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Threat reportAPTTL-2026-2787

Star Blizzard (SEABORGIUM) RedFlick technique: scheduled-task backdoor delivery via phishing (CosmicPulse)

highACTIVE

Microsoft Threat Intelligence reports that Russian FSB Centre 18 actor Star Blizzard (SEABORGIUM/COLDRIVER) has shifted from targeted spear-phishing to large-scale phishing and uses the RedFlick technique, in which scheduled tasks deploy backdoors with fewer user interactions than earlier ClickFix chains.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2787
Also known asRedFlick, CosmicPulse, YESROBOT, NOROBOT, BAITSWITCH
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows
AttributionStar Blizzard (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusRussia
MalwareMAYBEROBOT, NOROBOT, YESROBOT
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1027.003 Steganography, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1059.006 Python, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1112 Modify Registry, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204.002 Malicious File and 8 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration, ngo, think-tank, finance, academia, diplomatic, hospitality, technology
Target regionsukraine, united states of america, united kingdom, Europe
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2787 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 36 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: RedFlick - ssh.exe PermitLocalCommand Used to Launch Shell/Downloader/Installer

Detects ssh.exe run with PermitLocalCommand enabled and a LocalCommand that starts cmd, PowerShell, msiexec or curl. In the January 2026 Star Blizzard RedFlick variant a hidden BAT (launched from an LNK disguised as a PDF inside a VHDX) uses this ssh.exe trick to download an MSI from attacker infrastructure with a single user interaction. This is a rare, high-fidelity execution primitive.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1566.001, T1204.002, T1059.003, T1105
  • Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*\\ssh.exe" CommandLine="*PermitLocalCommand*" earliest=-24h
| eval cl=lower(CommandLine), cl_nopermit=replace(lower(CommandLine), "permitlocalcommand", "")
| where match(cl, "permitlocalcommand[= ]+(yes|true)") AND match(cl_nopermit, "localcommand.*(cmd|powershell|msiexec|curl)")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parent_images by Computer, User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "ssh.exe"
| extend cl = tolower(ProcessCommandLine)
| extend cl_nopermit = replace_string(cl, "permitlocalcommand", "")
| where cl matches regex @"permitlocalcommand[= ]+(yes|true)"
| where cl_nopermit matches regex @"localcommand.*(cmd|powershell|msiexec|curl)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: SSH PermitLocalCommand Abuse to Run Local Command (RedFlick)
id: 3f6a1c52-8d47-4b19-a0c3-5e2b7d9f1a01
status: experimental
description: Detects ssh.exe launched with PermitLocalCommand enabled and a LocalCommand that spawns a shell, downloader or installer, as used by the January 2026 Star Blizzard RedFlick chain to pull an MSI from attacker infrastructure.
references:
  - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/09/29/star-blizzard-refines-phishing-and-malware-delivery-with-the-redflick-technique/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/09/29
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1566.001
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.002
  - attack.t1059.003
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith: '\ssh.exe'
  selection_permit:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'PermitLocalCommand=yes'
      - 'PermitLocalCommand yes'
      - 'PermitLocalCommand=true'
  selection_local:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'LocalCommand=cmd'
      - 'LocalCommand=powershell'
      - 'LocalCommand=msiexec'
      - 'LocalCommand=curl'
      - 'LocalCommand="cmd'
      - 'LocalCommand="powershell'
      - 'LocalCommand="msiexec'
      - 'LocalCommand="curl'
      - 'LocalCommand cmd'
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Administrators using ssh LocalCommand for tunnelling or automation
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Administrators or developers legitimately using ssh -o PermitLocalCommand=yes with a LocalCommand for tunnel automation

Tuning notes: Legitimate use is rare; allow-list known admin hosts/accounts by Computer+User if a sanctioned SSH automation exists. Widen the LocalCommand child-process list (mshta, wscript, certutil) if your environment sees variants.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • RedFlick - conhost --headless, curl PDF Download and PowerShell 'cAB' PDF Payload Extraction · unlock with TL Creds
  • RedFlick - control.exe / rundll32 Control_RunDLL Loading Remote CPL or DLL over WebDAV · unlock with TL Creds
  • CosmicPulse - Python Interpreter in User-Writable Path Making Public Network Connections · unlock with TL Creds
  • RedFlick - msiexec Installing an MSI from a Remote URL via Script Parent or Known MSI Host · unlock with TL Creds
  • CosmicPulse - Registry Key HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis Holding Payload AES Key · unlock with TL Creds
  • RedFlick/CosmicPulse - DNS Queries for Known MSI-Host and C2 Domains · unlock with TL Creds
  • RedFlick - Scheduled Tasks Masquerading as Windows Components (Internet Quality Test / [indicator] / [indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
  • RedFlick/CosmicPulse - Outbound Connections to Known MSI-Host and C2 Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 36 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2787.

