client; Microsoft Windows
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-494, CWE-427
AttributionStorm-2561 (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusRussia
MalwareWin32_PWS_Agent
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1189 Drive-by Compromise, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1552.001 Credentials In Files, T1553.002 Code Signing, T1555 Credentials from Password Stores, T1574.001 DLL, T1583.001 Domains, T1583.003 Virtual Private Server and 2 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsenterprise, technology, financial, healthcare, government, education
Target regionsNorth America, Europe, Asia Pacific
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-03-12, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0218 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 21 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Storm-2561 DLL Sideloading via Trojanized Ivanti VPN Installer — Exploitation

Detects DLL sideloading characteristic of the Storm-2561 campaign where msiexec.exe drops dwmapi.dll or pulse_extension.dll to non-standard directories. The trojanized Ivanti-VPN.msi installer deploys these DLLs outside of System32, which is a strong indicator of the initial exploitation phase of this campaign.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1574.002, T1036.005, T1204.002
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=7 OR EventCode=11)
| eval is_sideload_dll=if(match(ImageLoaded, "(?i)\\dwmapi\.dll$") AND NOT match(ImageLoaded, "(?i)^C:\\Windows\\System32\\"), 1, 0)
| eval is_payload_dll=if(match(ImageLoaded, "(?i)\\pulse_extension\.dll$"), 1, 0)
| eval is_msi_file_create=if(EventCode=11 AND match(Image, "(?i)msiexec\.exe$") AND (match(TargetFilename, "(?i)\\dwmapi\.dll$") OR match(TargetFilename, "(?i)\\pulse_extension\.dll$")), 1, 0)
| where is_sideload_dll=1 OR is_payload_dll=1 OR is_msi_file_create=1
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(Image) as parent_process values(ImageLoaded) as loaded_dlls values(TargetFilename) as created_files by Computer, User
| where count > 0
| table Computer, User, first_seen, last_seen, parent_process, loaded_dlls, created_files, count

Microsoft KQL

union DeviceImageLoadEvents, DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where
    (ActionType == "ImageLoaded" and
        ((FileName =~ "dwmapi.dll" and not FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\System32") or
         FileName =~ "pulse_extension.dll"))
    or
    (ActionType == "FileCreated" and
        InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "msiexec.exe" and
        (FileName =~ "dwmapi.dll" or FileName =~ "pulse_extension.dll"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Storm-2561 DLL Sideloading via Trojanized VPN Installer
id: f7a91c3e-4b2d-4e8f-a1c6-9d3b5e7f2a01
status: experimental
description: Detects DLL sideloading of dwmapi.dll from non-System32 paths and pulse_extension.dll loading, characteristic of Storm-2561 trojanized Ivanti VPN installer campaign.
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/03/12
references:
    - https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0218
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/12/storm-2561-uses-seo-poisoning-to-distribute-fake-vpn-clients-for-credential-theft/
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1574.002
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection_sideload:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\dwmapi.dll'
    filter_legitimate_path:
        ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\'
    selection_payload:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\pulse_extension.dll'
    condition: (selection_sideload and not filter_legitimate_path) or selection_payload
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate third-party applications that bundle their own dwmapi.dll (rare)
    - Software development environments with test DLLs
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate third-party applications bundling their own dwmapi.dll outside System32 (rare)
  • Software development environments with test DLL names matching campaign artifacts

Tuning notes: Exclude known legitimate applications that ship dwmapi.dll outside System32 by adding filter on Image or ImageLoaded path. Consider adding hash-based detection for SHA256 c31af2c52dde677c33f8bd9e2a35c21ffd585e7c7b8e9981aa8c5afc89fed006 for higher fidelity.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Storm-2561 Trojanized MSI Installer Execution with Code Signing Abuse — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Storm-2561 Credential Harvesting via DLL Injection into VPN Process — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Storm-2561 Network Connection to Azure C2 on Non-Standard Port — C2/Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
  • Storm-2561 SEO Poisoning Domain Access and Malicious Download — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Storm-2561 XOR Deobfuscation and Credential Staging Behavior — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Storm-2561 Full Kill Chain — DNS to C2 Exfiltration Correlation — C2/Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
  • Storm-2561 Ivanti VPN Credential Store Access by Unauthorized Process — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Storm-2561 C2 Exfiltration via HTTP POST to /income_shit Endpoint — C2/Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-03-12, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 21 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0218.

Sample indicators (3 of 21)

  • IP address: 4.239.95[.]1
  • Domain: ivanti-pulsesecure[.]com
  • File hash: c31af2c52dde677c33f8bd9e2a35c21ffd585e7c7b8e9981aa8c5afc89fed006

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 21 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

21 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Storm-2561 is a financially motivated threat actor tracked by Microsoft Threat Intelligence and Microsoft Defender Experts since late 2025. The group operates a sophisticated SEO poisoning campaign targeting enterprise users searching for legitimate VPN client software, specifically Ivanti Pulse Secure.

The attack chain begins with search engine manipulation. Storm-2561 registers convincing lookalike domains such as ivanti-pulsesecure.com (registered September 19, 2025) and ivanti-secure-access.org (registered September 14, 2025) and optimizes them to appear as top search results on Bing for queries like 'Ivanti Pulse Secure Download.' The campaign employs referrer-based conditional content delivery — serving benign content when pages are visited directly, but delivering malicious payloads when accessed via search engine referral.

