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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2719

Mantax Otax: Indonesian Android Malware Combines Ransomware with Spyware Integration

highACTIVE

Zimperium zLabs identified Mantax Otax, an Android malware family targeting Indonesian users that combines extensive spyware surveillance (screen recording, PIN theft, SMS/OTP interception, WhatsApp/Telegram theft, camera capture, location tracking) with ransomware capable of AES-encrypting files on Android 9 and earlier.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2719
Also known asMantax OTAX
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsGoogle Android OS
MalwareMantax Otax
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1417.002 GUI Input Capture, T1418 Software Discovery, T1426 System Information Discovery, T1429 Audio Capture, T1430 Location Tracking, T1453 Abuse Accessibility Features, T1513 Screen Capture, T1516 Input Injection, T1517 Access Notifications, T1582 SMS Control, T1616 Call Control, T1636.004 SMS Messages and 3 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsconsumer
Target regionsindonesia, Southeast Asia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-09-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2719 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 19 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Phishing-Delivered Mantax Otax APK Download (MediaFire Lure Files / otax.fun Hosting)

Detects the initial-access vector for Mantax Otax: a victim fetching the malicious sideload APK either directly from actor-controlled otax.fun/otax.store infrastructure or from MediaFire under one of the observed phishing lure filenames (FourMays.apk, RoomNoks.apk, MANTA.apk). This is the exploitation-stage trigger before any on-device compromise occurs.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1660, T1655.001
  • Data sources: zscaler_web_proxy, palo_alto_url_filtering, corporate_dns_logs
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=proxy OR index=web sourcetype IN ("zscaler:web","pan:threat","stream:http")
| eval apk_lure=if(match(url, "(?i)(FourMays|RoomNoks|MANTA)\.apk"), "lure_filename", null())
| where url_domain IN ("otax.fun","apimantax.otax.fun","apixnxx.otax.fun","otax.store","nodemyayun.otax.store") OR (url_domain="mediafire.com" AND isnotnull(apk_lure)) OR match(url, "(?i)\.apk$")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(url) as urls by src_ip, user, url_domain
| where count > 0

Microsoft KQL

let LureFiles = @"(?i)(FourMays|RoomNoks|MANTA)\.apk";
let C2Domains = dynamic(["otax.fun","apimantax.otax.fun","apixnxx.otax.fun","otax.store","nodemyayun.otax.store"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL has_any (C2Domains) or (DestinationHostName has "mediafire.com" and RequestURL matches regex LureFiles) or RequestURL endswith ".apk"
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, SourceUserName, DestinationHostName, RequestURL
| summarize Count = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by SourceIP, SourceUserName, DestinationHostName, RequestURL

Sigma

title: Mantax Otax Phishing APK Download (otax.fun / MediaFire Lure)
id: a1e4f2b0-6c3d-4e51-9a7f-2d8b6c1e4f01
status: experimental
description: Detects download of a Mantax Otax sideload APK from actor-controlled otax.fun/otax.store infrastructure or from MediaFire under an observed phishing lure filename.
references:
    - https://zimperium.com/blog/mantax-otax-indonesian-mobile-ransomware-with-spyware-integration
    - https://github.com/Zimperium/IOC/tree/master/2026-09-MantaxOtax/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-27
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1660
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1655.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_domain:
        c-uri-host|contains:
            - 'otax.fun'
            - 'apimantax.otax.fun'
            - 'apixnxx.otax.fun'
            - 'otax.store'
            - 'nodemyayun.otax.store'
    selection_lure:
        c-uri-host|contains: 'mediafire.com'
        c-uri|contains:
            - 'FourMays.apk'
            - 'RoomNoks.apk'
            - 'MANTA.apk'
    selection_ext:
        c-uri|endswith: '.apk'
    condition: selection_domain or selection_lure or selection_ext
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate developer/tester APK downloads from MediaFire unrelated to this campaign
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate MediaFire downloads of unrelated .apk files by developers/testers on a BYOD device

Tuning notes: Extend the lure-filename regex as new phishing filenames are added to the Zimperium IOC feed; if the org blocks all sideloading at the MDM layer, downgrade severity for managed devices and keep high only for unmanaged/BYOD.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Phishing URL Click Leading to Mantax Otax Sideload Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • MediaProjection Screen-Capture Session Concurrent with WhatsApp/Telegram Foreground UI Scraping · unlock with TL Creds
  • Persistent WebSocket Beacon to Mantax Otax v2 Raw IP:Port C2 ([indicator]:2034 / [indicator]:2034) · unlock with TL Creds
  • DNS Resolution to Mantax Otax Masqueraded C2/Distribution Domain Cluster · unlock with TL Creds
  • SMS/OTP Interception, Notification Access Grant, and Device-Registration Beacon (Mantax Otax Collection Stage) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Catbox Media Exfiltration of Captured Screen Recordings Concurrent with Firebase RTDB Ransom-Chat Traffic · unlock with TL Creds
  • Non-Play-Store Package Granted Accessibility Service + Device Administrator (Mantax Otax Root-Enabler Pattern) · unlock with TL Creds
  • GitHub-Repo-Resolved Dynamic C2 Handoff to Mantax Otax Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-09-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 19 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2719.