Sample indicators (3 of 36)

  • IP address: 103.245.213[.]217
  • Domain: etia[.]ca
  • File hash: 9707a8694e954e9ee13e839d6e5905ce626c0837c7c90da6d1025bfbe152866b

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 36 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

36 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Payloads include the Python backdoor CosmicPulse (YESROBOT) and a Control Panel applet (CPL) downloader (NOROBOT/BAITSWITCH); more than 100 organizations were affected, primarily in Ukraine and then the US and UK.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence (2026-09-29) describes how Star Blizzard, a Russian state actor assessed by CISA and partner agencies (AA23-341A) as almost certainly subordinate to FSB Centre 18, evolved during 2026 from manual, targeted spear-phishing to mass-mailing campaigns of tens to hundreds of emails per wave. Lures impersonate legitimate organizations: conference and roundtable invitations (IISS, Chatham House, Atlantic Council-themed, USUBC, MAMA Summit, Future of Liberty/Peace Operations forums), Ukrainian-language tax and fine-payment notices, a Kyiv water-supply outage notice aimed at hotels, and a payment advice note aimed at an international financial organization. From March 2026 onward the actor also created accounts on compromised cPanel/WordPress-hosted sites to send phishing. Targets include Ukrainian individuals, NGOs, think tanks, governments and financial institutions supporting Ukraine; over 100 organizations were affected, primarily in Ukraine and then the US and UK.

After a recipient replies, a follow-up email delivers a password-protected RAR/ZIP archive, with the password shown as an image to evade email filtering. The archive starts the RedFlick chain, which needs a single user interaction. In the January 2026 variant a ZIP holds a VHDX containing an LNK disguised as a PDF and a hidden BAT directory. The LNK launches a hidden conhost.exe and cmd.exe, and the BAT opens a decoy PDF and runs ssh.exe with PermitLocalCommand enabled to download an MSI from attacker infrastructure. The MSI creates a scheduled task that uses control.exe to fetch a CPL downloader (CosmicPulse downloader, aka NOROBOT/BAITSWITCH). In the July 2026 variant a RAR nested in a ZIP holds an LNK that uses conhost.exe and curl to download a PDF. PowerShell locates the magic header 'cAB' in the PDF, extracts 208 bytes of Base64 data, and decodes a command that downloads the MSI, which creates two scheduled tasks. In mid-August 2026 the actor added image-based/steganographic obfuscation.

From April 2026 persistence moved to three coordinated scheduled tasks masquerading as Windows components: 'Internet Quality Test Connection' (beacons a UTF-16 Base64 string containing network/computer name and username to the C2 and runs an attacker DLL via Shell32 Control_RunDLL from a WebDAV UNC path), 'Network Configuration Manager' (uses net.exe to prepare WebClient/WebDAV access) and 'System Health Monitor' (control.exe loads a remote CPL from a hardcoded C2, 103.245.213.217). The CPL downloader fetches two ZIPs: one holding a Python 3.8 64-bit package plus a bootstrapper, the other an encrypted CosmicPulse payload. An AES key is stored under HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis, and the bootstrapper decrypts the payload with that key plus an embedded AES-ECB key and runs the CosmicPulse (YESROBOT) backdoor. Microsoft states the backdoor's capabilities are unchanged from earlier versions.

