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Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-2833

Warlock Ransomware Attackers Hit Water and Telecom Operators via SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation (Longlegs / Storm-2603)

criticalACTIVE

China-nexus actor Longlegs (aka Storm-2603) is exploiting Microsoft SharePoint ToolShell vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-49704/49706/53770/53771) to deploy Warlock ransomware against water utilities, telecom providers, a regional government body and a university in Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking countries across Europe, Africa and Latin America. In one July 2026 intrusion Warlock reached 33+ hosts via SYSVOL replication after an AV/EDR killer using the vulnerable K7RKScan driver was run.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2833, CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-53770, CVE-2025-53771, CVE-2025-1055
Also known asWarlock ransomware campaign, ToolShell exploitation
SeverityCRITICAL
CVSS9.8
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2025-49704 (added ), CVE-2025-49706 (added ), CVE-2025-53770 (added )
EPSSCVE-2025-53770: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2025-49704: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2025-53771: 99.8% (99.9th percentile)
Affected productsMicrosoft SharePoint Server (on-premises); K7 Computing K7RKScan driver (abused for BYOVD, CVE-2025-1055)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-502, CWE-862, CWE-94, CWE-287, CWE-22
AttributionLonglegs, Storm-2603 (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusChina
MalwareStorm, WarLock
ToolsNetExec
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account, T1098.007 Account Manipulation: Additional Local or Domain Groups, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying, T1136.001 Create Account: Local Account, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application and 14 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorswater, telecoms, government administration, education
Target regionsEurope, Africa, Latin America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2833 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 53 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: ToolShell SharePoint Exploitation - w3wp Shell Child and Layouts Webshell Write (Warlock)

Detects the ToolShell exploitation outcome on on-premises SharePoint (CVE-2025-49704/49706/53770/53771) used by Longlegs / Storm-2603 to stage Warlock ransomware. Fires when a SharePoint IIS application pool (w3wp.exe) spawns cmd/PowerShell, or when a script file (.aspx/.ashx/.asmx) is written into the SharePoint template\layouts directory, with a dedicated signal for the known layout2sp.aspx / spinstall0.aspx webshell names. The SPL and KQL flavors cover both legs; the Sigma flavor covers the process-creation leg.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1190, T1505.003, T1059.001, T1059.003
  • Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, windows_process_creation
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h
    ((EventCode=1 ParentImage="*\\w3wp.exe" ParentCommandLine="*SharePoint*" (Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe" OR Image="*\\cmd.exe"))
    OR (EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*\\web server extensions\\*\\template\\layouts\\*" (TargetFilename="*.aspx" OR TargetFilename="*.ashx" OR TargetFilename="*.asmx")))
```EventCode 1 = SharePoint app pool spawning a shell; EventCode 11 = script written into SharePoint layouts hive```
| eval signal=case(EventCode=1, "w3wp_shell_child", match(TargetFilename, "(?i)(layout2sp|spinstall0)[.]aspx$"), "known_toolshell_webshell", true(), "layouts_script_write")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(signal) as signals values(Image) as images values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(TargetFilename) as files by host
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

// ToolShell: SharePoint app pool shell children + script files dropped into the layouts hive
let lookback = 24h;
let ShellChildren = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'w3wp.exe' and InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains 'SharePoint'
| where FileName in~ ('powershell.exe', 'pwsh.exe', 'cmd.exe')
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Signal = 'w3wp_shell_child', Account = AccountName, Target = FileName, Detail = ProcessCommandLine;
let WebshellWrite = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where ActionType in ('FileCreated', 'FileModified', 'FileRenamed')
| where FolderPath contains 'web server extensions' and FolderPath contains @'\template\layouts'
| where FileName endswith '.aspx' or FileName endswith '.ashx' or FileName endswith '.asmx'
| project Timestamp, DeviceName,
    Signal = iff(FileName in~ ('layout2sp.aspx', 'spinstall0.aspx'), 'known_toolshell_webshell', 'layouts_script_write'),
    Account = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Target = FolderPath, Detail = InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
union ShellChildren, WebshellWrite
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: SharePoint Application Pool Spawning Shell (ToolShell Exploitation)
id: a3f1c8d2-5b7e-4c19-9d3a-1e6f0b8a7c21
status: experimental
description: Detects a SharePoint IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawning cmd.exe or PowerShell, the post-exploitation pattern of ToolShell (CVE-2025-53770) used by Storm-2603 / Longlegs to stage Warlock ransomware.
