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Threat reportAPTTL-2026-0253

Larva-26002 Threat Actor Targeting MS-SQL Servers with Go-Based ICE Cloud Scanner Suite

highACTIVE

Turkish-speaking threat actor Larva-26002 (also tracked as RE#TURGENCE) continues actively targeting internet-exposed MS-SQL servers with weak credentials, deploying a new Go-based ICE Cloud scanner suite for mass reconnaissance and brute-force attacks. The actor has historical ties to Trigona and Mimic ransomware campaigns dating back to 2023.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0253
Also known asRE#TURGENCE Campaign, ICE Cloud Campaign, Trigona MS-SQL Campaign
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft SQL Server; Microsoft Windows Server
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-307, CWE-521, CWE-798
AttributionLarva-26002, RE#TURGENCE (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusTurkey
Malwaremimic, trigona
ToolsAnyDesk, ICE Cloud, Teramind
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003 OS Credential Dumping, T1005 Data from Local System, T1021 Remote Services, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1049 System Network Connections Discovery, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1082 System Information Discovery and 10 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsfinancial, healthcare, government, technology, manufacturing, retail
Target regionsNorth America, Europe, Latin America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-03-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0253 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 24 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Larva-26002 MS-SQL Server xp_cmdshell Exploitation via Child Process Spawning

Detects SQL Server process (sqlservr.exe) spawning command shell or PowerShell child processes, a key indicator of Larva-26002 initial exploitation via xp_cmdshell on brute-forced MS-SQL servers. The actor uses xp_cmdshell to execute reconnaissance commands and download the ICE Cloud scanner payload.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL
  • ATT&CK: T1059.003, T1059.001, T1078
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, edr
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ParentImage="*\\sqlservr.exe" (Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe") | eval risk_score=case(like(CommandLine,"%DownloadString%"),"critical",like(CommandLine,"%109.205.211.13%"),"critical",like(CommandLine,"%bcp%"),"high",1=1,"high") | table _time, Computer, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine, User, risk_score | sort -_time

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "sqlservr.exe" | where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") | extend RiskScore = case(ProcessCommandLine has "DownloadString", "critical", ProcessCommandLine has "109.205.211.13", "critical", ProcessCommandLine has "bcp", "high", "high") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName, RiskScore | sort by Timestamp desc

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate SQL Server maintenance scripts using xp_cmdshell for scheduled backups or ETL jobs
  • Database administrators manually running diagnostics via sqlcmd

Tuning notes: Whitelist known DBA accounts and scheduled maintenance windows. Add exclusions for approved backup scripts by CommandLine pattern. Monitor for xp_cmdshell being re-enabled after being disabled (sp_configure changes).

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Larva-26002 MS-SQL xp_cmdshell Exploitation and Reconnaissance Chain · unlock with TL Creds
  • Larva-26002 Registry Persistence and Suspicious File Drops in ProgramData · unlock with TL Creds
  • Larva-26002 ICE Cloud MS-SQL Brute Force Scanning and Credential Dumping · unlock with TL Creds
  • Larva-26002 SQL Server PowerShell Download Cradle Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • Larva-26002 Suspicious File Creation in ProgramData by Database Processes · unlock with TL Creds
  • Larva-26002 Credential Dumping and Lateral Movement via Remote Desktop · unlock with TL Creds
  • Larva-26002 BCP Payload Extraction and Local Admin Account Creation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Larva-26002 C2 Communication and Remote Access Tool Deployment · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-03-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 24 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0253.

Sample indicators (3 of 24)

  • IP address: 109.205.211[.]13
  • Domain: hostroids[.]com
  • File hash: 0a9f2e2ff98e9f19428da79680e80b77

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 24 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

24 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Larva-26002 is a financially motivated, Turkish-speaking threat actor that has been persistently targeting poorly managed Microsoft SQL Server instances since at least April 2023. The actor's latest campaign, documented by AhnLab ASEC on March 20, 2026, introduces the ICE Cloud scanner suite — a pair of Go-language tools designed for mass MS-SQL server reconnaissance and credential brute-forcing. The attack chain begins with brute-force or dictionary attacks against MS-SQL servers exposed to the internet with weak credentials. Upon gaining access, the actor leverages the Bulk Copy Program (BCP) utility — a legitimate Microsoft tool — to extract malware payloads stored in database tables (notably a table named 'uGnzBdZbsi') to the local filesystem, typically writing to C:\ProgramData\. Alternative delivery methods include curl, bitsadmin, and PowerShell downloads from the C2 server at 109.205.211.13. The ICE Cloud suite consists of two components: the ICE Cloud Launcher, a Go-based downloader that authenticates to the C2 infrastructure and retrieves the scanner payload; and the ICE Cloud Client, a Go-based scanner containing Turkish-language strings that performs mass MS-SQL authentication testing against target lists distributed by the C2 server. The Client supports a '-show9' argument for execution logging. Post-exploitation activities include installation of AnyDesk and Teramind remote management tools for persistent access, system reconnaissance commands (hostname, whoami, ifconfig, netstat, tasklist), and port forwarding utilities for lateral movement. The actor creates local administrator accounts and has been observed deploying Mimikatz for credential harvesting. Historically, Larva-26002's campaigns culminate in ransomware deployment. The actor has deployed both Trigona ransomware (first observed April 2023) and Mimic ransomware (first observed January 2024, using Everything by VoidTools for file enumeration, encrypting with .QUIETPLACE extension). The RE#TURGENCE campaign tracked by Securonix documented a typical timeline of approximately one month from initial MS-SQL compromise to domain-wide ransomware deployment. Attribution to Turkish-speaking operators is supported by Turkish-language strings in the ICE Cloud Client binary, intercepted communications referencing locations in Turkey (Kayseri), Turkish Lira exchange rate discussions, and the actor's use of Turkish hosting infrastructure. The Securonix investigation identified potential operator details including the username 'atseverse' linked to Steam and hacking forum profiles. The campaign represents a significant threat to organizations running internet-exposed MS-SQL servers, particularly in the United States, European Union, and Latin America. The evolution from direct ransomware deployment to a dedicated scanning infrastructure (ICE Cloud) suggests the actor is scaling operations and potentially selling access to compromised hosts.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

