Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-2852
The First 24 Hours of a Ransomware Intrusion: Exfiltration, Credential Theft and Backup Targeting (Akira, REDBIKE, AGENDA)
Huntress-hosted guest article walks through the first 24 hours of a ransomware incident, citing Mandiant M-Trends 2026 (14-day median dwell time; 22-second initial-access-to-ransomware-affiliate hand-off) and the CISA/FBI Akira advisory (data theft completed in just over two hours in some cases). First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2852, CVE-2024-40766, CVE-2023-28252, CVE-2024-37085, CVE-2023-27532, CVE-2024-40711 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Akira ransomware, Akira_v2, Megazord |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Exploitation status | Linked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2024-40766 (added ), CVE-2023-28252 (added ), CVE-2024-37085 (added ), CVE-2023-27532 (added ), CVE-2024-40711 (added ) |
| EPSS | CVE-2024-40711: 90.3% (99.7th percentile); CVE-2023-27532: 81.3% (99.6th percentile); CVE-2023-28252: 48.9% (98.8th percentile) |
| Affected products | SonicWall SonicOS SSL VPN; Veeam Backup & Replication; VMware ESXi; Microsoft Windows |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-284, CWE-502, CWE-305 |
| Attribution | Akira (medium confidence) |
| Malware | AgendaCrypt, Akira, Akira (ELF), Akira _v2 - S1194, Cobalt Strike, Mega, Megazord - S1191, MimiKatz, POORTRY, STONESTOP, STOP Ransomware, SystemBC - S9001 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1003.001 LSASS Memory, T1003.002 Security Account Manager, T1003.003 NTDS, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1110.003 Password Spraying, T1133 External Remote Services, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1482 Domain Trust Discovery, T1489 Service Stop and 7 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | education, manufacturing, information-technology, health, finance, food-and-agriculture |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-03, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2852 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 31 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Akira Post-Exploitation — Credential Dumping (LSASS, SAM, NTDS, LaZagne, NetExec) and Domain Discovery
Detects the credential theft toolkit named in the CISA Akira advisory: suspicious LSASS process access (Sysmon 10), Mimikatz/LaZagne/Impacket/NetExec execution, SAM/SYSTEM hive export via reg save, NTDS extraction via ntdsutil IFM, and nltest /dclist and /DOMAIN_TRUSTS domain discovery.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1003.001, T1003.002, T1003.003, T1555, T1482
- Data sources: sysmon_eventcode_1, sysmon_eventcode_10, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceEvents
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
((EventCode=10 TargetImage="*lsass.exe" (GrantedAccess="0x1010" OR GrantedAccess="0x1038" OR GrantedAccess="0x1410" OR GrantedAccess="0x143a" OR GrantedAccess="0x1fffff") NOT (SourceImage="*MsMpEng.exe" OR SourceImage="*MsSense.exe" OR SourceImage="*csrss.exe" OR SourceImage="*wininit.exe" OR SourceImage="*svchost.exe" OR SourceImage="*taskmgr.exe"))
OR (EventCode=1 (Image="*mimikatz.exe" OR Image="*lazagne.exe" OR Image="*secretsdump.exe" OR OriginalFileName="mimikatz.exe" OR OriginalFileName="lazagne.exe" OR CommandLine="*sekurlsa::*" OR CommandLine="*lsadump::*" OR CommandLine="*kerberos::list*" OR CommandLine="*secretsdump*" OR CommandLine="*--dpapi*" OR (Image="*ntdsutil.exe" CommandLine="*ifm*") OR (Image="*reg.exe" CommandLine="* save *" (CommandLine="*hklm*" OR CommandLine="*hkey_local_machine*") (CommandLine="*sam*" OR CommandLine="*system*" OR CommandLine="*security*")) OR (Image="*nltest.exe" (CommandLine="*dclist*" OR CommandLine="*domain_trusts*")))))
| eval technique=case(EventCode=10,"T1003.001 LSASS memory access", like(lower(CommandLine),"%nltest%"),"T1482 domain discovery", like(lower(CommandLine),"%lazagne%"),"T1555 password stores", like(lower(CommandLine),"%ntdsutil%"),"T1003.003 NTDS", like(lower(CommandLine),"% save %"),"T1003.002 SAM/SYSTEM hive export", true(),"T1003 credential dumping tool")
| table _time host User EventCode technique SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess Image ParentImage CommandLineMicrosoft KQL
let LsassAccess = DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == 'OpenProcessApiCall' and FileName =~ 'lsass.exe'
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ('MsMpEng.exe','MsSense.exe','csrss.exe','wininit.exe','svchost.exe','taskmgr.exe','lsass.exe')
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Technique = 'T1003.001 LSASS memory access', Process = InitiatingProcessFileName, CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