references:
  - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/warlock-ransomware-critical-infrastructure
  - https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0058
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/01
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1190
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1505.003
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.t1059.003
  - cve.2025-53770
  - cve.2025-49704
  - cve.2025-49706
  - cve.2025-53771
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
    ParentCommandLine|contains: 'SharePoint'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\cmd.exe'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
  - Custom SharePoint solutions or health scripts that legitimately shell out from the application pool
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Custom SharePoint farm solutions or timer jobs that intentionally launch cmd/PowerShell from w3wp.exe
  • SharePoint patching or PSConfig activity writing aspx files into the layouts hive

Tuning notes: Scope to SharePoint servers only (lookup of SP hosts). Exclude Image=msiexec.exe/psconfig.exe/TrustedInstaller writers for the file-write leg during patch windows. Child shells from w3wp.exe are rare enough to alert on without a threshold.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • ToolShell Chain - PowerShell Reflective System.Workflow.ComponentModel Load and Layouts Webshell Write · unlock with TL Creds
  • BYOVD AV/EDR Killer - Vulnerable K7RKScan Driver Load (CVE-2025-1055) and Killer Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • VS Code Insiders Tunnel Service Install for Covert Remote Access · unlock with TL Creds
  • Burp Collaborator ([indicator]) Exploitation Canary from SharePoint Server · unlock with TL Creds
  • Warlock DLL Side-Loading Pairs (ssvagent / logger / doexe) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Silent msiexec Install of Remote MSI from catbox.moe / wasabisys.com · unlock with TL Creds
  • Post-Exploitation Domain Recon and Local Administrator Group Addition (SPSEPRDSetup) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Warlock Ransomware Staging via SYSVOL Replication and NetExec Lateral Execution · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 53 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2833.

Sample indicators (3 of 53)

  • IP address: 65.38.121[.]198
  • Domain: litter[.]catbox[.]moe
  • File hash: 116ca4e88a1bcebb6c0da7fb431c8eca7b8ef3f9767194820c56091972ccac2c

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 53 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

53 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

2 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

Symantec's Threat Hunter Team (published 2026-10-01) reports at least four organizations hit over roughly two months: a water utility, a telecommunications provider, a regional government body and a university, all in Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking countries across Europe, Africa and Latin America. Earlier Warlock activity spanned the US, Brazil, India, Russia, Taiwan and Japan. Symantec attributes the activity to Longlegs (aka Storm-2603), a China-nexus actor, and links it to the CL-CRI-1040, CamoFei and ChamelGang clusters. Warlock emerged in June 2025 and exploited the ToolShell SharePoint zero-days weeks later.

Initial access is the ToolShell chain against on-premises SharePoint (CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-53770, CVE-2025-53771), using forged, machine-key-signed __VIEWSTATE payloads to execute code in the SharePoint application pool. In the detailed intrusion, a PowerShell command wrote the webshell layout2sp.aspx into the SharePoint 14 hive template\layouts directory on 2026-07-22. The actor then ran reconnaissance (net user /domain, whoami, nltest /domain_trusts), cleaned up staging artifacts, issued an outbound request to a Burp Collaborator (oastify.com) canary, re-tested the webshell, and loaded System.Workflow.ComponentModel via reflection in PowerShell as part of the exploit chain. ASP.NET machine keys were harvested to forge payloads.

On 2026-07-29 the domain account SPSEPRDSetup was added to the local Administrators group and Visual Studio Code Insiders was installed as a tunnel service (code-insiders.exe tunnel service install --accept-server-license-terms) for covert remote access that blends with developer traffic. Payload MSIs were pulled with msiexec /q /i from file-sharing/cloud storage (litter.catbox.moe, s3.wasabisys.com/fortifs, xn8xyt-drop.s3.wasabisys.com). Persistence and execution used DLL sideloading pairs (ssvagent.exe + gsdll64.dll.tmp, logger.exe + doexeloc.dll.tmp, doexe.exe + doexeloc.dll). NetExec (nxc.exe) was used for AD enumeration, credential spraying and remote execution.

