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Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-2729

Microsoft Tracks Storm-2570 Ransomware Affiliate Behind Qilin, DragonForce, Anubis, and BERT Deployments

highACTIVE

Microsoft Threat Intelligence has tracked Storm-2570, a cross-ecosystem ransomware affiliate, since April 2025 as it rotates between Qilin, DragonForce, Anubis, and BERT ransomware payloads while reusing an identical pre-encryption tradecraft chain. The actor has hit healthcare, education, government, financial, energy, and manufacturing organizations across the US, Canada, UK, Spain, Netherlands, and Puerto Rico, and Microsoft's guidance emphasizes detecting the shared toolchain rather than any single ransomware family.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2729
SeverityHIGH
AttributionStorm-2570 (medium confidence)
MalwareAgendaCrypt, Anubis Ransomware, Bert, DragonForce, MimiKatz, anubis
ToolsAtera, CloudFlare Tunnel, Impacket - S0357, LaZagne - S0349, MeshAgent / MeshCentral, MeshCentral
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003.001 LSASS Memory, T1003.003 NTDS, T1018 Remote System Discovery, T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol, T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1087.001 Local Account, T1087.002 Domain Account, T1135 Network Share Discovery, T1219 Remote Access Tools and 5 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorshealth, education, government administration, financial services, energy, manufacturing, retail, information technology
Target regionsNorth America, Europe
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-09-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2729 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 19 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Microsoft Defender Tampering via Registry and PowerShell Set-MpPreference/Add-MpPreference

Detects both the registry-level and PowerShell-cmdlet paths Storm-2570 uses to blind Microsoft Defender before staging tools: direct modification of the DisableAntiSpyware/DisableRealtimeMonitoring policy values, or a PowerShell Set-MpPreference/Add-MpPreference invocation disabling real-time monitoring or adding a C:\PerfLogs exclusion path. Payloads subsequently staged in the newly-excluded path are frequently packed/obfuscated to survive re-enablement of scanning, so obfuscated-file indicators in that path are folded in as a secondary signal.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1562.001, T1059.001, T1027
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, windows_defender_operational, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

(index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4657 ObjectName="*Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender*" (ObjectName="*DisableAntiSpyware*" OR ObjectName="*DisableRealtimeMonitoring*"))
OR (index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*\\powershell.exe" (CommandLine="*Set-MpPreference*DisableRealtimeMonitoring*" OR CommandLine="*Add-MpPreference*ExclusionPath*" OR CommandLine="*Set-MpPreference*DisableAntiSpyware*"))
OR (index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational" EventCode=5007 (Data="*PerfLogs*" OR Data="*DisableRealtimeMonitoring*"))
| eval mitre_technique=case(match(CommandLine,"(?i)powershell"),"T1059.001", match(ObjectName,"(?i)DisableAntiSpyware|DisableRealtimeMonitoring"),"T1562.001", match(Data,"(?i)PerfLogs|DisableRealtimeMonitoring"),"T1562.001", 1=1,"T1562.001")
| eval perflogs_exclusion=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)perflogs") OR match(Data,"(?i)perflogs"),1,0)
| stats count dc(mitre_technique) as distinct_techniques min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as commands values(ObjectName) as objects values(Data) as defender_events by host, user, perflogs_exclusion
| table first_seen, last_seen, host, user, distinct_techniques, commands, objects, defender_events, perflogs_exclusion

Microsoft KQL

let registry_tamper = DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RegistryKey has @"Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender"
| where RegistryValueName in ("DisableAntiSpyware", "DisableRealtimeMonitoring") and RegistryValueData == "1"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Technique="T1562.001", Detail=strcat(RegistryValueName, "=", RegistryValueData);
let ps_tamper = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Set-MpPreference", "Add-MpPreference")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Technique="T1059.001", Detail=ProcessCommandLine;
let exclusion_added = DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "AntivirusExclusionAdded" and AdditionalFields has "PerfLogs"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Technique="T1562.001", Detail=tostring(AdditionalFields);
union registry_tamper, ps_tamper, exclusion_added
| summarize Events=count(), Techniques=make_set(Technique), Details=make_set(Detail) by DeviceName, AccountName, bin(Timestamp, 4h)