Context from Google Threat Intelligence Group (October 2025): after the May 2025 LOSTKEYS exposure, COLDRIVER developed the COLDCOPY ClickFix lure, the NOROBOT DLL downloader (rundll32 export humanCheck/verifyme) and the YESROBOT Python 3.8 backdoor (HTTPS, AES-encrypted commands, host identity in the User-Agent header), later replaced by the PowerShell backdoor MAYBEROBOT (SIMPLEFIX). Zscaler ThreatLabz independently documented BAITSWITCH/SIMPLEFIX in September 2025. Microsoft also notes DarkSword iOS backdoor delivery observed in a March 2026 Atlantic Council-themed lure (Proofpoint report). Microsoft Defender detects the activity as Trojan:Script/RedFlick, Backdoor:Script/CosmicPulse and Backdoor:Python/CosmicPulse, with behavioral alerts for suspicious LNK execution from a container, curl downloads, msiexec.exe behavior and Control Panel item use.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1027.003 Steganography; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1218.002 Control Panel; T1218.007 Msiexec; T1553.005 Subvert Trust Controls

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1059.006 Python; T1204.002 Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

defense-impairment

T1112 Modify Registry

Credential Access

T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle

Initial Access

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment; T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

Resource Development

T1586.002 Compromise Accounts

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block the listed RedFlick MSI-host and CosmicPulse C2 domains and IPs at DNS, proxy and firewall
  • Hunt for scheduled tasks named 'Internet Quality Test Connection', 'Network Configuration Manager' and 'System Health Monitor', and for the HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis registry key
  • Hunt for ssh.exe with PermitLocalCommand=yes and LocalCommand=cmd.exe, and conhost.exe launching curl
  • Quarantine password-protected RAR/ZIP/VHDX attachments and review recipients who replied to conference or payment lures

Workarounds

  • Enable ASR rules: block executable files unless they meet prevalence/trusted criteria, and block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts
  • Enable network protection against malicious domains
  • Restrict WebDAV/WebClient outbound access and outbound HTTP to newly observed hosts from control.exe and msiexec.exe

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy phishing-resistant authentication (FIDO2) and Conditional Access with identity-driven signals
  • Enable Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Safe Links, Safe Attachments and zero-hour auto purge
  • Run EDR in block mode with cloud-delivered protection and automatic sample submission
  • Run Attack Simulator training on phishing lures and password-protected archives

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific; social-engineering delivery

Timeline

Last updated · 2 updates · revalidated 1×

  • Star Blizzard (SEABORGIUM/COLDRIVER) targeting of academia, defense, government, NGOs and think tanks documented since at least 2019 (CISA AA23-341A, MITRE G1033)
  • CISA, UK NCSC and partners publish AA23-341A assessing Star Blizzard as almost certainly subordinate to FSB Centre 18
  • GTIG publicly exposes COLDRIVER's LOSTKEYS stealer; the group then rapidly retools with NOROBOT and YESROBOT (ClickFix/COLDCOPY chain)
  • Zscaler ThreatLabz publishes BAITSWITCH and SIMPLEFIX analysis; GTIG follows in October 2025 with the COLDCOPY/NOROBOT/YESROBOT/MAYBEROBOT report
  • January 2026: first observed RedFlick variant, using a password-protected ZIP containing a VHDX with an LNK disguised as a PDF and an ssh.exe PermitLocalCommand MSI download, against Ukrainian targets with a tax-audit lure
  • March 2026: actor begins sending phishing from accounts on compromised cPanel/WordPress sites; conference lures (IISS, CES) target government, academia and tech, and an Atlantic Council-themed lure delivers the DarkSword iOS backdoor
  • April 2026: persistence evolves from one to three coordinated scheduled tasks with WebDAV-based dynamic payload delivery; finance-themed roundtable lure targets financial organizations
  • Digital Security Lab Ukraine documents a fake Ukraine Recovery Conference invitation campaign against Ukrainian CSOs: ZIP with VHDX and an LNK carrying PowerShell in its Description field, plus four scheduled tasks calling back to locked-ioc-20 and locked-ioc-13.
  • June 2026: MAMA Summit and Chatham House London Conference lures target diplomatic staff, think tanks, NGOs and parliament
  • July 2026: PDF-embedded PowerShell variant (magic header cAB, 208 bytes of Base64) delivered through USUBC-themed and Kyiv hotel water-outage lures
  • Payment Advice Note campaign uses a unique password-protected ZIP per target.
  • Mid-August 2026: image-based obfuscation added; a 'Payment Advice Note' lure targets an international financial organization
  • NCSC updates its Star Blizzard advisory, documenting the actor's use of EvilGinx to bypass MFA, lookalike domains and mail-forwarding rules for persistence.
  • Microsoft Threat Intelligence publishes the RedFlick analysis, reporting over 100 affected organizations, primarily in Ukraine then the US and UK

Update history

Sources cited

More from Star Blizzard

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated .

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