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Threat reportAPTTL-2026-2795

Star Blizzard (FSB) RedFlick mass-phishing campaigns deliver CosmicPulse backdoor, expanding beyond Ukraine

highACTIVE

Microsoft reports that Russian FSB-affiliated Star Blizzard (SEABORGIUM, Callisto Group, TA446, COLDRIVER) shifted from targeted spear-phishing to mass-mailing, running at least 13 large campaigns since January 2026 against 100+ organizations, mainly in the US and UK plus Ukrainian entities. The RedFlick delivery technique uses LNK/VHDX/MSI chains and scheduled tasks to deploy the custom Python backdoor CosmicPulse after a single user interaction.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2795
Also known asRedFlick, CosmicPulse
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows endpoints (social-engineering delivery; no CVE)
AttributionStar Blizzard (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusRussia
MalwareCosmicPulse, NOROBOT, RedFlick, YESROBOT
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1036.008 Masquerade File Type, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1059.006 Python, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer and 10 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration, diplomacy, think tanks, ngo, finance, research, public-policy, news - media, academia
Target regionsunited states of america, united kingdom, ukraine, Europe
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2795 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 33 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: RedFlick — OpenSSH PermitLocalCommand Abuse to Download MSI

Detects ssh.exe launched with the PermitLocalCommand option. In the January 2026 RedFlick chain (ZIP > VHDX > LNK > BAT) Star Blizzard abuses OpenSSH LocalCommand to run a download of the MSI that installs the CosmicPulse downloader. PermitLocalCommand is almost never used on Windows endpoints, so this is a high-fidelity indirect-command-execution signal.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1202, T1059.003, T1105
  • Data sources: sysmon, defender_xdr_DeviceProcessEvents
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 (Image="*\\ssh.exe" OR OriginalFileName="ssh.exe") CommandLine="*PermitLocalCommand*"
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parent_images values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_cmds by host, User
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "ssh.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "ssh.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "PermitLocalCommand"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: OpenSSH PermitLocalCommand Abuse to Run Payload Download (RedFlick)
id: 7c1e4a92-3b5d-4f68-a9d1-2e8f60b7c301
status: experimental
description: Detects ssh.exe launched with the PermitLocalCommand option, abused by Star Blizzard's RedFlick LNK chain to run a LocalCommand that downloads an MSI from actor infrastructure.
references:
  - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/09/29/star-blizzard-refines-phishing-and-malware-delivery-with-the-redflick-technique/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-29
tags:
  - attack.defense-evasion
  - attack.t1202
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.003
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: '\ssh.exe'
    - OriginalFileName: 'ssh.exe'
  selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains: 'PermitLocalCommand'
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Administrators using OpenSSH LocalCommand for legitimate session hooks (rare on Windows)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Developers or administrators using OpenSSH LocalCommand for legitimate session hooks or tunnel automation

Tuning notes: Allowlist known dev/admin hosts and service accounts that legitimately use LocalCommand. Escalate when the parent is explorer.exe, conhost.exe or cmd.exe, or when the same host recently mounted a VHDX or extracted a password-protected archive.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • RedFlick — Hidden conhost.exe --headless Launching Download or Script Stages · unlock with TL Creds
  • RedFlick — Control Panel Item / Control_RunDLL Loaded From User-Writable or WebDAV Path · unlock with TL Creds
  • RedFlick — WebClient Service Start and WebDAV UNC Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • RedFlick — PowerShell Base64 Payload Extracted From PDF (cAB Magic Header) · unlock with TL Creds
  • CosmicPulse — Registry Key HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis Written · unlock with TL Creds
  • Star Blizzard RedFlick — DNS Resolution or Connection to Known C2 Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • RedFlick — CosmicPulse Scheduled Task Names Created · unlock with TL Creds
  • CosmicPulse — Python Interpreter from User-Writable Path Beaconing to Public IPs · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 33 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2795.

Sample indicators (3 of 33)

  • IP address: 103.245.231[.]248
  • Domain: etia[.]ca
  • File hash: 9707a8694e954e9ee13e839d6e5905ce626c0837c7c90da6d1025bfbe152866b

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 33 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

33 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

On 2026-09-29 Microsoft Threat Intelligence published analysis of Star Blizzard's new RedFlick malware delivery technique. Star Blizzard, attributed to the Russian FSB (Centre 18, per CISA advisory AA23-341A), historically ran low-volume, targeted credential-phishing spear-phishing. Since January 2026 Microsoft counted at least 13 larger campaigns, each with tens to hundreds of emails - a scale not previously seen from the actor - affecting more than 100 organizations, mostly in the United States and United Kingdom, in government, diplomacy, research/think tanks, NGOs, public policy, journalism and financial sectors tied to Ukraine. January-February 2026 campaigns focused on Ukrainian targets; from March 2026 targeting broadened globally.

Lures were varied: Ukrainian tax-audit result notifications and fine-payment debit notices, exclusive event invitations (IISS, CES, Atlantic Council, Chatham House, USUBC roundtable, Ukraine Recovery Conference), M&A and diplomatic-forum discussions, Kyiv hotel water-supply shutdown notices, and 'Payment Advice Note' messages to international financial organizations. Mail was sent from accounts the actor created on compromised cPanel/WordPress websites (reusing account names across compromised domains), a departure from earlier reliance on Proton Mail and Microsoft consumer accounts. Initial messages were often attachment-free; a follow-up delivered a password-protected RAR/ZIP (nested ZIP-in-RAR also seen), with the password supplied as an image in the email.