Sample indicators (3 of 19)

  • IP address: 38.45.65[.]159
  • Domain: apimantax[.]otax[.]fun
  • File hash: dba600f1cb731e3f6dc91977d97dc2099adfaf74f38490f684abe324924ae816

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 19 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

19 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

It is sideloaded via phishing/social-engineering links and uses a GitHub-repo-based dynamic C2 resolution mechanism with Firebase and Catbox for exfiltration.

Mantax Otax is a hybrid Android malware family, documented by Zimperium zLabs on 2026-09-09, that fuses full-featured mobile spyware with a device-encrypting ransomware component and an active harassment/extortion-pressure layer. Two variants have been identified: a baseline v1 and a more advanced v2 that adds coercive UI-manipulation commands. The malware is distributed outside Google Play as standalone APKs hosted on third-party file-sharing infrastructure (MediaFire, and the actor's own otax.fun domain), pushed to victims through phishing messages, messaging-platform links, and social-engineering lures rather than any software vulnerability or exploit chain.

Once sideloaded, the app requests Device Administrator privileges and Android Accessibility Service access, which it abuses as the root enabler for nearly all of its capabilities. Using the Accessibility APIs it performs Input Injection to mimic user interaction (e.g., stealing lock-screen PINs via a device-locking overlay) and harvests WhatsApp message content/profile data and Telegram credentials and chat history directly from the UI. It abuses the Android MediaProjection API to perform real-time screen recording (encoded as MP4) and periodic screenshots (JPEG), streaming a near-real-time live view of the victim's display back to the operator as Base64-encoded frames. Additional collection includes SMS and one-time-password interception, silent front/rear camera capture without user interaction, physical location tracking, contact-list and call-log harvesting, browser history extraction, and notification-content monitoring — giving the operator both financial-fraud-grade credential access and full device surveillance.

On devices running Android 9 or earlier, Mantax Otax additionally functions as ransomware: it AES-encrypts media, documents, archives, databases, and cryptographic-key files, appends a '.enc' extension, and securely deletes the originals, then replaces local images with ransom notices and opens an interactive on-device chat portal for extortion negotiation. The encryption key used is victim-specific and is retrieved from the actor's C2 infrastructure rather than generated purely on-device. On Android 10 and later, native Scoped Storage restrictions confine this component to app-private directories, sharply limiting its practical impact — though the spyware and device-control functionality remain fully active regardless of OS version.

Mantax Otax's C2 model is designed to survive takedown of any single domain: the app resolves its active C2 endpoint dynamically by reading a value from a GitHub repository rather than hardcoding it, letting operators rotate infrastructure without shipping an app update. Confirmed backend domains/IPs include apimantax.otax.fun (also used to host APK payloads directly), apixnxx.otax.fun, nodemyayun.otax.store, and cromwell.danzzichosting.my.id, alongside raw C2 IP:port pairs 38.45.65.159:2034 and 96.9.212.22:2034. The v1 C2 channel runs over HTTPS; v2 upgrades to a persistent WebSocket connection. Firebase Realtime Database instances (otax-ceada-default-rtdb and mantax-e0919-default-rtdb, both in the asia-southeast1 region) serve as the backend for the ransom chat interface and command dispatch. Zimperium researchers were able to exploit a misconfiguration in this Firebase backend to directly observe attacker-victim communications and operational data. Captured screenshots and screen-recording video are exfiltrated to the third-party host Catbox rather than the primary C2, separating bulk-media exfiltration from the control channel. On first execution the malware registers a unique device_id against a '/register' endpoint together with geolocation, network operator, and OS version.