let Tooling = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ('mimikatz.exe','lazagne.exe','secretsdump.exe','nxc.exe','netexec.exe')
or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in~ ('mimikatz.exe','lazagne.exe')
or ProcessCommandLine has_any ('sekurlsa::','lsadump::','kerberos::list','secretsdump','--dpapi')
or (FileName =~ 'ntdsutil.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has 'ifm')
or (FileName =~ 'reg.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has 'save' and ProcessCommandLine has_any ('hklm','hkey_local_machine') and ProcessCommandLine has_any ('sam','system','security'))
or (FileName =~ 'nltest.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has_any ('dclist','domain_trusts'))
| extend Technique = case(
FileName =~ 'nltest.exe', 'T1482 domain discovery',
FileName =~ 'lazagne.exe', 'T1555 password stores',
FileName =~ 'ntdsutil.exe', 'T1003.003 NTDS',
FileName =~ 'reg.exe', 'T1003.002 SAM/SYSTEM hive export',
'T1003 credential dumping tool')
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Technique, Process = FileName, CommandLine = ProcessCommandLine;
union LsassAccess, Tooling
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Credential Dumping and Domain Discovery Tooling Used by Akira Operators
id: 18c5d9e3-7b2a-4f64-9d01-a5e83b6c2f70
status: experimental
description: Detects Mimikatz, LaZagne, Impacket secretsdump and NetExec credential theft, SAM and SYSTEM hive export with reg save, NTDS extraction with ntdsutil IFM, and nltest domain controller and trust discovery, as documented for Akira intrusions in CISA AA24-109A.
references:
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-109a
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/what-happens-during-a-ransomware-attack
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-03
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.t1003.002
- attack.t1003.003
- attack.t1555
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1482
- attack.tool.mimikatz
- attack.tool.lazagne
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_tool_image:
Image|endswith:
- '\mimikatz.exe'
- '\lazagne.exe'
- '\secretsdump.exe'
- '\nxc.exe'
- '\netexec.exe'
selection_tool_original:
OriginalFileName:
- 'mimikatz.exe'
- 'lazagne.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'sekurlsa::'
- 'lsadump::'
- 'kerberos::list'
- 'secretsdump'
- '--dpapi'
selection_ntdsutil:
Image|endswith: '\ntdsutil.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'ifm'
selection_reg_img:
Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
selection_reg_save:
CommandLine|contains: ' save '
selection_reg_hive:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'hklm\sam'
- 'hklm\system'
- 'hklm\security'
- 'hkey_local_machine\sam'
- 'hkey_local_machine\system'
selection_nltest:
Image|endswith: '\nltest.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'dclist'
- 'domain_trusts'
condition: 1 of selection_tool_* or selection_cli or selection_ntdsutil or selection_nltest or (selection_reg_img and selection_reg_save and selection_reg_hive)
falsepositives:
- Authorized red team or penetration test tooling
- Administrators running nltest for domain troubleshooting
- Backup software exporting registry hives
level: highKnown false positives:
- EDR, AV or backup agents opening lsass.exe with high access masks
- Domain administrators running nltest /dclist during troubleshooting
- Authorized penetration testing
Tuning notes: Add your EDR and AV agent images to the LSASS SourceImage exclusions. Treat nltest as medium severity on its own and escalate when it follows a credential-tool hit on the same host within an hour. Enable Sysmon EventCode 10 with an lsass.exe TargetImage rule and ProcessVersionInfo enrichment so renamed Mimikatz is still caught.
- Akira Exploitation — Veeam Backup Service Spawning Shells or Account Management (CVE-2024-40711, CVE-2023-27532) · unlock with TL Creds
- Akira Impact Preparation — Shadow Copy Deletion, Backup/Service Stop and Firewall Disable · unlock with TL Creds
- Akira C2 and Tunneling — Ngrok, Cloudflared, LogMeIn and Community-Observed Sibling Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
- Akira Exploitation — ESX Admins Group Creation or Rename (CVE-2024-37085) · unlock with TL Creds
- Akira Credential Access — Kerberoasting (RC4 Service Ticket Bursts) · unlock with TL Creds
- Akira Ransomware Impact — Ransom Notes, Encrypted File Extensions and Known Encryptor Hashes · unlock with TL Creds
- Akira Initial Access — VPN Password Spraying and Brute Force (No-MFA VPN) · unlock with TL Creds
- Akira Exfiltration — RClone, WinSCP, FileZilla, Password-Protected Archives and Non-Browser Mega Traffic · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-03, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 31 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2852.
