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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-1297

Operation ShadowRecruit: APT36-Linked SheetAgent RAT Campaign Abuses ControlR RMM and Google Sheets C2 to Target Indian Government Job Seekers

highACTIVE

Seqrite's APT Research Team disclosed Operation ShadowRecruit, a recruitment-themed espionage campaign targeting applicants for a Cabinet Secretariat 'Senior Field Officer (Technical)' posting in India. A malicious LNK file masquerading as a Microsoft Edge document triggers a four-stage infection chain that installs the legitimate ControlR RMM agent for remote access alongside a custom .NET SheetAgent RAT that uses the Google Sheets API as a resilient, low-noise C2 channel.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1297
Also known asOperation ShadowRecruit, SheetAgent RAT campaign
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (LNK/Scheduled Task/Startup abuse); ControlR (Bitbound) ControlR RMM Agent; Google Google Sheets / Google Drive API
AttributionAPT36, Transparent Tribe (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusPakistan
ToolsGoogle Sheets API / Google Drive API
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027.011 Fileless Storage, T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1102 Web Service and 16 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration, education, technology
Target regionsindia, South Asia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources12 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-07-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1297 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 23 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: SheetAgent Post-Exploitation — Defender-Masquerading Scheduled Task with Sub-5-Minute Re-Fire

Detects creation of a scheduled task named to impersonate Windows Defender (e.g. WindowsDefenderSyncService) with an unusually short re-fire interval (~3 minutes), plus companion Startup-folder persistence and the %APPDATA%\Microsoft\WinSyncDefender\ working directory containing service.json — the SheetAgent dropper's dual-persistence mechanism.

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=1 Image="*\\schtasks.exe" CommandLine="*WindowsDefenderSync*") OR (EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*\\Microsoft\\WinSyncDefender\\*") OR (EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\WindowsDefenderSync*.lnk")
| eval detection_reason=case(Image="*schtasks.exe*","scheduled_task_masquerade", TargetFilename="*WinSyncDefender*","working_dir_masquerade", TargetFilename="*Startup*WindowsDefenderSync*","startup_persistence")
| table _time, ComputerName, User, Image, CommandLine, TargetFilename, detection_reason
| sort - _time

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "WindowsDefenderSync"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| union (
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FolderPath has @"\Microsoft\WinSyncDefender\" or FolderPath has "WindowsDefenderSync"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath
)
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Scheduled Task or Startup Persistence Masquerading as Windows Defender Sync Component
id: 3f2e9a11-7bd4-4a0e-8f2c-2b6d1e7c9a3d
status: experimental
description: Detects scheduled task creation or file-drop activity masquerading as a Windows Defender sync service, consistent with SheetAgent's WindowsDefenderSyncService persistence and WinSyncDefender working directory
references:
    - https://www.seqrite.com/blog/operation-shadowrecruit-a-recruitment-themed-malware-campaign-leveraging-controlr-and-google-sheets-to-target-indian-job-seekers/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-14
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036.004
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_task:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'WindowsDefenderSync'
    selection_path:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\WinSyncDefender\'
            - 'WindowsDefenderSync'
    condition: selection_task or selection_path
falsepositives:
    - Genuine Microsoft Defender maintenance tasks (verify parent process is MpCmdRun.exe/MsMpEng.exe and task binary is Microsoft-signed)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Genuine Microsoft Defender platform update/maintenance scheduled tasks — verify the task action binary is Microsoft-signed and located under %ProgramFiles%\Windows Defender\

Tuning notes: Cross-reference task action binary path/hash against known-good Defender platform paths to eliminate legitimate matches; alert with higher confidence when the working directory also contains service.json or cleanup.bat.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Rogue ControlR RMM Tenant Enrollment via Bitbound-Signed Installer · unlock with TL Creds
  • SheetAgent Config/Cleanup Artifact Drop and Anti-Forensic Self-Deletion · unlock with TL Creds
  • SheetAgent Sandbox/VM Fingerprinting Discovery Sequence Prior to Payload Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • Malicious LNK Masquerading as Microsoft Edge Document Triggering RMM/Downloader Chain · unlock with TL Creds
  • ControlR RMM Remote-Hands-On-Keyboard Session from Rogue Tenant Enrollment · unlock with TL Creds
  • Connection to Known ShadowRecruit C2 Infrastructure or Exposed RAT Panel Ports · unlock with TL Creds
  • SheetAgent Initial Access — LNK-Triggered Hidden-Window PowerShell Downloader · unlock with TL Creds
  • SheetAgent Cloud C2 — Anomalous Non-Office Process Beaconing to Google Sheets/Drive API · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-07-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 23 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1297.