The v2 variant adds a set of remote commands purpose-built to pressure victims into paying rather than to expand technical capability: <blockapp> dynamically restricts access to a targeted application, <touchBlock> raises a transparent full-screen overlay that intercepts all touch input, <dialogSpam>/<dialogSpamStop> floods the screen with alert dialogs, <videoOverlay> obstructs the display with full-screen video, <jumpscarestart>/<jumpscare2Start> injects full-screen image popups at roughly 600ms intervals, and <TTS_SPEAK> uses the device's own text-to-speech engine to vocalize threat messages aloud. The attacker-facing control panel observed by researchers displayed a running count of infected devices, though the exact figure was not disclosed.

Attribution is inferred only from language indicators and artifacts recovered from victim devices pointing to Indonesian-origin operators targeting Indonesian victims; no named threat-actor group, group aliases, or nation-state sponsorship have been established, and Zimperium's reporting treats this as financially motivated cybercriminal activity rather than espionage. Google has confirmed Play Protect already detects and blocks known Mantax Otax samples, and Zimperium — a Google App Defense Alliance partner — published a corresponding IOC set (APK hashes, C2 infrastructure, phishing distribution URLs) to its public GitHub IOC repository at the time of disclosure.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1417.002 GUI Input Capture

Discovery

T1418 Software Discovery; T1426 System Information Discovery

Collection

T1429 Audio Capture; T1430 Location Tracking; T1513 Screen Capture; T1517 Access Notifications; T1616 Call Control; T1636.004 SMS Messages

collection

T1453 Abuse Accessibility Features

Impact

T1516 Input Injection; T1582 SMS Control

Exfiltration

T1646 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Defense Evasion

T1655.001 Match Legitimate Name or Location

Initial Access

T1660 Phishing

Remediation

Patches

  • No vendor patch applies — this is a malware family, not a software vulnerability; Android 10+ Scoped Storage is the relevant structural OS mitigation for the ransomware component only.

Immediate actions

  • Do not sideload APKs received via phishing links, messaging-app shares, or third-party file-sharing sites (MediaFire, Catbox, otax.fun); install only from Google Play.
  • Revoke Device Administrator and Accessibility Service permissions from any unrecognized or recently sideloaded application, and uninstall it.
  • Block known Mantax Otax C2 infrastructure at DNS/perimeter: apimantax.otax.fun, apixnxx.otax.fun, nodemyayun.otax.store, cromwell.danzzichosting.my.id, and IPs 38.45.65.159 / 96.9.212.22.
  • Confirm Google Play Protect is enabled and current; Google has confirmed it already detects and blocks known Mantax Otax samples.

Workarounds

  • Maintain offline or cloud backups of media, documents, and databases to reduce impact from the AES file-encryption component.
  • Disable 'install unknown apps' / unknown-sources installation in Android Settings to prevent sideloading of the distributed APKs.

Longer-term hardening

  • Upgrade legacy handsets from Android 9 or earlier to Android 10+ so Scoped Storage structurally limits the ransomware component to app-private directories.
  • Deploy mobile threat defense (MTD) tooling capable of flagging abuse of the MediaProjection API and Accessibility Service APIs by third-party apps.
  • Run security-awareness campaigns targeting phishing and social-engineering lures delivered over messaging apps, which is Mantax Otax's sole observed infection vector.

Affected and fixed versions

  • Google — Android OS
    Vulnerable versions: Android 9 and earlier (full AES file-encryption/ransomware capability); all Android versions (spyware, credential-theft, and device-control functionality)
    Fixed in: Android 10+ (Scoped Storage restricts the ransomware component to app-private directories; does not mitigate spyware/surveillance functions)

Timeline

  • Security press outlets (BleepingComputer, Cyberpress, Security Journal Americas, Android Headlines, Rankiteo) republish and corroborate Zimperium's findings on the same disclosure.
  • Google confirms Play Protect already detects and blocks known Mantax Otax samples; Zimperium is credited as a Google App Defense Alliance partner in the disclosure.
  • Malpedia adds a library entry cataloguing Mantax Otax as a distinct tracked Android malware family.
  • Zimperium publishes an IOC set — APK SHA-256 hashes, C2 domains/IPs, and phishing distribution URLs — to its public GitHub IOC repository under 2026-09-MantaxOtax.
  • Researchers exploit a misconfiguration in the malware operator's Firebase Realtime Database backend, directly exposing attacker-victim ransom chat communications and operational data.
  • Zimperium identifies two variants — a baseline v1 and a more advanced v2 that adds coercive full-screen harassment commands (blockapp, touchBlock, jumpscarestart, TTS_SPEAK) and moves the C2 channel to WebSockets.
  • Zimperium zLabs publishes the initial technical analysis of Mantax Otax, an Indonesian Android malware family fusing ransomware and spyware capabilities.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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