Sample indicators (2 of 31)
- File hash:
bfd5fc6cd3dea74738ac7025fa14ea844f400708df2293572796568f65bd6b61 - File hash:
3298d203c2acb68c474e5fdad8379181890b4403d6491c523c13730129be3f75
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 31 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
The CISA Akira update documents the VPN-without-MFA vector, edge and backup-software CVEs, exfiltration tooling (FileZilla, WinRAR, WinSCP, RClone, Mega, Ngrok) and credential theft (Mimikatz, LaZagne, LSASS, Kerberoasting).
This item is incident-response guidance rather than a new variant disclosure, but it consolidates operator tradecraft that is corroborated by the CISA #StopRansomware Akira advisory (AA24-109A, originally published 2024-04-18 and updated 2025-11-13 with the FBI, DC3, HHS, Europol EC3 and French, German and Dutch agencies).
Initial access and speed. The CISA update names VPN services without multi-factor authentication as a primary Akira entry vector, together with password spraying (SharpDomainSpray) and brute-forcing of VPN endpoints. Edge and infrastructure CVEs used for initial access or escalation are CVE-2024-40766 (SonicWall, improper access control), CVE-2023-28252 (heap-based buffer overflow), CVE-2024-37085 (authentication bypass), CVE-2023-27532 and CVE-2024-40711 (Veeam Backup; the latter a deserialization flaw). Mandiant M-Trends 2026 reports the median time from an initial access broker foothold to hand-off to a ransomware affiliate fell to 22 seconds in 2025 (from over eight hours in 2022), while global median dwell time rose to 14 days from 11.
Credential theft and discovery. The article cites Mimikatz and LaZagne for credential dumping, LSASS memory extraction and Kerberoasting against service accounts. CISA adds SAM and NTDS dumping, NetExec (including the --dpapi option), Impacket and nltest domain-controller and trust enumeration (nltest /dclist:, nltest /DOMAIN_TRUSTS). Lateral movement and C2 tooling named by CISA includes Cobalt Strike, SystemBC, POORTRY and STONESTOP loaders, LogMeIn, OpenSSH, Cloudflared and Ngrok.
Exfiltration. Staging and compression use FileZilla, WinRAR and 7-zip; transfer uses WinSCP, RClone, FTP/SFTP and the Mega cloud storage service; Ngrok provides encrypted tunnels that bypass perimeter monitoring. CISA documents data theft completed in just over two hours from initial access in some cases. Because these are legitimate tools, the article advises hunting on outbound volume and destination (unusual volume to a consumer cloud endpoint off-hours) rather than on signatures.
Impact and backup targeting. M-Trends 2026 reports operators actively targeting backup infrastructure, identity services and virtualization management planes; volume shadow copies are frequently removed with PowerShell. CISA documents PowerShell and WMIC used to disable services, firewall modification, and encryptors: Akira/Akira_v2 (.akira, .akiranew, .aki; Rust-based), the deprecated Megazord variant (.powerranges) and a Linux/ESXi encryptor that also targets Nutanix AHV. Ransom notes are fn.txt or akira_readme.txt. CISA states Akira has claimed about $244.17 million in proceeds as of late September 2025 and primarily targets small and medium-sized businesses, with a notable preference for educational institutions.
The article also names REDBIKE and AGENDA in the context of backup-infrastructure targeting; it provides no specific IPs, hashes or hostnames. The two SHA-256 hashes below come from the CISA advisory, not the article. The article's statistics are second-hand citations; Akira details were corroborated against the CISA advisory, and M-Trends figures against the Google Cloud M-Trends 2026 coverage.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
T1003.001 LSASS Memory; T1003.002 Security Account Manager; T1003.003 NTDS; T1110.003 Password Spraying; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores; T1558.003 Kerberoasting
Exfiltration
T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol; T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Execution
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
Command and Control
T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1572 Protocol Tunneling
Discovery
Impact
T1489 Service Stop; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
Collection
Defense Impairment
Remediation
Patches
- Patch CVE-2024-40766 (SonicWall), CVE-2024-37085 (VMware ESXi), CVE-2023-27532 and CVE-2024-40711 (Veeam Backup) and CVE-2023-28252 (Windows CLFS)
Immediate actions
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all VPN and remote-access paths
