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Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-2852

The First 24 Hours of a Ransomware Intrusion: Exfiltration, Credential Theft and Backup Targeting (Akira, REDBIKE, AGENDA)

highACTIVE

Huntress-hosted guest article walks through the first 24 hours of a ransomware incident, citing Mandiant M-Trends 2026 (14-day median dwell time; 22-second initial-access-to-ransomware-affiliate hand-off) and the CISA/FBI Akira advisory (data theft completed in just over two hours in some cases). First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2852, CVE-2024-40766, CVE-2023-28252, CVE-2024-37085, CVE-2023-27532, CVE-2024-40711
Also known asAkira ransomware, Akira_v2, Megazord
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2024-40766 (added ), CVE-2023-28252 (added ), CVE-2024-37085 (added ), CVE-2023-27532 (added ), CVE-2024-40711 (added )
EPSSCVE-2024-40711: 90.3% (99.7th percentile); CVE-2023-27532: 81.3% (99.6th percentile); CVE-2023-28252: 48.9% (98.8th percentile)
Affected productsSonicWall SonicOS SSL VPN; Veeam Backup & Replication; VMware ESXi; Microsoft Windows
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-284, CWE-502, CWE-305
AttributionAkira (medium confidence)
MalwareAgendaCrypt, Akira, Akira (ELF), Akira _v2 - S1194, Cobalt Strike, Mega, Megazord - S1191, MimiKatz, POORTRY, STONESTOP, STOP Ransomware, SystemBC - S9001
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003.001 LSASS Memory, T1003.002 Security Account Manager, T1003.003 NTDS, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1110.003 Password Spraying, T1133 External Remote Services, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1482 Domain Trust Discovery, T1489 Service Stop and 7 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorseducation, manufacturing, information-technology, health, finance, food-and-agriculture
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-03, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2852 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 31 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Akira Post-Exploitation — Credential Dumping (LSASS, SAM, NTDS, LaZagne, NetExec) and Domain Discovery

Detects the credential theft toolkit named in the CISA Akira advisory: suspicious LSASS process access (Sysmon 10), Mimikatz/LaZagne/Impacket/NetExec execution, SAM/SYSTEM hive export via reg save, NTDS extraction via ntdsutil IFM, and nltest /dclist and /DOMAIN_TRUSTS domain discovery.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1003.001, T1003.002, T1003.003, T1555, T1482
  • Data sources: sysmon_eventcode_1, sysmon_eventcode_10, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceEvents
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
    ((EventCode=10 TargetImage="*lsass.exe" (GrantedAccess="0x1010" OR GrantedAccess="0x1038" OR GrantedAccess="0x1410" OR GrantedAccess="0x143a" OR GrantedAccess="0x1fffff") NOT (SourceImage="*MsMpEng.exe" OR SourceImage="*MsSense.exe" OR SourceImage="*csrss.exe" OR SourceImage="*wininit.exe" OR SourceImage="*svchost.exe" OR SourceImage="*taskmgr.exe"))
    OR (EventCode=1 (Image="*mimikatz.exe" OR Image="*lazagne.exe" OR Image="*secretsdump.exe" OR OriginalFileName="mimikatz.exe" OR OriginalFileName="lazagne.exe" OR CommandLine="*sekurlsa::*" OR CommandLine="*lsadump::*" OR CommandLine="*kerberos::list*" OR CommandLine="*secretsdump*" OR CommandLine="*--dpapi*" OR (Image="*ntdsutil.exe" CommandLine="*ifm*") OR (Image="*reg.exe" CommandLine="* save *" (CommandLine="*hklm*" OR CommandLine="*hkey_local_machine*") (CommandLine="*sam*" OR CommandLine="*system*" OR CommandLine="*security*")) OR (Image="*nltest.exe" (CommandLine="*dclist*" OR CommandLine="*domain_trusts*")))))
| eval technique=case(EventCode=10,"T1003.001 LSASS memory access", like(lower(CommandLine),"%nltest%"),"T1482 domain discovery", like(lower(CommandLine),"%lazagne%"),"T1555 password stores", like(lower(CommandLine),"%ntdsutil%"),"T1003.003 NTDS", like(lower(CommandLine),"% save %"),"T1003.002 SAM/SYSTEM hive export", true(),"T1003 credential dumping tool")
| table _time host User EventCode technique SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess Image ParentImage CommandLine

