Threat reportAPTTL-2026-0759
UAC-0239 Spearphishing Campaign Against Ukrainian Defense Forces and Local Government Using the OrcaC2 Framework and FILEMESS Stealer (CERT-UA#17691)
CERT-UA tracks UAC-0239, a cyber-espionage cluster that since mid-September 2025 has targeted Ukraine's Defense Forces and local self-government bodies with SBU-themed spearphishing ("countering Russian sabotage/reconnaissance groups") delivering VHD-borne payloads. The intrusion set pairs the open-source Go-based OrcaC2 framework (Orca Puppet agent) with FILEMESS, a custom Go file-stealer that exfiltrates documents to Telegram.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0759 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | CERT-UA#17691 |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows |
| Attribution | UAC-0239 (medium confidence) |
| Malware | FILEMESS |
| Tools | OrcaC2 (Orca Puppet) |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1053 Scheduled Task/Job, T1055 Process Injection, T1056 Input Capture, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1090 Proxy and 15 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | government, defense, military, local-government, public-sector |
| Target regions | Ukraine, Eastern Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-05-21, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0759 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 59 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: FILEMESS Telegram Bot-API Exfiltration & OrcaC2 Non-Standard-Port Beacon
Detects the C2/exfiltration stage: FILEMESS POSTs collected documents to api.telegram.org/bot<digits>/sendDocument, and the OrcaC2 Orca Puppet agent beacons over WebSocket to non-standard high ports (promoukrnet.xyz:2264/ws, tcp 185.186.26.98:7324) or to known actor C2 IPs. Either a Telegram sendDocument request from an endpoint or an outbound connection to the campaign's C2 ports/IPs is a strong post-compromise signal.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1567, T1071.001, T1102, T1573, T1095
- Data sources: proxy, sysmon, edr_network_telemetry, firewall
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
(index=proxy OR index=network sourcetype="*proxy*") (uri_path="*/sendDocument*" url="*api.telegram.org/bot*") OR (index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=3 (DestinationPort=2264 OR DestinationPort=7324 OR DestinationIp IN ("185.186.26.98","87.120.93.239","87.120.126.184","87.120.93.143","64.188.91.87","92.53.116.149")))
| eval signal=case(match(url,"(?i)api\.telegram\.org/bot\d+") AND match(uri_path,"(?i)/sendDocument"),"filemess_telegram_exfil", (DestinationPort==2264 OR DestinationPort==7324),"orcac2_nonstd_beacon", isnotnull(DestinationIp),"orcac2_known_c2_ip")
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(url) as urls values(DestinationIp) as dst_ips values(DestinationPort) as dst_ports values(Image) as proc by Computer,User,signal
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)Microsoft KQL
let tg = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has "api.telegram.org/bot" and RemoteUrl has "/sendDocument"
| extend Signal = "filemess_telegram_exfil";
let c2 = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemotePort in (2264, 7324) or RemoteIP in ("185.186.26.98","87.120.93.239","87.120.126.184","87.120.93.143","64.188.91.87","92.53.116.149")
| extend Signal = "orcac2_beacon";
union tg, c2
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, SignalSigma
title: FILEMESS Telegram Exfiltration and OrcaC2 Beacon (UAC-0239)
id: 8f1d2c3a-0759-4a03-9b33-aa03c2e7d103
status: experimental
description: Detects FILEMESS document exfiltration via the Telegram Bot API (sendDocument) and OrcaC2 Orca Puppet WebSocket beacons to non-standard high ports or known UAC-0239 C2 IPs.
references:
- https://cert.gov.ua/article/6285731
- https://github.com/Ptkatz/OrcaC2
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/10
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1567
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1102
- attack.t1573
- attack.t1095
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection_tg:
c-uri|contains:
- 'api.telegram.org/bot'
c-uri|contains: '/sendDocument'
selection_c2:
dst_port:
- 2264
- 7324
c-uri|endswith: '/ws'
selection_ip:
dst_ip:
- '185.186.26.98'
- '87.120.93.239'
- '87.120.126.184'
- '87.120.93.143'
- '64.188.91.87'
condition: selection_tg or selection_c2 or selection_ip
falsepositives:
- Legitimate corporate use of Telegram bots for notifications (rare in enterprise, verify per environment)
level: highKnown false positives:
- Sanctioned internal use of Telegram bots for alerting/notifications
- Security tooling beaconing on overlapping high ports (validate process and destination)
Tuning notes: Promote the C2 IP/domain set to a threat-intel lookup so new UAC-0239 infrastructure is appended without query edits. If Telegram is sanctioned for any business unit, scope the api.telegram.org rule by source subnet or correlate it with a preceding recursive document-discovery burst to raise fidelity.
- UAC-0239 PowerShell+curl LOLBin Ingress Chain (Sentinel/Defender) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAC-0239 Run-Key Persistence (Google Update / misspelled 'Sustem') · unlock with TL Creds
- FILEMESS Recursive Document Discovery Preceding Telegram Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
- UAC-0239 VHD/ISO Container Mount Followed by Volume Execution (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- OrcaC2 UAC-Bypass and Process Injection Post-Exploitation (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- OrcaC2 WebSocket C2 Beacon to Non-Standard Ports / Known UAC-0239 Infrastructure (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAC-0239 Hidden PowerShell Spawning curl.exe Download Chain (VHD Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAC-0239 VHD Mount Followed by EXE/VBS Execution from Mounted Volume · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-05-21, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 59 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0759.