January 2026 chain: password-protected ZIP containing a VHDX holding a malicious LNK disguised as a PDF, a hidden BAT script and a decoy PDF. Opening the LNK launches conhost.exe hidden, cmd.exe runs the BAT, the decoy PDF opens, and ssh.exe is abused with PermitLocalCommand/LocalCommand to download an MSI from actor infrastructure. The MSI uses control.exe to create a scheduled task that pulls a CosmicPulse CPL downloader (Control Panel applet DLL; tracked as NOROBOT/BAITSWITCH/YESROBOT lineage in reporting). By April 2026 the MSI created three scheduled tasks: 'Internet Quality Test Connection' (sends Base64/UTF-16-encoded computer name, network name and username to C2 and runs remote DLLs via Shell32 Control_RunDLL over WebDAV UNC paths), 'Network Configuration Manager' (invokes net.exe to start WebClient/WebDAV) and 'System Health Monitor' (control.exe to run CosmicPulse downloader stages from C2). In July 2026 a variant used an LNK that ran conhost.exe with curl to fetch a PDF from the actor's server; PowerShell located the magic header 'cAB' in the PDF, extracted 208 bytes of Base64, decoded and executed it to download and install the MSI.

CosmicPulse is a Python-based backdoor: the CPL downloader retrieves two ZIPs from C2 - the first with a Python 3.8 64-bit package and bootstrapper, the second with an encrypted CosmicPulse payload. The bootstrapper reads an encrypted AES key from HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis, decrypts it with AES-ECB using an embedded key, decodes the payload and runs it, giving the operator remote command execution and persistent access. Microsoft detections: Trojan:Script/RedFlick, Backdoor:Script/CosmicPulse, Backdoor:Python/CosmicPulse, plus behavioral alerts for suspicious LNK execution from a container, curl download, msiexec and Control Panel item use. C2 infrastructure rotated roughly monthly; secure-dns-hub.com remained active as of 2026-09-29.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1036.008 Masquerade File Type; T1112 Modify Registry; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1202 Indirect Command Execution; T1218.002 Control Panel; T1218.007 Msiexec; T1564.003 Hidden Window

Discovery

T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1059.006 Python; T1204.002 Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Initial Access

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains; T1584 Compromise Infrastructure

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Hunt for scheduled tasks named 'Internet Quality Test Connection', 'Network Configuration Manager' and 'System Health Monitor'
  • Block the listed domains and IPs at proxy/DNS/firewall and search historic logs for them
  • Quarantine password-protected RAR/ZIP, VHDX and LNK attachments; isolate affected hosts and preserve email threads and archives
  • Search for the registry key HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis and Python 3.8 packages in user-writable paths

Workarounds

  • Alert on ssh.exe with PermitLocalCommand=yes and LocalCommand, and on conhost.exe launching curl
  • Block or alert on VHDX mounting and LNK execution originating from containers

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy phishing-resistant authentication and Conditional Access with continuous access evaluation
  • Enable Defender for Office 365 Safe Links (recheck on click), Safe Attachments and zero-hour auto-purge
  • Enable EDR in block mode, cloud-delivered protection, attack surface reduction rules and network protection
  • Restrict outbound SSH via Windows Firewall; train users on password-protected archive lures

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows endpoints (social-engineering delivery; no CVE)
    Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific

Timeline

Last updated · 2 updates · revalidated 1×

  • CISA/Microsoft advisory AA23-341A attributes Star Blizzard (SEABORGIUM/COLDRIVER) to FSB Centre 18 and documents its worldwide spear-phishing (month-level context for later escalation)
  • Late May 2025: Google Threat Intelligence observes COLDRIVER deploying the NOROBOT loader and the Python YESROBOT backdoor, ancestors of CosmicPulse, followed in June by MAYBEROBOT.
  • January 2026: first RedFlick-era mass campaign against Ukrainian targets using tax-audit lures; ZIP > VHDX > LNK > ssh.exe MSI download chain (infra locked-ioc-27, locked-ioc-11); date is month-level
  • February 2026: continued Ukraine-focused campaigns with new infrastructure (locked-ioc-28, locked-ioc-26, locked-ioc-17, locked-ioc-12); date is month-level
  • March 2026: DarkSword iOS exploit-kit links seen in an Atlantic Council-themed Star Blizzard mailing; month-level date.
  • March 2026: targeting expands beyond Ukraine to global think tanks and policy organizations (Atlantic Council-themed lures; locked-ioc-18, locked-ioc-13, locked-ioc-14); date is month-level
  • April 2026: MSI installers create the three RedFlick scheduled tasks (Internet Quality Test Connection, Network Configuration Manager, System Health Monitor); infra locked-ioc-20, locked-ioc-19; date is month-level
  • June 2026: Chatham House / Ukraine Recovery Conference-themed lures with password-protected RAR (locked-ioc-23, locked-ioc-15); date is month-level
  • July 2026: new variant hides a Base64 PowerShell payload (208 bytes after magic header 'cAB') inside a PDF fetched via curl; USUBC roundtable lure; infra locked-ioc-24, locked-ioc-21, locked-ioc-9, locked-ioc-16; date is month-level
  • August 2026: 'Payment Advice Note' campaign against financial organizations (locked-ioc-25, locked-ioc-22); date is month-level
  • Microsoft publishes RedFlick/CosmicPulse analysis (13+ campaigns, 100+ organizations); locked-ioc-9 still active

Update history

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated .

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