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Threat reportAPTTL-2026-2800

AhnLab ASEC August 2026 APT Attack Trend Report (South Korea): LNK Spear Phishing Delivering XenoRAT and Script-Based Backdoors

highACTIVE

AhnLab ASEC's monthly report on APT activity against South Korean targets describes six spear-phishing-driven attack types (A-F) in August 2026, mostly malicious LNK files that drop decoy documents and deploy AutoIt, PowerShell, VBS, BAT and Python backdoors, XenoRAT variants, and DLL side-loaded implants.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2800
Also known asAhnLab ASEC August 2026 Domestic APT Trend
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (LNK, PowerShell, Task Scheduler, curl.exe, mshta); Hancom Hangul Word Processor (HWP) documents with embedded OLE objects
MalwareBackdoor/Python.Agent, Downloader/BAT.Agent, Dropper/LNK.Generic, Rakhni, Trojan/HWP.Agent, Trojan/LNK.Agent, Trojan/PowerShell.Agent, Trojan/VBS.Agent, XenoRAT
ToolsAutoIt, curl.exe
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1055 Process Injection, T1056.001 Keylogging, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1059.005 Visual Basic, T1059.006 Python, T1059.010 AutoHotKey & AutoIT, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information and 4 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration, defense, research, general-enterprise, cryptocurrency
Target regionssouth korea
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-09-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2800 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 29 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Malicious LNK Launching PowerShell/CMD Payload Restoration — Exploitation Phase

Detects powershell.exe, pwsh.exe or cmd.exe spawned by explorer.exe (user double-click on a spear-phishing LNK) whose command line either references the LNK itself or combines hidden/bypass switches with decode or drop primitives (Base64/HEX restoration, ReadAllBytes, curl, %TEMP%/ProgramData staging). Covers the LNK-first delivery chains in ASEC August 2026 Types A, C, D and E, where the LNK rebuilds a decoy document plus AutoIt/VBS/BAT/Python backdoor components.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1566.001, T1204.002, T1059.001, T1059.003, T1140
  • Data sources: sysmon_eid1_process_creation, windows_security_4688, defender_for_endpoint_deviceprocessevents
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: medium