Sample indicators (3 of 59)
- IP address:
185.186.26[.]98 - Domain:
ssu-gov[.]com - URL:
hxxps://drive[.]google[.]com/open?id=1TB2pnMfFpPuyV6Ggq6f8OcO5FhzpVnJE
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 59 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Community OSINT corroboration
6 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.
Technical analysis
Ukraine's national cyber incident response team CERT-UA, in cooperation with the Armed Forces of Ukraine cyber unit (A0334), has tracked targeted attacks since the second half of September 2025 against the Defense Forces of Ukraine and local self-government bodies in several regions, using a lure theme of "countering Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups (DRG)" impersonating the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). The activity is tracked under the identifier UAC-0239.
Initial access is achieved by distributing emails via services such as Ukr.net and Gmail (but not exclusively) containing links to download an archive (sometimes password-protected) holding a VHD (Virtual Hard Drive) file, or by attaching the VHD directly. The mounted VHD contains an executable plus several PDF decoy documents impersonating SBU regional-office appeals. Execution of the payload chains PowerShell and curl.exe (LOLBin) to retrieve follow-on stages from paste.c-net.org and an actor-controlled site (sbufiles.cloud), drops a VBScript (gupdate.vbs) and an executable masquerading as GoogleUpdate.exe (the Orca Puppet agent), and opens a decoy PDF.
Two malware families are deployed. FILEMESS is a Go file-stealer that recursively searches Desktop/Downloads/Documents and logical drives D-Z for a broad list of document and image extensions, computes MD5 hashes, and exfiltrates matching files via the Telegram Bot API. Its Telegram bot token is XOR-encrypted and BASE64-encoded; persistence is via a Run registry key; mutex-style single-instance enforcement checks for an existing process. A leaked PDB path (C:/Users/U7RY6W3E/Downloads/CLIMess/FIleMess/coreFile.go) confirms the Go build. OrcaC2 is a multifunction WebSocket-encrypted C2 framework written in Go (open source, github.com/Ptkatz/OrcaC2, last release 2022); its Orca Puppet agent supports remote command execution, interactive shell, file transfer, screenshots, keylogging, process management and dumping, UAC bypass, shellcode execution, multiple process-injection techniques, proxying (RUDP/TCP/RICMP/RHTTP/KCP/QUIC), SOCKS, traffic tunneling (SSH/SMB), and a port scanner. Persistence for OrcaC2 can use scheduled tasks, Run registry entries, or services.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1113 Screen Capture; T1560 Archive Collected Data
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1055 Process Injection; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
Discovery
T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery
Persistence
T1053 Scheduled Task/Job; T1543 Create or Modify System Process; T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Credential Access
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution
Command and Control
T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1102 Web Service; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1572 Protocol Tunneling; T1573 Encrypted Channel
Privilege Escalation
T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Initial Access
Exfiltration
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block the listed C2 domains/IPs (promoukrnet.xyz, ssu-gov.com, sbufiles.cloud, ukrnetpromo.xyz, ukrostars.xyz, mrbeam.shop, 185.186.26.98, 87.120.93.239, 64.188.91.87, 87.120.126.184, 87.120.93.143, 92.53.116.149) at perimeter and DNS.
- Hunt for and quarantine the listed VHD/EXE/VBS/PDF.LNK artifacts by SHA256/MD5.
- Alert on mounting of VHD files delivered via email and on GoogleUpdate.exe / gupdate.vbs executing from %PUBLIC%\Downloads.
Workarounds
- Disable double-click VHD auto-mount via Group Policy / file-association hardening.
- Block known disposable paste/file-hosting services (paste.c-net.org) at proxy.
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for curl.exe download chains spawned by powershell.exe -nop -w hidden.
- Restrict automatic mounting of VHD/ISO/IMG containers delivered from external email.
- Monitor outbound api.telegram.org bot traffic and paste.c-net.org access from endpoints.
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows
Vulnerable versions: targeted endpoints — VHD auto-mount + Run-key persistence
Timeline
- OrcaC2, the WebSocket-encrypted Go C2 framework later abused in this campaign, has its last public release on GitHub (Ptkatz/OrcaC2).
- From the second half of September 2025, CERT-UA begins observing targeted attacks against Ukraine's Defense Forces and local self-government bodies under SBU 'counter-DRG' lures.
- First documented infection-chain example (per CERT-UA Figure 1): VHD-borne payload delivery impersonating an SBU regional appeal.
- Second documented infection-chain example (per CERT-UA Figure 2).
- SOC Prime, Broadcom/Symantec and other vendors publish detection content and protection bulletins for the UAC-0239 campaign.
- CERT-UA publishes advisory CERT-UA#17691 attributing the activity to UAC-0239 and detailing OrcaC2 + FILEMESS TTPs and indicators.
Sources cited
- CERT-UA#17691: UAC-0239 attacks using OrcaC2 and FILEMESS (primary advisory) CERT-UA · Government advisory · 2026-05-21
- Broadcom Symantec Protection Bulletin — UAC-0239 group targets Ukraine with OrcaC2 and FILEMESS broadcom.com · Vendor report · 2026-05-21
- OrcaC2 source code (Ptkatz/OrcaC2) — WebSocket-encrypted Go C2 framework GitHub · Code repository · 2022-01-01
- OrcaC2 Orca_Puppet/main.go — agent source GitHub · Code repository · 2022-01-01
- SOC Prime — UAC-0239 Activity Detection: Spearphishing via OrcaC2 and FILEMESS socprime.com · Blog · 2026-05-21
- cybersecurity-help.cz — UAC-0239 targets Ukraine's Defense Forces with OrcaC2 and Filemess cybersecurity-help.cz · News · 2026-05-21
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.