Sample indicators (3 of 23)

  • IP address: 38.242.157[.]89
  • Domain: demo[.]controlr[.]app
  • File hash: 434243e615b93a1b948c26ad55902bd78f9fa18e42375c15790634375c1ad3f4

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 23 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

23 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

The campaign is attributed with medium confidence to APT36 (Transparent Tribe) based on targeting overlap and TTP similarity to the Zscaler-documented SheetCreep/Firepower/MailCreep cloud-C2 toolset.

Operation ShadowRecruit begins with a spearphishing lure themed around a genuine Cabinet Secretariat 'Senior Field Officer (Technical)' recruitment notice (Employment News, issue dated 13-19 June 2026) delivered to Indian government job applicants. The initial artifact is a Windows shortcut file, Document-24062026-Y6352634.lnk, disguised with a Microsoft Edge icon and a benign-sounding description ('Install ControlR Agent'). Executing the LNK invokes PowerShell in hidden mode to run a downloader script, JT-agenda.ps1, which retrieves the legitimate, Bitbound-signed ControlR RMM agent installer directly from demo.controlr.app and silently enrolls the victim endpoint into an attacker-controlled ControlR tenant using hardcoded enrollment credentials (Tenant ID, Key ID, Key Secret). This abuse of a legitimate, signed commercial RMM tool grants the operators full remote-hands-on-keyboard access while evading many security-tool trust heuristics that flag unsigned or unknown remote-access binaries.

In parallel, a 32-bit .NET dropper (Document.exe) stages a second, custom implant tracked as SheetAgent, extracting it (as agent.exe / WindowsDefenderSyncService.exe / MicrosoftSyncService.exe) into a working directory at %APPDATA%\Microsoft\WinSyncDefender\, alongside a decoy PDF-rendering shortcut (Document.lnk) that opens the genuine recruitment notice to distract the victim while the malware installs. The dropper establishes dual persistence via a scheduled task ('WindowsDefenderSyncService', triggered at logon and re-fired every three minutes) and a Startup-folder shortcut (WindowsDefenderSync.lnk), both masquerading as Windows Defender components.

SheetAgent is a custom .NET RAT whose most notable feature is its command-and-control channel: rather than (or in addition to) beaconing to a traditional C2 server, it authenticates to the Google Sheets and Google Drive APIs using a hardcoded Google Cloud service-account private key (service@sheet12-500308.iam.gserviceaccount.com, project sheet12-500308) and registers each victim as a row in a shared spreadsheet. Column A holds the victim hostname, B a timestamp, C attacker-issued commands, D command output, E the victim's public IP, F an ONLINE/ERROR status flag, H alerts, and J a URL-monitoring list. The implant polls Column C for new commands and writes results back to Column D, giving operators an encrypted-in-transit (HTTPS-to-Google), reputationally 'clean' C2 channel that blends into normal cloud/SaaS traffic and is difficult to block without disrupting legitimate Google Workspace usage. A second attacker-controlled server (38.242.157.89) hosts a decoy PDF plus three exposed web panels: SecureMonitor on port 9000, a 'PrivateRat' dashboard (developer alias 'HeartMelt') on port 7000, and an unnamed management interface on port 8000 - indicating this actor also operates or resells a broader RAT panel product alongside the bespoke SheetAgent tooling.

SheetAgent embeds an unusually extensive 14-point virtualization/sandbox-detection routine, checking WMI system-manufacturer strings, BIOS information, VM-associated disk-drive and GPU identifiers, running VMware/VirtualBox processes, VM-signature registry keys, VM-associated MAC address OUI prefixes, VM-specific drivers and installation directories, common sandbox analyst usernames, and known Any.Run and Triage sandbox artifacts, plus VM-specific devices/services. On positive detection the malware self-destructs via a dropped cleanup.bat that force-deletes the RAT executable, its service.json configuration file, and the batch script itself, minimizing forensic residue in automated analysis environments.

Seqrite attributes the campaign to APT36 (Transparent Tribe) with medium confidence, citing the recurring pattern of targeting Indian government job seekers, the multi-stage .NET malware architecture consistent with the group's known tradecraft, and - most significantly - the use of Google Sheets as a C2 channel, which overlaps with Zscaler ThreatLabz's prior reporting on the APT36-attributed SheetCreep, Firepower, and MailCreep cloud-abuse backdoor family targeting Indian government and diplomatic entities. APT36 (aka Transparent Tribe, Mythic Leopard, Earth Karkaddan, ProjectM, COPPER FIELDSTONE) is a Pakistan-aligned cyber-espionage actor active since at least 2013 with a long history of recruitment- and government-notice-themed lures against Indian military, diplomatic, and public-sector personnel, and has increasingly diversified its toolkit toward abuse of legitimate cloud APIs (Google Sheets/Drive, Microsoft Graph) for C2 to blend into normal SaaS traffic.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Defense Evasion

T1027.011 Fileless Storage; T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1070.004 File Deletion; T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1497.001 System Checks; T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Execution