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
  ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe"
  (Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe" OR Image="*\\cmd.exe")
```explorer.exe parent = user opened the LNK; child interpreter is the embedded command```
| eval cl=lower(CommandLine)
| eval lnk_ref=if(like(cl,"%.lnk%"),1,0)
| eval hidden_ps=if(match(cl,"(-w(indowstyle)?[ ]+hidden|-nop|-ep[ ]+bypass|-executionpolicy[ ]+bypass)"),1,0)
| eval decode_or_drop=if(match(cl,"(frombase64string|readallbytes|writeallbytes|-enc|curl([.]exe)?[ ]|programdata|%temp%|[$]env:temp)"),1,0)
| where lnk_ref=1 OR (hidden_ps=1 AND decode_or_drop=1)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host, User, ParentImage, Image
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'explorer.exe'
| where FileName in~ ('powershell.exe','pwsh.exe','cmd.exe')
| extend CmdL = tolower(ProcessCommandLine)
| extend LnkRef = CmdL contains '.lnk'
| extend HiddenPs = CmdL matches regex @'(-w(indowstyle)?\s+hidden|-nop|-ep\s+bypass|-executionpolicy\s+bypass)'
| extend DecodeOrDrop = CmdL matches regex @'(frombase64string|readallbytes|writeallbytes|-enc|curl(\.exe)?\s|programdata|%temp%|\$env:temp)'
| where LnkRef or (HiddenPs and DecodeOrDrop)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: LNK-Launched PowerShell or CMD Restoring Embedded Payloads
id: 7c1e4a52-9b3d-4f60-a8e2-51d0c3b7a901
status: experimental
description: Detects powershell.exe, pwsh.exe or cmd.exe started by explorer.exe (user double-click on a malicious LNK) whose command line references the LNK itself or combines hidden or bypass switches with payload decode or drop primitives, as seen in ASEC August 2026 Types A, C, D and E.
references:
  - https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/95648/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-30
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1566.001
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.002
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.t1059.003
  - attack.defense-evasion
  - attack.t1140
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\cmd.exe'
  selection_lnk:
    CommandLine|contains: '.lnk'
  selection_hidden:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '-WindowStyle Hidden'
      - '-w hidden'
      - '-nop'
      - '-ep bypass'
      - '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass'
  selection_decode:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'FromBase64String'
      - 'ReadAllBytes'
      - 'WriteAllBytes'
      - '-enc'
      - 'curl'
      - 'ProgramData'
      - '%temp%'
      - '$env:temp'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_child and (selection_lnk or (selection_hidden and selection_decode))
falsepositives:
  - Administrators launching helper scripts from shortcuts that reference a .lnk path
  - Software installers started from Explorer that use hidden PowerShell
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Administrator or IT-tooling shortcuts that launch hidden PowerShell with staged scripts
  • Software installers started from Explorer that decode embedded payloads

Tuning notes: Allow-list known corporate shortcut scripts by CommandLine hash or signed parent path. Enable command-line auditing (4688) or Sysmon EID 1. For fleets with heavy Explorer-launched PowerShell, drop the lnk_ref branch and rely on the hidden+decode branch.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Native curl.exe / mshta.exe Payload Download and HTA Execution — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • AutoIt, pythonw and Windows Script Host Backdoor Execution from User-Writable Paths — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • ASEC-Listed C2 Domains and Script-Host Access to GitHub/Google Drive/Dropbox — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • HWP Document Spawning Shells or Temp-Path Executables (OLE Link Abuse) — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • DLL Side-Loading of [indicator] / [indicator] from User-Writable Paths — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • ASEC August 2026 Malware Hash Sightings (MD5 + Community SHA256) — C2 / Implant Presence · unlock with TL Creds
  • OneDrive-Disguised Scheduled Task Running Script Interpreters from User-Writable Paths — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • PubNub Channel C2 Traffic from Script Hosts and User-Path Processes — C2 · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-09-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 29 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2800.

Sample indicators (3 of 29)

  • Domain: cwmodern[.]com
  • File hash: 0099bf67cfa72030c1c317240441f3b8
  • Domain: dolgicap[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 29 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

29 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

2 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

The report names no threat actor.

AhnLab Security Emergency response Center (ASEC) published its August 2026 domestic APT trend report on 2026-09-30, classifying the month's APT attacks against South Korean targets by delivery chain. Spear phishing with malicious LNK files dominates.