Defense evasion used an AV/EDR killer (a.exe) that abuses the vulnerable K7RKScan kernel driver (CVE-2025-1055) in a BYOVD technique, staged from an SMB share and run via net use / copy / start /B. On 2026-07-31 Warlock (run.exe / rune.exe) was staged in the domain SYSVOL scripts share and copied to C:\Users\Public and started on hosts via cmd, with dfsrs.exe confirming SYSVOL replication delivery. In about two hours the killer ran on 40 hosts and Warlock on 33 hosts. No CVSS score is stated in the source.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory; T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying; T1552.004 Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys

Lateral Movement

T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares; T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer

Discovery

T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account; T1482 Domain Trust Discovery

Execution

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

Privilege Escalation

T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Persistence

T1098.007 Account Manipulation: Additional Local or Domain Groups; T1136.001 Create Account: Local Account; T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell; T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service

Command and Control

T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1219.001 Remote Access Tools: IDE Tunneling; T1572 Protocol Tunneling

Initial Access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Stealth

T1218.007 System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec; T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification; T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading; T1620 Reflective Code Loading

Impact

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact

stealth

T1574.001 DLL

Defense Impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Patches

  • Apply Microsoft SharePoint Server security updates for CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-53770, CVE-2025-53771

Immediate actions

  • Patch on-premises SharePoint Server against CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771
  • Hunt for layout2sp.aspx and other unexpected files in the SharePoint 14\template\layouts directory
  • Rotate ASP.NET machine keys on SharePoint servers
  • Alert on msiexec /q /i installs from remote URLs, including catbox.moe and wasabisys.com
  • Alert on code-insiders.exe tunnel service install and on SYSVOL scripts containing executables

Workarounds

  • Block catbox.moe and wasabisys.com egress where not business-required
  • Restrict SharePoint exposure to the internet

Longer-term hardening

  • Block or restrict VS Code tunnel features in production environments
  • Monitor LOLBin recon (net user /domain, whoami, nltest /domain_trusts) and unauthorized additions to local admin groups
  • Audit SYSVOL/DFSR replication and Group Policy execution
  • Enable vulnerable-driver blocklisting (HVCI / Microsoft driver blocklist) to blunt BYOVD
  • Apply the additional SharePoint hardening guidance in the July 2026 CISA advisory cited by Symantec

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — SharePoint Server (on-premises)
    Vulnerable versions: Unpatched on-premises SharePoint exposed to ToolShell
    Fixed in: Versions with the security updates for CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-53770, CVE-2025-53771
  • K7 Computing — K7RKScan driver (abused for BYOVD, CVE-2025-1055)
    Vulnerable versions: Vulnerable K7RKScan driver builds

Timeline

Last updated · 5 updates · revalidated 5× · latest source

  • LockBit component (bbb.msi) from the Storm-2603 / CL-CRI-1040 toolkit first submitted to VirusTotal (Unit 42).
  • Affiliate account 'wlteaml' registered on the LockBit 3.0 portal, linked to the cluster (Unit 42).
  • Warlock ransomware first emerges (June 2025 per Symantec); ToolShell SharePoint zero-days exploited weeks later
  • Microsoft observes Storm-2603 exploiting on-premises SharePoint vulnerabilities and deploying ransomware.
  • SharePoint 'ToolShell' zero-day (CVE-2025-53770) discovered and exploited in the wild; Warlock/Storm-2603 was among the early ransomware operators to use the chain.
  • CISA adds SharePoint ToolShell CVE-2025-53770 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog; Warlock gains notoriety exploiting ToolShell in July 2025.
  • Microsoft publishes analysis attributing ToolShell exploitation to Storm-2603 and the deployment of Warlock ransomware.
  • Check Point Research publishes analysis of Storm-2603's earlier ransomware operations (Warlock/X2anylock and LockBit Black via DLL sideloading).
  • CISA issues a SharePoint hardening alert covering newly exploited SharePoint vulnerabilities (cited in coverage of the Symantec findings).
  • Webshell locked-ioc-33 written to a victim SharePoint server via PowerShell
  • Reconnaissance commands (net user /domain, whoami, nltest /domain_trusts) executed and staging artifacts cleaned up
  • Outbound web request to a Burp Collaborator (locked-ioc-39) domain from the compromised server
  • Webshell re-tested and ToolShell exploitation chain activity begins
  • Domain account SPSEPRDSetup added to local administrators; VS Code Insiders tunnel service installed
  • DLL sideloading persistence activity and deployment of the AV/EDR killer (K7RKScan BYOVD) begin, continuing to July 31
  • Warlock deployed via SYSVOL replication; AV/EDR killer on 40 hosts and Warlock on 33 hosts in about two hours
  • Symantec Threat Hunter Team publishes analysis of Warlock attacks on water and telecom operators
  • The Record publishes Symantec's findings on Warlock attacks against critical infrastructure in Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking countries.
  • Cloud Security Alliance publishes a research note on Warlock's SharePoint exploitation and EDR-disabling tradecraft.

Update history

Sources cited

Other reports on CVE-2025-49704

Previous and next in ransomware

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated .

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