Microsoft KQL

let LsassAccess = DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == 'OpenProcessApiCall' and FileName =~ 'lsass.exe'
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ('MsMpEng.exe','MsSense.exe','csrss.exe','wininit.exe','svchost.exe','taskmgr.exe','lsass.exe')
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Technique = 'T1003.001 LSASS memory access', Process = InitiatingProcessFileName, CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
let Tooling = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ('mimikatz.exe','lazagne.exe','secretsdump.exe','nxc.exe','netexec.exe')
    or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in~ ('mimikatz.exe','lazagne.exe')
    or ProcessCommandLine has_any ('sekurlsa::','lsadump::','kerberos::list','secretsdump','--dpapi')
    or (FileName =~ 'ntdsutil.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has 'ifm')
    or (FileName =~ 'reg.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has 'save' and ProcessCommandLine has_any ('hklm','hkey_local_machine') and ProcessCommandLine has_any ('sam','system','security'))
    or (FileName =~ 'nltest.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has_any ('dclist','domain_trusts'))
| extend Technique = case(
    FileName =~ 'nltest.exe', 'T1482 domain discovery',
    FileName =~ 'lazagne.exe', 'T1555 password stores',
    FileName =~ 'ntdsutil.exe', 'T1003.003 NTDS',
    FileName =~ 'reg.exe', 'T1003.002 SAM/SYSTEM hive export',
    'T1003 credential dumping tool')
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Technique, Process = FileName, CommandLine = ProcessCommandLine;
union LsassAccess, Tooling
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Credential Dumping and Domain Discovery Tooling Used by Akira Operators
id: 18c5d9e3-7b2a-4f64-9d01-a5e83b6c2f70
status: experimental
description: Detects Mimikatz, LaZagne, Impacket secretsdump and NetExec credential theft, SAM and SYSTEM hive export with reg save, NTDS extraction with ntdsutil IFM, and nltest domain controller and trust discovery, as documented for Akira intrusions in CISA AA24-109A.
references:
  - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-109a
  - https://www.huntress.com/blog/what-happens-during-a-ransomware-attack
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-03
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1003.001
  - attack.t1003.002
  - attack.t1003.003
  - attack.t1555
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1482
  - attack.tool.mimikatz
  - attack.tool.lazagne
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_tool_image:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\mimikatz.exe'
      - '\lazagne.exe'
      - '\secretsdump.exe'
      - '\nxc.exe'
      - '\netexec.exe'
  selection_tool_original:
    OriginalFileName:
      - 'mimikatz.exe'
      - 'lazagne.exe'
  selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'sekurlsa::'
      - 'lsadump::'
      - 'kerberos::list'
      - 'secretsdump'
      - '--dpapi'
  selection_ntdsutil:
    Image|endswith: '\ntdsutil.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: 'ifm'
  selection_reg_img:
    Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
  selection_reg_save:
    CommandLine|contains: ' save '
  selection_reg_hive:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'hklm\sam'
      - 'hklm\system'
      - 'hklm\security'
      - 'hkey_local_machine\sam'
      - 'hkey_local_machine\system'
  selection_nltest:
    Image|endswith: '\nltest.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'dclist'
      - 'domain_trusts'
  condition: 1 of selection_tool_* or selection_cli or selection_ntdsutil or selection_nltest or (selection_reg_img and selection_reg_save and selection_reg_hive)
falsepositives:
  - Authorized red team or penetration test tooling
  - Administrators running nltest for domain troubleshooting
  - Backup software exporting registry hives
level: high