- Isolate affected hosts via EDR; disable compromised accounts and reset krbtgt twice if credential theft is confirmed
- Hunt outbound volume and destination for FileZilla, WinSCP, RClone, Mega and Ngrok use
- Verify backup server does not authenticate against the compromised domain and that immutability is enabled
Workarounds
- Close VPN access without MFA until MFA is enforced
- Restrict and monitor remote administration and tunneling tools (Ngrok, Cloudflared, LogMeIn)
Longer-term hardening
- Test a full end-to-end backup restore and keep offline/immutable backups
- Document incident decision authority with named deputies and run tabletop exercises
- Rebuild identity infrastructure (clean domain controller) first during recovery
- Rotate service-account passwords that predate the intrusion
Affected and fixed versions
Timeline
- Per Mandiant M-Trends 2026, median initial-access-to-ransomware-affiliate hand-off was still over eight hours as recently as 2022 (approximate year; no exact date given)
- CISA, FBI and partners publish the original #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware advisory (AA24-109A)
- As of late September 2025, Akira has claimed approximately $244.17 million in ransomware proceeds (CISA; approximate date)
- AA24-109A updated with new TTPs and IOCs: VPN without MFA, new CVEs, Akira_v2, Linux/ESXi encryptor, SystemBC, Cloudflared and other tooling; co-sealed by Europol EC3 and French, German and Dutch agencies
- Mandiant M-Trends 2026 reports global median dwell time of 14 days (up from 11) and a 22-second median initial-access-to-ransomware-affiliate hand-off in 2025 (month approximate)
- Huntress publishes guest article 'The First 24 Hours: What Actually Happens When Ransomware Lands' by UnderDefense CEO Nazar Tymoshyk
Sources cited
- #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware (CISA AA24-109A) CISA · Government advisory · 2025-11-13
- FBI IC3 CSA: Akira Ransomware update ic3.gov · Advisory · 2025-11-13
- FBI IC3 CSA: Akira Ransomware (original advisory) ic3.gov · Advisory · 2024-04-18
- M-Trends 2026: Data, Insights, and Strategies From the Frontlines (Google Cloud / Mandiant) Google Cloud · Research · 2026-03-01
- M-Trends 2026 Report (Executive Edition) Google Cloud · Research · 2026-03-01
- AttackIQ: Updated Response to CISA Advisory AA24-109A attackiq.com · Vendor report · 2025-11-18
- SafeBreach: Coverage for Updated CISA AA24-109A Akira Ransomware safebreach.com · Vendor report · 2025-11-14
- The First 24 Hours: What Actually Happens When Ransomware Lands (Huntress) Huntress · Blog · 2026-10-02
- Mandiant M-Trends 2026: ransomware hand-off time of 22 seconds decryptiondigest.com · News · 2026-03-01
More from Akira
- Ransomware Ecosystem Professionalization: Akira, Qilin, Play Business-Style Operations and Sicarii AI-Assembled Variant Lacking Working Decryptor
- Top 10 Critical Threat Actors to Watch in 2026: Akira, DragonForce, Qilin, LockBit, Scattered Spider, Cl0p, Lazarus, Volt Typhoon, APT29, OilRig (CVE-2024-40766, CVE-2025-61882, CVE-2023-34362, CVE-2024-39717, CVE-2024-30088)
- Ransomware Targeting of Backup Infrastructure: Akira/Fog/Frag Exploiting Veeam CVE-2024-40711, Plus CVE-2025-23120 and March 2026 Backup & Replication Flaws (CVE-2026-21666/21667/21708)
- Unit 42: Retail Peak Season Cyber Threats - Ransomware/Extortion, DDoS, Digital Skimming, Account Takeover and AI-Assisted Intrusion (CVE-2024-34102, CVE-2021-44228)
- Akira Ransomware Attack Collapses 158-Year-Old UK Logistics Firm KNP (Knights of Old) After Guessed Employee Password
- Healthcare Sector Ransomware Targeting and Expanding Attack Surface (Qilin, Akira, DragonForce, LockBit, The Gentlemen)
Other reports on CVE-2024-40766
- ThreatsDay Roundup: AI API Key Leaks (OpenCode Console), PingCAP Source Code Theft, Zeabur Breach, NVIDIA AIStore CVE-2026-65162, Signal CVE-2026-113380, Laravel CVE-2026-114509
- #StopRansomware: SafePay Ransomware (CISA AA26-293A) — Exploitation of Cisco ASA/FTD, Veeam B&R and SonicWall SonicOS
- Team Cymru Infrastructure Analysis: Seven Active Ransomware Gangs (Akira, DragonForce, Clop, MedusaLocker, Qilin, INC Ransom, Lynx) Abuse Dual-Use Tools and Exploit SonicWall, Gladinet CentreStack, and FortiGate Devices
- Akira Ransomware Reboots Victims into Safe Mode to Blind EDR and Windows Defender
- SEO Poisoning Supply Chain Campaign Distributing Akira Ransomware via Trojanized Enterprise Software
- Akira Ransomware Kill Chain — SSLVPN Credential Stuffing → Kerberoasting → RDP Lateral → vssadmin Shadow Copy Deletion (SANS ISC Forensic Reconstruction, May 2026)
Previous and next in ransomware
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.