credential-access

T1003 OS Credential Dumping; T1110 Brute Force

collection

T1005 Data from Local System

lateral-movement

T1021 Remote Services; T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer

defense-evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1078 Valid Accounts

exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

discovery

T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1049 System Network Connections Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery

execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

command-and-control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1219 Remote Access Tools

persistence

T1098 Account Manipulation; T1136 Create Account; T1505 Server Software Component

defense-impairment

T1112 Modify Registry; T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

impact

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block outbound connections to 109.205.211.13 and hostroids.com at perimeter firewall
  • Audit all MS-SQL servers for internet exposure — disable external access or restrict to VPN-only
  • Force password rotation on all MS-SQL service accounts with minimum 16-character complexity
  • Hunt for BCP.exe execution writing to C:\ProgramData\ in EDR/SIEM logs
  • Block known file hashes at endpoint protection layer
  • Check for unauthorized AnyDesk or Teramind installations across fleet

Workarounds

  • Disable xp_cmdshell on MS-SQL servers where not operationally required
  • Restrict BCP utility execution via AppLocker or WDAC policies
  • Disable sa account and use Windows Authentication where possible
  • Block PowerShell download cradles via constrained language mode

Longer-term hardening

  • Implement network segmentation isolating database servers from internet-facing segments
  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for SQL Server child process spawning (sqlservr.exe -> cmd.exe/powershell.exe)
  • Enable MS-SQL audit logging for failed login attempts and xp_cmdshell usage
  • Implement IP allowlisting for MS-SQL server connections
  • Deploy MFA for all remote access tools and database administration
  • Establish baseline for BCP utility usage and alert on anomalous execution

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — SQL Server
    Vulnerable versions: 2016; 2017; 2019; 2022
  • Microsoft — Windows Server
    Vulnerable versions: 2016; 2019; 2022

Timeline

  • AhnLab ASEC first documents Trigona ransomware targeting MS-SQL servers via brute-force attacks, establishing the threat actor's initial TTP pattern
  • Securonix begins tracking the RE#TURGENCE campaign targeting MSSQL servers with Cobalt Strike and Mimic ransomware, attributing to Turkish-speaking operators
  • Securonix publishes RE#TURGENCE report identifying Turkish-speaking operators via intercepted communications and OPSEC failures, including references to Kayseri, Turkey
  • ASEC confirms Trigona threat actor deploying Mimic ransomware via BCP utility against MS-SQL servers, linking the two ransomware families to same operator
  • Multiple security outlets (BleepingComputer, SecurityWeek, BankInfoSecurity) report on Turkish hackers exploiting MS-SQL servers for Mimic ransomware deployment
  • Larva-26002 observed deploying Rust-based scanner for MS-SQL and RDP service reconnaissance, along with Teramind RMM tool for persistent remote access
  • AhnLab ASEC publishes analysis of Trigona threat actor's latest attack cases showing continued infrastructure overlap with uGnzBdZbsi table name and locked-ioc-11 format file
  • ASEC publishes IOCs including 5 MD5 hashes, C2 IP locked-ioc-10, domain locked-ioc-13, and file paths associated with ICE Cloud deployment
  • AhnLab ASEC confirms Larva-26002 deploying new Go-based ICE Cloud scanner suite (Launcher + Client) for mass MS-SQL brute-force reconnaissance, marking evolution from direct ransomware deployment to dedicated scanning infrastructure
  • As of 2026-05-29, Larva-26002 (RE#TURGENCE) remains active: AhnLab ASEC's 20 Mar 2026 report confirms the Turkish actor "continues to target improperly managed MS-SQL servers in 2026" with the new Go-based ICE Cloud scanner. No CVE/patch applies (weak-credential and living-off-the-land abuse); no takedown, arrest, or successor reported, and the actor keeps re-hitting prior victims.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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