Known false positives:

  • EDR, AV or backup agents opening lsass.exe with high access masks
  • Domain administrators running nltest /dclist during troubleshooting
  • Authorized penetration testing

Tuning notes: Add your EDR and AV agent images to the LSASS SourceImage exclusions. Treat nltest as medium severity on its own and escalate when it follows a credential-tool hit on the same host within an hour. Enable Sysmon EventCode 10 with an lsass.exe TargetImage rule and ProcessVersionInfo enrichment so renamed Mimikatz is still caught.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Akira Exploitation — Veeam Backup Service Spawning Shells or Account Management (CVE-2024-40711, CVE-2023-27532) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Akira Impact Preparation — Shadow Copy Deletion, Backup/Service Stop and Firewall Disable · unlock with TL Creds
  • Akira C2 and Tunneling — Ngrok, Cloudflared, LogMeIn and Community-Observed Sibling Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • Akira Exploitation — ESX Admins Group Creation or Rename (CVE-2024-37085) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Akira Credential Access — Kerberoasting (RC4 Service Ticket Bursts) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Akira Ransomware Impact — Ransom Notes, Encrypted File Extensions and Known Encryptor Hashes · unlock with TL Creds
  • Akira Initial Access — VPN Password Spraying and Brute Force (No-MFA VPN) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Akira Exfiltration — RClone, WinSCP, FileZilla, Password-Protected Archives and Non-Browser Mega Traffic · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-03, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 31 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2852.

Sample indicators (2 of 31)

  • File hash: bfd5fc6cd3dea74738ac7025fa14ea844f400708df2293572796568f65bd6b61
  • File hash: 3298d203c2acb68c474e5fdad8379181890b4403d6491c523c13730129be3f75

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 31 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

31 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

The CISA Akira update documents the VPN-without-MFA vector, edge and backup-software CVEs, exfiltration tooling (FileZilla, WinRAR, WinSCP, RClone, Mega, Ngrok) and credential theft (Mimikatz, LaZagne, LSASS, Kerberoasting).

This item is incident-response guidance rather than a new variant disclosure, but it consolidates operator tradecraft that is corroborated by the CISA #StopRansomware Akira advisory (AA24-109A, originally published 2024-04-18 and updated 2025-11-13 with the FBI, DC3, HHS, Europol EC3 and French, German and Dutch agencies).

Initial access and speed. The CISA update names VPN services without multi-factor authentication as a primary Akira entry vector, together with password spraying (SharpDomainSpray) and brute-forcing of VPN endpoints. Edge and infrastructure CVEs used for initial access or escalation are CVE-2024-40766 (SonicWall, improper access control), CVE-2023-28252 (heap-based buffer overflow), CVE-2024-37085 (authentication bypass), CVE-2023-27532 and CVE-2024-40711 (Veeam Backup; the latter a deserialization flaw). Mandiant M-Trends 2026 reports the median time from an initial access broker foothold to hand-off to a ransomware affiliate fell to 22 seconds in 2025 (from over eight hours in 2022), while global median dwell time rose to 14 days from 11.

Credential theft and discovery. The article cites Mimikatz and LaZagne for credential dumping, LSASS memory extraction and Kerberoasting against service accounts. CISA adds SAM and NTDS dumping, NetExec (including the --dpapi option), Impacket and nltest domain-controller and trust enumeration (nltest /dclist:, nltest /DOMAIN_TRUSTS). Lateral movement and C2 tooling named by CISA includes Cobalt Strike, SystemBC, POORTRY and STONESTOP loaders, LogMeIn, OpenSSH, Cloudflared and Ngrok.