Type A: an LNK embeds a PowerShell script that restores HEX-encoded data into a legitimate decoy document, a legitimate AutoIt interpreter and a malicious AutoIt script. The script runs from C:\ProgramData and persists through a scheduled task disguised as a OneDrive update. Commands are retrieved through PubNub channels, and collected data is sent out Base64-encoded.

Type B: Windows-native curl.exe downloads a malicious HTA file into %TEMP%. The HTA is hosted on GitHub repositories or Google Drive. It creates decoy files and a downloader named sys.dll, which loads infostealers, keyloggers and backdoors into memory.

Type C: LNK-embedded PowerShell writes Base64 data in %temp% and executes it, pulls decoy files and further malicious scripts from GitHub, creates scheduled tasks, exfiltrates system information and deploys XenoRAT-type malware.

Type D: LNK files masquerading as resumes or other documents carry a legitimate decoy plus malicious PowerShell. They generate VBS, BAT and PowerShell scripts registered in Task Scheduler, download supplementary files and use DLL side-loading to inject a backdoor into legitimate processes.

Type E: LNK files use CMD and PowerShell to copy curl.exe into %TEMP% and download further files, including a decoy PDF and a BAT downloader. The BAT installs Python packages and registers pythonw.exe in Task Scheduler, which runs a Python backdoor that executes attacker commands.

Type F: OLE objects embedded in HWP (Hangul Word Processor) documents carry attachment links. Opening a link writes object files to %TEMP% and launches a legitimate tool that loads a malicious version.dll by DLL side-loading, followed by BAT scripts and a PowerShell backdoor.

The report lists five MD5 hashes and five C2/download URLs across cwmodern.com, dolgicap.com and dpaper.dothome.co.kr. AhnLab detection names are Backdoor/Python.Agent, Downloader/BAT.Agent, Dropper/LNK.Generic, Trojan/LNK.Agent, Trojan/PowerShell.Agent, Trojan/VBS.Agent and Trojan/HWP.Agent. The article states no CVEs and no attribution. The related July 2026 report likewise names no group, uses the same Type A-F taxonomy, and cites GitHub, Google Drive, Dropbox and PubNub as infrastructure. Severity is an analyst assessment.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service; T1055 Process Injection; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1218.005 Mshta; T1574.001 DLL

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task

Collection

T1056.001 Keylogging

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1059.005 Visual Basic; T1059.006 Python; T1059.010 AutoHotKey & AutoIT; T1204.002 Malicious File

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

Command and Control

T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication

Initial Access

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block the listed C2/download URLs and domains (cwmodern.com, dolgicap.com, dpaper.dothome.co.kr) at proxy and DNS
  • Hunt for the listed MD5 hashes and for scheduled tasks named like OneDrive updates that run AutoIt, pythonw.exe or scripts from C:\ProgramData or %TEMP%
  • Quarantine inbound LNK attachments and LNK files inside archives; alert on LNK-spawned powershell.exe, cmd.exe, curl.exe or mshta.exe

Workarounds

  • Disable HWP OLE object auto-execution and enforce Protected View / attachment prompts
  • Block LNK and HTA attachments at the mail gateway

Longer-term hardening

  • Restrict execution of curl.exe, mshta.exe and wscript/cscript from user-writable paths via application control
  • Monitor or restrict outbound access to PubNub, GitHub raw content and Google Drive from endpoints that have no business need
  • Deploy EDR rules for DLL side-loading (version.dll, sys.dll loaded from %TEMP% or ProgramData) and for HWP documents with embedded OLE objects
  • Train users in Korean-language targets on resume- and document-themed spear phishing

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (LNK, PowerShell, Task Scheduler, curl.exe, mshta)
    Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific; abuse of built-in functionality
  • Hancom — Hangul Word Processor (HWP) documents with embedded OLE objects
    Vulnerable versions: Not specified in source

Timeline

  • During August 2026, Type E (curl.exe copy, BAT downloader, pythonw.exe Python backdoor via Task Scheduler) and Type F (HWP with embedded OLE object, locked-ioc-15 side-loading, BAT and PowerShell backdoor) observed (exact dates not stated in source)
  • During August 2026, Type C (GitHub-sourced scripts, scheduled tasks, XenoRAT variants) and Type D (resume-themed LNK, VBS/BAT/PowerShell in Task Scheduler, DLL side-loading injection) observed (exact dates not stated in source)
  • During August 2026, Type A (LNK PowerShell restoring decoy, AutoIt and malicious AutoIt script; OneDrive-update-disguised scheduled task; PubNub commands) and Type B (curl.exe pulling HTA from GitHub/Google Drive; locked-ioc-16 in-memory loader) observed (exact dates not stated in source)
  • AhnLab ASEC begins the August 2026 monitoring window for domestic (South Korea) APT attacks; observed activity is spear phishing with malicious LNK files (approximate start of the reporting month)
  • End of the August 2026 monitoring window covered by the ASEC report
  • AhnLab ASEC publishes the August 2026 domestic APT attack trends report with MD5 hashes, C2 URLs and detection names

Sources cited

Previous and next in apt

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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