Victims who click on the poisoned search results are redirected through intermediary domains (netml.shop, shopping5.shop) to a landing page that closely mimics the legitimate Ivanti download portal. The page offers a trojanized MSI installer file named 'Ivanti-VPN.msi' for download.

The trojanized installer is digitally signed with a certificate issued to 'Hefei Qiangwei Network Technology Co., Ltd.' by Certum Extended Validation Code Signing 2021 CA, signed on September 26, 2025 (valid through September 11, 2026, thumbprint EC443DE3ED3D17515CE137FE271C885B4F09F03E). The legitimate-looking code signature helps the malware bypass security controls and user suspicion.

Upon execution, the MSI installer deploys two malicious DLLs via DLL sideloading: dwmapi.dll (the sideloaded loader) and pulse_extension.dll (the credential-stealing payload). The malware targets the Ivanti VPN client's credential store at the hardcoded path C:\ProgramData\Pulse Secure\ConnectionStore\connectionstore.dat. It parses this file to extract the stored VPN server URI and associated authentication credentials.

The stolen credentials are exfiltrated via HTTP POST to a command-and-control server at 4.239.95.1:8080 (hosted on Microsoft Azure infrastructure) using the distinctive URI path /income_shit. The malware employs XOR-based deobfuscation during the C2 handshake to evade network-level detection.

This campaign is assessed as a precursor to ransomware operations. Threat intelligence correlation indicates that campaigns with these characteristics have historically preceded Akira ransomware deployment, where stolen VPN credentials enable initial network access, followed by lateral movement and eventual ransomware execution. The use of legitimate enterprise VPN credentials provides a high-value initial access vector that can bypass perimeter security controls.

The campaign has been active since at least September 2025 and continues to target enterprise users across multiple sectors as of March 2026.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

defense-evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

command-and-control

T1071.001 Web Protocols

initial-access

T1189 Drive-by Compromise

execution

T1204.002 Malicious File

credential-access

T1552.001 Credentials In Files; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores

defense-impairment

T1553.002 Code Signing

stealth

T1574.001 DLL

resource-development

T1583.001 Domains; T1583.003 Virtual Private Server; T1588.003 Code Signing Certificates; T1608.006 SEO Poisoning

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block domains ivanti-pulsesecure.com, ivanti-secure-access.org, netml.shop, shopping5.shop at DNS/proxy level
  • Block C2 IP 4.239.95.1 at perimeter firewall
  • Hunt for dwmapi.dll and pulse_extension.dll in non-standard locations
  • Scan endpoints for SHA256 c31af2c52dde677c33f8bd9e2a35c21ffd585e7c7b8e9981aa8c5afc89fed006
  • Revoke and rotate VPN credentials for any users who may have downloaded VPN clients from unofficial sources
  • Alert security team to monitor for unauthorized access using legitimate VPN credentials

Workarounds

  • Distribute official Ivanti VPN clients through internal software distribution channels only
  • Block MSI execution from user download directories via AppLocker or WDAC
  • Restrict outbound HTTP connections to port 8080 from endpoints

Longer-term hardening

  • Implement application whitelisting to prevent execution of unsigned or untrusted MSI installers
  • Deploy EDR with DLL sideloading detection capabilities
  • Enforce software download policies requiring IT-approved sources only
  • Implement DNS sinkholing for known campaign infrastructure
  • Deploy browser extensions or web proxies that warn on newly-registered domains
  • Enable MFA on all VPN connections to mitigate credential theft impact
  • Monitor for certificate thumbprint EC443DE3ED3D17515CE137FE271C885B4F09F03E in code signing events

Affected and fixed versions

  • Ivanti — Pulse Secure VPN Client
    Vulnerable versions: All versions (impersonated, not exploited)
  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: 10; 11; Server 2016; Server 2019; Server 2022

Timeline

  • Domain locked-ioc-8 registered by Storm-2561 operators
  • Domain locked-ioc-9 registered by Storm-2561 operators
  • Code signing certificate from Hefei Qiangwei Network Technology Co., Ltd. used to sign trojanized MSI installer via Certum EV CA
  • Security researchers begin analyzing the fake Ivanti VPN installer campaign and identify credential-stealing behavior
  • Zscaler ThreatLabz publishes technical analysis of spoofed Ivanti VPN client sites with IOCs and malware behavior details
  • CyberPress reports on threat actors exploiting Google and Bing search results with fake Ivanti VPN client download pages
  • LMNTRIX links SEO poisoning VPN campaigns to Akira ransomware deployment as a coordinated attack strategy
  • Microsoft Threat Intelligence formally attributes the campaign to Storm-2561 and publishes comprehensive threat analysis
  • As of 2026-05-29, Storm-2561 remains an operational financially-motivated actor and its SEO-poisoning/signed-trojan VPN-credential-theft technique is ongoing (no CVE, not KEV-relevant), per Microsoft and trade reporting through March 2026. However Microsoft took down the GitHub-hosted payloads and revoked the abused code-signing certificate, burning this threat's specific infrastructure, so it warrants MONITORING.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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