Sigma

title: Microsoft Defender Tampering via PowerShell Set-MpPreference / Add-MpPreference
id: 9f4a2d6e-3c81-4b57-a9d0-6e2f8b1c4a73
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell-driven tampering with Microsoft Defender -- disabling real-time monitoring/anti-spyware or adding a C:\PerfLogs exclusion path -- Storm-2570's consistent pre-staging defense-evasion step used to blind Defender before dropping likely-packed tooling and payloads.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/09/24/beyond-ransomware-tracking-storm-2570-consistent-tradecraft-across-deployments/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-28
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1562.001
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_ps:
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
    selection_disable:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Set-MpPreference'
            - 'Add-MpPreference'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'DisableRealtimeMonitoring'
            - 'DisableAntiSpyware'
            - 'ExclusionPath'
    selection_perflogs:
        CommandLine|contains: 'PerfLogs'
    condition: selection_ps and (selection_disable or selection_perflogs)
falsepositives:
    - Approved endpoint-management (Intune/SCCM/GPO) baseline scripts that legitimately call Set-MpPreference/Add-MpPreference during a change-controlled maintenance window
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Approved Group Policy/Intune/SCCM Defender configuration changes pushed by the endpoint-management team during a sanctioned maintenance window

Tuning notes: Exclude change-controlled GPO/Intune/SCCM Defender policy pushes by correlating with the change-management ticket window and the known service account; treat any interactive-user-driven Set-MpPreference/registry change combined with a C:\PerfLogs exclusion as high-confidence, and flag any subsequently-written file in that exclusion path with a high entropy/packed-binary signature (T1027) for priority review.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Paired LSASS Credential Dumping (Mimikatz/pypykatz) and NTDS.dit IFM Extraction · unlock with TL Creds
  • Unauthorized or Renamed RMM Tool Installation (MeshAgent + Atera/ScreenConnect/NinjaRMM/Splashtop/Remotely_Agent) · unlock with TL Creds
  • s5cmd/Rclone Bulk Exfiltration to Attacker-Controlled S3 Buckets · unlock with TL Creds
  • LaZagne / pypykatz Local Credential Harvesting via Obfuscated PowerShell Loader · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cloudflare Tunnel / ngrok Persistent Service Exposing RDP · unlock with TL Creds
  • Storm-2570 Multi-Stage Toolchain Correlation (Discovery -> Credential Theft -> Defense Evasion -> Persistence -> C2 -> Lateral Movement -> Exfiltration) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Storm-2570 Network, Share, System, and Account Discovery Sweep · unlock with TL Creds
  • PsExec/Impacket/NetExec SMB Lateral Movement Driven by External Host List · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-09-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 19 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2729.

19 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Storm-2570 is a ransomware affiliate that Microsoft Threat Intelligence has followed since April 2025 across intrusions ultimately culminating in four different ransomware payloads: Qilin, DragonForce, Anubis, and BERT. Rather than being tied to a single ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) brand, Storm-2570 behaves as a cross-ecosystem operator that shifts between RaaS programs as opportunities arise, retaining the flexibility to deploy whichever payload is most advantageous for a given payout while keeping its intrusion tradecraft essentially constant.

Microsoft states that the actor's initial access method remains unconfirmed, but from the point of foothold onward the group follows a highly consistent playbook. Discovery is performed with NetScan, SoftPerfect Network Scanner Portable, Nmap, and native Windows commands to map reachable hosts, shares, and high-value targets. Credential access relies on Mimikatz, LaZagne, and pypykatz for in-memory credential theft, paired with ntdsutil.exe to create an Install-From-Media (IFM) backup of the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) staged under C:\Windows\Temp.

For persistence and hands-on-keyboard access, Storm-2570 deploys a wide bench of legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools -- MeshAgent/MeshCentral (its most consistent tool, frequently renamed to match the victim organization, e.g. meshagent64-[organization].exe), Atera, ScreenConnect, NinjaRMM, Splashtop, and Remotely_Agent -- alongside Cloudflare Tunnel (cloudflared.exe, run as a persistent LocalSystem service) and ngrok to expose RDP on TCP 3389. Defense evasion centers on tampering with Microsoft Defender: disabling real-time monitoring, adding an exclusion for C:\PerfLogs, and modifying DisableAntiSpyware/DisableRealtimeMonitoring registry values and WinDefend service behavior. Lateral movement is carried out with PsExec (driven by host lists such as @ip.txt), Impacket, and NetExec over SMB, plus batch scripts (rdp.bat) that enable Remote Desktop and open the corresponding firewall rule.