T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1059.001 PowerShell; T1106 Native API; T1204.002 Malicious File

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1133 External Remote Services; T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Discovery

T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1518.001 Security Software Discovery; T1614.001 System Language Discovery

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1102 Web Service; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1219 Remote Access Tools

Privilege Escalation

T1548.004 Elevated Execution with Prompt

Initial Access

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

Resource Development

T1584.006 Web Services; T1585.003 Cloud Accounts

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block and alert on the attacker-controlled IP 38.242.157.89 and its exposed panel ports (7000, 8000, 9000) at perimeter/firewall/proxy
  • Hunt for the scheduled task 'WindowsDefenderSyncService' and startup entry 'WindowsDefenderSync.lnk' masquerading as Windows Defender components
  • Search endpoints for the working directory %APPDATA%\Microsoft\WinSyncDefender\ and files service.json / cleanup.bat
  • Hash-match environment against the full IOC hash list (LNK, PS1, .NET dropper, SheetAgent variants, decoy documents, ControlR installer)
  • Audit installed ControlR RMM agents for enrollment against the identified rogue Tenant ID (d5eab065-bbe2-4178-9574-1cbac7e40c64) and Key ID (319fe2d0-027e-4435-8b29-52af76a1972b); remove unauthorized enrollments
  • Flag/monitor outbound traffic from endpoints to the Google Sheets/Drive API associated with service account service@sheet12-500308.iam.gserviceaccount.com and project sheet12-500308
  • Warn recruitment-eligible government personnel about LNK-based email/portal lures themed on the Cabinet Secretariat 'Senior Field Officer (Technical)' posting

Workarounds

  • Disable Windows Script Host / restrict .lnk execution from email and browser-downloaded content via Attack Surface Reduction rules
  • Restrict outbound access to demo.controlr.app and other unauthorized RMM vendor domains at the proxy for non-IT-managed endpoints

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for PowerShell-spawned-from-LNK execution chains and scheduled-task persistence masquerading as Defender services
  • Implement application allowlisting / RMM governance to restrict which RMM tools (ControlR, AnyDesk, etc.) may be installed and which tenants employees may enroll into
  • Deploy CASB/SSE inspection or DLP rules for anomalous Google Sheets/Drive API calls from endpoint processes (unusual for standard office workflows)
  • Establish organization-wide LNK-attachment filtering/blocking at the email gateway for external senders
  • Conduct recurring phishing-simulation and OPSEC training for recruitment-eligible personnel targeted by government-notice lures

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (LNK/Scheduled Task/Startup abuse)
    Vulnerable versions: All supported Windows desktop/server versions
  • ControlR (Bitbound) — ControlR RMM Agent
    Vulnerable versions: Legitimate agent abused via rogue tenant enrollment; no product vulnerability
  • Google — Google Sheets / Google Drive API
    Vulnerable versions: Abused as a C2 transport via a compromised/attacker-created service account; no product vulnerability

Timeline

  • Zscaler ThreatLabz uncovers three additional cloud-API-abuse backdoors (precursors to the SheetCreep/Firepower/MailCreep family later linked to APT36) during a September 2025 investigation.
  • Start of the November 2025-January 2026 window in which Zscaler ThreatLabz observes active deployment of new APT36 cloud-C2 tooling (SheetCreep, Firepower, MailCreep) against Indian government and diplomatic targets.
  • Zscaler ThreatLabz publishes analysis of the SheetCreep/Firepower/MailCreep cloud-API-abuse backdoor family attributed to APT36, establishing the Google Sheets-as-C2 TTP baseline later matched to SheetAgent.
  • Operation ShadowRecruit infection chain observed active during June 2026, targeting Indian government job applicants with the recruitment-themed LNK lure.
  • Genuine Cabinet Secretariat 'Senior Field Officer (Technical)' recruitment notice published in Employment News (issue window 13-19 June 2026), later repurposed as the campaign's decoy document.
  • Malicious lure file Document-24062026-Y6352634.lnk built/staged, embedding the date 24062026 in its filename, indicating campaign preparation around this date.
  • Seqrite Labs publishes a separate but temporally adjacent APT report, 'From Invoice to AnyDesk', covering a phishing campaign targeting Russian aerospace organizations, one week before the ShadowRecruit disclosure.
  • Full IOC set released including file hashes for the LNK, PowerShell downloader, .NET dropper, SheetAgent variants, decoy PDF, and ControlR installer, plus attacker infrastructure at locked-ioc-17.
  • Seqrite's APT Research Team (Priya Patel, Kartik Jivani, Shrutirupa Banerjiee) publishes 'Operation ShadowRecruit', disclosing the full infection chain, IOCs, and medium-confidence APT36 attribution.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 12 sources; published ; last updated —.

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