Exfiltration. Staging and compression use FileZilla, WinRAR and 7-zip; transfer uses WinSCP, RClone, FTP/SFTP and the Mega cloud storage service; Ngrok provides encrypted tunnels that bypass perimeter monitoring. CISA documents data theft completed in just over two hours from initial access in some cases. Because these are legitimate tools, the article advises hunting on outbound volume and destination (unusual volume to a consumer cloud endpoint off-hours) rather than on signatures.

Impact and backup targeting. M-Trends 2026 reports operators actively targeting backup infrastructure, identity services and virtualization management planes; volume shadow copies are frequently removed with PowerShell. CISA documents PowerShell and WMIC used to disable services, firewall modification, and encryptors: Akira/Akira_v2 (.akira, .akiranew, .aki; Rust-based), the deprecated Megazord variant (.powerranges) and a Linux/ESXi encryptor that also targets Nutanix AHV. Ransom notes are fn.txt or akira_readme.txt. CISA states Akira has claimed about $244.17 million in proceeds as of late September 2025 and primarily targets small and medium-sized businesses, with a notable preference for educational institutions.

The article also names REDBIKE and AGENDA in the context of backup-infrastructure targeting; it provides no specific IPs, hashes or hostnames. The two SHA-256 hashes below come from the CISA advisory, not the article. The article's statistics are second-hand citations; Akira details were corroborated against the CISA advisory, and M-Trends figures against the Google Cloud M-Trends 2026 coverage.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003.001 LSASS Memory; T1003.002 Security Account Manager; T1003.003 NTDS; T1110.003 Password Spraying; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores; T1558.003 Kerberoasting

Exfiltration

T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol; T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Command and Control

T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1572 Protocol Tunneling

Discovery

T1482 Domain Trust Discovery

Impact

T1489 Service Stop; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

Collection

T1560.001 Archive via Utility

Defense Impairment

T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall

Remediation

Patches

  • Patch CVE-2024-40766 (SonicWall), CVE-2024-37085 (VMware ESXi), CVE-2023-27532 and CVE-2024-40711 (Veeam Backup) and CVE-2023-28252 (Windows CLFS)

Immediate actions

  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all VPN and remote-access paths
  • Isolate affected hosts via EDR; disable compromised accounts and reset krbtgt twice if credential theft is confirmed
  • Hunt outbound volume and destination for FileZilla, WinSCP, RClone, Mega and Ngrok use
  • Verify backup server does not authenticate against the compromised domain and that immutability is enabled

Workarounds

  • Close VPN access without MFA until MFA is enforced
  • Restrict and monitor remote administration and tunneling tools (Ngrok, Cloudflared, LogMeIn)

Longer-term hardening

  • Test a full end-to-end backup restore and keep offline/immutable backups
  • Document incident decision authority with named deputies and run tabletop exercises
  • Rebuild identity infrastructure (clean domain controller) first during recovery
  • Rotate service-account passwords that predate the intrusion

Affected and fixed versions

Timeline

  • Per Mandiant M-Trends 2026, median initial-access-to-ransomware-affiliate hand-off was still over eight hours as recently as 2022 (approximate year; no exact date given)
  • CISA, FBI and partners publish the original #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware advisory (AA24-109A)
  • As of late September 2025, Akira has claimed approximately $244.17 million in ransomware proceeds (CISA; approximate date)
  • AA24-109A updated with new TTPs and IOCs: VPN without MFA, new CVEs, Akira_v2, Linux/ESXi encryptor, SystemBC, Cloudflared and other tooling; co-sealed by Europol EC3 and French, German and Dutch agencies
  • Mandiant M-Trends 2026 reports global median dwell time of 14 days (up from 11) and a 22-second median initial-access-to-ransomware-affiliate hand-off in 2025 (month approximate)
  • Huntress publishes guest article 'The First 24 Hours: What Actually Happens When Ransomware Lands' by UnderDefense CEO Nazar Tymoshyk

Sources cited

More from Akira

Other reports on CVE-2024-40766

Previous and next in ransomware

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.

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