Before encryption, the group exfiltrates data using s5cmd (staged with hardcoded AWS access keys to push documents, spreadsheets, databases, mail files, images, and archives to attacker-controlled S3 buckets) and Rclone for real-time cloud synchronization, supporting a double-extortion model. Only after staging is complete does Storm-2570 hand off to whichever ransomware payload -- Qilin, DragonForce, Anubis, or BERT -- is deployed for that engagement, each of which independently operates a RaaS/cartel affiliate program (Qilin: 80-85% affiliate payouts plus a 'Call Lawyer' pressure feature and a Tor/clearnet WikiLeaksV2 leak site; DragonForce: a self-declared 'cartel' since March 2025 offering white-label branding and 80% payouts to affiliates). Microsoft's guidance to defenders is to hunt the consistent pre-encryption toolchain -- rogue RMM agents, NTDS.dit IFM extraction, Defender tampering, PsExec-driven lateral movement, and S3/Rclone exfiltration -- rather than waiting to catch the final, rotating ransomware family.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003.001 LSASS Memory; T1003.003 NTDS

Discovery

T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1087.001 Local Account; T1087.002 Domain Account; T1135 Network Share Discovery

Lateral Movement

T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol; T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares; T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell

Command and Control

T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1572 Protocol Tunneling

Exfiltration

T1537 Transfer Data to Cloud Account; T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Enable Microsoft Defender tamper protection tenant-wide to block registry-based disabling of real-time monitoring and DisableAntiSpyware modification
  • Identify and remove any RMM software (MeshAgent/MeshCentral, Atera, ScreenConnect, NinjaRMM, Splashtop, Remotely_Agent) not explicitly sanctioned by IT, and reset credentials for any RMM service accounts found with unauthorized installations
  • Block or alert on Cloudflare Tunnel (cloudflared.exe) and ngrok binaries and outbound tunnel establishment from endpoints that should not be running them
  • Restrict and monitor ntdsutil.exe usage; alert on Install-From-Media (IFM) backup creation of NTDS.dit outside scheduled AD maintenance

Workarounds

  • Alert on renamed MeshAgent binaries matching organizational-name patterns (meshagent64-[organization].exe) at process-creation time
  • Monitor for Defender exclusion additions targeting C:\PerfLogs and other non-standard paths
  • Alert on outbound S3 API traffic via s5cmd or bulk Rclone sync jobs originating from endpoints that have no legitimate cloud-storage business need

Longer-term hardening

  • Enforce MFA for all approved RMM systems and remote administration tooling
  • Deploy Microsoft Defender Attack Surface Reduction rules to block PsExec/WMI-based process creation and enable ransomware protection features
  • Enable automatic attack disruption in Microsoft Defender XDR to contain hands-on-keyboard ransomware activity
  • Apply the DisableLocalAdminMerge GPO policy to prevent local Defender exclusion-list tampering from propagating via Group Policy
  • Segment and monitor SMB/administrative-share traffic to detect Impacket- and NetExec-driven lateral movement

Timeline

  • Qilin ransomware operators (one of Storm-2570's rotating payloads) extend double-extortion exposure by launching WikiLeaksV2, a clearnet mirror of their Tor-based leak site, in addition to the existing dark-web site.
  • DragonForce (another of Storm-2570's rotating payloads) publicly rebrands as a ransomware 'cartel,' shifting to a distributed affiliate model offering white-label encryptors, customizable branding, and 80% payouts.
  • Microsoft Threat Intelligence begins tracking Storm-2570 as a distinct ransomware affiliate, observing a consistent pre-encryption tradecraft chain across multiple investigated intrusions.
  • Between January and May 2026, Qilin (one of Storm-2570's deployed families) is linked to at least 557 separate ransomware incidents, making it the most active RaaS operation of the period.
  • Qilin's leak site is observed listing 2,302 total publicly claimed victims, including 107 added in the preceding 30 days.
  • Microsoft publishes 'Beyond the ransomware: Tracking Storm-2570's consistent tradecraft across deployments,' detailing the shared RMM abuse, NTDS.dit theft, Defender tampering, PsExec-driven lateral movement, and S3/Rclone exfiltration tradecraft observed across Storm-2570's Qilin, DragonForce, Anubis, and BERT deployments, along with Defender detection names and KQL hunting queries.
  • Cyber Security News, Cyberpress, and other outlets republish and summarize Microsoft's Storm-2570 findings, extending public awareness of the shared tradecraft to detect across all four ransomware families.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.

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